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
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# SIR ROBERT SANDEMAN.

“ . . . Peace hath her victories  
No less renowned than war. . . .”  
MILTON.





Robert L. Samuelson

# COLONEL SIR ROBERT SANDEMAN

HIS LIFE AND WORK ON OUR INDIAN FRONTIER.

A MEMOIR, WITH SELECTIONS FROM  
HIS CORRESPONDENCE AND  
OFFICIAL WRITINGS.

By THOMAS HENRY THORNTON, C.S.I., D.C.L.,

FORMERLY SECRETARY TO THE PUNJAB GOVERNMENT AND SOMETIME  
FOREIGN SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

'To be successful on this frontier a man has to deal with the hearts and minds of the people, and not only with their fears. To be successful requires much labour. I have taken it, and have had a hard life, but a happy one, in the feeling that I have helped men to lead a quiet and peaceful life in this glorious world of ours'—SIR R. SANDEMAN'S Letter of April 29, 1891

*WITH PORTRAIT MAP, AND ILLUSTRATIONS*

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## INTRODUCTORY.

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THE following pages contain particulars of the life and work of the late Colonel SIR ROBERT GROVES SANDEMAN, K.C.S.I., Agent to the Governor-General, and Chief Commissioner in Balúchistán, who died, after a short illness, on January 29, 1892, while encamped at Lus Beyla, capital of a petty state on the Sind border. More than thirty-six years of arduous service in trying climates, as soldier, administrator, and political officer, had undermined a splendid constitution, which succumbed to an attack of influenza,—thus prematurely closing a remarkable career.

That career may be briefly sketched as follows :—

After two years' active military service, during and after the Mutiny, first as infantry, then as cavalry officer, he accepted civil employ under the Punjab Administration, and became distinguished for his successful management of the Balúch tribes on the south-west frontier of the province. Owing to the great influence he had acquired over these tribes, he was twice sent on a mission to Khelát, and ultimately succeeded, without firing a shot, in terminating an internecine struggle of twenty years' duration between the Khan and his confederate chiefs.

To maintain the peace he had established, he secured for the British Government, by arrangements embodied in

a new Treaty, supreme influence in the Khanate ; a territory on our western frontier, the home of Balúch and Brahúi clans, some loosely federated under the Khelát Chief, some practically independent ; a territory mountainous and sparsely peopled, but politically important—having an area larger than Great Britain, a sea-board of six hundred miles, command of the principal highways between India, Kandahár, and Persia, and a military position at Quetta which is (or can be made) impregnable. And under the provisions of the same Treaty Quetta was occupied by British troops in 1876.

Throughout this extensive region he was able, as British Representative, to settle outstanding quarrels, allay animosities, and make tribal warfare cease—winning, at the same time, the affection of Khan and chiefs and tribesmen, over whom he exercised commanding influence till death.

During the Afghán War he was in charge of our communications through the Bolán Pass, provisioned our troops in times of difficulty, and, at the risk of his life, nipped in the bud and crushed what might have been a formidable rising of the tribes upon our flank.

After the war he was instrumental in adding to the Empire a new province, of much strategic importance, commanding the passes into south Afghanistán and access to three trade-routes between Persia, Kandahár, and British India ; a province he administered with prudence and success and in hearty sympathy with the Patán races which inhabit it ; maintaining peace and order ; dispensing justice promptly, with as little interference as possible with native usages ; associating chiefs and tribesmen with us in the work of government ; improving communications, promoting trade, providing medical aid for the people, developing irrigation, preserving forests.

of conciliating and controlling the wild races with which he had to deal—is the object of this Memoir.

A word as to sources of information. These are in some respects abundant. In the first place, a large and well arranged collection of Sir Robert's official and demi-official correspondence, reports, maps, and memoranda, together with Parliamentary papers relating to Balúchistán, has been placed at the writer's disposal by Lady Sandeman, who has been indefatigable in supplying all further information in her power to obtain, and has herself contributed the pathetic chapter describing Sir Robert Sandeman's last hours. Then, old friends, colleagues and subordinates have rendered willing help. Lastly, the writer's own reminiscences come into play, and seeing that for nearly thirteen years he was in frequent correspondence with Sir Robert, had much personal intercourse with him, and more than once viewed his work upon the frontier, they have enabled him to understand and appreciate his character more thoroughly than would have otherwise been possible.

But though the materials are generally abundant, there has been some difficulty in dealing with them, as many of the papers are too professional and others too confidential for publication ; and there is, in one respect, a great deficiency ; Sir Robert kept no diary, and until the later years of his career there is an almost entire absence of any but purely business letters. This is to be regretted, but it cannot be helped. It serves, however, in some measure to explain the severity, so to speak, of the record of one of the most genial of men.

Where so many have been helpful it is impossible adequately to thank all, but special acknowledgments are

due to His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, General Lord Roberts, Sir Richard Temple, Sir Alfred Lyall, and the Hon. G. Curzon, for the reminiscences they have recorded, and to His Excellency Sir G. White, Commander-in-Chief in India, for his narrative of the operations of the Zhob Field Force in 1890

The writer is also under great obligations to Lieutenant-General E. F. Chapman, C.B., Head of the Intelligence Department of the War Office, to whom he is indebted for the note on the Military results of Sir Robert Sandeman's work, and under whose supervision the map of Balúchistán has been prepared.

His cordial thanks are also due to Mr. H. S. Barnes, I.C.S., late Revenue Commissioner of British Balúchistán, and for many years—between 1880 and 1892—one of Sir Robert's most trusted subordinates; to Mr. R. I. Bruce, C.I.E., now acting Commissioner of the Deraját, but for many years Sir Robert's chief assistant and devoted fellow-worker both in the Punjab and Balúchistán; Major MacIvor, C.I.E., Political Agent in the Zhob valley; Mr. Fitzgerald, late I.C.S., formerly first assistant; Major Temple, Political Agent at Khelát; Rae Bahadur Hittú Rám, C.I.E., for many years Sir Robert's native secretary and now Assistant Commissioner in Balúchistán; Diwán Ganpat Rae, C.I.E., and to Mr. E. Neel, C.I.E., of the Political and Secret Department of the India Office, for their assistance.

He is also greatly indebted to the Earl of Northbrook, the Marquis of Lansdowne, Field-Marshal Sir Donald Stewart, Sir Charles Aitchison, Major-General Sir Owen Burne, Sir Mortimer Durand, Major-General A. A. Munro, Major-General Sir J. W. M'Queen, Major-General Sir W. H. R. Green, the Right Hon. Hugh Childers, Sir Andrew Scoble, Q.C., Major W. Broadfoot, R.E., and

Mr. Rose, C.E., for help in various ways. He has, further, to thank the Editor of the *Asiatic Quarterly Review* for allowing him the free use of his article on Balúchistán in the January number of 1888,—an article written in personal communication with Sir Robert Sandeman. And he has found Lieutenant R. Southey's *Gazetteer of Balúchistán* a valuable book of reference.

In the matter of spelling Oriental names the writer has followed the system prescribed by the Government of India and carried out in Sir William Hunter's Imperial Gazetteer. Under that system the vowels are ordinarily sounded as in Italian, but an exception is made in the case of names of places, the spelling of which has been fixed by usage. In accordance with these principles the name of the capital of Balúchistán has been spelled *Khelát*, not *Kaldát*; the name of the river port of Upper Sind *Sukkur*, not *Sakkar*; and the place of Sir Robert's burial *Lus Beyla*, not *Las Béla*.





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# SIR ROBERT SANDEMAN.

## CHAPTER I.

### EARLY YEARS.

Birth and parentage—Origin of the Sandeman family—Members of it distinguished for individual force of character—Robert Sandeman, founder of the "Sandemanian" sect—Inscription on his tomb at Danbury in Connecticut—General Sandeman, Sir Robert's father, his career and character—Sir Robert's mother—His education—Character as a boy—Anecdotes—Proceeds to India and joins his father's regiment—The Mutiny—His regiment disarmed—Conduct of Sandeman on that occasion—Volunteers for service at Delhi—After fall of Delhi takes part in the capture of Jhajhar ; then joins the 1st Sikh Cavalry and serves throughout the Oude Campaign—Incident at Unao—Death of his commander, Major Wale—Sandeman twice wounded—Testimony of Lord Roberts to his general pluck and forwardness—Appointment to the Punjab Commission.

ROBERT GROVES SANDEMAN was born on February 25, 1835, at Perth, where his father's family had been settled for some generations.

The Sandemans, or Sandymanns, as they were formerly called, are of Scandinavian origin, but have been domiciled in British territory for more than 200 years. They are said to have come originally as fur-merchants trading with their own ships. The first member of the family of whom an authentic record exists was David Sandeman, who lived in Alyth in Fife, where he was married in 1628. From Fife he is believed to have migrated to Perth, where we find his descendant and namesake, David Sandeman, one of the leading citizens and

*City Magistrate from 1735 to 1763. He left five sons, each of whom acquired distinction by individual force of character. The fourth, William Sandeman, is renowned in the annals of the burgh for his "indefatigable industry" in diverting a river and excavating a canal through granite for manufacturing purposes; the fifth, Thomas Sandeman, Sir Robert's great-grandfather, was Treasurer and Magistrate of Perth; the eldest, Robert Sandeman, was author of papers on religious questions, which caused some sensation at the time, and gave his name to a sect of Christians—the first assertors in Scotland of the "voluntary principle"—among whom patience, benevolence, and self-sacrifice are regarded as cardinal virtues.*

At the time of his death, in 1771, Robert Sandeman was engaged on a religious mission to America, and in doing his utmost to promote "peace and good-will" between the colonists and the mother country. From the inscription on his tomb at Danbury, in Connecticut (given below), he would seem to have possessed not only the same conciliatory instincts, but also the same tenacity of purpose which characterized his great-great-nephew and namesake :—

HERE LIES,  
UNTIL THE RESURRECTION,  
THE BODY OF  
ROBERT SANDEMAN,  
A NATIVE OF PERTH, NORTH BRITAIN,  
WHO, IN THE FACE OF CONTINUAL OPPOSITION  
FROM ALL SORTS OF MEN,  
LONG AND BOLDLY CONTENDED  
FOR THE ANTIENT FAITH;  
TO PREACH THIS BLESSED TRUTH  
HE LEFT HIS COUNTRY—HE LEFT HIS FRIENDS,  
AND, AFTER MUCH PATIENT SUFFERING,  
FINISHED HIS LABOURS,  
AT DANBURY,  
SECOND APRIL, 1771,  
AGED 53.

In recognition of the services of the family to Perth a cadetship in the East India Company's service was bestowed by the town-council on Thomas Sandeman's grandson, Robert Turnbull Sandeman, the father of the subject of this Memoir.

Robert Turnbull Sandeman entered the military service of the East India Company in 1824, and rose to considerable distinction. When only a captain he commanded his regiment (the 33rd Bengal Native Infantry) at the battles of Ferozeshuhur and Sobraon, and in the crisis of 1857 his personal influence saved the regiment from mutiny.

For his belief in the sepoy, and determination to deal justly with him, even in the darkest days of the great Mutiny, he received the sobriquet of "White Pandy"; but his men remained staunch, and their arms, which had been taken from them, were publicly restored upon parade, and the regiment, now known as the 4th Bengal Native Infantry, as a mark of royal favour, had for its Honorary Colonel the late Duke of Clarence.

Besides being a gallant soldier, he was a man of fervent piety, his religious views being those of the sect which bears his name. His son Robert never joined the sect, but greatly respected its tenets, and had much of the religious earnestness which characterizes its members.

For some years General Sandeman commanded a brigade in the Punjab, retired in 1862, and died in 1876, after an honourable career of 38 years.

The relations between General Sandeman and his son Robert were delightful. It too often happens that parents and children, who have been long separated, find, when brought together, a want of mutual sympathy; but this was never the case with the two Sandemans. Though they never met from the time Robert was left an infant



with his aunts until his arrival in India, they at once became fast friends and more like brothers than father and son. And the General's death, which occurred at a critical period of his son's career, was a cause of the deepest sorrow to him.

Sir Robert's mother was the daughter of Mr. Barclay, son of a retired naval officer. By all accounts, she was a lady of attractive manners and appearance, an affectionate mother, and blest with a singularly placid disposition. But, owing probably to frequent separation from her children (an unhappy necessity of Anglo-Indian life), her influence was less strongly felt than it would otherwise have been.

Robert was one of a family of ten ; some died in infancy ; seven—three brothers and four sisters—survive.\* About ten months after his birth the parents returned to India, and Robert was left, together with his elder brother, in the charge of his father's sisters—four maiden ladies who lived at Perth. The aunts brought him up with most devoted care, and sowed the seed of that strong religious belief which, steadily developing through life, became the guiding principle of his maturer years. And doubtless their loving influence and example fostered the sensitive and strongly affectionate side of his nature, which had much to do with his power of influencing others. Their kindness and devotion were never forgotten by the

\* Of the brothers, the eldest, William Barclay Sandeman, is settled at Horsham ; the second, Colonel J. E. Sandeman, of the Indian Staff Corps, is at present Deputy Surveyor-General of India ; the third, George Sandeman, a solicitor in London. Of his sisters one is the wife of J. C. Robertson, Esq., of the Bengal Civil Service, lately Commissioner of Bareilly ; another married General E. Pulteney Gurdon, late Commissioner of Multan ; another, Colonel Cotton, late of the Gordon Highlanders ; another is the wife of J. Greene, Esq., now in Australia.

nephew, who regarded them, through life, with the affection of a son.

Two anecdotes of Sir Robert's boyhood, illustrative of this side of his character, may here be mentioned. One night he was found upon the stairs weeping bitterly, because he had neglected, before going to bed, to release a "blue-bottle" he had imprisoned in a tumbler, and was afraid the insect was suffering pain. Again, when a young college student, he presented himself, one evening, at his home in Perth weary and footsore, having walked some thirty miles to inquire why he had not received his customary letter, which had been accidentally delayed.

It must not be supposed from this that Sandeman was in the slightest degree wanting, as a boy, in manliness or spirit. On the contrary, pluck and tenacity were his characteristics then as ever. A single instance will suffice. One day he had occasion to administer slight chastisement to a younger school-fellow for impertinence. The boy's elder brother interfered and offered to fight Sandeman. Sandeman replied that he would be happy to fight them both at once, and accordingly the three set to. But the two brothers combined were more than a match for Sandeman, who got so severely punished, that the bystanders interfered and separated the combatants. Sandeman, however, was far from having had "enough of it," and retired protesting that he "would fight them both again on the earliest opportunity." The second fight never came off, but in due time the "elder brother" became a distinguished officer in the Punjab Frontier Force, and one of Sandeman's best friends.

Robert was educated at Perth Academy, and subsequently at St. Andrew's University. We do not find that he distinguished himself either at his books or in athletic sports. This was attributable partly to the fact

that as a growing lad he was not strong, and partly (according to Sandeman himself) to the over-indulgent rule of his devoted aunts. In later years he used deeply to regret the poor use he had made of his opportunities, and, in particular, his lack of literary power. "If I could only put my ideas adequately on paper," he used to say, "what grand things I should accomplish!"

When Robert was about sixteen his father was offered cadetships in the East India Company's Service for two of his sons, but for the time, to his sons' great disappointment, he refused them, not wishing any member of his family to adopt an Indian career. Robert, the second son, was afterwards offered by his relations—the great firm of wine merchants—a place in their office, but he declined it with thanks; he was determined to be a soldier, and his father had ultimately to yield.

Accordingly, in 1856, he closed his brief career at the University and proceeded to India with what was technically known as a "direct Infantry appointment;" and in after years he used to repeat with infinite humour the parting words of his old schoolmaster, the Rector of Perth Academy, when he called to say good-bye. "Robert Sandeman!" said the Rector, speaking with a broad Scotch accent, "Robert Sandeman! ye did little work at school, but I wish ye well. And I would not be the Saracen of Bagdad or the Tartar of Samarkund that comes under the blow of your sabre."

These words describe, quaintly but effectively, some of the main features of Sir Robert's character. He was indeed a "stalwart" in the best sense. A true knight, strong-in-the-arm and determined, but always courteous; with no pretence to scholarship, but none the less deserving of the blessings of the community. He was all this, and a good deal more besides, as our subsequent history

will show. But he was the friend, not the foe, of the "Saracen" and "Tartar," and force was the last weapon of his armoury.

After some service with an English corps, he joined his father's regiment, the 33rd Native Infantry, as ensign. As already mentioned, the regiment remained staunch during the Mutiny, but at Philor, on its road to Delhi, it was disarmed, as a precautionary measure, by order of General Nicholson. On this occasion, young Sandeman did excellent service. Though only a junior subaltern of a few months' standing, he had great influence with the men, and did much towards pacifying them; he had also great influence over his father, and it was mainly through his advice, that his father, who had implicit faith in his sepoy, and was strongly disposed to resist the order for their disarmament, was induced to acquiesce in it. Others say that, through young Sandeman's connivance, his father was kept in complete ignorance of the order until the fatal moment for its execution arrived. However this may be, the men gave up their arms quietly and remained faithful, and, after the crisis was over, their arms, as has been already stated, were publicly restored to them. "This satisfactory result," says a general officer well acquainted with the circumstances, "was in no small measure due to Sandeman, who, though a mere youngster, grasped the situation better than his seniors, and showed all the tact and discretion of a field officer."

After the disarmament of his father's regiment, Sandeman was transferred to the cadre of the 14th Native Infantry, then at Jhilmam, but volunteered for active service before Delhi, and was appointed to do duty with the 2nd E.B. Fusiliers. On the fall of Delhi, the regiment with which he was doing duty was attached to Shower's pursuing column, and with it he took part in the capture of Jhajhar.

In February, 1858, he was appointed to do duty as lieutenant in the 1st Sikh Cavalry—a regiment newly raised in the Punjab by Major Wale, and afterwards well known as “Probyn’s Horse,”—now as the 11th (Prince of Wales’ Own) Bengal Lancers. After some time spent on outpost duty near Cawnpore, he joined the main body of his new regiment in Oude, was made adjutant, and took part in the storming of Dilkhushah, the final capture of Lucknow, the engagement at Músabágh, and subsequent operations in pursuit of the rebels.

Owing to the disappearance of home-letters, and the absence of a diary or book of reminiscences, there are few details to be recorded of Sandeman’s experiences as a soldier; but ample testimony is borne by Lord Roberts and others to his general pluck and forwardness. It is said that, while on duty at the Kashmir Gate of Delhi, after its capture, he gave proof of his soldierly obedience to orders by firmly refusing to admit (without a pass) no less a personage than the Civil Commissioner, although personally well known to him. And we have glimpses of his work on outpost duty in the “Mutiny Memoirs” of Colonel A. R. D. Mackenzie, C.B., who served as subaltern in the same cavalry regiment, and was one of his most intimate friends. We find him joining in a successful night attack on a bivouac of rebels near Unao, in Oude, in a manner very characteristic of him. His squadron, it appears, was ordered to meet a detachment of the 3rd battalion of the Rifle Brigade, and go to the protection of a village and police-post besieged by the enemy. On arriving at the place of rendezvous, to Sandeman’s great disappointment, there were no Rifles, but a messenger from the colonel, with a letter. “Unfortunately,” says Colonel Mackenzie, “it was too dark to read the letter without a light, and I had no matches! Neither,

very curiously, had Sandeman! At any rate we didn't find any in our pockets; so we held a short council of war, and decided that, in the absence of instructions, we felt it our duty to go ahead." After the rebel bivouac had been successfully discovered, attacked, and dispersed, the colonel's letter was read, and found to contain orders, not for their advance, but for their immediate return to camp, "as the retirement of the enemy had put an end to the object of the expedition."

At Músabágh he was by the side of Major Wale (his commander), when that gallant officer was mortally wounded, and carried him in his arms to a place of shelter. "My native A.D.C. who was in the regiment," writes Lord Roberts, "often spoke to me about 'Sinniman' Sahib's pluck and forwardness; and when I last visited Lucknow, about fifteen months ago, showed me where Wale was killed, and where he saved Sandeman's life."

Sandeman himself was twice severely wounded, and once reported as killed, and the circumstance led to an important phase in his career. On the occasion referred to—we give the story current in the family—while in the pursuit of mutineers after a skirmish, his horse was shot under him: he was separated from the rest of his party at the time, and as he did not appear, they supposed he had been killed. On his eventually getting back to camp, he found, to his concern, that his place in the regiment had already been filled up. As a consolation, however, he was made the bearer of important despatches to Sir John Lawrence, then Chief Commissioner of the Punjab. The duty was a hazardous one, for the country to be traversed was infested with mutineers and plunderers, but the despatches were conveyed to their destination with marvellous rapidity, and

Sir John Lawrence was so taken with the zeal and smartness of the young officer, that he offered him a place in the Punjab commission. He hesitated to accept the offer, as it involved the renunciation of a military career, which, as a keen soldier, he had no desire to relinquish. But the fighting was now practically over, and his father (an old friend of Lawrence) strongly advised acceptance, so he decided reluctantly to enter civil employ, and in May, 1859, he was gazetted Assistant Commissioner in the Punjab. After a few months' service in Kohát and two years' service in Cis-Indus districts, he was re-transferred to the Punjab frontier, where he laid the foundation of his future fame.

## CHAPTER II.

## ON THE FRONTIER.

The North-West frontier—Its tribes and their character—Description by Sir Richard Temple—Measures taken for its protection by the Sind and Punjab authorities respectively—Those of Sind essentially military—Those of the Punjab partly military, partly political, and conciliatory—John Lawrence's "Close-border" system, and its results—Lieutenant Sandeman's first experiences—The Ambela campaign—Marriage—Is appointed District Officer of Dera Gházi Khan.

FOR the benefit of English readers it may be well to give a brief description of the new scene of Lieutenant Sandeman's labours—the north-west frontier.

By the conquest of Sind in 1843, and the annexation of the Punjab in 1849, the north-west frontier of British India was advanced across the river Indus to the foot of the rocky mountain ranges which separate the plains of the Indus valley from the higher plateaus of Afghanistán and Khelát. These mountain ranges—together with an offshoot of the Western Himalayas on the east side of the Indus (known as the Black Mountain)—formed a vast irregular belt of independent or semi-independent territory, extending from the Khágán glen, immediately west of Kashmír, round the British districts of Pesháwar, Kohát, and Bannú, and then in a long stretch southward down the Indus valley to the Sind seaboard near Karáchi—a total length (including deflections) of about 1200 miles.

But the mighty barrier thus formed is pierced by several natural highways formed by streams. In the north the



Khaibar Pass connects the Pesháwar valley with Kábul; in the centre the Tochi and Gúmal Passes connect the plains of the Indus with Ghazni and south Afghanistan; while the Mulla, the Bolán and the Khojak Passes connect the plains of Sind with the plateaus of Khelát and Kandahár. And through these and other similar routes from time immemorial has passed the trade between Afghanistan, Balúchistán, and India.

The belt of territory above described was inhabited by fierce marauding tribes, amounting in all to nearly 200,000 fighting men, armed, for the most part, with buckler, sword, and matchlock,—often at war with each other, ever and anon harrying the plains of the Punjab and Sind, and the constant terror of the trade caravans during their journey through the passes.

Of the tribes, those around and north of the Takht-i-Sulimán are Patáns,\* in race and language akin to the Afgháns of Kábul,—some of them independent, some

\* In a paper read before the Royal Asiatic Society, the late Dr. Bellew stated that the word *Patán* is a corruption of *Pukhtánah*, meaning dwellers in the hills (from *Pukht*, a hill, akin to the Persian *pushtah*, and traceable in the *Pactyia* of Herodotus); that *Afghán* has the same meaning, being a corruption of the Armenian *Aghwán*, a term applied to the *Albanians*, who can be shown to have had settlements in western Afghanistan; that *Rohilla*, the name applied to the Patán settlers in the north-west provinces of India, has the same signification. In Afghanistan the name Afghán is properly restricted to certain tribes dwelling in the valley of the Halmand and its tributaries, that is, in the Kandahár country; whilst the name Patán is applied to the inhabitants of the Sulimán range and its offshoots. In other words, western Afghanistan is Afghán, and eastern Afghanistan is *Pukhtún*, or Patán. But by common usage, and especially by foreigners, the term Afghán is applied, in a comprehensive sense, to all the inhabitants of Afghanistan. The Afgháns themselves claim to be *Bani Isráel*, or "Children of Israel," but indignantly reject the idea of being of Jewish descent. They have no historical records of an earlier date than the reign of the Emperor Jahángir (the 17th century), and those are quite unreliable.

recognizing the Amír of Kábul as their suzerain ; those south of the Takht are Balúchis, speaking mongrel dialects of Persian overlaid with Sindi and Punjábí words ; at the time we speak of most of them were practically independent, but, when convenient to themselves, recognized as their suzerain the ruler of ~~Belát~~ <sup>Belát</sup>.

Their general character was thus described by Mr. (now Sir Richard) Temple in a paper drawn up by him when secretary to the Punjab Government some forty years ago : \*

"Now these tribes are savages, noble savages perhaps, and not without some tincture of virtue and generosity, but still absolutely barbarians nevertheless. They have nothing approaching to Government or Civil institutions ; they have for the most part no education ; they have nominally a religion, but Mahomedanism, as understood by them, is no better, or perhaps is actually worse, than the creeds of the wildest races on earth. In their eyes the one great commandment is blood for blood, and fire and sword for all infidels, that is, for all people not Muhammadans. They are superstitious and priest-ridden. But the priests (Mullas) are as ignorant as they are bigoted ; and use their influence simply for preaching crusades against unbelievers, and inculcate the doctrine of rapine and bloodshed against the defenceless people of the plain.

"The hill-men are sensitive in regard to their women ; but their customs in regard to marriage and betrothal are very prejudicial to social advancement. At the same time they are a sensual race. They are very avaricious ; for gold they will do almost anything, except betray a guest. They are thievish and predatory to the last degree.

"The Patán mother often prays that her son may be a successful robber. They are utterly faithless to public engagements ; it would never occur to their minds that an oath on the Koran was binding if against their interests. It must be added that they are fierce and bloodthirsty. They are never without weapons : when grazing their cattle, when driving beasts of burden, when tilling the soil, they are still armed. They are perpetually at war with each other. Each

\* This description is more applicable to the Patán tribes of the north-west than to the Balúches, and would not perhaps be accepted at the present day as a fair account of the character of our border tribes ; but it shows the character borne by them at annexation, and at the time they were first dealt with by Sir R. Sandeman.

tribe, and section of a tribe, has its internecine wars ; every family its hereditary blood-feuds ; and every individual his personal foes. There is hardly a man whose hands are unstained. Each person counts up his murders. Each tribe has a debtor and creditor account with its neighbours, life for life. Reckless of the lives of others, they are not sparing of their own. They consider retaliation and revenge to be the strongest of all obligations. They possess gallantry and courage themselves, and admire such qualities in others. Men of the same party will stand by one another in danger. To their minds hospitality is the first of virtues. Any person who can make his way into their dwellings will not only be safe, but will be kindly received. But as soon as he has left the roof of his entertainer, he may be robbed or killed.

"They are charitable to the indigent of their own tribe ; they possess the pride of birth, and regard ancestral associations. They are not averse to civilization whenever they have felt its benefits ; they are fond of trading, and also of cultivating, but they are too fickle and excitable to be industrious in agriculture, or anything else. They will take military service, and, though impatient of discipline, will prove faithful, unless excited by fanaticism.

"Such, briefly, is their character, replete with the unaccountable inconsistencies, with that mixture of vices and virtues belonging to savages "

With neighbours so warlike, bloodthirsty, and treacherous, it was necessary to make special arrangements for the proper protection of our new boundary. The particular measures to be taken were left to the local Governments concerned ; thus, the portion between the seaboard and Kasmore on the Indus, a distance of some 400 miles, was entrusted to the Government of Sind ; the portion from Kasmore to the Khágán Glen—a distance of some 800 miles—was entrusted to the Government of the Punjab.

But though each local Government was left a fairly free hand, the general policy of border defence adopted was greatly affected by recent events. The disasters of the first Afghán war and the tragical episode at Khelát were fresh in men's recollection, and created a strong feeling against any political interference with tribes or countries beyond our border. Russia was still far off, and we had no treaty

with the Kábul Chief; it was accordingly the aim and object of the Government, while providing adequately for the defence of the frontier, to have as little as possible to do with tribes and states beyond.

The Sind Government was first in the field. After two years' successful campaigning against the hill tribes, General Sir Charles Napier organized a plan of frontier defence essentially military in character, and it was carried out and developed with great ability by his distinguished successor, Brigadier-General John Jacob. The boundaries of British territory were carefully marked out, and for the portion requiring military protection a special force was raised, known as the Sind Frontier Force. The portion of the border referred to is a semi-desert tract, extending from Kasmore on the Indus to the northern spurs of the Hála Mountains, a distance of about 150 miles. In the centre of this tract, on the borders of the desert intervening between the British boundary and the hills, a cantonment was located, and the surrounding district placed under military control. The frontier was constantly patrolled, and intending marauders promptly attacked and slain, and, to prevent complications, no tribe was allowed to have possessions on both sides the border. The peace of the border was thus effectually secured, and, thanks to the construction of canals and roads, the abolition of transit duties, and a just and wise administration under such men as Bartle Frere and Jacob, the prosperity of the Sind Frontier District advanced with rapid strides.

In the Punjab the situation was different. In the first place, the length of the frontier requiring protection was 800 miles instead of 150 miles. In the second place, the border was anything but "scientific," but much as we received it from our predecessors, the Sikhs. It is rarely marked out with pillars, sometimes it runs at the foot,

sometimes along the crest of the first range ; nor does it always follow the boundaries of tribal possession, and in the south especially there are several tribes with lands and interests on both sides the border. Then, the tribes, especially those in the north, were more numerous and less tractable than those with whom the Sind authorities had to deal, while the territory to be protected was too vast and too developed, and its administration too difficult to be placed under purely military control. Lastly, on the Punjab border there was no desert, as in Sind, between the hills and the cultivated portion of British territory. British villages dotted the slopes of the Black Mountain, and along the Trans-Indus frontier cultivation pressed close up to the boundary line ; rich harvests waved in dangerous proximity to mountain gorges, the home of freebooters, and extensive tracts were dependent for irrigation on torrents flowing from independent hills. The problem before the Punjab Government was consequently far more difficult than that which had to be dealt with in Sind.

As in Sind, one of the first measures taken was to organize a frontier force of all arms. That of the Punjab consisted of about 12,000 men, composed of Sikhs, Patáns, and other fighting tribes organized on the "irregular" system, with a limited number of British officers,—a system now adopted for the entire native army. The force was under the command of a brigadier-general, directly subordinate to the Punjab Government, and was located in seven cantonments, connected together, save at one point, by a frontier road and chain of some fifty military and militia posts.\* For administrative purposes the tract was divided

\* The cantonments were at Abbottabád in the Hazára District ; at Hoti-Mardán, in the Yusufzai division of the Pesháwar District ; at Kohát, Bannu, Dera Ismael Khan, Déra Gházi Khan, and Rájánpur. The gap in the chain of communications was between the cantonments of Kohát and Hoti-Mardán. This was unavoidable, as Kohát is cut off

into six districts, and the administration was conducted by members of the Punjab Commission, generally military officers in civil employ ; and as the two services—civil and military—belonged to the same local Government, they worked well together.

The force was an excellent one in every way, but it was clear, from the first, that it would be impossible to organize the defence of the Punjab frontier on a purely military basis, and that much must depend upon the maintenance of a good understanding with the hill-tribes. Moreover, we inherited from our Sikh predecessors a number of political engagements with tribes and parties on the frontier which it was impossible for the British Government to ignore. Accordingly, from the very first, the system of border defence maintained by the Punjab Government was not purely military, but partly military, partly political and conciliatory. While the passes were carefully watched and the frontier road patrolled, every means was taken for the promotion of friendly intercourse. Thus, all frontier customs duties were abolished ; a capitation tax, levied by the Sikhs on foreigners, was discontinued, and the land-tax on the holdings of independent tribesmen was reduced to a nominal sum ; roads were made, connecting the frontier passes with the market-towns, free hospitals and dispensaries were established ; steamers for the conveyance of passengers and goods were started on the upper Indus ; and inundation canals, a priceless boon in rainless tracts, extending cultivation and affording food and work to thousands, were vigorously developed in the southern Deraját.

So long as they were friendly, the tribesmen had free from the Pesháwar District by a strip of independent territory ; while the portion of the Pesháwar District lying between the Kohát Pass and Hoti-Mardán was sufficiently protected by the large cantonment at Pesháwar, garrisoned by a division of the regular army.

access to British territory ; they were welcome to hold land, temporarily or permanently, to enlist in our army, and make use of our markets, hospitals, and dispensaries ; and some of the wild spirits of the frontier, representatives of tribes, or sections of tribes adjoining, were utilized as a local militia in aid of the regular troops.

Again, in all the six districts bordering on the frontier, the district officers and their assistants (generally military officers) were specially selected men. They had wider powers and a freer hand than in more law-ridden districts on the Lahore side of the Indus ; they were to govern on "patriarchal" lines, to make free use of arbitrators, to decide judicial cases on principles of "justice, equity, and good conscience," eschewing all technicalities, and professional lawyers were to be sent to the "right about ;" and, lastly, they were strictly charged, in their dealings with frontier tribes, to do their utmost to develop friendly feelings, and settle misunderstandings by firmness, tact, and personal ascendancy, rather than by force of arms.

Nothing could be more statesmanlike ; nothing could be more humane and appropriate for a tract like the Punjab frontier than these principles of administration. But unfortunately, in the case of the trans-frontier tribes, their operation was seriously hampered by a restriction—a restriction dictated by the prevailing sentiment of the time, and suitable enough in early days, but somewhat disastrous in its ultimate effect : *District officers were never (without special sanction) to risk their lives beyond the border, or to dream of its extension beyond present limits.\** In other words, our officers were to say to the tribesmen, "We shall be happy to see you if you like to visit us in a

\* The writer is not sure that the restriction referred to was ever formulated as a standing order, but the rule was well understood and acted upon until it was officially relaxed by Lord Lytton's Government in 1877.

friendly way, but we cannot return your call. We cannot interpose to maintain peace outside our border, however much you may desire it; and if your lands are cut in two by an arbitrary boundary-line, we cannot help you to obtain a re-adjustment, however advantageous it may be to both of us."

However, this policy—which may be described as the Lawrence policy, or "close-border system"—was, up to a certain extent, eminently successful. The constant and deadly hatred prevailing in Sikh times between the hill-tribes and the officials and people of the plains soon disappeared; raids once chronic became exceptional; cultivation on the British side of the border advanced with rapid strides, even to glens and passes beyond our own immediate frontier; the bazaars of the frontier stations teemed with hill-men, and *Poindahs*\* (warrior merchants) from Ghazni, with trains of laden camels, streamed out of the Gúmal Pass, laid down their arms, and, leaving their women in black tents encamped on British soil, spread themselves as peaceful traders throughout India; returning at the close of the cold season, their camels laden with piece-goods, indigo, and copper, to fight their way back into the hills.† Members of the frontier clans prayed for our protection, and permission to settle in our territories; the people of Upper Míranzai voluntarily became our subjects; the people of Daur more than once sought to be transferred to British rule; sections of the Wazírís, the most warlike and predatory of the frontier tribes, settled

\* The derivation of the word *Poindah* is a subject of dispute. Some derive it from a Persian word meaning "wanderer"; others from a Pashtú root, signifying "to graze."

† "I hardly ever saw," says Sir H. Edwardes, "a *Poindah* who had not one or more wounds on his body; and the loss of an eye, broken noses, scored skulls, lame legs, and mutilated arms, are almost as common as freckles in England."



down as peaceful cultivators on the Tánk border; and the Bithannis, a robber clan, took land in Bannú. Service in our army and militia was eagerly sought after; thousands found relief in our hospitals, and disputes were voluntarily referred by independent tribesmen for the arbitrament of British officers.

Such are some of the results of Lawrence's frontier policy—carried out, as it was, by such illustrious men as Edwardes, Mackeson, James, Nicholson, and Reynell Taylor. They were great, and deserve to be recorded. But the success achieved must not blind us to the evil effects of the over-cautious restrictions to which we have adverted. These restrictions, suitable enough at the time they were imposed, became, as time went on, not only uncalled for, but positively detrimental to our interests; they tied the hands of district officers, and effectually checked the growth of political influence among the trans-border tribes; and would have continued to do so, if they had not (as this history will show) been boldly set aside—by Sandeman.

At the time of his advent the Lawrence system had been in force for more than thirteen years; nevertheless, our relations with the tribes, though far friendlier than they had been in times past, were by no means satisfactory. The Patán in his native hills was still fickle and treacherous, and the Balúch was little better; tribal factions and inter-tribal feuds still went on beyond our border, leaving the wilder spirits a free hand to plunder in the plains; quarrels about irrigation or the sex still led to outrages in British territory; blood-feuds with British subjects were still rife on the Patán frontier, leading to acts of vengeance, in which, however, the single assassin generally took the place of the marauding band. The evil was greatly lessened in intensity, but it was still there, for no one was allowed

to deal with it at its source; and, from time to time, some serious raid or outrage, for which no satisfaction would be given, necessitated a blockade, or, if that was ineffectual, an expedition. The expeditions (some fifteen in number) were admirably conducted and invariably successful: that is to say, crushed all opposition, destroyed homesteads, and secured the submission of the tribe; but, as the troops promptly returned to British territory, and submission involved no forfeiture, the effect, though beneficial for a time, was not calculated to be lasting.

In short, the influence of the district officer—excellent so far as it went—was too remote to effect material change in the conduct of the tribes, while the fear of our military strength, though it tended to prevent large raids, certainly did not develop friendly feeling. It thus happened that, after nearly thirty years of British rule, the hills immediately adjoining the western Punjab frontier were almost as much *terra incognita* as the hills of Central Africa; that the trade-routes were still unprotected; that Tírah, the summer haunt of the Afridis, was and is still strictly closed to Englishmen, while the Takht-i-Sulaimán, the mighty pine-crowned ridge, which looks scornfully over the plains of Dera Ismael Khan, was unvisited by Europeans until the year 1883.

Such was the state of the Punjab frontier when Lieutenant Sandeman entered on his duties. He soon gave evidence of special aptitude for frontier work; he was not learned in the law, but had plenty of good sense, patience, *bonhomie*, and dash. He was careful and thorough in his judicial investigations, and particularly successful in dealing with Patán *jirgahs*, or committees of village or tribal elders appointed to discuss affairs—an institution he afterwards successfully introduced among the Balúches.\* As often

\* The statement that Lieutenant Sandeman "introduced" the

happens in the case of junior assistants, he was moved from district to district. On his return to the frontier, he served first (1862) in Pesháwar—perhaps the most important of the frontier districts—a fertile valley almost surrounded by wild hills, within a few miles of the Khaibar Pass, and in Yusufzai, a subdivision of that district, between the Swat river and the Indus—then a bare plain, but now, thanks to a canal, initiated by the late Sir Henry Durand, a broad sheet of splendid cultivation. Here he was brought into contact with Afridis, Jadúns, Osmankhails, Momands, and tribes from the Swat valley and Bonér.

*Jirgah* system among the Balúches is made on the authority of his native secretary; but probably all that is meant is that he revived amongst the Balúches a system of deciding disputes which had fallen into desuetude.

*Jirgah* is a Persian word meaning "circle," and probably the same in origin as the Latin *circus* and the Greek κύκλος. Homer's description of tribal chiefs—"ἡμένοι ἐν ξεστοῖσι λίθοις ἱερῶ ἐν κύκλῳ"—describes what happens every day in Afghanistan, and there are few more interesting spectacles. The writer was once present at a *jirgah* of independent tribesmen, convened at Tánk to discuss the possibility of opening the Gúmal Pass for general traffic, and arranging for the security of caravans. On that occasion the representatives of tribes or sections of tribes at deadly feud with each other sat quietly side by side; each speaker rose and expressed his views with great earnestness, but briefly and to the point; he was answered by another, who spoke with equal earnestness and brevity, and so on to the end; there was no interruption and no disorder, and one left the meeting with the impression that assemblies in other parts of the world might well learn a lesson of business-like and orderly conduct of debate from a Patán *jirgah*.

Some-years after, at a reception given by the Secretary of State for India in 1887, the writer had an opportunity of conversing with the native commissioned officers who visited England on the occasion of Her Majesty's Jubilee. He inquired from them what had struck them most during their visit to the Metropolis. The general opinion was that the most interesting sight in London was the Westminster Aquarium; but one of them—a tall Afghán—said, "No; the most interesting sight was 'Parliament,' for it was the largest and the noisiest *jirgah* he had ever seen."

About this time Sandeman obtained promotion, and as he had never been in debt, but had managed, by economy and self-denial—not by stinginess, for that was wholly foreign to his nature,—to save, he felt in a position to take another step in life. He took short leave to England and secured the hand of his second cousin, Catherine, daughter of John Allen, Esq., of Kirby Lonsdale, with whom he spent five happy years. But their union could not take place then, as there were rumours of disquiet on the frontier which necessitated Sandeman's immediate return to India.

This disquiet culminated in the Ambela Pass campaign of 1863, the most serious frontier trouble that had taken place since annexation. The peace of the Pesháwar border having been for several years disturbed by the operations of a body of Wahábi fanatics from Hindustán, located first at Sitána, on the Indus, then at Malka in the Mahában range, it was considered necessary that the colony should be dislodged and broken up; but as they were under the patronage of the Akhúnd, or spiritual head, of the Swat tribes, the latter flocked to the rescue of their co-religionists, and some severe fighting was the result. Malka, the stronghold of the fanatics, was ultimately destroyed, but not without considerable loss to our side; and, after all, the snake was "scotched, not killed."\*

Here, however, Lieutenant Sandeman was in his element, and is well remembered as the jovial leader of a body of wild horsemen, scouring the country, and doing good service as intelligencer and guerrilla warrior. With a force of a thousand tribesmen collected from all

\* The casualties in the Ambela Campaign were :—

Killed,	15 British,	4 Native officers	} out of a force of 9000 men.
"	34 "	185 " rank and file	
Wounded,	21 "	27 " officers	
"	118 "	504 " rank and file	

parts of the Pesháwar district, he was placed in charge of the passes leading from Rustam Bazár and Nao Kila to the position the army held on the Ambela heights. His activity and usefulness, and the admirable manner in which he organized his motley army during the campaign, elicited the hearty commendation of his superiors—Colonel R. G. Taylor, C.B., Commissioner, and Major Munro, District Officer of Pesháwar.

One of his comrades bears testimony to Sandeman's coolness in action. He well remembers seeing him engaged in reading a letter (just received from his *fiancée*) "by snatches," under a dropping fire from matchlocks, alternately glancing at the precious document and then giving a word of command.

Another story is told of his proceedings, which may or may not be true, but is, at any rate, *ben trovato*. One of his duties, during this time, was to convey from the telegraph station to the front all messages received from the Government of India. It is said that, on the eve of the final assault, a telegram was received directing its postponement. Sandeman, believing the delay would be disastrous, carefully arranged that the telegram should reach its destination *after* the assault had been delivered.

The campaign over, he claimed his bride, whom he met and married at Calcutta. In 1864 he was transferred to Hazára, a lovely Himalayan valley at the foot of the Black Mountain, between the Upper Indus and Kashmir, and in 1865 was sent to Bannú—sacred to the memory of Nicholson and Herbert Edwardes—a green oasis in the north-west corner of the frontier, at the foot of hills occupied by the Wazírís, the most numerous and warlike of all the border tribes. "In spring," says Edwardes,\* "it is a vegetable emerald; and in winter its many-coloured

\* "Year on the Punjab Frontier," p. 69

harvests look as if Ceres had stumbled against the great Salt Range and spilt half her cornucopia in this favoured vale. As if to make the landscape perfect, a graceful variety of the sheeshum-tree, whose boughs droop like the willow, is found here, and here alone; while along streams and around the villages, the thick mulberry, festooned with the wild vine, throws a fragrant shade, beneath which well-fed Syuds look exquisitely happy sleeping midway through their beads." \*

But Sandeman was not allowed to remain for long in this favoured, but somewhat fever-stricken vale; in the early part of 1866 he was selected by Sir Donald Macleod, the Lieut.-Governor, to act as District Officer of DĒra Ghāzi Khan, at the southern end of the Punjab frontier, in immediate proximity to Sind.

\* On a marble tablet in the little church at Bannú is the following inscription, from the pen of Edwardes, in memory of his beloved friend Nicholson, who, while differing widely in some points, yet, in the combination of gentleness and strength and the fascination he exercised over the minds of Asiatics, had much in common with the subject of this Memoir—

"IN AFFECTIONATE MEMORY OF  
BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN NICHOLSON, C.B.,  
ONCE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF THIS DISTRICT,  
WHO, AT THE GREAT SIEGE OF DELHI,  
LED THE STORM,  
FELL, MORTALLY WOUNDED, IN THE HOUR OF VICTORY, AND  
DIED 23rd SEPT., 1857, AGED ONLY 34.

Gifted in mind and body,  
He was as brilliant in Government as in Arms;  
The snows of Ghazni attest his youthful fortitude;  
The songs of the Punjab his manly deeds,  
The peace of this frontier his strong rule;  
The enemies of his country know  
How terrible he was in battle;  
We, his friends, love to recall  
How gentle, generous, and true he was "

## CHAPTER III.

## WORK IN DÉRA GHÁZI KHAN.

Déra Gházi Khan described—Duties of district officer—First dealings with Balúches—Balúch and Patán contrasted—Difficulties with Sind authorities—Great raid at Harrand successfully defeated—Meeting of frontier chiefs at Rájánpur—System of tribal service inaugurated—Lieutenant Grey, District Officer of Déra Ismaél Khan, carried into the hills by a discontented Balúch chief—The chief hunted down and given up to justice through Lieutenant Sandeman's influence over the border tribes—Distressing death of Mrs. Sandeman and two of his three children—He pays a brief visit to England and returns to his post, and makes his first tour in the Balúch hills, escorted by tribal chiefs—Commencement of controversy with the Commissioner in Sind.

THE district of Déra Gházi Khan is cited by Sir William Hunter as "a striking instance of the prosperity and security afforded by a strong and benevolent government in a naturally barren tract, formerly desolated by border strife and internal anarchy." It is a strip of country about 25 miles broad, extending for nearly 200 miles between the Sulaimán range and the river Indus, bounded on the north by Déra Ismaél Khan and on the south by the Upper Sind Frontier district.

Except in the riverain tracts, watered by canals fed by the annual rising of the Indus, the general aspect of the country is dreary and monotonous. But the chief town and cantonment is picturesquely placed amid luxuriant groves of palms. Numerous small passes lead from British

territory into the adjoining hills, and of the population nearly one third consists of Balúch tribes akin to those beyond the border.

Such was the district which Lieutenant Sandeman was appointed to administer. And in those days the District Officer, or (to give him his official title) the Deputy Commissioner—especially in a frontier district—held a remarkable position. Subject to general instructions, the control of distant superiors, and a great freedom of appeal, he was supreme in all departments, judicial or administrative. Judge of appeal and of first instance, in criminal and civil cases, magistrate, chief of the police, jail superintendent, head of the revenue department, way-warden, ex-officio chairman of every administrative committee for local purposes, statistician, and reporter-general to a variety of departments on every kind of topic, from land-tenures to dāk-bungalow chimneys, from the repression of a raid to the loss of a scarf-pin by some distinguished traveller. His opinion was required on the provisions of almost every bill before the legislative council, and many state-papers were sent to him for criticism. If the experimental cultivation of *sorghum saccharatum* or of Carolina rice was required by some philanthropic faddist at head-quarters, the experiment had to be conducted by the district officer: if a large land-owner or *jágirdár* (assignee of land revenue) deceased, leaving no son of age, the district officer, as Court of Wards, took charge of and managed the estate: if scarcity or famine prevailed, the district officer was responsible for organizing relief.

In addition to all these responsibilities and many more, the frontier district officer had the anxious and important duty of dealing with the tribes: and much of his time was taken up in interviews with their representatives,



in patiently hearing their complaints, and endeavouring to adjust their differences.\*

With the ordinary duties of a district officer Lieutenant Sandeman was already well acquainted, but on one point Dera Ghazi Khan afforded him a new experience. Hitherto his frontier duties brought him in contact with Patán tribes; he had now to deal with Balúches, and the Patán and the Balúch are, in some respects, widely different. Both are warlike, revengeful, predatory; but while the Patán is a republican, having little reverence for the person of his chief, the Balúch respects and obeys the head of his clan; while the Patán is bigoted and priest-ridden, the Balúch pays scant respect to the *Sayyad* or the *Maulavi*. Conciliate a Balúch chief, and you in most cases conciliate the clan; the Patán chief is head of a dominant faction only, and friendliness with him secures ill-feeling from his opponents, while priestly influence may be at work to destroy or thwart, it may be in a few hours, the conciliatory policy of years. The Balúch is thus easier to deal with than the Patán, and consequently better suited for initial experiments in a "peace and goodwill" policy.

Nevertheless, Sandeman showed in after years that the methods he found so successful among the aristocratic Balúch were not inapplicable to their more democratic neighbours. Pishín, Harnái, Tal-Chotiáli, Bori, and Zhob

\* This combination of political, administrative, and judicial functions in a frontier district officer was a vital point in the system of John Lawrence, with whom the pure "political" was no favourite. He considered that an administrative officer would be able to bring powerful influences to bear upon frontier tribes in or resorting to British territory, and, at the same time, would have his attention sufficiently preoccupied to prevent unnecessary interference in affairs beyond the border. In later years Sir Robert Sandeman in his dealings with tribes adjoining the Punjab frontier deeply regretted his loss of administrative power in the adjacent British districts.

are all peopled almost exclusively by Patán races. The Sheránis of the Takht-i-Sulimán and its neighbourhood, who for forty years resisted all the advances made to them from the Punjab, yielded to the methods of Sir Robert Sandeman, and the Bargha, or Highland Sheránis, between Zhob and the Punjab, are now peaceably paying revenue to the officers of the Balúchistán agency; while the Wazírís, one of the most powerful and rowdy Patán tribes on the whole border, have been induced to enter our service, and to keep open the Gúmal Pass by their tribal levies. Some attempts, too, have recently been made, with encouraging results, to follow the principles of Sir Robert's policy in Kurram and the Black Mountain.

But we are greatly anticipating events, and must return to the year 1866.

Despite his multifarious duties as district officer, Lieutenant Sandeman was soon busily engaged in the work of conciliation. He found the tribal organization of the Balúches of his district in a state of rapid decay, the authority and influence of the chiefs and headmen waning, the different sections and sub-sections at loggerheads with each other, and some of the tribes at bitter enmity with tribes beyond the border; while, still further west, civil war was raging between the Khan of Khelát and his confederate chiefs.

Lieutenant Sandeman soon grasped the situation. He saw in the hereditary influence of tribal chiefs an element of strength which might, if maintained and well directed, become a potent instrument for good. Accordingly he directed his energies to a settlement of existing quarrels and the re-establishment of the position and dignity of the Tumandár, or chief, whose hearty co-operation was thus secured; at the same time, any complaints against

the chief for harshness or oppression were carefully inquired into, and justice done between the parties.

He first took in hand the Balúch tribes on the British side of the border.\* Sandeman's attention was here forcibly drawn to the unsatisfactory character of the existing boundary, which, in many cases, split the tribes into two divisions—one living under British jurisdiction, the other outside and beyond it, a state of things involving, in his opinion, "cruel injustice." So he lost no time in pressing the Government to effect a revision of the boundary. But in those days a revision of boundary could not be thought of, and meanwhile the "cruel injustice" had its advantageous side, for the sequel will show that the Balúch chief, with interests and influence on both sides the border, was a powerful instrument for conciliating the tribes beyond it.

However, with the help of his assistant, Mr. R. Bruce (now Commissioner of the Deraját Division), he organized these tribes under competent chiefs and headmen, composed their differences, enriched them by giving them work in canal-excavation, and, with his usual keen insight into character, at once recognized the merits and ability of Imám Baksh Khán,\* acting tumandár or chief of the Mazári tribe—now Nawáb Sir Imám Baksh Khán, K.C.I.E.—whom he constituted his chief native henchman. This remarkable man had formerly served as native commissioned officer in the 3rd Punjab Cavalry, and during the great Mutiny commanded the levies which had been raised to protect the district during the absence of the regular troops. His loyalty to the British Government was undoubted, and his character singularly upright. At the same time, he was a Balúch to the backbone. He was thus an excellent intermediary between the British

\* The Mazáris, the Dreshaks, the Gurchánis, the Lunds, the Looháris, the Khosas, the Natkánis, and the Kasránis.

Government, or its representatives, and the Balúch tribes beyond the border.

Having got the British Balúch tribes in hand, he proceeded to deal with the more important tribes living beyond the border—the Búgtis, the Marrís, the Khetráns, and the Bozdárs. Of these, the two first had long been the terror of the border, and were at open war with their nominal suzerain, the Khan of Khelát, while the Bozdárs had, a few years previously, brought upon themselves the chastisement of a military expedition.

But here a new difficulty arose. The Marrís and Búgtis were under the suzerainty of the Khan of Khelát, and the political relations of the Khan of Khelát and his confederate chiefs with the British Government were then conducted by the Government of Bombay, represented locally by the Commissioner in Sind, and the policy of the Government of Bombay and Sind in dealing with frontier tribes was different from that of the Punjab Government. In Sind, as has already been explained, a strip of desert intervened between its northern frontier and the cultivated portion of British territory, and the military force at the disposal of the authorities was much larger in proportion to the extent of frontier to be guarded. Accordingly, for preservation of peace upon the border, the Sind authorities depended more upon military measures of protection and repression than upon conciliatory treatment of the tribes.\*

\* General Jacob's mode of dealing with the Búgtis is thus described (*Blue Book on Balúchistán*, i. p. 70):—"General Jacob assumed charge of the frontier in January, 1847, and at once adopted an offensive attitude against these freebooters. By a well-arranged plan of outposts and incessant patrolling it was rendered almost impossible that any robbers should leave the hills for the purpose of plunder with impunity. The result was that in the autumn following the Búgtis, driven to desperation, entered the plain near Shahpore in force, were encountered by a detachment of Sind horse, and

They were also averse from dealing with frontier tribes, except through their suzerain, the Khan,—a policy sound enough on the assumption that the suzerain has power to control his vassals, but inapplicable, as was soon proved, in the case of the Balúch tribes on the Punjab frontier.

Early in 1867 a noted Búgti freebooter (by name Ghulám Hosein), at the head of a mixed gathering of Marrís, Búgtis, and Khetráns, some 1500 strong, made a raid on Harrand, in the Dera Gházi Khan district, attacked the fort, burned several villages, killed British subjects, and carried off some hundreds of head of cattle. The tribes on the British side, re-organized and inspired by their new district officer, and kept well informed of the movements of the raiders, were promptly called to arms, and in conjunction with 30 troopers from the military outpost, pursued and attacked the raiders in the Cháchar Puss. Ghulám Hosein, with 120 of his followers, was killed, and about 200 prisoners were taken, the loss on the British side being seven killed and 60 wounded.

Great was the “kudos” deservedly accorded to Lieutenant Sandeman for his services on this occasion, which were thus acknowledged by the Punjab Government in a letter to Colonel Graham, Commissioner of the Deraját :—

“The brilliant affair of the 26th of January, 1867, ending in the dispersion of an organized and extensive robber confederacy and the destruction of its leader, is an achievement of which the Frontier Force may well be proud; but His Honour regards with even greater satisfaction the *policy* which has been kept in view throughout by yourself, Lieutenant Sandeman, and Brigadier-General Wilde—of seeking, as far as possible, without unduly condoning offences, or compromising the position of the British Government, the promotion of friendly relations with the chiefs of border tribes.

“For the successful inauguration of this policy, as regards the completely overthrown. It was reckoned that one half of the fighting men were killed or taken prisoners on that occasion.”

Marrí tribe, you have generously assigned the entire credit to Lieutenant Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of Déra Gházi Khan ; but as he has been doubtless greatly aided in his efforts by your experience and cordial support, His Honour desires me to convey both to yourself and Lieutenant Sandeman his hearty acknowledgments for the services you have rendered."

And the results of the achievement were important. The 200 prisoners were detained by Lieutenant Sandeman and were the unconscious cause of an interesting development of policy.

Sandeman addressed a letter to Sir Henry Green, then Political Superintendent of the Sind Frontier, asking him to obtain from the Khan of Khelát compensation for the injury done by his marauding subjects. Sir Henry Green declined on the ground that, though the Marrís were nominally the Khan's subjects, His Highness had about as much control over them as the Amír of Kábul over the Afridis of the Khaibar Pass, and in fact suffered more from their depredations than the British Government.

In these circumstances Sandeman felt justified in taking matters into his own hands. He informed the chiefs of the offending tribes that the prisoners would not be liberated until the chiefs appeared in person and submitted. The chiefs, already favourably disposed towards Lieutenant Sandeman, and assured of honourable treatment, obeyed the summons, and an interesting meeting took place at Rájánpur. Here it was agreed that the offending tribes should rigidly abstain from committing outrages or plundering in Déra Gházi Khan, and protect and keep open the routes leading from British territory to their respective hills ; and Lieutenant Sandeman, on behalf of the British Government, engaged to give service to a small number of tribal horsemen, to be employed chiefly in keeping up communications between the chiefs and the British authorities

This was the small commencement of the great system of "tribal service," which forms an important feature in the so-called "Sandemanian" method of frontier management. The arrangement was sharply censured at the time by outside critics as being of the nature of "black-mail,"\* but it was an arrangement for which an ample *quid pro quo* was given, and has been fully justified by its results. Peace was obtained upon the frontier, and free intercourse commenced between the populations on either side.

But freedom of intercourse led inevitably to petty disputes. For the decision of these Sandeman organized tribunals on the Patán model, composed of chiefs and tribal headmen, and the arrangement worked well. This system was afterwards extended and elaborated, and was regarded by Sandeman as one of the keystones of his policy. In 1875 he organized a yearly gathering of chiefs at his summer quarters in the Sulimans, for the purpose of discussing tribal questions; and in later years *jirgahs* were held annually at Sibi in the cold weather and Quetta in the hot weather, for the decision of intertribal quarrels, and many feuds which might otherwise have led to bloodshed were satisfactorily settled.

But one difficulty remained. There was a blood feud of old standing between the Marrís on the one hand and the Mazáris and Dreshaks on the other; until that was settled there could be no friendly intercourse between those tribes. It was settled by Lieutenant Sandeman in Oriental fashion. He persuaded the Marrí chief to give a niece in marriage to the respective chiefs of the Mazáris and the Dreshaks, and the thing was done.

\* See Sandeman's letter of August 5, 1875, quoted in chapter xxix., where the criticisms on his policy are discussed; also Mr. Barnes' Note in chapter xxviii.

The benefit resulting from the new arrangements with the border tribes was soon remarkably exemplified. In July, 1867, Lieutenant Grey, officiating Deputy Commissioner of the adjoining district of Dera Ismaél Khan, proceeded in person to the extreme south of his district to arrest Kaura Khan, the chief of the Kasranis (one of the Baluch tribes settled in British territory) on a criminal charge. The boat containing Lieutenant Grey's escort having missed the proper channel, he found himself at his destination almost without a follower. After waiting in vain for the missing escort, Lieutenant Grey imprudently determined to effect the arrest in person. The chief and his son were summoned, charged, and arrested, and made over to Lieutenant Grey's orderlies, and were being marched to the river side. Seeing this, the chief's tribesmen in large numbers flocked to the rescue and forcibly released the prisoners; whereupon Kaura Khan, placing himself at the head of his followers, seized Lieutenant Grey and marched him into the hills beyond the border. A hot pursuit was set on foot by the people of the vicinity, and Lieutenant Grey was rescued after a few hours' detention. The offending chief for the time escaped, but not for long. Thanks to our improved relations with the border tribes, Lieutenant Sandeman was able to cause Kaura Khan to be hunted down from hiding-place to hiding-place, and finally captured and given up to justice, by Painsa Khan, Chief of the Misrikhel Patáns, without moving a single soldier across the border, or even the threat of a blockade.

But in the midst of his success and plans of future usefulness Sandeman became the victim of a crushing domestic sorrow. In the rains of 1868 diphtheria in a particularly fatal form attacked the English residents of Dera Gházi Khan. Sandeman's youngest child, an



infant a few months old, was seized with the fatal disease and died ; its mother was then taken ill and quickly followed it. Acting under medical advice, the father, though well nigh overcome with grief, conveyed the two surviving children to Lahore, *en route* for Simla, where he proposed leaving them in his sister's care ; but on the road they also were seized with illness, and, on reaching Lahore, his son, four years of age, expired. The eldest little girl survived, but with a constitution permanently weakened. After leaving the sole surviving child in his sister's care, Lieutenant Sandeman returned to his desolate home until the following winter, when he took short leave to enable him to take his little girl to England, and meanwhile devoted himself with Christian fortitude to the important work he had in hand.

Soon after his return from England, in a frame of mind somewhat reckless from the calamity he had suffered, he took a further step of momentous importance. Oblivious of standing orders, he *boldly crossed the border and made a tour for twenty days in the interior of the hills without military protection of any kind*, escorted by tribal chiefs, under whose guidance he paid friendly visits to the headquarters of all the principal clans,—localities where, three years previously, the life of a European would have been exceedingly precarious.

This was a particularly hazardous proceeding, because he not only risked his life, but his career. But it was completely successful, and fortunately the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir D. McLeod, was sympathetic, so the irregularity was condoned. And the success was the commencement of a new era in our relations with Balúch border tribes.

At a later period he took a further step. He selected for his summer quarters a hill 25 miles outside British

territory, between Barkhán and Sákí-Sarwar, with a view to increase his influence over the Marrís, Búgtis, and Khetráns, and prepare the way for re-opening the old trade route between Kandahár and the Punjab *via* Tal and Chotiáli. To this hill he gave the name of Fort Munro, in honour of his Commissioner, Colonel (now General) A. A. Monro, who heartily sympathized with his objects, and after years of valuable service on the frontier in important posts, has retired, highly esteemed and honoured by his fellow-workers and the Government he served.

But fresh difficulties awaited Lieutenant Sandeman. It will be recollected that at the meeting of the hill chiefs at Rájánpur it had been agreed, as the price of peace and in consideration of certain privileges, that the Márrís, Búgtis, and Khetráns should rigidly abstain from committing, or permitting others to commit, outrages in Dera Gházi Khan. They faithfully fulfilled their promise; but their promise did not bind them to abstain from raiding on the Sind frontier, or the territory of the Khelát Chief, with whom they were at war. Accordingly they continued their depredations on the Sind border and in the Kachi, an extensive plain in Khelát territory west of the Marri hills, for the most part bare and desolate, but with tracts of rich cultivation along the beds of mountain streams, rendering it the most valuable portion of the Khan's dominions. To this arrangement the Sind authorities naturally objected.

So far, indeed, as depredations on the Sind frontier were concerned, matters might, for the time being, have been satisfactorily adjusted, for the frontier officers of Sind and the Punjab were, at that time, in complete accord; but, under any circumstances, the dual control of frontier tribes by officers of different governments and traditions is open

to obvious objections, and, under present circumstances, the matter formed part of a much larger question, affecting the relations of the ruler of Khelát with his confederate chiefs and the policy of the British Government towards the Khan. On these subjects Lieutenant Sandeman had formed decided views. He was well acquainted with the opinions of the Sind Government, but his intercourse with the tribal chiefs and Brahúi vassals of the Khan had enabled him to hear another side of the question, and he was led, in common with the Political Superintendent of the Sind Frontier, strongly to doubt the equity and expediency of the policy pursued. His views brought him into collision with the Commissioner in Sind, and a keen controversy of upwards of six years' duration followed, the history of which will be dealt with in succeeding chapters.

## CHAPTER IV.

## KHELÁT AFFAIRS.

Dispute with Sind a conflict between old and new systems of frontier policy—Some knowledge of Khelát history necessary for comprehension of its bearings—Khelát—Its early history—The Balúch Confederacy—"Constitution" of Nasír Khan I.—Its breach by his grandson Mahráb leads to the latter's death—At the end of the first Afghán war he is falsely accused of treachery—Khelát stormed by British troops and Mahráb slain in the assault—A successor appointed by political officers without consulting the tribes—Murder of Lieutenant Loveday—Nasír Khan II.—Treaty with the British Government—Nasír Khan II. begins to organize a standing army—Is poisoned—Mír Khodádád Khan (the late ruler) succeeds—His disputes with the Brahúi Sirdárs—British Government declines to interfere—Khan is dethroned and reinstated—Civil war—Attitude of both parties to the British Government—Good influence of Sir Henry and Major Malcolm Green.

THE episode in Sir Robert Sandeman's official life contained in the next five chapters is not without some painful incidents, a theme at the time of much acrimonious discussion, and his biographer would gladly have been spared the necessity of dealing with so thorny and delicate a subject; but it is a phase in the history of that period too important to be slurred over or omitted, and was a turning point in Sandeman's career; and as the chief actors in the struggle are no more, and the result, though creditable to the one, reflects no discredit on the other, there seems to be no ground for reticence.

Moreover, the dispute with Sind, though it had its personal and provincial side, was not a mere squabble between officials of adjoining provinces, but raised important questions of Imperial frontier policy. It was, in fact, a protest against the existing systems of frontier management; against the uncompromising militarism of Sind and the "non-intervention—cum expeditions" system common to both Sind and the Punjab; and was a first step towards a new policy, a policy believed by its promoters to be more humane, more sympathetic, more civilizing, and, at the same time, imperatively called for on grounds of public expediency.

Still there was much to be said—there is always much to be said—in favour of the old systems, and both parties had strong supporters, while personal and provincial jealousies, as might have been expected, played their part. So the official situation became, for a time, extremely "lively."

However, after a six years' struggle, the victory, it will be seen, remained with Sandeman, and the results have been far-reaching.

But to proceed. The dispute, as we have seen, originated in certain arrangements made by Lieutenant Sandeman with the Marrí tribe; but it soon took a wider range and embraced the whole policy of the British Government towards Khelát during the civil war between the Khan and his Sirdárs, a policy the justice and expediency of which were boldly challenged by a young frontier officer of less than ten years' standing.\*

\* To Colonel Phayre, the Political Superintendent of the Upper Sind frontier, belongs the credit of having first moved in the matter, but he was soon removed from office, after which the brunt of the battle fell on Sandeman. Ultimately, after the advent of Lord Lytton, the occupation of Quetta and the development of the Russo-Afghan

It thus becomes necessary—to enable the reader to understand the merits of the questions raised—to give a brief account of Khelát and the Balúch confederacy, and a summary of leading events up to the time of Sandeman's appearance on the scene.

Strictly speaking, the name Khelát (literally “fort” or “stronghold”) is applicable only to the Khan's capital and the district immediately adjacent, but it is or was in practice applied to the entire territory under his control or suzerainty. That territory may be described, for present purposes,\* as the mountainous country west of the Indus valley, bounded on the north by Afghanistán, on the east by Sind and the Punjab, on the west by Persia, and on the south by the Arabian Sea. It includes extensive tracts of hill, plateau, and plain, for the most part arid and barren, but with a few fertile spots occupied by pastoral tribes, chiefly Brahúi and Balúch, in various degrees of subordination to the Khan. Its area is more than ten times that of Switzerland; in shape it resembles the section of an upturned vase, and its coast line extends for nearly 600 miles. Its population is scanty, its products few and unimportant, but, owing to its position near our frontier and its command of trade routes between Persia, Afghanistán, and India, the friendship of its ruler and the peace of his territory have for years past been

difficulty, our frontier policy became a burning question, in regard to which official opinion in India was divided into two camps,—the Lawrencites and the Lyttonites,—resembling the Whigs and Tories of Queen Anne's time, with their policies reversed. As might have been expected in a society composed largely of military officers, the Lawrencites were greatly in the minority.

\* A more detailed account of the physical features, geography, and population of Khelát will be found in chapter xi. The name is spelled in Persian كلات (*Kalát*), and this is the spelling officially used in Balúchistán; but *Khelát* has the sanction of long usage, and is the mode of spelling adopted in the “Imperial Gazetteer.”

matters of interest to the British Government, and this interest has latterly increased.

Its history, so far as it bears upon the matter in hand, is soon told.\*

Up to the beginning of the seventeenth century the people of the town and district of Khelát were Hindú in race and religion, and governed by a Hindú dynasty. Isolated and oppressed apparently by the power of Persia, they invited Kambar, son of a Brahúi Mussulman chief, to ascend the throne of Khelát

The chief, from whose patronymic the dynasty is still called Kambaráni, and his immediate successors gradually extruded the Hindús from power and influence, and the State became Muhammadan.

Khelát proper was still small and uninfluential, but the khans gradually increased their power by granting fiefs in Khelát territory to the adjoining tribes, who were bound in return to furnish troops or tribal levies on certain specified quotas. By means of troops so raised, the territories of the Khan were gradually extended by conquest. The chiefs consulted together, and finding the necessity for mutual cohesion and co-operation in the presence of three formidable kingdoms—Persia, Afghanistán, and Sind—the independent tribes and the petty State of Khelát, with their joint conquests, gradually became more or less voluntarily joined into one federal State under the authority of the Khan,—each confederate chief retaining full power of government within the limits of his chieftainship.

In the first half of the eighteenth century, Muhabbat Khan, fifth in descent from Kambar, obtained from Nádir Shah, in return for service rendered, the district of Kach

\* In this *résumé* of Khelát history, a Minute by the late Sir E. Clive Bayley, member of the Government of India (recorded in 1877), has been mainly followed.

Gandáva, an extensive low plain which had hitherto belonged to Sind ; but at a later period incurred the disfavour of the great Ahmad Shah Duráni, and was deposed in favour of his younger brother, Nasír Khan I.

Nasír Khan I., who reigned from 1755 to 1795, reduced to a regular system the various customs of the confederacy. Under this system the chiefs were grouped into two divisions, Sarawán and Jhalawán, answering to *Highland* and *Lowland*, or, perhaps, more accurately, to *Upper* and *Lower Highland*, and the respective chiefs of these two tribal sections, in association with an hereditary prime minister of Hindú extraction, were the constitutional advisers of the ruler ; the former representing the nobles and their following ; the latter the original inhabitants and traders, besides being the depository of the customs of the realm.

The Khan could call out levies, and make war or peace or treaties ; was the Court of Appeal in any tribal disputes ; could make or revoke the grant of *jágírs* or fiefs in territories under his direct control, and no death sentence could be executed without his confirmation ; but he had no direct powers of government save in his own domains, or in the conquered provinces ; and no armed force to support his authority except that of the levies furnished by the chiefs.

On the death of a khan, his successor was elected by the assembled chiefs, but the khanship was practically hereditary in the Kambaráni family. The chiefs were, in like manner, elected by the tribes upon hereditary principles, but their election was subject to confirmation by the Khan.

This "Constitution" of Nasír Khan I., fairly observed, secured to the confederated tribes nearly a century of substantial prosperity and peaceful government, although



his immediate successors were far from being model rulers.

Mahráb Khan, grandson of Nasír Khan I., was the first to make a serious breach in this constitution by removing the hereditary wazír, and appointing a man of another family, a creature of his own, to the office, and his proceeding was a fatal one. When, in 1838, it was determined by the British Government to replace Shah Shúja on the throne of Kábul, the co-operation of the Khelát chief was sought for, and a British army marched through his territories to Kandahár. Mahráb Khan, through the influence of his dismissed wazír, was accused by our political officers—wrongly, it afterwards appeared—of treachery. In November, 1840, Khelát was stormed by a column of British troops, and Mahráb Khan slain in the assault.\*

The political officers then, without consulting the tribes, placed upon the throne Shah Nawáz Khan, representative of the elder and discarded branch of the family, to the exclusion of the direct heir, the son of Mahráb Khan, and commenced the work of disintegrating Balúchistán. An insurrection followed, during which Shah Nawáz Khan abdicated, and Mahráb Khan's son, known subsequently as Mír Nasír Khan II., was placed upon the throne by the confederated tribes.

Meanwhile, the political officer, Lieutenant Loveday, was carried off a prisoner, and, during a hot pursuit by British troops, barbarously put to death. Ultimately, on the advice of Sir James Outram, Nasír Khan II. was recognized by the British Government, and in October,

\* Sir Robert Sandeman informed the present writer that this event, the most profoundly tragical perhaps in the history of the first Afghán war, was never referred to by the Khan, even at this distance of time, without emotion.

1841, a treaty of friendship was concluded with him. Throughout our disasters in Afghanistan, the Khan remained faithful to his engagements, and loyal to the British Government, and in 1854, under Lord Dalhousie's Government, a fresh treaty was executed. In this treaty the Khan bound himself and his successors (1) to act in all cases in subordinate co-operation with the British Government; and (2) enter into no negotiations with other states without its consent; (3) to permit British troops to be stationed in his territory; (4) to prevent outrage at or near British territory; (5) to protect merchants, and levy no transit duties in excess of a schedule annexed to the treaty. The British Government on its part agreed to pay the Khan an annual subsidy of Rs.50,000.

But Nasir Khan II. had troubles with his chiefs, resulting from his appointment of *khatnah-sáds*, or household slaves, to the wazirship in lieu of members of the family to which the appointment formerly belonged, and from his raising a small body of mercenary troops—a measure which they regarded as a serious encroachment on their liberty. The Khan, however, had shown signs of coming to an amicable arrangement with his chiefs on the basis of a settlement of Nasir Khan I., when in 1857 he died suddenly from poison, administered—it is believed—by the wazir, who found he was about to be abandoned.

Mir Khodádád Khan, brother of Nasir Khan II., was then elected Khan, and held the post until his abdication in 1893. At the time of his elevation he was only sixteen years of age, and at once came under the influence of the household slaves. Soon after his election, the chiefs seem to have pressed somewhat rudely on the Khan their demands for redress of grievances. Khodádád Khan's first act, under the advice of the wazir, was to open fire with his guns upon the chiefs who had just raised him to the

throne, as they lay encamped near the city of Khelát. The chiefs fled in indignation, and revenged themselves by the plunder of his granaries. They then appealed to the British Government for redress ; but the representative of the British Government, acting under instructions, declined to "receive letters or hold communications with men in arms against their king."

From that date until the final reconciliation at Mastung in 1876—a period of nearly twenty years—the Khan was engaged in a series of struggles with the principal Brahúi chiefs, aided from time to time by the Jám of Lus Beyla (a petty feudatory State on the south), and Azád Khan of Khárán, a robber chief on the north-west of his dominions, connected by marriage with the Khan, but alternately giving his allegiance to Persia, Kábul, or Khelát, as suited his convenience. In 1863 the country was reported to be "seething with discontent"; Mír Khodádád Khan was attacked in camp by his cousin, severely wounded, and afterwards dethroned, but in the following year reinstated by the very persons who were accomplices in his overthrow. The struggle then continued, and, with a view of crushing his opponents, the Khan largely increased his mercenary force, consisting, to quote the language of our agent, of "scoundrels of all sorts, Patáns, and Afgháns, and men from all parts of Central Asia," and amounting in 1869 to about 2000 men. But though often defeating, he failed, such was the strength of tribal feeling, to subdue his adversaries. Of his principal Brahúi chiefs, one died in prison, and two fled to Kandahár ; others were exiled, and fines and confiscations were the order of the day ; but the pacification of the country seemed as far off as ever.

In 1869 the British Agent, who had been withdrawn since 1864, was re-appointed, and the chiefs laid before him

a remarkable statement of their grievances. They claimed, (1) the observance of the customs and laws of Nasir Khan I.; (2) the disbandment of the mercenary troops, and the restoration of the fiefs assigned for the support of tribal levies; (3) a reversal of the Khan's act in appointing his own son to the chieftaincy of the lowland clans; (4) the restoration of the chiefs, or their representatives, to the right as of old to share in the civil and military councils of the State; (5) that all treaty engagements should be made with the British Government by the Khan, not simply as Khan, but as head of the Baluch confederation; (6) that since it had become impossible to continue the selection of the wazir from the family in which that office had been hereditary, the chiefs asked that the office might now be made elective, the wazir being elected by the chiefs. Nothing immediately came of these representations, except a flat refusal by the Khan to yield anything.

Meanwhile the state of the country was, as might be supposed, deplorable. The traffic which once flowed from Kandahar by Tal Chotiáli and the Cháchar Pass into the Punjab had wholly ceased; that by the Mulla and Bolán Passes to Sind was interfered with, for the British subsidy which should have been expended in keeping open trade routes was required to keep up the mercenary force. The nobles could not approach the Khan for fear of their lives, and the Khan remained shut up for long periods in his fortress, neglecting the duties of his administration; while his mercenary followers had uncontrolled license, and were a scourge to the country.

There was indeed one ground for satisfaction. Thanks to the influence of officers of the stamp of Col. Sir Henry Green and his brother, Major Malcolm Green, the attitude of both parties during the struggle towards the British Government was of the most friendly and respectful

character. The Khan did his best, with the means at his hand, to carry out the stipulations of the treaty, and during the time of his deposition steadily refused all assistance from foreign powers.

But the Government of India could not remain an unconcerned spectator of events upon its western frontier; *tua res agitur, paries cum proximus ardet*; and in the year 1869 it became a serious question whether some decided action should not be taken.

The action taken will be described in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER V.

KHELÁT AFFAIRS (*continued*).

Policy in Khelát affairs pursued since 1854—Conflict of opinion as to its expediency—Captain Sandeman joins Colonel Phayre in pressing for its reconsideration—The Government of India appealed to—Lord Mayo's Government directs Sir Henry Durand to confer with the Sind Commissioner—Death of Sir Henry Durand at Táńk—Is succeeded by Mr. (now Sir) Henry Davies—Conference held at Mittankot—Joint recommendations submitted and approved by the Government of India.

FROM 1854, the policy in Khelát affairs generally, if not invariably, followed by the Sind and Bombay Governments, and acquiesced in by the Government of India, had been one of non-intervention ; “ to regard the Khan as supreme ruler, and acknowledge no other authority ; to recognize the chiefs in no other capacity than as his subjects, and abstain from all interference otherwise than by friendly counsel and advice.” But such moral assistance as could be given was given in support of the Khan's authority.

Was this policy to be maintained? Such was the question which came before the Supreme Government in 1869.

On this point, unfortunately, there was the greatest divergence of opinion among the local officers. Colonel Phayre, C.B. (now Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Phayre, G.C.B.), who had succeeded Sir Henry Green as Political

Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier, having inquired into the representations of the discontented chiefs, was strongly of opinion that the time had come for a reconsideration of our policy.

‘The Khan of Khelát,’ he argued, ‘was not an autocratic sovereign, but merely the head of a confederacy of chiefs, and bound by the unwritten constitution of Nasir Khan I.; yet the present Khan had throughout his reign, been striving to make himself independent of the constituted form of government, and by so doing had justly incurred the resentment of the chiefs.’ He contended that ‘without the countenance of the British Government the Khan’s rule would be quickly overturned; that it was, consequently, the duty of the Government, which virtually kept him on the throne, to see justice done between him and his discontented chiefs; that, apart from the question of duty, the chiefs were too powerful to be ignored; and that unless decided action were taken disturbances, dangerous to the peace of the border and possibly to British power, would soon occur.’

Colonel Phayre’s immediate superior was the Commissioner in Sind, Colonel Sir William Merewether, K.C.S.I., C.B., an officer of ripe experience in civil and military affairs, who had been more or less identified with the policy pursued towards Khelát since the accession of the present chief. His view, in substance, was as follows —

‘The Khan may be nominally the head of a confederacy, but in reality he is a sovereign prince. At any rate, he is the sole person with whom we have to deal, for the treaty of 1854 was executed with him, and him alone, and we have no right to interfere between him and his subjects. The Khan may not be a perfect character, but he is a fair specimen of an Eastern ruler and more sinned

against than sinning; he has done his best to fulfil his treaty obligations, and it is not for us to criticize his conduct in raising a standing army! The fact is Balúchistán is going through a phase which must inevitably occur when, in the progress of good government, feudal institutions come into collision with the central power. Our policy should be to strengthen, not to weaken, the Khan's hands; above all we should carefully abstain from listening to representations from his rebellious subjects, and no intervention on their behalf should ever be thought of, unless preceded by their absolute submission.'

Captain Sandeman (he had obtained his captaincy in 1868) had, strictly speaking, no *locus standi* in the matter, for he was a Punjab officer with no political powers in reference to Khelát affairs, but his successful dealing with the Khan's subjects along two hundred miles of frontier, and the knowledge he had acquired in his journeyings, gave him, he conceived, a right to speak. Accordingly he addressed a letter to his superior in terms similar to those of Colonel Phayre, and added the expression of his firm conviction that it would be possible by friendly inquiry and intervention to settle the disputes between the Khan and his Sirdárs.

Lord Mayo's Government, to whom these representations were referred by the Governments of Bombay and the Punjab respectively, directed, in the first instance, Major-General Sir Henry Durand, R.E., then Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab—who, as Engineer Officer in the first Afghán war, and more recently as Foreign Secretary and Member of the Government of India, had had considerable experience of Khelát affairs—to have a conference with Sir William Merewether in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel Phayre and Captain Sandeman, in view to the "submission of such proposals in regard to frontier tribes



and the status of the Khan of Khelát and the members of the Balúch confederacy as will enable the Supreme Government to reconcile existing differences of opinion, and decide on a strictly uniform line of policy for the Sind and Punjab frontier."

Sir Henry Durand arranged for the conference, but was destined never to attend it. On his way thither, down the Punjab frontier, he halted at Tánk, a small township in the Déra Ismáel Khan district, and proposed to visit the town upon an elephant in company with the local Nawáb. While passing through the covered gateway a portion of the howdah touched a projecting beam; the elephant became frightened, and dashed through. Unfortunately, owing to the rising ground, the inner orifice of the gateway was much smaller than the outer; the howdah was crushed, and both occupants were severely injured. The Nawáb had three ribs broken. Sir Henry Durand was crushed out of the howdah, fell heavily on a low wall backwards, injured his spine, and died the following day, deeply regretted by the Government he served and by all who knew him. He was succeeded in office by Mr. (now Sir) Henry Davies, then Chief Commissioner of Oude, but formerly Secretary to the Punjab Government.

The conference was held on February 3, 1871, at Mittankot in the Déra Gházi Khan district. The Punjab was represented by the Lieutenant-Governor, Mr. Henry Davies, and the secretaries in the civil and military departments, the General commanding the Punjab Frontier Force, the Commissioner of the Derajáť division, and Captain Sandeman; Sind by the Commissioner, Sir William Merewether, and Colonel Phayre, Political Superintendent of the Frontier, Upper Sind. It was of the most friendly character and unanimous in its conclusions. Both Sind and Punjab authorities were clearly

of opinion that the existing state of things, under which the political relations of the British Government with the Balúch tribes on its border were partly under the control of the Sind Government and partly under that of the Punjab, should cease, and that hereafter such relations should be under the control of the Government of Sind ; and, with this view, they recommended—

(1) That Captain Sandeman, though a Punjab officer and in charge of a Punjab district, should, *quâ* these tribes, be under the orders of the Political Superintendent of the Sind Frontier ; (2) That all arrangements with frontier tribes recognizing the suzerainty of the Khan of Khelát should be made, so far as possible, through the Khan and not directly with the chiefs. They fully approved of the employment of tribal horsemen for protecting trade-routes and keeping up friendly communications in the manner set on foot by Captain Sandeman, and recommended, (3) That the system be extended ; but, with a view of maintaining the authority of the Khan, they further proposed, (4) That all payments to the local chiefs should be made in the name, not of the British Government, but of the Khan of Khelát.

But on the most important question, the internal condition of Khelát and the relations of the Khan with his Sirdárs, no joint recommendation was submitted, as the new Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab wisely abstained from expressing an opinion on a subject on which he was imperfectly informed.

By a Resolution of the Government of India, dated October 19, 1871, the joint recommendations were sanctioned, and the policy of the Bombay Government, under which the Khan of Khelát was regarded as supreme ruler and the rights of his confederate chiefs unrecognized, was “generally approved.” In other words, a fresh trial

was to be given, under somewhat altered conditions, to the policy of "non-intervention."

But one important point was gained. The employment of tribal horsemen for the protection of trade-routes on the frontier (the germ of the tribal levy system) was recognized and approved.

## CHAPTER VI.

KHELÁT AFFAIRS (*continued*).

General rising of the tribes throughout Khelát territory—Commissioner in Sind refuses to avail himself of Captain Sandeman's experience—New departure in Imperial Policy declared by Lord Mayo's Government—Commissioner in Sind to mediate between the Khan and his Sirdárs—Sir William Mercwether's mediation and award—Lord Mayo assassinated and succeeded in the Viceroyship by Lord Northbrook—Sir William Merewether's proceedings approved—Colonel Phayre removed, and Captain Sandeman reminded of his subordination to the Commissioner in Sind—Captain Sandeman watches events—A glimpse at his proceedings at Déra Gházi Khan in a letter from Lady White, and in Mr. Ball's "Jungle Life in India."

NO sooner was the Resolution referred to in the last chapter passed than intelligence was received of serious disturbances at Quetta (the Khan's northern fortress) and Mastung, a highland valley, the head-quarters of the Sarawán chiefs. Colonel Phayre, in reporting the occurrence, described the outbreak as "a national uprising against oppression;" the Commissioner in Sind, as "a local *émeute* got up by the local chiefs, encouraged by the sympathy in their cause indiscreetly exhibited by our frontier officers."

However this might be, the rising spread and the exiled chiefs were soon upon the scene; Kachi was quickly in rebellion; Dádar, the Khan's outpost at the mouth of the Bolán, was taken after three days' resistance, and the Khan's representative burnt alive; Bágh (the capital

of Kach Gandáva) and Gandáva, the Khan's winter residence, were occupied by tribesmen; Lus Beyla in the south fell into the hands of Alí Khan Jamót, a relative of the ex-chief, then a political *détenu* in British territory; the western province of Kej-Makrán threw off its allegiance; caravans were plundered, and by the end of the year nearly the whole of the domains were in the hands of the revolted Sirdárs.

In this crisis it was suggested to the Commissioner in Sind that he might usefully avail himself of Captain Sandeman's experience, and the latter was directed by the Foreign Office to proceed to Jacobábád for consultation. But the Commissioner declined to avail himself of Captain Sandeman's services. At length, on January 11, 1872, the Government of India addressed the Bombay Government a despatch which marked a new departure in the imperial policy.

In this despatch it is noted that the insurrection would in all probability not have proceeded so far unless based on some genuine grievances and supported by popular sympathy, and doubts were, for the first time, expressed as to the "soundness of a policy, which refuses to receive overtures from the insurgent chiefs except on their unconditional surrender." Military assistance for the suppression of internal revolt was definitely refused; but pecuniary assistance was promised, on the condition that the Khan accepted the mediation of the Commissioner in Sind in respect to the Sirdárs' grievances, and that he "would consent eventually to such a change in his administration as would give the principal chiefs a due share in the government of the country and an interest in the maintenance of order."

The despatch reporting these important proceedings to the Secretary of State for India was signed by Lord Mayo,

Sir John Strachey, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, Sir Barrow Ellis, and Sir Henry Norman.

The Khan agreed to the mediation, and, with one exception, the rebel Brahúi chiefs suspended hostilities and attended at Jacobábád on March 6, 1872, to submit their grievances to the arbitrament of the Commissioner in Sind.

In all, six chiefs attended, representing the principal Brahúi tribes of the Sarawán, or upper highland group. The only chief who did not comply with the conditions and attend was Núrdín Míngal, a lowland chief connected by marriage with the ex-chief of Lus Beyla. The Khan was represented by his wazír, Shah Ghássi Wali Muhammad, originally a household slave, but one of whose integrity and courage the Commissioner had a high opinion. Captain Sandeman also attended by direction of the Government of India, and submitted to the Commissioner a memorandum, containing "Remarks and observations on the present position of affairs in the Khelát State," in which he boldly set forth what he conceived to be the errors of the policy pursued towards the Khan and his Sirdárs.\* But he was not allowed to be present at or take part in the inquiry.

After a patient and elaborate investigation, extending over several days, the Commissioner delivered his award. He found that the Sirdárs had no valid grievances, and were wholly in the wrong, but as they had been misled, he promised that the Khan would, as an act of clemency, restore the lands and allowances which had been confiscated on condition that they, for the future, paid due allegiance to their ruler, and that all property plundered, whether from caravans or the cultivators of Balúchistán, during the disturbances be restored to their respective

\* In a letter to Commissioner in Sind, dated March 6, 1872, printed at p. 255 of Blue Book on Balúchistán (No. I.), 1877.

owners. With regard to giving the principal chiefs a share in the administration, the Commissioner observed that at present it would be "difficult and probably dangerous;" but the Political Agent would do his best to induce the Khan to follow such a course as would draw his chiefs towards him.

During this critical period in the history of Khelát affairs a change took place in the Government of India. Lord Mayo, the author of the "new departure," was assassinated in the Andamans and was succeeded in the Viceroyship by Lord Northbrook; and Sir James Fitzjames Stephen's place, as Law Member of Council, was taken by Mr. (now Lord) Hobhouse.

The award of the Commissioner came before the Council, thus newly constituted, and on May 30, 1872, Lord Northbrook's Government recorded its emphatic approval of Sir William Merewether's proceedings. It was afterwards arranged that Colonel Phayre, the Political Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier, who had gone on leave after the inquiry, should not return to his old post; and Captain Sandeman was reminded of his subordination to the Commissioner in Sind in matters relating to the frontier tribes.

Between this date and the latter part of 1874 Captain Sandeman took no prominent part in Khelát affairs, but he, nevertheless, kept a watchful eye on the progress of events. We find him busily engaged in collecting information as to trade routes in Balúchistán, and we have an interesting glimpse at his proceedings and ideas in a letter from Lady White, wife of the present Commander-in-Chief in India. She tells us that in the cold weather of 1872-3, she accompanied her father and mother on a visit to Captain Sandeman at Dera Gházi Khan, and well remembers his bringing out a map of the frontier, pointing

out Quetta, and saying—"That is where we ought to be, and that is where I hope to be some day."

Some seventeen years afterwards the two met again at Quetta—one as Governor-General's Agent for Balúchistán, the other as wife of the General commanding.

We have another glimpse of Sandeman and his surroundings about this time in Mr. V. Ball's "Jungle Life in India," published in 1880.

Mr. Ball, who is now Director of the Science and Art Museum in Dublin, was *formerly employed in the Geological Survey Department of India*, and in 1874 was sent to report on traces of coal recently discovered by Captain Sandeman in the Balúch hills.

Accordingly, in the summer of 1874, he visited Sandeman at his summer quarters in the Sulimáns, and accompanied him on a tour through the hill country to the Chamálang valley (where the coal was situated), and back by the Hun pass and the country of the Khetráns. The seams of coal turned out to be too thin to be of any practical value, but in the record of his journeyings Mr. Ball has given an interesting account of the state of the country and of Sandeman's commanding influence over the tribes.

His camp included a vast gathering of tribesmen. There were 16 chiefs—seven British and nine from independent territory—with followers aggregating about 1500, of whom half were mounted. "In this vast assemblage," says Mr. Ball, "I did not once hear anything like a squabble going on—not even high words. . . . It seemed as if, for the time, the British flag had quieted all animosities."

The writer then graphically describes the meeting between Captain Sandeman and the chiefs of the Lúni Patán tribes (within whose lands the coal-seams had been found)—a formidable looking band, armed with long tapering spears. On seeing Sandeman, however, they one and all



hastily dismounted and made obeisance, and presented offerings to the great English Sáhíb.

Mr. Ball notices the numerous piles of stones along the old caravan route to Kandahár,—each pile marking the spot where some tribesman or traveller had been shot down; he describes the stretches of valley irrigable by mountain streams, but then left desolate, owing to inter-tribal feuds, and quotes the farewell remark of a Khetrán chief, as the cavalcade moved homewards:—"We are sorry you are leaving. Henceforth turmoil and raiding will form the principal events of our daily life."

Since 1874—thanks to Sandeman—a mighty change has taken place, and "turmoil and raiding" have ceased in the Khetrán hills. But we must return, in the next chapter, to the year 1872.

## CHAPTER VII.

KHELAT AFFAIRS (*continued*)

The results of Sir William Merewether's award—The Khan dismisses his Wazír and appoints new councillors distasteful to the Commissioner, who causes them to be detained in British territory as political prisoners—Khan's interview with Lord Northbrook at Sukkur—The Khan becomes impracticable—Our Agent recalled from Khelat, and Khan's subsidy suspended—Affairs in Baluchistán drift into anarchy—Sir William Merewether proposes a military expedition to dethrone the Khan—Captain Sandeman proposes a friendly mission—Captain Sandeman's proposal accepted by the Supreme Government.

THE result of Sir William Merewether's well-intended mediation was grievously disappointing. The Kurds, the Kákáirs, and the Marrís, who had real or supposed grievances against the Khan, were disappointed because they were not included in the settlement. The Brahúi chiefs felt that the conditions imposed upon them were impossible of fulfilment. The Khan was disappointed at the amount of the subvention, and at having to restore confiscated estates instead of being placed in a position to crush his enemies.

On May 24, 1872, news was received of the plunder of a caravan in the Bolán Pass by a section of the Marrís in revenge for an injury inflicted by the Khan's order. On June 14 the Khan dismissed the wazír Shah Ghassi Muhammad, who had represented him at the arbitration, and appointed as his councillors persons

distasteful to the Commissioner in Sind, and objected to carry out the provisions of the treaty. Matters were patched up for a time, and the Khan was induced by a threat of withdrawal of the Agent to reinstate the wazir and hand over his new councillors for detention as political prisoners in British territory; and on November 5, 1872, he was permitted to pay his respects to Lord Northbrook at Sukkur on the Indus, but his demeanour, though respectful, was far from satisfactory. He was nervously apprehensive of detention, paid little heed to friendly advice, and seemed chiefly intent upon obtaining the release of his dismissed councillors.

After the interview at Sukkur, the Khan became more and more impracticable, and at length, on April 23, 1873, Major Harrison, the Political Agent at Khelát, was recalled, and the wazir, who feared for his life, was permitted to accompany him to British territory. The subsidy of Rs.50,000 per annum was also suspended in consequence of the non-fulfilment of treaty obligations.

From that date the affairs of Balúchistán steadily drifted into a state of anarchy. Frequent outrages occurred on the caravan route between Karáchi and Khelát; the wording of communications to the Commissioner in Sind became less and less respectful, and at length, on February 10, 1874, a party of 200 Brahúis crossed the Sind border, and forcibly carried off certain slaves who had taken refuge in British territory. At the same time difficulties were increasing with the Marri tribe, whose chief failed to make restitution of plundered property and evaded compliance with the Political Superintendent's order to attend at Jacobábád.

In these circumstances the Commissioner in Sind proposed to send a military expedition to depose the Khan and place upon the throne a more competent and

amenable successor ; and, at the same time, to reduce the Marrís to order by establishing a blockade against the tribe along the Sind and Punjab borders simultaneously.

The Government of India declined, for the present, to sanction the military expedition, and, after consulting the Punjab Government, demurred to the blockade, which would inflict more injury on British subjects than on the tribe they were seeking to coerce.

At this juncture Captain Sandeman made a suggestion—a suggestion, simple and obvious enough, but not the less valuable ; it proved, in fact, to be a turning point in the history of our frontier policy. He recommended that, before resorting to military coercion, an effort should be made to effect an amicable settlement between the Khan and the opposing tribes by the despatch of a Mission of Sind and Punjab officers, accompanied by friendly Balúch chiefs, with power to inquire into and settle tribal disputes and grievances.

This suggestion was supported by the Punjab Government and favourably regarded by the Government of India, but, as might have been expected, was strongly objected to by the Commissioner in Sind. There was much correspondence, and Captain Sandeman was sent to Jacobábád to confer with Colonel Loch, the newly appointed Political Superintendent of the Sind Frontier. But the conference was abortive ; thereupon, on November 16, 1874, Captain Sandeman recorded a forcible statement of his policy,\* while the Commissioner in Sind pressed his views on the Government with great vigour and ability.

The latter's policy was the old one of *parcere subjectis et debellare superbis*. "The Marrís," he said, "do not understand forbearance. They must be taught obedience. If the Marri Chief is so proud as to refuse compliance with

\* Balúchistán Blue Book, i. 1877, p. 514.

our demands he must be curbed, and by a good thrashing if persistence makes it necessary."

"But what," asks Captain Sandeman, "have been the results of such a policy? Has the object of civilizing the Búgti been obtained by Sir Charles Napier's campaign, which took place after the conquest of Sind? Did they carry off less cattle in the recent depredations?"\* Again, "in dealing with a proud frontier chieftain," he continues, "we must be careful so to frame our requests that our negotiations are not at the outset brought to an end." "Our efforts should be directed to win the confidence of himself and the minor chiefs, without whose aid our experiment must fail." And he concludes by offering—in the interests of peace—to proceed himself to the Balúch hills and endeavour to ascertain by friendly inquiry the "true causes which have led to these continued disturbances."

Ultimately, after a personal conference with the Commissioner in Sind at Calcutta, the Viceroy in Council decided—to adopt Captain Sandeman's proposals. It was resolved:—That Captain Sandeman should henceforth be the sole medium of communication between the Marrí and Búgti tribes and the Commissioner in Sind; that he should, in the first instance, procure by friendly explanation the attendance and submission of the Marrí chiefs and the surrender of plundered property; this accomplished, he should prepare to proceed beyond the border in the manner proposed by him, and endeavour to effect a friendly settlement of inter-tribal feuds.

A novel and difficult task was thus imposed on Captain Sandeman, the successful fulfilment of which was to be a condition precedent to further action. He was to induce

\* Thanks to Robert Sandeman, the Búgtis are now staunch friends of the British Government, and their Chief, Shabbáz Khan, was, in 1890, created a Nawáb.

"by friendly explanation" a robber tribe, for years past the terror of the border, to disgorge its plunder and formally tender its submission in British territory—a humiliation never before submitted to, except under pressure of blockade or reprisals, or some other form of military coercion.

Sandeman succeeded ; and he did so—it will be seen—by a measure as bold and self-sacrificing as it was effective.

He proceeded himself to the Marri hills, unaccompanied by any military escort. What followed can best be told in his own words :—

"I went," he says, "to a spot near the Marri headquarters of Káhan, well known as a trysting place. I had no troops with me. There I summoned the Marri chiefs and explained the whole matter to them. Vainly they pleaded that they had not committed the raid. I could but answer, 'Restore the cattle, proceed to Jacobábád, and ask for pardon, or take the consequence.' They said, 'If we go there, we will be imprisoned.' I answered, 'No, you will not.' At last it was settled that I should remain in the hills as a hostage for their safe return. I did so. All the principal chiefs, including the Sirdár Ghazan Khan (who was supposed to be endowed with supernatural powers and to be too holy a man to visit our stations), set out for Jacobábád, saying, 'Sahib, we will do your bidding ; you are responsible for results,' or words to that effect. All ended well."

The preliminary condition was satisfactorily accomplished. The plundered property, or its value, was disgorged and handed over ; Ghazan Khan and the other Marri chiefs arrived at Jacobábád and paid their respects to the Political Superintendent of the Sind Frontier ; and by the middle of November, 1875, all was in readiness for the adventurous expedition.

Before starting, Captain Sandeman received through

the Commissioner in Sind the following instructions from the Government of India, dated October 16, 1875 :—

"At present the real causes of the quarrels and disturbances which prevail are but imperfectly known. Without fuller and more explicit explanation there is little prospect of the influence of the British Government being applied to their settlement. His Excellency in Council therefore desires that Captain Sandeman shall proceed to the Marri hills as early in the cold season as possible, in order to (1) procure what information he can respecting local feuds and quarrels among the Marri and Búgti tribes, or between them and the Afgháns, or between them and the Brahúis ; (2) to endeavour as far as he can to bring about an amicable settlement of these quarrels ; (3) to report for the information of Government, through the Commissioner in Sind, his views on such as he cannot settle ; and (4) to report on the general relations between the Marri and Búgti tribes and the Khan's Government. Sir William Merewether may, if he think fit, depute an officer from Sind to be associated with Captain Sandeman, but in subordination to him.

"Captain Sandeman will also inquire and report whether anything, and if so, what, can be done for the protection of trade, *viâ* the Bolán ; and whether a system of fixed tolls for caravans could not be arranged for, the proceeds of which would go to the tribes employed in the protection of the routes. In respect to all or any of these objects, Captain Sandeman will have discretion to make any arrangements he may think advisable within the total sum sanctioned after the Mittankót Conference, namely, Rs.66,960 per annum.

"At the same time, considering the importance of the Kandahár trade, his Excellency in Council thinks it advisable that an alternative route should be opened up whereby the trade may be rendered to some extent independent of the Bolán, and may not be liable to interruption by the feuds in Khelát. For this purpose the Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab is authorized to take such measures as His Honor may think practicable to open up the old trade route from Kandahár *viâ* Tal Chotiáli, and if necessary to communicate with His Highness the Amír of Afghanistan with a view to enlist the co-operation of the Kábul authorities.

"Should the measures now authorized be successful in affording reasonable security to trade through Khelát territory, and should His Highness the Khan show an earnest desire to co-operate for this end, and to return to a proper sense of his duties, it will afford the Governor-General in Council great pleasure, on receiving an expression of regret for what has occurred, to restore the former subsidy and re-establish the old friendly footing with His Highness's Government."

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CAPTAIN SANDEMAN'S FIRST MISSION.

Its enthusiastic reception by the Chiefs—Friendly messages from the Khan—His proceedings interfered with by the Commissioner in Sind—Clashing instructions—Captain Sandeman refers to the Foreign Office and proceeds—Mission peremptorily recalled by the Commissioner in Sind—Commissioner's orders overruled by the Government of India—Captain Sandeman supported and Commissioner in Sind relieved of responsibility for Khelát affairs—First interview with the Khan, who is at first cordial, but afterwards doubts the extent of Captain Sandeman's powers—Un-  
toward events—Captain Sandeman returns with a letter from the Khan—Government of India decides to send a second mission—Change of Government.

CAPTAIN SANDEMAN left Déra Gházi Khan on November 18, 1875, and crossed the frontier from Harrand on the 22nd, reporting his departure to the Commissioner in Sind. He had a small personal escort of Punjab troops under the command of Captain Wylie, but no Sind officer was associated with him. In his train was a large following of mounted *Balúches* of the *Déra Gházi Khan* district, headed by their *tumandárs*, or chiefs, and numbering in all from 1000 to 1200 horsemen. Similar tribal escorts had accompanied him in journeys through the hills on previous occasions, but never on so grand a scale as this; and "the moral effect of such a gathering of clans assembled publicly in the interests of peace\* must have been great."

\* Colonel Munro's Report.



His welcome by the chiefs and tribesmen in Khelát territory was enthusiastic, and from the time he crossed the border until his reception by the Khan his march resembled a triumphal procession. On November 25, and following days, various sections of the Marrí tribe appeared and joined his retinue. The Khetráns and Búgti chiefs then presented themselves with a considerable following, and the mission, thus swollen in proportions, entered Káhan, the Marrí capital, and received a cordial reception from Ghazan Khan, the chief, who had advanced to meet it.

Information was here received that a rising of the Brahúi clans against the Khan's Government was imminent, and that the Marrí tribe was urged to join, but the Marrí chief was ready to accept Captain Sandeman's mediation. On December 8 he reached Sibi—then in the territory of the Amír of Kábul—and in a letter to his father he thus describes his march:—

“Camp Sibi,

“December 10, 1875.

“MY DEAREST OLD FATHER,

“I marched in perfect security straight through the Marrí hills to this, which is a political triumph in itself. The Marrí chiefs have behaved very well, and did not seem to mind my marching through the very heart of their country. The road through their hills is quite open, and quite fit for an army. The distance from the Punjab is 180 miles. The view from the plains here is very fine. The mountains of Khorassán rise right in front of us, their tops being covered with snow. All in camp are well, our chiefs being in great spirits at the success of our march. I am very grateful and thankful that all has prospered so well hitherto, and if I could restore peace to this distracted country it will be a very great matter. I have much, very much, still to accomplish before that is effected, but I am in excellent heart and spirits, and trust that God will bless the good work I know I am attempting to accomplish.

“Your loving Son,

“R. G. SANDEMAN.”

At Sibi he met the principal Brahúi chiefs, who found

this outlying strip of Afghán territory a convenient centre for machinations against the Khan. These, too, accepted his good offices, and agreed to suspend hostilities, and accompany the mission to Quetta through the Bolán Pass, the opening of which was one of the objects of Captain Sandeman's deputation. The Marrís and Brahúis further agreed to prepare a joint petition to the Khan for reconciliation, and to send it by the hand of two of Captain Sandeman's trusted Balúch chiefs. A letter from Captain Sandeman to the Khan, dated December 12, was sent to His Highness in advance, and acknowledged by him in friendly terms.

A deputation here met him from the Khan's commandant, inviting him to Dádar, at the mouth of the Bolán, and on arrival he was received with the salute of eleven guns; the chiefs and people were most friendly, and the merchants implored his assistance in opening the pass. On the 15th he marched for Kirta, in the Bolán, where he was joined by the pass headmen.

Everything was thus progressing favourably, when an express reached him from the Commissioner in Sind, containing subsidiary instructions, dated November 21. These subsidiary instructions prohibited Captain Sandeman from proceeding beyond the Marrí hills, or taking any action with reference to the Brahúis, and required him to meet the Commissioner in Sind before the end of December. The instructions arrived too late to be complied with, and conflicted with subsidiary instructions he had received from the Punjab Government to proceed beyond the Bolán Pass, and arrange for opening up a new trade route, and also with the orders of the Government of India which had been sent to him for guidance. He was thus placed in an exceedingly embarrassing position, but adopted what seemed to him

to be the wisest course. He referred for instructions to the Foreign Office, and meanwhile proceeded on his journey.

Just before reaching Quetta, he received another message from the Commissioner in Sind, dated December 13, informing him that a revolution was imminent, and that he was not to communicate with the Brahúis, or proceed in the direction of the Bolán Pass, or Sibi. To this he replied that fortunately a revolution was no longer imminent, that he was engaged in carrying out the instructions of the Government of India, the result of which would be soon known.

Captain Sandeman arrived at Quetta on December 24, and was received with every mark of honour by the Khan's agent, who placed in his hands a letter from His Highness, offering to meet him at any place he desired to name; he also received a communication from the Sirdárs, whom he had sent to the Khan, reporting that His Highness had agreed to grant peace to his vassals on the terms of Nasir Khan I.'s settlement.

On the same day, however, he received another express from Jacobábád, peremptorily directing his return to Dera Gházi Khan. To this direction Captain Sandeman replied, that compliance was impossible without sacrificing the objects of his mission, and again referred for orders to the Foreign Office.

After a lively interchange of telegrams and letters between the Foreign Office and the Commissioner in Sind, the Government of India decided that Captain Sandeman had proceeded in conformity with the letter and spirit of their instructions, and must be supported; and that, as the Commissioner in Sind had evinced irreconcilable difference of opinion with the Government of India in reference to Khelát affairs, it was necessary to relieve him



DISTANT VIEW OF QUETTA From a Dra wing by Captain M Fall



of all responsibility for them. Accordingly, the conduct of Khelát affairs was transferred from the Commissioner in Sind and the Political Superintendent of the Sind Frontier to Colonel Munro, the Commissioner of the Deraját division of the Punjab, and remained in charge of that officer until the creation of the Balúchistán agency.

Meanwhile, the effect of the communications from Jacobábád, the purport of which appears to have become generally known, was unfortunatê. Doubts arose as to the objects of Captain Sandeman's mission, and the extent of his political authority. But Captain Sandeman put a bold face on matters, and proceeded to Khelát. Here he was received by the Khan with honour and great friendliness.

. Mír Khodádád Khan (whom Sandeman now saw for the first time), whatever may be his merits—and he has, or had, many—cannot be said to be attractive in appearance. "He is of small stature, has dark piercing eyes, swarthy complexion, and long black ringlets, usually surmounted by a gay shawl turban. His features are not regular, and his expression, though generally careless and by no means ill-tempered, can on occasion be determined, sullen, or even ferocious." Such is his description by one who knew him well.

However, at the first day's interview, he was particularly gracious and created a very favourable impression. But on the following day it was evident that his attitude towards the mission was somewhat changed. This, he frankly admitted, was in consequence of his being uncertain as to the extent of Captain Sandeman's powers. "If," he said, "I do as you suggest, and the Sind Commissioner objects, I shall be in an unpleasant situation." Accordingly he drew back from his promise at

once to grant peace on the basis of "Nasír Khan's settlement," but still professed his entire dependence on the British Government, and his readiness to obey its directions whatever they might be. "I have an office," said His Highness, "filled with letters advising me to pursue the policy I am engaged on"—the policy of crushing his Sirdárs—"but if," he added, "the British Government, after hearing my representations, give me directions to change this policy, I will do so." He added that arrangements for opening the Bolán Pass to traffic practically involved the entire question of his relations with the Brahúi chiefs, and could not be carried out until a settlement was made.

Afterwards, at Captain Sandeman's request, he received the Brahúi Sirdárs and Marri and Búgti chiefs in *durbár*, expressed his willingness to forgive the past, and to abstain from hostilities against them, pending the decision of the Supreme Government; and eventually made Captain Sandeman the bearer of a letter to the Viceroy couched in submissive terms, asking permission to offer an explanation of his conduct, through Captain Sandeman, or to attend at any placè appointed to offer it in person.

Matters were so far fairly satisfactory. Captain Sandeman did not indeed succeed in carrying out all the objects of his mission, but had proved one important fact, namely, that the advent of a British officer as mediator was welcome to the Khan and chiefs alike. But unfortunately during the stay of the mission in Khelát two events occurred which seemed likely to place difficulty in the way of effective mediation.

In the first place, on the very day after the *durbár* at which the Khan had declared for a suspension of hostilities, his agent in Kachi (acting, as the Khan afterwards admitted,



И. И. АИ. КНОУДЭД Р. АН. ТЖ-НАН ОЕ КИГЛА





under his own orders) opened fire upon some Brahúi followers of the Sirdárs, killed several, and carried off some head of sheep and goats. The occurrence was announced by the Khan himself, who explained that it was in punishment for an attempt to plunder. Captain Sandeman was justly aggrieved at the Khan's conduct, but the leading Brahúi chiefs did not attach, apparently, much importance to it.

The second and most serious occurrence was, that Núrdín, the Mingal chief, was killed by the Khan's troops a few days after Captain Sandeman had left Khelát. The chief had arrived at Khelát some time before Captain Sandeman, and his advent was in no way connected with that officer's visit; his death, therefore, was not in violation of the pledge of safety given to the chiefs accompanying Captain Sandeman. The Khan, indeed, who was the first to inform Captain Sandeman of the event, explained that, in causing the death of the sirdár, he simply anticipated an attempt to be made on his own life.

However this might be, the occurrence had an unfortunate effect, and it was with a somewhat heavy heart that Captain Sandeman proceeded on his return journey, escorted by Brahúi and Marrí chiefs. He was still, however, received with respect and consideration, and was able during his journey to settle the disputes of several Balúch tribes. At Mal he dismissed his Brahúi and Balúch escort; at Kirta, in the Bolán Pass, he received a letter from the Sind Commissioner severely censuring his conduct; but on emerging from the pass on the next day he received the satisfactory intimation that his troubles from the Sind quarter were over, and soon afterwards joined the camp of the Commissioner of the Deraját division, then en route for Jacobábád to take over from Sir William Merewether

the management of Khelát affairs. His feelings are thus described in a letter to his father :—

“Camp, Balúch hills,

“January 21, 1876.

“ . . . . . “It is very jolly, is it not, dear old father, matters ending so nicely? Now Munro is at the head of affairs, once the country is quiet, I shall easily get home. Perhaps not this hot weather, but shortly after it, say this time next year. God grant we may live till then to meet again. I have had a hard battle, but the conquest is complete. Thank God for His goodness to the people and to me. We have still a hard nut to crack with H. H. the Khan, but I doubt not all will come well. I am still left pretty independent and permitted to carry out my own views in accordance with the Resolution of the 16th of October last. One of our chiefs, Sirdar Imám Buksh Khan Mazári (a most intelligent man), when I told him the news, said, ‘Yes! Sahib, honesty triumphs in the long run. We have worked for the Government and people, and God has prospered us.’”

Meanwhile events in Balúchistán progressed. The highland sirdárs, having lost all confidence in the Khan in consequence of the death of Núrdín, were in communication with the lowlanders, in view to a general rebellion; plunder and anarchy generally prevailed, and raiding by Marrís and Brahúís went on freely in Kachi. On March 11 a collision was reported between the highland clans and the Khan’s troops on the Marri border, and the highlanders were said to be concerting a combined movement against the Khan, expressing disappointment at the inaction of the British Government. Meanwhile Kandahár caravans returned from Hindustan had arrived at Shikárpur, and the merchants were clamouring for assistance through the pass. In these circumstances it became necessary for Lord Northbrook’s Government promptly to decide upon the course to be pursued, whether to abandon the task of mediation or to make a renewed attempt. Lord Northbrook’s Government decided upon the latter course in a Resolution dated Fort William, March 14, 1876.

Orders were issued to Major Sandeman \* to return to Khelát, arrange for another meeting with the Khan and his Sirdárs, and make a renewed attempt to carry out the objects of his first mission ; he was further directed, if the Khan should show a proper spirit, to effect the re-establishment of friendly relations between him and the British Government.

At the same time measures were taken to disarm the possible suspicions of the Amír of Kábul by keeping our agent duly informed of the nature and objects of Major Sandeman's deputation.

It unfortunately happened, as had happened on a previous occasion, that in this most critical position of affairs a change took place in the *personnel* of the Government of India. Lord Northbrook resigned his office, and was succeeded in the Viceroyalty by Lord Lytton, a statesman of splendid ability and considerable diplomatic experience, but necessarily unversed in Indian affairs. Before Lord Lytton had assumed office Major Sandeman's mission was well on its way to the Bolán.

\* He had attained the rank of Major on February 8, 1876.

## CHAPTER IX.

## MAJOR SANDEMAN'S SECOND MISSION.

Anxieties at starting—Lord Lytton succeeds to the Viceroyship—His attitude towards the mission—Cholera attacks the escort—No instructions from head-quarters for many weeks, until the Khan's assent to mediation is reported—Major Sandeman arranges for a meeting of Khan and Chiefs at Mastung, and meantime makes arrangements for re-opening the Bolán Pass—The gathering at Mastung—Committee of arbitration appointed—All disputes settled and reconciliation between Khan and Chiefs formally proclaimed—Colonel Colley, Military Secretary to the Viceroy, proceeds to Khelát with draft treaty, and Khan prepares to meet the Viceroy at Jacobábád.

MAJOR SANDEMAN started on his second mission on April 4, 1876, bearing a letter to the Khan from the Viceroy (Lord Northbrook), couched in the following terms, and dated March 20 :—

“I have received your Highness's letter in which you communicate your wish to remain under the protection of the British Government, and your urgent desire to offer explanations in order to prevent a severance of the friendly relations which long existed between Khelát and the British Government.

“My friend ! the British Government has always desired the maintenance of friendly relations with the Khelát State, and I would remind your Highness that the suspension of those relations, which has unhappily continued for nearly three years past, is the result of your Highness's own conduct.

“Nevertheless, I am willing to accept your Highness's communication as evidence of regret for the past and a desire for reconciliation. I have accordingly determined to authorize Colonel Munro, the officer now in charge of Khelát affairs, to depute Major Sandeman, an officer

who possesses my full confidence, and with whom your Highness is already personally acquainted, for the purpose of conferring with your Highness upon the affairs of Khelát, and if possible effecting a settlement of all disputes.

"I take this step in the expectation that your Highness will not fail to co-operate sincerely and heartily with Major Sandeman in the adjustment of all existing differences, whether in respect to your relations with my Government, or in respect to the Chieftains and tribes of Balúchistán.

"By hearkening to Major Sandeman's counsels, and acting in conformity with his advice, your Highness will afford the best proof of the sincerity of your professions, and relieve me from the necessity of taking further measures to secure the tranquillity of the British frontier and the protection of trade."

His military escort was on a far larger scale than on the previous occasion, being, in accordance with instructions, of such strength as was considered "amply sufficient" for his protection and dignity. It consisted of two mountain guns; a wing of regiment of Sind Horse; two companies of Jacob's Rifles from the garrison at Jacobábád; 100 sabres of the 4th Punjab Cavalry; three companies of the 4th Sikhs from the Punjab Frontier Force.

The tribal following was designedly much smaller, but the faithful Sirdárs, Imám Baksh Khan, Mazári and Jumál Khan, Loghári, were there; and so far all was well. Relieved from the trammels which impeded him on his first mission, and armed with full credentials, Major Sandeman was now in a position to carry out effectively the instructions he had received.

But there were elements of grave anxiety; the hot weather had set in; fifty miles of desert lay before him, then a toilsome journey of sixty miles along the shingly bed of a dry torrent, shut in by stupendous cliffs without a blade of vegetation, before the uplands could be reached; moreover, cholera was in the air, and as he quitted British territory, there followed a vast train of caravans with some

4000 to 5000 baggage animals, and from 6000 to 7000 followers, glad to avail themselves of the protection of his force in their journey through the Bolán Pass. But what caused him most anxiety was the fact that on April 12, 1876, Lord Northbrook had been succeeded by a new Viceroy, and it was doubtful how far the latter would support the policy of his predecessor.

It is no secret that Lord Lytton came to India with grave doubts as to the opportuneness of the measures taken in reference to Khelát affairs and the suitability of the agency employed. His doubts were strengthened during his intercourse with officials at Bombay, and one of the first topics discussed with his Council was the propriety of giving immediate orders for the recall of the Khelát mission.\*

Ultimately it was decided that the mission should not be recalled or halted, but no communication, official or demi-official, was to be made to its leader for the present.

Meantime at Bágh, on the far side of the desert between British territory and Balúchistán, the dreaded cholera attacked Major Sandeman's escort with some virulence; and he himself had a choleraic seizure. It also appeared among the caravans, and something like a panic ensued. Pressure was put upon Major Sandeman to return to British territory and await instructions; but he scouted the idea, and, thanks to the friendly assistance

\* Lord Lytton came to India with the following programme. It was intended that Sir Lewis Pelly should proceed, as special envoy, first to Khelát and then to Kábul, ostensibly for the purpose of announcing the Queen's assumption of the Imperial title, but in reality with the view of re-organizing our relations with those two countries on a sounder and more definite footing than had hitherto been practicable. But the action of Lord Northbrook in despatching Major Sandeman to Khelát seriously interfered with the first part of the programme, much to the annoyance of Lord Lytton; but, as it turned out, with the happiest results.

of the tribal chiefs, he was able to send on the caravans to higher regions, where they soon shook off the cholera. He followed with his escort, losing men daily until he reached the healthier climate of Ábigúm,\* where he halted for some days.

In this situation a word of recognition or encouragement from his superiors would have been most precious, but none came. Important communications reached him from the Khan and the Sirdárs, but there was still an ominous silence at head-quarters. Early in June, the Government of the Punjab officially pressed upon the Government of India the importance, in this critical stage of Major Sandeman's negotiations, of giving him some assurance of support—but in vain. At length, on receipt of a telegram from Colonel Munro, conveying the consent of the Khan of Khelát to the mediation of the British Government, Lord Lytton permitted the following telegram to be sent, dated June 13 :—

“ You are to convey to Major Sandeman the Viceroy's congratulations on his having obtained the consent of the Khan as well as the Sirdárs to the mediation of the British Government, but you are at the same time to instruct Major Sandeman that he must in the meanwhile be scrupulously careful not to commit the Government of India to any line of policy towards either the Khan or the Sirdárs.”

These circumstances are mentioned—not with the view of casting blame upon Lord Lytton, who had his reasons for the course which he pursued—but in justice to Major Sandeman, who—whatever may be the explanation

\* The orthography of this word is a subject of contention ; in Major Sandeman's official Report it is spelled *Abigam* ; another authority, well acquainted with the Bolán Pass, asserts that its proper spelling is *Ábigham* (آبِغَم), meaning, “ water of affliction ” ; another says it is *Ábigum* (آبِگَم), meaning “ lost water,” or water that disappears underground.



of the course adopted—is clearly entitled to the credit of having carried out successfully a most arduous duty under extremely discouraging conditions.

About this time also he received tidings of the death of his father, General Sandeman, to whom he was deeply attached. He had been long counting on the pleasure of seeing his father once more, and was for a time almost prostrate with grief. But he soon “pulled himself together” and threw himself with even greater earnestness into the work before him.

It was arranged that the meeting of the Khan and the Sirdárs should take place at Mastung, a town conveniently situated for both Khan and chiefs, in an elevated valley of the same name, surrounded by gardens and orchards, and amply furnished with grass and other supplies necessary for a large gathering. The Khan at first evinced considerable reluctance to leave Khelát to meet the British Envoy. This reluctance was partly attributable to a not unnatural sentiment of personal humiliation at having to meet his rebellious sirdárs under the protection of the British Government; partly to fear of treachery from them; and partly, perhaps, from mistrust of the objects of the British Government. In these circumstances Major Sandeman thought it advisable to send him the Viceroy’s letter by the hand of Captain Wylie. Eventually the Khan overcame his scruples and proceeded to the place of meeting, which he reached on May 31.

But meanwhile, as the more distant tribal chiefs were moving to the place of meeting, Major Sandeman took the opportunity of making arrangements, with the consent of the Khan, for the due protection of trade by the Bolán Pass, and on July 1 was able to report that this part of his mission had been satisfactorily accomplished. According to this arrangement the protection of the pass was



ENTRANCE TO MASTUNG

(See p. 80.)



GURU, IN THE MASTUNG VALLEY, BETWEEN DIFTIA AND KHILAI



entrusted to the tribes interested, namely, the Kurd and Mingal Brahúis, the Marrís and the Kákar Patáns under the superintendence of Alladína Khan, the Kurd chief,\* and the general control of Sirdár Mulla Muhammad, the principal chief of the upper highland clans. Tribal posts were located at intervals throughout the pass, a tariff of moderate duties was agreed upon, and provision made for their due collection and proper division of the proceeds; one share going to the Khan as suzerain, another to the superintending chiefs, and the rest distributed in fixed proportions to the chiefs and men employed in protecting the pass and escorting caravans. Provision was further made—and this was an important part of the arrangement—for the decision of all disputes by committees of tribal chiefs. The system thus inaugurated—a system of inter-tribal self-government under British supervision—has been since developed and improved, but it worked well from the first and secured the safe transit of caravans throughout the Afghán wars.

But to return to the great gathering at Mastung. A committee of arbitration was appointed, consisting of three members nominated by the Khan, viz. his *vakil*, his paymaster, and his spiritual adviser, and three nominated by

\* The Kurds (originally from Kurdistán in Western Asia) hold lands in the plateau known as the Dasht-i-be-daulat, or “unhappy plain,” at the top of the Bolán Pass, at Morás in the hills a little left of the pass, and some near Bágh in Kachi. Writing in 1872, Sir William Merewether gave the following account of Alladína Khan:—“He is a subtle character, most unscrupulous in his sayings and doings. Much of the evil that has occurred in the country during the past nine years may with justice be laid at the door of this restless schemer.” Under the firm but genial control of Sandeman this “restless schemer” became an exceedingly useful member of society. It was Alladína’s son, Yár Muhammad, the present chief, who, during the outbreak of cholera in the Bolán Pass, escorted the cholera-stricken caravans to higher and healthier regions.

the Brahúi chiefs, namely, the principal chief of the upper highland clans and the two British Balúch chiefs, with Munshi Hittú Rám, the Hindú superintendent of Major Sandeman's office, as secretary, and Major Sandeman himself as final referee and umpire. A list was prepared of all the claims and complaints of the Brahúis against the Khan and of the Khan against the Brahúis, and each claim was discussed by the committee, who held continuous sittings from the 9th to the 11th of July. Thus (to quote the Government of India's despatch)—

“With great judgment he threw upon a body of arbitrators, nominated by the two parties, the difficult and invidious task of deciding between their rival claims; skilfully reserving to himself the advantageous position of an impartial adviser to both parties in the dispute, rather than that of judge. He brought his influence to bear with excellent effect on the wild tribesmen who seem to have followed his advice with unlimited trust; he calmed their apprehensions; he judiciously upheld the position of the Khan; and thus, by dint of impartial honesty of purpose, by well-directed sympathy and unfailing patience, he persuaded both the Khan and the Sirdárs to meet each other half way in a rational and amicable spirit.”

By July 11 all matters in dispute were settled, and the settlement agreed to by the Khan. On July 13 a grand *durbár* was held, attended not only by the chiefs but by the British military officers present in camp, when formal declarations of the terms of reconciliation agreed to on both sides were made and ratified on oath in the most solemn manner according to Muhammadan custom.

In the instrument embodying these terms of reconciliation the chiefs, highland and lowland, declare their submission and allegiance to the Khan according to “ancient rule and custom”; the Khan, on his part, restores to them their “ancient rights and privileges,” and promises to treat them with every kindness and consideration so long as they continue loyal and faithful to the Khelát

Government. Details connected with the nomination of certain sirdárs to be chiefs of tribes, grievances arising from confiscation of land, etc., were also settled in this document; and assent given to the measures for the protection of the Bolán Pass. The Khan and Sirdárs, moreover, made a solemn pledge to forget the past and stay all hostilities against one another pending reference of matters in dispute to the British Government for its decision.

In making his final report of the proceedings, Major Sandeman expressed his deliberate opinion that the settlement thus effected would be only transitory unless its maintenance was provided for by the continuous supervision of the British Government. With this view a separate instrument was drawn up and assented to by the Khan and the Sirdárs, and submitted with his report.

On receipt of the report, a question of grave importance had to be decided by the Government of India, viz. what was to be their future policy in regard to Khelát affairs? Were they to rest content with the settlement which had been effected without taking measures to secure its maintenance,—with the certainty that the settlement could not last and that the war would soon break out afresh? or were they to abandon or modify their policy of non-intervention? and if so, to what extent?

Their decision and the grounds for it are best given in the words of the despatch of March 23, 1877, to the Secretary of State for India, which bears the signature of Lord Lytton, Sir Arthur (now Lord) Hobhouse, Sir Edward Clive Bayley, Sir Alexander Arbuthnot, Lieutenant-General Sir Andrew Clarke, R.E., Sir John Strachey, and Major-General Sir E. B. Johnson.\*

\* In the preparation of this despatch Lord Lytton took the keenest personal interest. It was so altered, added to, and re-written by him

"Major Sandeman's final report reached us early in the month of September last, and at once received our most careful consideration. We had then to decide whether we should regard our intervention as terminated by the conclusion of peace between the ruler and the chiefs of Khelát, or whether we should accept with all its responsibilities the task of prolonged intervention which had been so earnestly urged upon our acceptance by all the parties concerned.

/"We had to consider in the first place all the conditions of the peculiar position we had assumed towards Khelát by the Treaty of 1854. This position, though sometimes ignored by ourselves, had been continually known and appealed to by the other contracting parties. We had, in the next place, to consider all the practical consequences of the mediation of 1872. . . . We had also before our eyes the history of all previous mediations in Khelát. It showed plainly that each of them had resulted in confusion worse than that which mediation had attempted to remedy. And we had beneath our hand the strongly expressed opinion of an officer, exceptionally well qualified to form a sound opinion on this subject, that a similar result would infallibly attend his own successful mediation if we decided on withholding the continued intervention which he deemed necessary to maintain and perpetuate the good effect of it. Finally, our consideration was duly given to the consequences foreseen and fully accepted by the Government of India when framing the Resolution of March 14, 1876. That Resolution enabled Major Sandeman to carry out his last mission with unusual pomp and publicity, supported by an imposing military force. This circumstance had attracted to it the special attention of neighbouring states, at the same time securing to it the special confidence and respect of all parties and persons in Khelát. To the reliance thus inspired on our power and determination to protect order, maintain peace, and punish unprovoked aggression, must be mainly attributed the almost unprecedented eagerness of all concerned to follow the advice and accept the award of the British mediator.

"We had therefore to consider very seriously what would be the effect on the Khanate itself, more especially upon those of its inhabitants and rulers who had unreservedly placed their rights and interests in our hands, and what the effect upon our influence elsewhere, of immediately terminating an intervention which, on all sides, we were earnestly requested to prolong ; or abruptly withdrawing those means of maintaining the settlement effected by our agent which the persons who had accepted it and were directly interested in its maintenance

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that much of it is in his own words ; and to the best of the writer's recollection it was reprinted some seventeen times before it was finally approved.

unanimously regarded as necessary for that purpose. The British mediator, himself, had in very emphatic terms recorded his deliberate opinion that a more direct and active interference than heretofore would long be needed to secure the fruits of his mediation. With this opinion before us we were constrained to acknowledge that we could not decline the position thus decreed to us by a long course of antecedent circumstances without thereby incurring the grave responsibility of deliberately plunging into renewed bloodshed and interminable anarchy, a neighbouring and friendly state which had urgently appealed to us for timely rescue from those evils.]

"Whilst, therefore, we were fully alive to the difficulties and responsibilities of the permanent intervention advocated by Major Sandeman, we could not disguise from ourselves the greater difficulties and responsibilities of renouncing the position in which the success of his mediation had conspicuously placed us. Moreover, we were also of opinion that the highest and most general interests of this Empire (interests no longer local but Imperial) rendered it necessary to place our relations with Khelât on a much firmer, more durable, and more intimate footing than before. Whatever may have been the personal disinclination of this Government in times past to exercise active interference in Khanates beyond our border, it must now be acknowledged that, having regard to possible contingencies in Central Asia, to the profound and increasing interest with which they are already anticipated and discussed by the most war-like population within as well as without our frontier, and to the evidence that has reached us of foreign intrigue in Khelât itself (intrigue at present innocuous, but sure to become active in proportion to the anarchy or weakness of that State and its alienation from British influence), we can no longer avoid the conclusion that the relation between the British Government and this neighbouring Khanate must henceforth be regulated with a view to more important objects than the temporary prevention of plunder on the British border. But, indeed, the experience of late years is no less conclusive that even the permanent protection of British trade and property equally demands a more energetic and consistent exercise of that authority which we are now invited, by its ruler, its chiefs, and its people, to exercise in Khelât."

This decision was not at the time officially communicated to Major Sandeman, but inasmuch as there were some points in his proposal to which the Government could not give their unreserved assent, it was deemed desirable to depute Colonel Colley, C.B., then Military




Secretary to His Excellency,\* to proceed to Khelát, place Major Sandeman in full and confidential information of the views of the Government, place before him a draft treaty for the consideration of the Khan, and in the event of its acceptance, arrange for a meeting with the Viceroy at Jacobábád in view to its execution.

While awaiting the arrival of Colonel Colley at Khelát, Major Sandeman had frequent opportunities of conversation with the Khan, and thus laid the foundation of a friendship which gradually developed into the most affectionate regard, so that in later years the Khan always spoke of the Agent as his "elder brother." One of these conversations is sufficiently characteristic to be worth recording.

One day the Khan, dwelling upon the difficulties of managing his confederate chiefs, observed that the best way of dealing with Brahúís was that prescribed in a well-known rhyming proverb:—

\* Afterwards Sir George Colley, the brave but ill-fated Governor of Natal, who perished on Majuba Hill. A secret history attaches to Colonel Colley's deputation to Khelát which, as it reflects credit upon him and discredit upon nobody, may without impropriety be revealed. Although fully inclined to adopt the policy recommended by Major Sandeman, Lord Lytton had still some lingering doubts regarding that officer's reliability and fitness. His Excellency had at that time no personal knowledge of Major Sandeman, and that officer's sterling merits were not always to be gathered from his writings; and although there were many at Simla, including the Foreign Secretary, who were well acquainted with Major Sandeman's antecedents, and could testify to his ability and worth, there were others, especially in Bombay, by whom he was less favourably regarded. In these circumstances Lord Lytton took an unusual, but not perhaps an unnatural, course; he sent an officer of his personal staff, in whom he had full confidence, with a draft treaty in his pocket, with instructions, if satisfied of the reality of Major Sandeman's settlement and the strength of his influence with the Khan, to produce the draft treaty and arrange for its execution. Colonel Colley at once advised that Major Sandeman should be supported, and from that date Major Sandeman had no firmer friend and supporter than Lord Lytton.



3 HELA—A IN T I I V R I, ON PALACE OF THE KHAN



" *Pahle sotl,*  
*Pichhe rotl.*"

(Literally, "First the rod, then food," but may be freely translated as :

"Hit them hard, then pat them on the back ;"

or,

"Punch their heads, before you pamper them,"

—an Oriental version of *parcere subjectis*.)

Major Sandeman promptly rejoined that there was another rhyming proverb still more applicable :

" *Pahle bāt,*  
*Pichhe lāt.*"

(Literally, "First a word, then the stick," meaning, "Reason before you strike.")

The Khan promised to be guided in future by the latter proverb,—a good illustration of the practical value of a knowledge of proverbial sayings in administrative work in India.

Colonel Colley reached Khelāt on October 14, and at a grand *durbār*, held on the 18th, in the *Miri* or citadel, presented the letter from the Viceroy, the draft treaty, and an invitation to His Highness to attend with his chiefs at the approaching Imperial Assemblage. The documents were received with great ceremony under a salute of twenty-one guns, and the Khan pressed the Viceroy's letter to his forehead. The invitation was accepted, the provisions of the treaty generally approved, and the Khan at once made arrangements for meeting the Viceroy at the time and place appointed.

## CHAPTER X.

## TREATY OF 1876.

Jacobábád—Khan proceeds thither by the Mulla Pass—Movements of the other chiefs—Major Sandeman arranges for the occupation of Quetta and opens the Bolán Pass for traffic—Lord Lytton starts from Simla—His route—Reception at Jacobábád—Execution of the Treaty and explanation of its provisions—The Khan and Chiefs at the Imperial Assemblage—Major Sandeman made a C.S.I. and appointed Agent to the Governor-General for Balúchistán.

THE place appointed for the execution of the Treaty was Jacobábád, head-quarters of the Sind Frontier Force,—an oasis in the desert,—the creation of the illustrious man whose name it appropriately bears. There his body rests in peace, while his brave and just and self-sacrificing spirit still lives in the recollections of the people and the splendid Force he organized.\* All around is desolation, but, thanks to irrigating streams caught by engineering skill from the rising waters of the Indus, grand avenues of arching trees shut out the glare and make you dream of England, or, at least, forget you are in the most rainless portion of the western frontier of India.

Towards this place of meeting all parties to the coming Treaty began to move. Accompanied by Captain Wylie

\* The late Lord Napier of Magdala, speaking of the commanding influence of General John Jacob, once said to the present writer, "Even now the name of Jacob works a miracle—it makes service on the Sind frontier popular."

and a portion of the British escort, the Khan, with a retinue of 3000 followers, descended from Khelát, and proceeded slowly by the Mulla Pass to Gandáva on the Kachi plain, whence four desert marches lead to the British frontier station, a toilsome journey of upwards of 200 miles.

The Brahúi chiefs broke up their camps at Mastung and moved down the Bolán; and besides Brahúis, Balúch chiefs from the Kachi plain, Boledis (of Arabian stock) from Makrán, the land of spikenard, and Gichkis (of Sikh origin) from fertile Panjgúr, and our old friends the Marrís and Búgtis from the eastern hills, hastened to the appointed *rendezvous*.

Major Sandeman, with Colonel Colley and his interpreter, Major Upperton, proceeded rapidly to Quetta, and with the sanction of the Khan, and in anticipation of the provisions of the new treaty, arranged for the location there of a portion of the escort. The party then inspected the new tribal levies in the Bolán Pass, and opened the pass for traffic. Leaving the pass, they selected Mittri on the Nári stream as a place for the winter quarters of the Sind detachment; then hastened to Gandáva to await the advent of the Khan, and finally escorted His Highness and the assembling chiefs to Jacobábád.

Early in November, the Viceroy, accompanied by Lady Lytton, the Acting Foreign Secretary, and a small personal staff, commenced his march. Proceeding from Simla by mountain roads through Narkanda to the Kangra valley, he spent a day at Pálampúr, a lovely spot, sacred to the memory of Douglas Forsyth, where English capital and energy, aided and encouraged by a paternal Government, have covered the hillsides with tea plantations. Having heard and dealt with representations from the tea-planters—for even in this earthly paradise our excellent countrymen

have grievances—His Excellency visited Dalhousié (the queen of hill-stations), and thence descended gently to the banks of the river Rávi, here flowing in a narrow gorge till it reaches the plains of the Punjab. The party then embarked on “charpoys” fixed upon inflated skins, and were whirled down the rapids to Mahdopur, a township picturesquely placed where the river emerges from the hills, —at the head of the great irrigation work which, under the unpoetic name of “Bári Doáb Canal,”\* has transformed hundreds of thousands of acres of dry scrub into fertile fields, and materially changed the climate and surroundings of the capitals of the Punjab. At Mahdopur the Viceroy received a deputation from the Maharája of Kashmír, and made important announcements of his policy; then proceeded through Jhllam to Pesháwar, where he met and conferred with the Envoy and Plenipotentiary, Sir Lewis Pelly, who was there awaiting the advent of Sayyad Núr Muhammad Shah, the Envoy from Sher Ali Khan, Amír of Kábul, on the eve of the well-meant but unfortunate negotiations. Here too he discussed frontier affairs with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and made his first acquaintance with the brave, chivalrous, but over sanguine Cavagnari. From Pesháwar he circled back through Lahore to Multán and the river Indus, and steamed down to Sukkur, the port of Upper Sind.

At Sukkur Lord Lytton was received by the Commissioner in Sind, Sir William Merewether, Major Sandeman’s

\* The author of this great work, that is, the official who first put the project in the way of realization, was the late Lord Napier of Magdala, then Chief Engineer of the Punjab. Its designer and chief constructor was Colonel Dyas, R.E., who died years ago of over-work, but his second in command, now Major-General Crofton, R.E., still survives, and after filling several high engineering posts under the Government of India, has retired from the service, not unhonoured, but undecorated, and devotes his time to philanthropic work amongst the poor of London.







FNEEL A B N I C A Y DIA " WU HU H TIBATA C F X S C WAS SHAND

determined but not unfriendly opponent, who bore his trying position with dignity, and throughout the subsequent proceedings displayed the best qualities of a loyal public servant. Escorted by Sir William Meredith, the party proceeded to busy Shikárpur, and thence through a wilderness of 24 miles, some in carriages, some on Balúch riding camels (not always tractable), or mounts kindly provided by the officer commanding the Sind Horse. On the evening of December 7 the Viceroy and staff reached Jacobábád and found the Khan with his retinue of chiefs in waiting,—together with the hero of the hour, Major Sandeman, bearing unmistakable traces of the fatigues and anxieties through which he had passed during the last nine months.

After the usual interchange of ceremonial visits, there was a further consideration of the draft treaty, protracted to late hours of the night, when its text was finally settled. The document was executed at 3.30 p.m. on the 8th inst. in the *durbár*-room at the residence of the officer commanding the Sind Frontier Force, known as "Jacob's Castle."

The official record of proceedings on this historic occasion, together with the text of the treaty, will be found, by those who care for such things, in a Parliamentary Blue Book published in 1877.\* It will suffice to mention here that the treaty was executed by the high contracting parties, in the presence of a large gathering of chiefs,—including Brahúis from the central plateaus (highland and lowland) and Balúch chiefs from all quarters of the Khanate,—from the eastern hills adjoining the Punjab, from the borders of the Kachí plain, and from Makrán and Panjgúr upon the western frontier,—and that they one

\* "Papers relating to the Treaty concluded with the Government of India and the Khan of Khelat on the 8th December, 1876."—1877.

and all accepted its provisions, which had been previously carefully explained to them by Major Sandeman.

After the execution of the treaty, the Viceroy offered for the Khan's acceptance a sum of three lakhs of rupees as a gift from the British Government, to afford His Highness material assistance in replenishing his treasury, which had been exhausted by the anarchy of recent years,—an offer which was received with great gratification. He drew the special attention of the Sirdárs to the fact that they, as well as the Khan, were mentioned in the treaty, and were thus parties to its terms; and proceeded to inform the Khan that he had selected Major Sandeman to reside at the court of His Highness as the representative of the British Government.

"I have done so," His Excellency said, "for two reasons: first, because it is to Major Sandeman that your Highness is indebted for the renewed friendship of the British Government, and secondly, because Major Sandeman possesses my entire confidence."

It was further announced that the three councillors who had been detained as political prisoners at the request of the Commissioner in Sind would be set at liberty; and that the chief of Lus Beyla, who had been similarly detained, would be allowed to return on certain conditions.

"And now," His Excellency concluded, "I have only to wish that, under the benign protection of Almighty Providence, your Highness may long continue to enjoy all health and happiness, whilst also promoting the happiness of your sirdárs and subjects."

As for the treaty itself, the first three articles renew and reaffirm the treaty of 1854, whereby the Khan agreed to oppose the enemies of the British Government, to act in subordinate co-operation with it, and to abstain from entering, without its permission, into any negotiations

with any other states ; the British Government, on its part, agreeing to respect the independence of Khelát, and to aid the Khan, in case of need, by such means as it may deem expedient in the maintenance of his just authority, and in protection of his territory from external attack.

But on two points there is an important difference between the two treaties.

In the first place, the treaty of 1854 is between the British Government and the Khan alone ; in the treaty of 1876 the Sirdárs are mentioned with the Khan as parties.

Again, by the fourth and fifth articles the Political Agency is permanently established at the Court of the Khan, and the British Government is constituted the final referee in cases of dispute between the Khan and his Sirdárs. This is, perhaps, the most important provision in the whole treaty. It terminated the old system of non-intervention, placed the supreme control of affairs in Balúchistán in the hands of the British Government, and has had the beneficial effect of substituting, throughout the Khanate, peace and good order for chronic civil war.

Article six arranges for the location of British troops in His Highness's dominions, and the subsequent articles provide for the construction of railways and telegraphs in Khelát territory, and an increase of the subsidy granted to the Khan from Rs.50,000 to Rs.100,000 per annum.

No time was lost in carrying out the more important provisions of the treaty. Before its formal execution, Major Sandeman had, as already mentioned, with the consent of the Khan, left a portion of his escort in occupation of Quetta ; another detachment from the Sind Frontier Force was temporarily stationed at Mittri, with outposts along the foot of the hills, as a check on the raiding propensities of the Marri and Búgti tribes, and

orders were issued for connecting Jacobábád with Quetta by a telegraph line through the Bolán Pass.

The Viceroy and suite returned to Sukkur, where the event was celebrated by illuminations, and then left by steamer for Karáchi and Bombay; the Khan, with his followers, escorted by Major Sandeman, proceeded on their journey to Delhi, where, on January 1, 1877, they were delighted spectators of the imposing ceremonial of the Imperial Assemblage.

Throughout their stay at Delhi, the ringletted strangers from Balúchistán were the observed of all observers, and strange stories of their proceedings were current in the camps. Rumour said that, misled by a literal translation of the word "Pears," they ate the scented soap provided in their sleeping tents, mistaking it for sweetmeats, but fortunately with no serious results.

The Khan was charmed with all he saw, the railway, the troops, the trains of elephants, the brilliant camps scattered far and wide over the plains of Delhi, but what gave him most delight were the heraldic banners which, under mediæval inspiration, Lord Lytton had distributed to the assembling feudatories. His Highness inquired why no banner had been vouchsafed to him, and on its being explained that banners were a sign of vassalage, while he, the Khan, was not a vassal, but an ally—"Give me a banner," said the Khan, "and I will be your vassal."

On January 1 Major Sandeman was made a C.S.I., on February 21 he was gazetted Agent to the Governor-General for Balúchistán, with a staff of three assistants and a medical officer, and in a despatch to the Secretary of State for India, dated March 23, his services were thus spoken of:—

"In conclusion, we submit to your Lordship the Resolution we have issued regarding the appointment of Major Sandeman as Agent

to the Governor-General in Balúchistán, and the measures we have adopted in connection therewith. We feel assured that your Lordship will appreciate the services of that officer as fully as we ourselves have done ; and no less do we entertain the hope that the settlement which we have endeavoured to effect of an anxious and difficult question will receive the approval of Her Majesty's Government. Of one thing we feel certain. If it be conducive to British interests, as we have no doubt it is, to influence the tribes and peoples who live beyond our border, we must be in contact with them. It is by the everyday acts of earnest, upright English gentlemen that lasting influence must be obtained ; not by spasmodic demonstrations, nor any sudden and temporary influence purchased by money and presents. If, at length, we succeed in binding more closely to us the people of Khelát, by making them feel the benefits of peace, and the power for good exercised by the British Government, we shall have added an additional bulwark to our Empire. An important part of our frontier will no longer be harassed by mistrustful, wild, and dangerous neighbours, and our officers will have chiefs and populations to deal with who welcome their counsels and receive them as their best friends."

## CHAPTER XI

## DESCRIPTION OF BALÚCHISTÁN

Geography—Four distinctive tracts—General aspect—Its dreariness subject to considerable qualification—Fertility of certain parts—Testimony of General Chapman, Sir Richard Temple, and others to the beauty of its scenery and colouring—Scenery around Quetta and along the Railway—The Rifts—Population and Language—Revenue and Trade—Political, commercial, and strategic importance

LET us now take a somewhat closer survey of the territory thus placed under Major Sandeman's political control.

GEOGRAPHY.—The Khanate of Khelát has already been generally described as an arid mountain region, some ten times the size of Switzerland, enclosed between Persia, Afghanistan, British India, and the Arabian Sea.

This mountain region—as will be seen from the map—though, at first sight, a “mighty maze,” is not “without a plan.”

In central Balúchistán the ranges run from north to south, and ultimately disappear into the ocean at Cape Monze. These ranges—an offset from the great Sulaimáni chain—form the backbone of the mountain system.

In western Balúchistán numerous offsets from the central range, after making a sharp curve westwards, run in lines parallel with the sea-coast, and either disappear into the ocean further west, or are lost in the desert plains

of southern Persia, or merge into the Persian mountain system.

In eastern Balúchistán—that is, Balúchistán east of the Harnái valley—the ranges run from west to east, with a northward curve, until they blend with the main range of the Sulimáns.

Such is the mountain frame-work of this wild region. Further examination will show that it is divisible into four distinctive tracts.

On the north-east a vast alluvial plain—a V-shaped inlet of the Indus valley cut off from the river by a strip of desert—runs from south to north into the hill-country, thus separating the Balúch tribes of the eastern hills (Marrís and Búgtis) from the Brahúis of the central plateau. This plain, known as the Kachi,\* is about three times as large as Lincolnshire and nearly as extensive as the entire cultivated area of Egypt. It is almost rainless, and during eight months of the year intensely hot ; but as it is fertilized in parts by streams from the hill country, it is the most valuable portion of the Khan's territories. Most of the tribes in the adjoining hills have settlements in the Kachi. Kach Gandáva, its ancient capital, is the Khan's head-quarters in the cold season, and Bágh is a flourishing township.

\* *Kach*, or, more properly, *Kachh*, is a term applied in these parts to moist alluvial tracts in or near the beds of streams ; thus we have *Kach-Gandáva*, *Kach-Amadán*, *Gul-Kach*. The termination "i" denotes, *inter alia*, "connection" or "locality." Thus *Kardáchi* (corrupted from *Kuláchu*) is said to mean "place of trade"; *basti*, an inhabited spot, or place of chattels. *Kachi*, therefore, means a "land of alluvial tracts." And this is precisely what the *Kachi* is—an alluvial plain or delta, fertilized to some extent by the waters of the Bolán, the Mulla, and the Nári ; but except within the influence of irrigation, or after successive seasons of favourable rain, it is little better than a desert. This desert portion bears the equally euphonious name of *Pat*.



West of the great Kachi plain is the second of the four distinctive tracts—the stupendous mass of mountains which form the central and dominant range of Balúchistán—a range with towering peaks and elevated uplands, the home of the principal Brahúi tribes, and known since the days of Pottinger as the Brahúic plateau. Its highest peak is that of Zarghún, north-east of Quetta—nearly 12,000 feet above sea-level; but three other peaks, Takatú, Murdár, and Chihiltán, are over 10,000 feet in altitude.

This central range is divided into four provinces or districts; Sarawán, the upper highlands, containing the plateaus of Mastung, 6000 feet above sea-level, and Shál, or Quetta,\* 5600 feet—held by a group of Brahúi tribes under the hereditary headship of the Raisáni chief; the high valley of Khelát (the Khan's special domain), 6800 feet above the sea; the Jhalawán, or lower highlands, very sparsely populated, but containing several fertile valleys, such as Sohráb, 5500 feet above the sea, Zahri and Bagwána, 4400 feet, Khozdár, Wad and Nál of similar elevation, held by another group of Brahúi tribes, of which the Zahri Chief is the head; and lastly, Lus, or Lus Beyla, the lowland tract on the sea coast, of which the Jám, or Chief, has feudal relations with Khelát.

The Brahúic plateau is connected with the plains of Kachi through rifts in the ranges by which streams find an outlet; of these the Bolán Pass on the north, 60 miles in length, leading to Quetta and Pishín, and the Mulla Pass on the south, 80 miles in length, leading to Khelát

\* Quetta, though part of the Khelát Khanate, belongs geographically and ethnically to Pishín. Its streams flow into the Pishín Lora and its inhabitants are principally Patáns. The name Quetta is said to be an Afghán corruption of Kot, meaning "Court-house," the final syllable in *Sháلكوت*, the name by which the place is known among Brahúis. *Shál* is the more ancient name of the valley, and is traced by Rawlinson as far back as the 10th century A.D.

and Khárán, are the principal. Both passes follow the shingly bed of a mountain stream through open valleys connected by narrow defiles. The former is now traversed by a carriage road and a line of railway, and the latter has been made practicable for artillery.

The maritime mountain system west of the Brahúic plateau—the third of the distinctive tracts—is sometimes known as the Balúch plateau, as the tribes inhabiting it are, for the greater part, Balúch. It presents some singular features. For 60 or 70 miles from the sea the ground level rises, at first very gradually, but afterwards more rapidly, to an altitude of 500 feet. Beyond this is an abrupt scarp of 1500 to 2000 feet, behind which there is a gradual ascent of 500 more to the foot of a second scarp of about the same altitude as the last. The summit of this last scarp forms the water-parting between the basin of the Halmand and the Arabian Sea. The mountains rising from this plateau are of inferior elevation to those of the Brahúic plateau on the one hand and the Persian highlands on the other, the highest point being the summit of the Siánah Koh, 7000 feet above the sea.

In this tract, between the sea-coast and the first parallel range or scarp, is situated Makrán,\* the land of *malí-khurán*, or "fish-eaters," the *ichthyophagi* of Arrian, with traces of a considerable past, but at present dry, barren, and unhealthy, and in parts an uninhabitable wilderness. Inland are numerous long and narrow ranges parallel to the coast, forming extensive valleys, for the most part sandy and barren, the exception being the long valley

\* The name *Makrán* has an elastic signification. By some it is applied to the whole of Balúchistán west of the Brahúic plateau; Colonel Ross applies it to the portion between the second scarp (that is, the Siánah Koh range) and the sea. By others, including the late Sir O. St. John, it is limited to the tract between the sea and the first parallel range of mountains.

lying at the foot of the first scarp. This strip is well watered and fertile with numerous villages and date-groves, forming a natural highway between the Persian and Trans-Indus mountains. Here is situated Kej, the so-called capital, a cluster of forts and villages. The tract has recently been surveyed for railway purposes, and an able memoir by Colonel Holdich, R.E., shows that it is still the land of "myrrh and spikenard," and that the *euphorbia* of the sandy wastes and the mangrove of the swamps are still much as Arrian describes them.

Between the first scarp and the second is the basin of the Mashked, or Mashkel river, which, rising in the Persian highlands, flows south and east through western Balúchistán; then, bursting through the Siánah Koh, finds its way into the northern desert. In this basin is the fertile valley of Panjgúr, watered by the Rakshán, a tributary of the Mashkel—in the eyes of the Balúch an earthly paradise, but cursed, nevertheless, with fevers, scurvy, dust-storms, and tribal strife. Further east are the districts of Kolwah and Mushka, sparsely populated and almost waste, owing to internal feuds, but capable of considerable development.

The fourth tract, into which the region of Balúchistán is divisible, is the Registán, a desert region extending north of the second parallel range for some 200 miles to the valley of the Halmand. The general slope of the desert is towards the north-west, but it contains several large depressions, called Hamún, recipients of the drainage of the hills on either side. On the north-west the Hamún-i-Zirreh receives the waters of the Shelá river; in the centre the Hamún-i-Mashkel, the waters of the Mashkel; on the north-east the Hamún-i-Lora, the drainage of Pishín. In the vicinity of these depressions, says MacGregor, there is much cultivable land, water

being quite near the surface ; and if the district could be protected from the raids of Kharánis, Nharúis, and Sarhaddis, it might easily be populated.

On the right centre of the desert, in a tract watered by the Bado stream, and sometimes included in Sarawán, is Khárán, the focus of trade routes converging from India, Persia, and Afghanistán, and well known as the head-quarters of Ázád Khan, the late chief of the Nushirwání tribe, for years the enemy of Khelát and the terror of the border villages, whose conversion from a determined foe into a useful friend was not the least of Sir Robert Sandeman's achievements. The territory is extensive, but ill-defined, and its boundaries the subject of constant dispute. Roughly speaking, it may be described as a tract some 170 miles in length by 40 or 50 in breadth, of which the north-east portion is cultivable, the rest being arid waste, covered by a sea of rolling sand-hills.

On the north-east, by the Hamún-i-Lora, is Chágeh, or Chághai, a tract of thorny bushes and grasses suitable for camels, goats, and donkeys. Though undoubtedly part of the Khelát Khanate, it was appropriated by the Amír of Kábul in 1888, but has recently been restored to Khelát under the terms of the recent boundary convention.

Further east is Nushki, a pastoral settlement on the edge of the Sarawán highlands, with a small nomadic population, but possibly a great future.

PHYSICAL FEATURES AND SCENERY.—As might be expected from the geographical description given above, the general aspect of Balúchistán cannot be said to be inviting. It was a saying of Sir Charles Napier, often quoted by Sir Robert Sandeman himself, that Balúchistán

"must have been the place where, after the creation of the world, the spare rubbish was shot down";\* and in the scenery, especially of the western plateaus, where the sandstone rocks lie broken and mixed up in magnificent confusion, there is much to justify the statement.

Speaking generally, Balúchistán may be described as a region of arid mountain ridges, long sterile valleys, dry watercourses, and bare plateaus. Thin strips of cultivation follow the lines of drainage; tracts covered with low tamarisk give scanty pasture to camels, goats, and donkeys; while, towards the west, the vast circular depressions, edged with saline efflorescence, give an air of desolation to the scene. Along the 600 miles of its surf-bound coast there is scarce a harbour worthy of the name,† and throughout its length and breadth, from the sand-dunes of Sunmiáni to the slopes of the Toba plateau, from the wastes of Gandáva to the western edge of the Khárán desert, there is no river of permanent flow larger than a good-sized mountain stream.‡

\* A similar idea in reference to Alpine scenery is to be found in the Diary of John Evelyn,—“We arrived at night at Margazzo an obscure village at the end of the Lake Maggiore and at the very foot of the Alps, which now rose as it were suddenly after some hundred miles of the most even country in the world and where there is hardly a stone to be found, *as if nature had here swept up the rubbish of the Earth* to form and clear the plains of Lombardy.”

† On the Makrán coast are three small ports, Gwádar, Pasni, and Ormára, the first-named belonging to the Chief of Maskat. At Khor Kalmat, between the two last-named, there is said to be an “ideal” harbour, “but practically placed beyond the pale of discussion as a future port by the difficulty of approach.” Pasni Bay is shallow, and unprotected from the south-west monsoon, but it is healthy and accessible on the land side, and “if improved would draw to it all the trade of Makrán.” Further east is Sunmiáni, the so-called port of Lus Beyla, a miserable fishing village at the mouth of the Puráli, inaccessible to craft of any size.

‡ There is one feature in the hydrography of Balúchistán deserving of special mention, as it is almost unique; namely, that the drainage of

Of the streams which drain the highlands, some, such as the Nári, the Bolán, the Mulla, on reaching the eastern plain, dissolve in a net-work of irrigation channels, giving a fringe of verdure to a treeless waste; others, such as the Lora of Pishín, the Mushka of eastern, the Mashkel of western Makrán, find their way into the desert, and disappear in swamps; others, such as the Dasht, the Hingol, the Puráli, the Hab, have courses leading to the sea, but, for the greater part of the year, their beds are dry or nearly dry. With rain in the hills, indeed, the scene changes. The channels soon fill with raging torrents, and, should the rain continue, destructive floods ensue; followed, perhaps, by a plenteous crop of cholera, dysentery, and fever. But, as a rule, the rainfall is as scanty as it is uncertain; the summer heat of the plains intense and sometimes deadly;\* the winter cold of the higher plateaus severe and searching.

The forest trees—chiefly juniper, acacia, wild olive, pistacia, and tamarisk—save in a few favoured localities, are sparse and stunted; and the mineral resources, so far as is known at present, very limited; a petroleum well at Kattan,† not far from Sibi; traces of lead at

the valleys, instead of flowing from end to end between the lateral hills, frequently finds its way through gaps or crevices formed at right angles to them.

\* The heat of Dádar and Sibi in summer has produced some "sayings": "Having Dádar, why did God make hell?" "Those leaving Sibi in summer for the infernal regions should take warm wraps," are specimens.

† Experimental borings were carried on here for seven years, between 1884 and 1891, and, for a time, the results were most encouraging; but, after an expenditure of five and a half lakhs of rupees (about £33,000), it became evident that there was no large accumulation of oil, and the work had to be abandoned. It is understood, however, that within the last few months a concession has been granted to a private company, and that boring operations have been recommenced.

Sekrán, and copper in Lus Beyla; some antimony, gypsum, and sulphur of doubtful value, and a few thin seams of tertiary coal in the Harnái valley and hills adjacent, being all that can be quoted; while the total population does not, it is believed, exceed 500,000 souls, or five persons per square mile.

But this general and somewhat discouraging description is subject to considerable qualification.

Wherever irrigation is possible, whether by ducts from mountain streams, or underground channels (*karezes*),\* or reservoirs for storing surface-drainage, or dams, or wells, the soil is eminently productive. In the higher plateaus, such as Khelát, Quetta, Mastung and Pishín in the upper highlands, and those of Solhráb, Zahri, Bagwána, and Khozdár, in the lower, the fruits and products of southern Europe flourish, the grapes and melons of Mastung being specially renowned. Quetta gardens produce magnificent peaches and apricots, and almost every village in the Quetta valley has its orchard. In the smaller valleys, offshoots from the main plateau, which run in divers directions into the surrounding hills, the little mountain streams, wherever there is sufficient water, are bordered with tiny fields of corn, and the clusters of mud cottages are embowered in groves of willow, poplar, and the pretty green-leaved *sinjíd* or *cleagnus*. At Dasht and Panjgúr, in western Balúchistán—thanks to a fertilizing deposit from their rivers when in flood—corn, cotton, grapes, and dates are produced in abundance; thriving settlements, bosomed in date-groves, are to be found in Kej, Tump, and Mánd, on the Persian

\* *Karezes* are underground channels through which water is brought from a water-bearing stratum at a gentler slope than the surface soil, which is ultimately reached. They are sometimes two or even three miles in length, and have shafts about every hundred yards. This mode of bringing water for irrigation is common in Afghanistán, Persia, and Balúchistán



IN THE KHOJAL IASS LOOKING TOWARDS SANDAHAR—(WINTER)





frontier, and wool of superior quality, similar to that of Karmán, comes from the hill tracts.

At the same time the general want of verdure and absence of picturesque scenery are in a measure compensated for by the weird forms, grand outline and rich colouring of rocks and mountains. Well into June snow glistens from the peaks, and such is the clearness of the atmosphere that hills miles distant appear close.\*

"Beauties in the scenery of Balúchistán!" writes General Chapman, "yes, these are beauties! The sunset colouring on Takatú! the wonderful distance from the Khojak, whence we saw a mysterious horseman making his way alone from Kandahár when we first went up to look! The Gwája Pass! The great Desert! . The Rifts! It is scenery that has not a parallel, but one must know it!"

"Nothing," says Captain MacDonald, "can be more hideous than Makrán in the daytime; nothing can be more glorious than its colouring in the morning and the evening."


"The valley of Quetta," says Sir Richard Temple,† "lies in the bosom of grand mountains. These mountains are about 6000 feet above the altitude of Quetta, and Quetta itself is about 5500 feet above the sea level. They are magnificent limestone formations. On the right hand of the picture you see the mountain Murdár, in the distance to the right is the mountain of Zarghún, remarkable for its forests of juniper, but in this clear atmosphere in the evening light, so strong is the effulgence of the setting sun that

\* Tradition says that the Inspector-General of Fortifications first visiting Quetta had a melancholy time, believing the fortress to be hopelessly commanded by the surrounding hills; but speedily recovered, on ascertaining that a hill he supposed to be a few hundred yards distant was, in fact, three miles.

† Proceedings of the R.G.S. for September, 1880.

the mountain looks like one mass of rose colour. Midway in the picture, you see the Takatú mountain, which separates the valley of Quetta from the valley of Pishín. The spurs of Takatú stretch to the left, and through a long gap in them you see in the distance a line of blue-grey mountains, which form the Khoja Amrán range, and between the spurs of Quetta and these blue mountains lies the valley of Pishín. Further to the left is the mountain of Chiltán. In the middle distance you see the town and mud fort of Quetta. In the foreground is the road leading from the Bolán Pass towards Quetta, and joining the road near Quetta you will see a road that comes from the Khelát country. I am sure that no view I could present, no colours that I could depict, could give you any idea of the real splendour of the scene."

"Quetta and Pishín," says Mr. Barnes, late Revenue Commissioner in Balúchistán, "have beauties of their own which vary with each season of the year. In the spring, after the winter rains, the whole country, even on the stony slopes of the hills, is tinged with green, and everywhere the ground is studded with wild flowers; red and yellow tulips, similar to those found in the fields round Florence, nestle in the depressions of the lower hills; wild hyacinths and irises of various hues abound among the rocks and stones, the ground in many places is scarlet with the small red poppy, and all around the air is fragrant with the faint aromatic odour of the fresh green southernwood which covers the uncultivated plains. Summer is less gorgeous, but, till the harvest is cut in June, the country round Quetta itself is a sheet of waving corn-fields. July, August, and September are hot, dry, dusty, and depressing, but early in October frosts begin at night, the dust clears out of the sky, and the perpetual sunshine, the dry, keen, invigorating air, the clear distances and the glorious rose-coloured tints



THE QIETTA VALLEY, AND ENTRANCE TO THE BIAN PASS



of the hills at sunset and sunrise are a constant joy to a lover of the beautiful. In winter, the scene again changes, and though the country is arid and drab-coloured, and the leaves are off the trees, still few places are more beautiful than Quetta on a bright, still, frosty morning, when all the lofty peaks round the valley are capped with glistening snow."

The scenery of the Pishín Railway is thus described :—  
"Leaving the flat plain of Sibi, the railway runs through the Nári and Kacháli defiles, bounded by fantastically shaped hills of conglomerate shale and sandstone, then through the Spintangi, or 'white gorge,' a natural cutting through a ridge of limestone, and emerges, through a tunnel, on to a region of boulders, gravel and shingle, with a distressing absence of culturable soil and vegetation. After an unusually dismal stretch along this kind of scenery, the Harnái valley opens in front—a smiling contrast to its surroundings. In early summer the brilliant green of the carefully terraced rice-fields, the clumps of mulberry and apricot trees clustering round the rude, flat-topped houses, the rows of willows with their interlacing festoons of vines bordering the clear water of the numerous irrigation channels, the groups of happy and healthy looking children, and the comely Italian-faced women, in their indigo-blue, or scarlet, smocks, complete a picture of peaceful beauty and fertility, whose charm is not entirely dependent on its contrast to the rugged and barren surroundings. The roughly built square tapering towers, with their raised inside entrances, tell of the days when the husbandman had to watch his ripening crops against marauding Marrís and Kákars, and in face of overpowering force had to retreat into those places of refuge. But this oasis of fertility is of small extent. The railway resumes its monotonous course up to and along the Shárig valley,

less fertile than the Harnái, but commanding grander views of the surrounding hills. The limestone range here rises to its culminating height in the peak of Kalipat, over 11,000 feet high, towering over the valley as an apparently continuous precipice of 6000 feet, ending in an abrupt and commanding peak. Beyond, to the left, the jagged peaks of Zarghún showing in the distance over the irregular ridges of some lower hills completes a striking and impressive mountain panorama."

As for the Rifts, that in the Chappar mountain—through which the railway ascends from the head of the Harnái valley to the Pishín plateau—is one of the most remarkable. It is a gorge upwards of two miles long, with a narrow entrance at each end and perpendicular cliffs rising on each side to the height of fully a thousand feet above the torrent bed, which is strewn with debris and blocks of every shape and size. The line first burrows along the mountain side, then crosses the gorge by a bridge of 150 feet span, then plunges into another tunnel and emerges into the heart of the Rift; then after two more tunnels, excavated in solid rock, emerges on to the Mángi valley in full view of the Píl mountain—the scene throughout being almost unsurpassed for wildness.

POPULATION AND LANGUAGE.—The population of Balúchistán was estimated by Hughes, in 1877, at 350,000 souls. The peace and prosperity of the last seventeen years and the presence of British troops have probably increased it largely.\* Of the races comprised in it, the most widespread and numerous (as already mentioned) is the Balúch, a nomadic race, speaking a Persian *lingua*

\* The author of the *Gazetteer of Balúchistán*, published in 1891 (Lieutenant R. Southey of the 3rd Balúch Regiment), estimates it as "under a million." On the other hand, the editor of the last edition of *Mitchison's Treaties* (1892) says it is estimated at about 220,500.

*rustica*, over-laid in varying degree with Sindi and Punjābi words. There is no written literature and the dialects differ widely, a Nharúi Balúch from Makrán being hardly intelligible to the Rind Balúch from Gandáva or the north-eastern hills. The sub-tribes are numerous, and many are of foreign origin. Thus the Bolídas, once dominant in Kej, claim to be of Arab extraction ; the Gichkis of Panjgúr to be descended from a Sikh colony ; the Lumris of Lus Beyla to be Somar Rájputs ; while the Nushirwánis of the Khárán desert are distinctly Persian. Though there is no written literature, the memories of the people teem with ballads setting forth the brave deeds and loves and adventures of their national heroes, and the poetic fire is not extinct, for additions are being made to the stock.

In the central plateau are the Brahúi, the dominant and, perhaps, the older race, differing in appearance, character, and language, from the true Balúch ; but as the two races intermarry, and the Brahúi talks preferentially Balúchi, considering his own *patois* "vulgar," these differences must tend to disappear. Even now the name Balúch is not unfrequently applied to the Brahúi, and some tribes are so mixed that it is difficult to say to what race they appertain. To what family of languages Brahúi belongs is still an open question. Caldwell, at one time, claimed it as Dravidian, or akin to the languages of southern India, but has since modified his opinion ; Mockler finds resemblances to the old Scythian of the Behistun inscription ; Trumpp regarded it as Kolarian, or akin to the language of the Sontals, Kols, and other kindred races in the hills of Central India. Cust has provisionally included it in the Aryan family, as a language derived from the same source as Sindi and Punjābi, but containing Dravidian elements, the presence of which remains to be explained.



The Brahúis, like the Balúchis, are divided into numerous sub-tribes; the Mingals, the Bezanjos, and the Zahris, being the most powerful in the Jhalawán or lower highlands; the Raisánis, the Shawánis, and the Bangalzai in the Sarawán or upper highlands. The Khan of Khelát, as already stated, is a Brahúi of the Kambaráni tribe.

Besides the two principal races above described, there are found in the plains of Gandáva large colonies of Jats, who hail from the Punjab and speak a mongrel dialect called Jatki; and in the towns and villages of Khelát, there is a peculiar Persian speaking race called Dehwár, resembling the Tájiks of Persia and Afghanistán; and in Quetta are Patáns of various tribes.

The above-named races are Muhammadan; a few Hindús are found in towns and sea-ports engaged principally in trade and money-lending.

In character both Brahúi and Balúch are frank and open in their manner, and their hospitality is proverbial; they are brave and enduring, predatory but not pilferers, vindictive but not treacherous. With all the virtues of their neighbours the Afgháns, they are more reliable and less truculent, and on two points which have an important bearing on their management they differ widely: the Balúch is amenable to the control of his chief; the Afghán is republican, and obeys only the *Jirgah*\* or council of the dominant faction of his tribe. The Afghán is fanatical and priest-ridden; the Balúch is singularly free from religious bigotry.

In appearance the Balúch is shorter and more wiry than the Afghán; his features are regular, his nose aquiline. He wears his hair long, and generally in oily ringlets. He carries a sword, knife, and shield; his dress

\* See chap. ii.

is a cotton smock reaching to his heels, and pleated about the waist, loose drawers, and a long cotton scarf. As a nomad he does not seclude his women, but is not the less jealous of female honour. Like many other Mussulman races, the Balúchis claim to be of Qoreshi (Arabian) descent; while some hold them to be of Turkoman stock; their customs are said to support the latter theory; their features, in the case of some tribes, but not all, certainly favour the former.\*

Two striking customs, common to both Afghán and Balúch, may here be mentioned; one is the prevalence of the *Vesh*, or periodical distribution of land among the component households of a clan; the other the existence of a Levitical clan, who have the exclusive privilege of performing certain priestly functions connected, not with the Muhammadan religion, but with certain tribal functions, such as the dedication of tribesmen about to go to war by passing them under spears.

Except in the towns, which are few in number, and mud-built, permanent places of abode are rarely met with. Tents of dark camel's hair, called *kiris* or *ghedáns*, are the usual habitation of the tribesmen. A collection belonging to one tribe is called *tuman*, and the chief *tumandár*.

REVENUE AND TRADE.—The Revenue of the Khan consists chiefly of a share of agricultural produce, taken from inferior cultivators in his own domains—Brahúis being exempt. It was estimated by Hughes at from two and a half to three lakhs of rupees (from Rs.  $\times$  250,000 to Rs.  $\times$  300,000) per annum, but it is now considerably larger.†

\* Ibbetson's "Punjab Census Report."

† In the last edition of *Aitchison's Treaties* (1892) it is estimated at eight lakhs per annum, including the subventions from the British Government

For the collection of this revenue the Khan has agents, or *Naiibs*, in different parts of the Khanate, but they do not interfere administratively with the local tribes.

The Trade is small, the principal exports being wool and hides, madder, dried fruits, bdellium, tobacco, dates. The article of export most capable of development is wool from the hills, which is of superior quality.

POLITICAL, COMMERCIAL, AND STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE.—But though the general aspect of Balúchistán is uninviting, the population scanty, and the products few, its situation on our western frontier with command of the principal highways between India, Kandahár and Persia, and the strong military position of Quetta, gives it immense importance from political, commercial, and strategic points of view. A strong and friendly Balúchistán is almost as essential to British Indian interests as a strong and friendly Afghanistán.

## CHAPTER XII.

## FIRST EXPERIENCES AS AGENT.

Leave applied for, but services cannot be spared—Difficulties with the Khan—Proclamation of a religious war by the Amír of Kábul—Assassination of Lieutenant Hewson at Quetta—Attitude of the Brahúi Chiefs—Major Sandeman cordially supported by Lord Lytton—Proceedings during the cold season of 1877-88—Afghán affairs threatening—Precautions—Khan of Khelát throws in his lot with the British Government—Brief review of Major Sandeman's work during the past three years.

THE fatigue, exposure, and anxiety of the nine months preceding the execution of the Treaty had told upon Major Sandeman's health, and he was anxious for a few months' rest before entering upon new duties, which, he foresaw, would be of a very arduous character. Accordingly in December, 1876, just after the conclusion of the treaty, he applied for short leave of absence, to which he was entitled by the rules of the service. But his application evoked the following reply from Lord Lytton :—

"I am not surprised to learn from Colonel Burne that, after your trying labours for the last nine months, you feel the need of rest, and I need not say on this point that I am most anxious to meet your wishes ; but I feel so strongly that, just at present, and indeed so long as our relations with Russia and Afghanistan remain in their present ambiguous and critical position, your continued presence and influence in Khelát are absolutely necessary to secure and confirm the results of the recent Treaty, that I anxiously trust that it may be compatible with your convenience not to withdraw them till matters are more settled."

Major Sandeman at once gave up all thought of

leave, and, after accompanying the Khan to Delhi, and elaborating with the Foreign Office at Calcutta the arrangements for the establishment of the new Agency, he proceeded early in the spring of 1877 to take up the duties of Governor-General's Agent for Balúchistán.

His feelings at the time are thus expressed in a letter to Lord Northbrook —

“Calcutta,

“February 23, 1877.

“MY DEAR LORD NORTHBROOK,

“Your Lordship's very kind letter of the 4th January I received only a very few days ago. [It was, like the former one, sent first to Khelát, from which place it was forwarded to Calcutta to me here.]

“I am very greatly indebted to your Lordship for the kind congratulations the letter contains. I cannot sufficiently express in words my sincere and grateful thanks for your Lordship's very kind way of writing. I feel that the receipt of your Lordship's letter has given me fresh strength and heart to continue my work, and that of itself it is a very great return for all I went through in Khelát.

“I am very happy to be in a position to tell your Lordship that it is now generally admitted, that to have deposed the Khan by force of arms, and taken possession of the Khanate afterwards with our troops, placing the son on the throne, would have been a grave political mistake.

“I myself from the first felt convinced that even as a last resource such a line of policy was doubtful, for, had we adopted it, we must have roused the jealousy of friend and foe, and caused them to suspect the honesty of our objects.

“It is true troops are still to be kept in Khelát, but they are only to remain there as a friendly aid to the Khan and his Sirdárs, both sides accepting them as such and admitting their necessity.

“Your Lordship will, I feel certain, be glad to hear that I am to return to Khelát. Lord Lytton has appointed me Agent to the Governor General for Balúchistán. I have accepted the appointment at His Excellency's own request. At first I was very doubtful as to what course to pursue as I knew the old difficulties in connection with the Sind system of management would still remain, and I felt a great dislike to continue differing from those above me in authority. However, Mr. Thornton considered that any hesitation now on my part was unpatriotic, and that I ought to do as requested to Khelát.

"After considering the matter very fully, I wrote in reply to say that, putting aside all wishes and opinions of my own, I was most anxious and willing to do any service in connection with Khelát affairs the Viceroy required of me. It was then decided to make me the new Agent, and I return to my work determined to do all I can to maintain the peace of the country, and the prestige of our Government.

"Personally Lord Lytton has been very kind to me. I had a long conversation with His Excellency the other evening on the subject of Khelát affairs, and I mentioned casually to his Lordship the letter I had received from you. I did this because I felt the receipt of your Lordship's letter had given me heart to go on with the good work, and made my return to Khelát much easier than would otherwise have been the case.

"I leave Calcutta this evening by the mail and return to Jacobábád. From thence I march for Makrán, escorted by a wing of a regiment of Sind horse and two guns. I have been directed to try and settle the quarrel between the Khan's Government and old Ázád Khan of Khárán. He is the 'Rob Roy' of that part of the Khanate, and it will be very interesting meeting him.

"R. G. SANDEMAN."

Major Sandeman's anticipation of difficulties was soon realized. In the first place, soon after his return from Delhi, while Major Sandeman was detained in Calcutta, the Khan, under the influence of evil advisers, began to repent him of his bargain; he refused to accept the funds which had been placed at his disposal on the ground that they were insufficient; he demanded that the British Government should immediately aid him with troops in destroying his enemies—Isa Khan, the Gichki Chief of Panjgúr, and Ázád Khan of Khárán—and when informed that the British Government must inquire into the case before deciding upon the course to be pursued, assumed a sulky attitude, and went so far as to enter into secret correspondence with the Amír of Kábul.

Then the Amír of Kábul proclaimed at Kandahár a religious war against the British Government, and caused great excitement amongst the Khan of Khelát's Afghán

soldiery, and some of the Patán tribes in the vicinity of Quetta.

The Agent's difficulties were enhanced by the attitude of some of his own countrymen. In England a strong party was opposed to the occupation of Quetta, and made their voices heard in the London Press, and in Bombay a strong party, though in favour of the occupation of Quetta, objected to Major Sandeman, whose conduct and proceedings were attacked in a series of denunciatory articles published in the Bombay Gazette.

Major Sandeman, strong in the support of the Government of India, made no reply to these attacks, but he was greatly cheered by receiving a letter of hearty sympathy from his old friend and fellow-worker General Phayre. Meanwhile he endeavoured by a personal interview at Gandáva to bring the Khan into a reasonable frame of mind, but with little success at the time, and during his absence a sad event occurred at Quetta.

Land had been obtained for the erection of a house for the Agent and shelter for the troops of the escort, and the building had been commenced ; but, during the progress of the work, Lieutenant Hewson, R.E., a promising young officer, was assassinated by three Patáns, and Lieutenant Kunhardt, R.E., wounded. The three assassins were killed by Captain Scott, Commander of 4th Sikhs, who gallantly went to the rescue of his countrymen, but the incident was specially disquieting because there was reason to believe that it was not a mere case of Patán fanaticism, but instigated by persons opposed to the new arrangements.\*

\* The assassination of Lieutenant Hewson led to the occupation of the fort by British troops ; and ultimately an arrangement was made by which the administration of the entire district of Quetta was ceded to the British Government on payment of a quit-rent of Rs.25,000 a year. As the revenue of the district was at the time but

But, on the other hand, the Brahúi Chiefs and their tribesmen behaved admirably, and the fact that, in all his difficulties, he received the most cordial support from Lord Lytton was a source of great satisfaction to him. "Sandeman," said the Viceroy in a letter to the Foreign Secretary, "has shown excellent sense. He should persevere in his endeavours to bring the Khan to reason . . . so far from being at the end, we are only at the beginning of an anxious task."

During the cold season of 1877-78 matters had so far quieted that Major Sandeman was able to make his first official tour in Khelát territory, visiting Khelát, the capital; Zahri, the head-quarters of the Jhalawán Chief; and Lus, a small vassal state between the lower highlands and the sea-coast. Later on, he found time to pay a brief visit to England, and on his return settled some disputes on the Punjab frontier, and selected a place—Vitákri—in the Khetrán hills, between Quetta and the Punjab, for the location of a British Cantonment.

Vitákri was afterwards abandoned in favour of Loralai, a place situated further north on the new Pishín-Punjab road; but the following account of an interview with a Marri chief on the subject of the proposed location is worth recording, as it shows what a remarkable change of attitude had come over this once hostile tribe and the reasons for it. In a letter to the Foreign Secretary, dated August 12, 1878, Sandeman writes:—

"To-day the Loharáni Marri chief, who holds the country on the west side of the Shum Plain, and up to the border of the very spot where I propose placing the troops, has just come into my camp. He was well pleased to hear the news . . . On rising to go away he said, 'Our enemies said the Marri tribe would only behave well at the

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Rs.15,000 yearly, the arrangement was pecuniarily advantageous to the Khan. But with improved administration the revenues have enormously increased, so all parties have benefited by the change.



point of the sword. We all know, Sahib, you have saved us from destruction. You will see now that we will obey you equally well with the Balúch clans who are subjects to the British Government.' The fact is, the Marrís, like the Mazáris, are finding that peace pays and that the British Government respects their rights."

But the expedition to Makráń had to be postponed, for the relations between the British Government and the Amír of Kábul were becoming more and more strained, and the Agent's presence at Quetta was all important.

During this eventful period, the service he rendered—though little known beyond the precincts of the Indian Foreign Office—was simply invaluable. He kept the Government of India supplied with reliable information regarding affairs in southern Afghanistán; he succeeded in detaching the Patan tribes immediately north of Quetta from the side of the Afghán ruler, he opened friendly communications with parties in Kandahar, he quietly collected and stored up grain in view of eventual hostilities; and, lastly, he succeeded in doing what once seemed almost hopeless, but was of vital importance at the time—in thoroughly convincing the Khelát Chief that it was best for his interests to remain loyal to the British Government.

The events narrated in this chapter complete an epoch in Sir Robert Sandeman's career, and, before proceeding further, it will be convenient here to summarize briefly what had been accomplished, and to point out how overwhelmingly important, in connection with the outbreak of the Afghan war, which will be dealt with in the next chapter, were the results which Major Sandeman had been able to achieve.

It was in November, 1875, that Major Sandeman left Déra Ghazi Khan on his first mission to Khelát. It was in

November, 1878, that war was declared with Afghanistán. In this short interval of three years by the genius and resource of one man the whole aspect of the Balúch Frontier question had been changed ; and it is difficult to exaggerate the advantage which this alteration gave to us in our subsequent operations against Afghanistán.

A reference to the map will show that Balúchistán proper, that is to say, the territories of the Khelát State, extend from the Marri and Búgti hills opposite the Punjab district of Déra Gházi Khan to the sea at Karáchi, and intervenes between what was then our frontier at Jacobábád and the borders of southern Afghanistán. In order to march troops from Jacobábád through the Bolán Pass to Kandahár, it was necessary to cross about 250 miles of Khelát territory, before reaching the Afghán district of Pishín, some 30 miles beyond Quetta. For 20 years before Major Sandeman's first mission this tract of country had been the scene of constant civil war. The Khan was not strong enough to subdue his rebellious sirdárs. The sirdárs were unable to impose their terms upon the Khan. The result was that the whole countryside was in a state of perpetual unrest, in which every petty chieftain who could collect sufficient followers was at liberty to plunder to his heart's content. The country beyond our border was unsafe for British officers, and mostly unexplored and unknown. The first 100 miles of the route through the plains of Kachi were constantly raided by the Marri and Búgti tribes. The next 80 miles through the Bolán Pass were frequently closed to traffic for months by the turbulent Kurds and Mingals, who inhabit the precipitous hills through which the pass runs, and no caravans could pass through without a safe-conduct from these tribes. Along the rest of the route, through the Quetta district, the authority of the

Khan was so precarious that he could not have rendered us much assistance even if he wished to do so. If therefore the Afghán war had occurred three years sooner our troops for the first 250 miles of their march to Kandahár would practically have been journeying through an enemy's country, and the task of protecting our communications, and of procuring transport and supplies, would have been enormously increased. Moreover, had the wave of fanaticism which spread through Afghanistan on the outbreak of the war extended to the Muhammadan tribes of Balúchistán, it is possible that our advance through the Khelát State might even have been actively opposed.

All these dangers and difficulties were prevented and forestalled by the successful termination of Major Sandeman's intervention. The Marri and Búgti chiefs enthusiastically supported the bold young Punjab officer, and submitted to his control. The Bolán Pass was opened to traffic under regulations which provided for its guardianship by the neighbouring tribes in return for a light toll on caravans; the disputes between the Khan and his sirdárs were amicably settled and a treaty of alliance concluded with the British Government; our troops were established at Quetta, 200 miles on the way to Afghanistan; the routes through the Bolán, and the Marri and Búgti hills were explored and made known, and, when at last hostilities with the Amír broke out, our army marched through a friendly country to the Afghán border with all the resources in transport and supplies of a united Khelát State placed freely and even enthusiastically at its disposal.

This great change, even if its effects had been only of a temporary character, was sufficient to entitle Major Sandeman to all the praise and honour he received, and

when we contemplate the peace and prosperity which, for 14 years, he gave to the distracted Khelát State and to the whole of our Sind border, and compare this reign of quiet with the chaos and turmoil of the previous 20 years, we cannot fail to be impressed with the foresight and sagacity of the man to whose daring and original policy these results are mainly due.

It may be noted here that Major Sandeman's dealings with the Marri and Bugti tribes, and his mediation between the Khan and his sirdárs, revealed to the Government of India for the first time how much was to be accomplished by judicious intervention beyond the border, and they formed the first steps towards that revolution in our policy towards the independent frontier tribes which is perhaps the chief and most enduring achievement of Sir Robert Sandeman's career. This will be more fully explained in the pages which follow, and it is a point the reader should not lose sight of in tracing the progress made by the Balúchistán agency in after years.

SANDEMAN.

[CH. XIII.]

## CHAPTER XIII.

Leading events of THE AFGHAN WARS.

—Afghan territory to be noted with special reference to Major Sandeman's services—The Russian Mission—Outbreak of the War—Astor's territory entered from four points—Major Sandeman marches General Biddulph's force into Pishin—Sibi occupied—Passes at Alima-jid and the Péwar Pass—General Stewart's march through the Bolin greatly expedited by Major Sandeman's arrangements—Major Sandeman visits the crest of the Khojak Pass with a tribal escort and finds it unoccupied—General Stewart's force passes into Kandahar territory over the Khojak and Gwaja Passes, but Major Sandeman not allowed to accompany it—Friendly attitude of the Achakzai tribe—Loyalty of the Jám of Lus Beyla and Khan of Khelát—The *Times* on Major Sandeman's services—General Stewart's proceedings after occupation of Kandahar—Part of his force under General Biddulph returns—Major Sandeman accompanies General Biddulph in his return march by the Tal-Chotiáli route—Action at Baghaz—Treaty of Gandamak—Major Sandeman arranges for the administration of the Assigned Districts—Cholera—Honours for services in Afghan war announced—Major Sandeman made a K.C.S.I.—Letters of congratulation from Lord Lytton and others—Services mentioned in Parliament.

IT is of course no part of the design of this Memoir to write a history of the late Afghan wars, but it is due to Major Sandeman's memory to place on record the valuable political and administrative services rendered by him in connection with these historical events—services involving grave responsibility and no small amount of personal danger, but apt to be more or less lost sight of amid the glamour of great military achievements.

Accordingly, while giving a brief account of the

inception and leading events of the war, we shall direct attention principally to events and measures with which Major Sandeman was personally connected, or which have a bearing on his claims for recognition.

On July 31, 1878, intelligence was received that, in spite of the Clarendon-Gortchakoff Agreement of 1873, and subsequent assurances, under which Afghanistan was declared to be "beyond the sphere of Russian influence," a Russian embassy, headed by an officer of high military rank, with an escort of Cossacks and Usbeg horsemen had reached Kábul and been received with marked honour by our "friend" the Amír.\*

Preparations were at once made to send an embassy to Kábul from the British side, with General Sir Nevil Chamberlain, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., as Envoy and Plenipotentiary, and a suite of three English and three Indian officers—two of the latter being native princes, representatives of some of the principal feudatory chiefs of India.

After considerable delay—occasioned partly by the desirability of sending information to the Amír of our intention, and partly out of respect to the Amír's feelings in view of the recent death of his favourite son and

\* The action of Russia in this matter was regarded in England from two points of view; by the Tories as a "breach of faith"; by the Liberals as a "fair counter-move to our own action in despatching an Asiatic force to Malta during the Russo-Turkish War." But all parties, with few exceptions, agreed that the action of the Amír was a serious breach of friendship.

The Tories explained it as the result of our past policy; the Liberals as the result of the unconciliatory attitude of our Envoy and his Chief in the negotiations with the Amír's representative in 1877.

But it was generally admitted that the conduct of the Amír could not be ignored, and that the situation required decisive action, though the Liberals refused to regard it as a *casus belli*.

Indian opinion—official and non-official—was, for the most part, strongly in favour of Lord Lytton's policy.

heir-apparent, Abdullah Ján—the embassy, on September 21, proceeded to the entrance of the Khaibar Pass, *en route* for Kábul, but was refused a passage by the Amír's commandant, who accompanied his refusal with an ostentatious display of force.

The mission was at once recalled, and, in reply to an evasive letter from the Amír, an ultimatum was sent demanding a suitable apology, and the reception of a permanent British Mission. Meanwhile troops were mobilised, and the garrison at Quetta strengthened by a division under Major-General Michael Biddulph. Sandeman did his utmost, by friendly communications with the Governor and others, to secure the neutrality of Kandahár during the coming struggle; but he found that, though many of the leading men were favourably disposed towards us, the retirement of the British army from Kandahár in 1842—with all its terrible consequences to those who had acted as our friends—was still fresh in men's recollection, so that none dared avow their sentiments. But his efforts were not wholly fruitless.\*

On November 21, no satisfactory reply having been received, a declaration of war against the Amír was published, and a simultaneous advance made into Afghán territory from four points. Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Browne advanced from Pesháwar, with a column of 10,000 men and 30 guns, to seize the Khaibar Pass; Major-General Roberts, with a force of 5500 men and 20 guns, moved from the Kurram valley towards the Pêwar and Shutargardan

\* At the same time he earnestly pressed on the Government the necessity for prompt military action. A decisive victory over the Amír's troops would, he believed, give confidence to our friends in south Afghanistan, and pave the way for an amicable arrangement, on the lines of that effected in Khelát. For the same reason he strongly advocated the advance to Pishín and Kandahár,—a course to which Lord Lytton was, at first, opposed.

Passes ; and from the south Major-General Biddulph, with a force of 6400 men and 16 guns, accompanied by Major Sandeman, crossed the border into Pishín ; while a detachment of Sind Horse and Sikhs from Jacobábád occupied the Afghán district of Sibi near the southern end of the Bolán. There was no resistance either in Pishín or Sibi ; and the inhabitants were perfectly friendly and supplies plentiful. At the same time, Lieutenant-General Donald Stewart moved from Multán, with a force of about 7000 men, with a siege train and 38 guns, to the Bolán Pass, *en route* for Quetta and the north, while a reserve force of 6000 men and 12 guns, under the command of Major-General Primrose, was afterwards formed at Sukkur.

While Lieutenant-General Stewart's column was toiling through the Sind desert and the Bolán, stirring events were occurring in northern Afghanistan.

On November 22 Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Browne's division captured the fort of Ali Masjid in the Khaibar Pass, and within three days were in possession of the pass from end to end, and by December 20 had occupied Jellálábád.

On December 2 Major-General Roberts gained a brilliant victory in the Pewar Pass, carrying the Afghán positions after severe hand to hand fighting, and following the retreating enemy to the crest of the Shutargardan.

The advance of the British troops led to consternation in Kábul ; Sher Ali Khan fled towards Balkh with the remaining officials of the Russian Embassy, having previously released his son, Yakúb Khan, who had been long detained as a state prisoner, and entrusted him with the regency.

Lieutenant-General Stewart's operations were necessarily slower. But Major Sandeman's arrangements for the



protection of the pass, and provision of supplies, worked admirably, and by the end of December (long before the time expected) the whole of Lieutenant-General Stewart's force was assembled in Pishín.

Meanwhile, Major Sandeman, with a tribal escort of Kákar Pátáns, made a reconnaissance of the Khojak—one of the principal passes over the Khwája Amrán range, separating Pishín from Kandahár, and found its crest unoccupied by the enemy. Ultimately, Lieutenant-General Stewart's entire division passed into Kandahár territory, —some by the Khojak, some by the Gwája Pass, 20 miles south, reuniting at Takht-i-Pul, and by January 1, 1879, the force was ready to advance on Kandahár. No resistance was offered in either pass, and, thanks to Major Sandeman, the Achakzai, an Afghán tribe of shepherds inhabiting the Khwája Amrán hills, a tribe which in 1842 caused much trouble to our troops by continually harassing our camp followers and plundering our baggage, received us with the greatest friendliness, and assisted instead of impeding our advance. At the same time the Jám of Lus Beyla, a feudatory of the Khelát Chief, placed all his troops at our disposal, and the Khan himself, desirous of being associated with our advance on Kandahár, besides helping us with carriage, offered to attach his eldest son, Mahmúd Khan, to the staff of Lieutenant-General Stewart.

Referring to Major Sandeman's services at this juncture, a correspondent in the *Times*, writing in February, 1879, observes—"How different was the policy displayed towards us by the tribes in the Bolán now, to what it was in 1839." He attributes the improvement which had taken place entirely to Major Sandeman's influence, and adds—"The peaceful condition of the Bolán and the isolated cases of attacks on camp followers are in striking contrast to the

state of semi-anarchy reigning in Kurram and the Khaibar."

Major Sandeman was extremely anxious to accompany Lieutenant-General Stewart's force to Kandahár as Political Officer. For some time before he had, as we have seen, opened a correspondence with Sirdár Mir Afzal Khan, the Governor of Kandahár, and other Afghán officials, and had been actively interesting himself in reassuring the Afghán tribes and preparing the way for the advent of our troops ; moreover, he had the firm belief, which he expresses in a letter to the Foreign Secretary, that it would be possible, in friendly concert with the tribal chiefs, to effect a peaceful settlement of affairs, in the joint interests of the British Government and the Afgháns, after the manner he had so successfully adopted in Balúchistán. His ideas on this point were, as usual, a good deal in advance of the time, but, whether they were chimerical or not, there can be little doubt his great influence and prestige on the border, and the confidence felt by natives of all classes in his fairness and moderation, would have been of great value to the General commanding. But it was not to be. His presence in Balúchistán was considered indispensable, and accordingly another officer, Major, afterwards Sir Oliver, St. John, C.S.I., R.E., was appointed to accompany Sir Donald Stewart as chief political officer. So Sandeman had reluctantly to return to Quetta and devote his energies to the less interesting, but all important, work of arranging for the conveyance of supplies, and the maintenance of order in the pass, and good relations with the Balúch and Brahúi chiefs.

On the day he crossed the Khojak, Lieutenant General (now Field Marshal) Stewart thus expressed his appreciation of Sandeman's services :—" I must not let this occasion pass without thanking you for all you have done for the

Force . . . if every one had taken the trouble which you did to put the real state of the country before us the present operations would have been comparatively easy." And he has since borne generous testimony to the fact that the success of the great march from Sind to Kandahár was, in no small measure, due to Sandeman's marvellous influence over the tribes, as well as to his untiring energy and resourcefulness. "Sandeman," he says, "was always ready to help, and rarely said anything was impossible; and when he said a thing could be done it always was done."

After his return to Quetta, Sandeman was able to settle for the time being a dispute with a section of the Alizais, an important Afghán tribe from the Zemindáwar valley, which afterwards made a determined attack on Major-General Biddulph's rear-guard. And in addition to his ordinary duties he undertook the administration of Pishín, and afterwards of Shoráwak, an Afghán district between Pishín and the "Registán" or great Balúch desert, and he proved himself to be as successful in winning the confidence and support of the Afghán inhabitants as he had previously been in his dealings with the less fanatical Balúch. He also recorded an important Memorandum on the "Rectification of the north-west frontier of India,"\* in which he combats Lord Lawrence's opinion in favour of the Indus line, and boldly proposes the permanent occupation of Pishín, a measure which was ultimately carried out.

On January 1 Lieutenant-General Stewart's force advanced, and, after a skirmish with two troops of Afghán horse near Takht-i-Pul, entered Kandahár on January 8 without further opposition. The Governor and his adherents had fled towards Herát, and the people, though by no means enthusiastic, were quiet and apparently well-disposed.

\* See Appendix.

From Kandahár Lieutenant-General Stewart made a military reconnaissance as far as Khelát-i-Ghilzai, and temporarily occupied the fort, meeting with no opposition; and, under his orders, Major-General Biddulph made a similar reconnaissance in the direction of Herát, and occupied Girishk on the other side of the Halmand.

It was then decided, in view of the absence of resistance and the great expense of maintaining so large an army in south Afghanistan, to recall both forces to Kandahár, and send 5000 troops under Major-General Biddulph back to British territory, leaving Lieutenant-General Stewart in Kandahár with a garrison of about 6000 men. Much to Major Sandeman's delight, it was arranged that a portion of Major-General Biddulph's force should return to the Punjab by the route through Tal and Chotiáli—a route which he had long advocated as a means of communication between Quetta and the Punjab. The route has the advantage of avoiding the difficulties of the Bolán, with its intense heat, deficiency of forage and liability to inundation, and the 120 miles of desert which separates the pass from British territory. The route was formerly much used by caravans bound for the Punjab, until the weakness of the Khelát Chief and intertribal disputes left it exposed to depredations by Kákar Patáns and other disagreeable neighbours.

Meanwhile, two important events occurred in northern Afghanistan.

On February 20, 1879, Yakúb Khan, as *de facto* Chief in Kábul, made definite overtures through Major Cavagnari to the British Government; and on February 21 the Amír, Sher Ali Khan, died miserably at Mazár-i-Sharíf. After a struggle between contending factions, Yakúb Khan was recognized as his successor, and a long period of correspondence and negotiations followed.

To return to southern Afghanistan. Major-General Biddulph, with 5000 troops of all arms, re-crossed the Khojak Pass into Pishin, and a portion of the force, under the command of Major-General Biddulph himself, commenced an adventurous march to the Punjab by a new route.

Major Sandeman preceded the main body with a column of troops consisting of—400 1st Punjab, N.I., one squadron of 8th Bengal Cavalry, one squadron of Sind Horse, and four Mountain Guns, under the command of Major F. S. Keen, 1st P.N.I., and until reaching Baghao, a village some 60 miles east of Pishin, was able by friendly explanation to disarm the opposition of the local tribes.\*

\* The following amusing incident on the march is mentioned by Sandeman in a letter to Lord Lytton :

“Just before we arrived at the crest of the Charri Momand plateau, I received notice that it was held by one man who, sword in hand, refused the troops a passage. He had erected a small barricade and there he stood alone, apparently determined to oppose us—a veritable Roderick Dhu. I could quite imagine from the attitude he assumed his exclaiming—

‘Come on, come all, this rock shall fly  
From its firm base as soon as I!’

On hearing him, the friendly headmen of the night before advanced rapidly on his position, and throwing their long *chudders* or shawls over him, succeeded in bringing our opponent to the ground, but not before he had wounded one of them by a cut across the hand. However, when once a captive the man soon became quite quiet and docile.

“We had proceeded some seven or eight miles further, and approached a series of low hills, which we found occupied by Dúmars. I and Major Keen, with a party of infantry and two guns, at once advanced on the hill, which was pretty strongly held, and sent word to the hillmen not to oppose our advance. The guns were loaded, the hillmen refused to give way, and a collision appeared inevitable. At this juncture, to our great astonishment, the Roderick Dhu of the day before, who had attentively listened to the parley, suddenly broke

But at Baghao a large body of tribesmen from the Zhob and Bori valleys, under the command of Shah Jahán of Zhob, a religious fanatic and keen adherent of the late Amír,\* suddenly came into view, advancing across open ground to attack the force. After an action lasting for about three hours, the enemy (some 3000 strong) were completely defeated, the heights cleared and occupied, and on the following day Shah Jahán sued for peace. The entire force marched without further molestation, some through the Bori and Chamálang valleys, some by Tal Chotiáli, to the Barkhán plain, and thence by Fort Monro or the Cháchar Pass to the plains of Déra Gházi Khan.

Hearty congratulations were given to Sandeman and the Force accompanying him on the success of this first march from the Pishín highlands to the Punjab by the route he had so long advocated.† “But I aim,” he says in a letter to Lord Lytton, “at more permanent results. I trust to arrange with the Kákar clan—in the event of the Government of India approving my proposals—to keep this route continuously open for traffic.” He was allowed to carry out his policy, and, in a letter written from Baghao in 1885, he gives the following account of the change which had come over the scene:—

loose from those in charge of him, ascended the hill-side rapidly, and on reaching the top fell upon his fellow clansmen, calling out that he had surrendered, and who were they to dare to oppose our advance after he had submitted? This dispersed the party.”

\* Shah Jahán, having ousted his cousin Shabbáz Khan from the hereditary Chiefship of Zhob, had contrived by means of his reputation as a religious mendicant and miracle-worker to extend his influence over the allied tribes of Bori, Kach, and Khawás.

† An interesting account of the expedition from the pen of Major-General Sir Michael Biddulph will be found in the *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society* for April, 1880, and the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution* for June 16, 1880.

"This is the place where I was attacked by Shah Jahán in 1880. The people are quiet and apparently quite contented now. I had a long talk with one of the chief men yesterday, and he told me that cultivation was largely on the increase. In fact, people who were unable to settle in their villages, owing to local quarrels, are now returning, and I have had the pleasure of seeing about one hundred and fifty men, women, and children who had only very recently returned to a village, the land of which they had been unable to cultivate for years. Poor people, they looked very happy."

On May 8, 1879, Yakúb Khan presented himself at the head-quarters of the first division of the Kábul Field Force, then encamped on the highland of Gandamak, and on May 26, after protracted discussion, signed a treaty containing eight provisions ; \* but of these one only directly

\* The following is an abstract of the provisions :—

- (1) Peace and friendship between the parties.
- (2) Amír's subjects to be exempt from punishment or molestation on account of their intercourse with the British during the war.
- (3) The foreign affairs of the Amír to be conducted under British advice. The Amír to be supported by the British Government against foreign aggression.
- (4) A British Resident, accompanied by a proper escort, to be located at Kábul with power to depute British Agents to the frontier on special occasions. The Amír to be permitted to send Agents to India. The Amír to guarantee the safety and honourable treatment of British Agents.
- (5) A separate engagement regarding commercial matters to be entered into. Telegraphic communication to be established between India and Kábul *via* Kurram.
- (6) All the Afghán territory in British occupation to be restored to the Amír *except* the Kurram, Pishin and Sibi valleys, which would remain as districts assigned to the British Government, the Amír receiving the surplus revenues after payment of the expenses of administration.
- (7) British authorities to have complete control of the Khaibar and Michni Passes, as well as of relations with the independent tribes in the vicinity.
- (8) Amír to receive an annual subsidy of six lakhs of rupees contingent on fulfilment of treaty obligations.

The Treaty was *de facto* abrogated by the deposition of Yakúb Khan, and the arrangements made at the conclusion of the Afghán war.

affected the Balúchistán Agency. By this provision the districts of Pishín and Sibi were to remain as districts assigned to the British Government, the Amír receiving the surplus revenues after payment of the expenses of administration.

A descriptive account of Pishín and Sibi will be found in chapter xvi., where the question of their retention by the British Government is discussed at length. Here it will suffice to state that the paramount necessity of retaining these two districts was at once foreseen by Sir Robert Sandeman. The retention of Sibi in Afghán hands would have caused constant annoyance and risk of complications, while to us, lying as it does at the mouths of the Bolán and the Harnái routes to Quetta, it was of great strategical value. The Pishín district was of equal value both from a strategic and administrative point of view, while the Khwája Amrán range, a single ridge rising 2000 feet above the plain, with long western slopes unembarrassed by settled population, formed an ideal boundary between the district and Afghanistán.

But the provisions of the treaty were not wholly satisfactory to Major Sandeman, as they involved the retrocession of the Shoráwak valley, the retention of which was, in Sir Robert's opinion, a matter of great importance in view of probable extension of railway operations; but he lost no time, in conjunction with his second assistant, Captain Wylie, in arranging for the administration of the districts assigned.

Meanwhile Sirdár Shér Ali Khan, an uncle of Yakúb Khan, was sent to Kandahár as Governor, and measures were taken to recall the British troops from Afghán territory, but fortunately, as it happened, the return of the Kandahár division was postponed until the end of the hot weather



But peace between Afghanistan and the British Government brought no peace to Major Sandeman, for during April, May, and June (1879) he was engaged in an acute controversy with the Punjab Government on the subject of his jurisdiction,—and the matter, however uninteresting to the general reader, has to be referred to, as it forms part of an important administrative question which is still unsettled.

The dispute arose in connection with the proceedings of the District Officer of Dera Ghazi Khan in reference to arrangements made with the Khetrán tribe for the new cantonment of Vitákri. As Agent to the Governor-General for Balúchistán, Major Sandeman claimed exclusive political control over all the Balúch tribes on the Punjab frontier, whether inside or outside, or partly inside and partly outside, the imaginary line of demarcation, and that, *quâ* these tribes, the District Officer of Dera Ghazi Khan was under his orders and not under those of the Punjab Government.

The Punjab Government, on the other hand, claimed to exercise, through its District Officer at Dera Ghazi Khan, the same political control over the tribes on its border which it had been in the habit of exercising in the past, and quoted in support of its contention the very arguments used by Major Sandeman himself when District Officer of Dera Ghazi Khan.

The Government of India's decision was in the nature of a compromise, but substantially in favour of the Punjab Government. It gave Major Sandeman control over the Khetráns, but in respect to other tribes left matters as they were.

This decision may have been technically correct, for the instrument appointing Major Sandeman Agent to the Governor-General for Balúchistán gave him no authority

over Punjab officers, nor expressly deprived the Punjab Government of a jurisdiction formerly exercised by it. But whether the decision was politically expedient is another question, and on this, as often happens, there is much to be said on either side. But the present writer is in a position to affirm that the decision of the Government of India in 1879 was not in accordance with the intention of the Government of India in 1877. It was then intended that the Governor-General's Agent for Balúchistán should exercise political control over all the Balúch tribes of the Déra Gházi Khan border. Lord Lytton was also prepared to go still further, and grant Major Sandeman administrative powers in the district of Déra Gházi Khan, but abstained from doing so in deference to the wishes of Mr. R. E. Egerton, then Lieutenant-Governor designate of the Punjab, and in lieu of such arrangement a clause was inserted in the instrument giving the Governor-General's Agent a right to be consulted in all administrative matters affecting or likely to affect the border tribes.

During June and July Major Sandeman was busily engaged in the work of organizing the administration of the new districts, and in bringing under British influence the tract known as Zúwar, formerly, with Sibi, a dependency of Kandahár, including the valleys Sanghao, Harnái, Shárig'h and Kach Amadán, through which the main line of the Sind-Pishín railway was ultimately taken ; he was also much occupied in reducing expenditure, and pressing upon the Government the importance of permanently opening the new route from the Pishín highland to the plains of the Punjab.

In the midst of his engrossing occupations there was a smart outbreak of cholera in Quetta. Writing to the Foreign Secretary on July 5, he says :—

"We have indeed had a severe time of it with this horrid disease. My house has been more like a hospital than anything else. Major Noble, commanding the siege train, is very ill. Lieutenant Ravenshaw was attacked by cholera only two days ago, and poor Mrs. Bruce is still in a very critical state. . . . We have lost in the military lines about 200 native soldiers and camp-followers; in the civil station about one-third of that number. I have lost three of my servants."

But the sequel should be told. Mrs. Bruce got worse, and even her husband thought her dying. Sandeman, however, refused to give up hope, but mounted his horse and rode nearly 40 miles to fetch his own doctor, whom he brought back with him. By his timely aid Mrs. Bruce was pulled through, and attributes her escape from death entirely to Major Sandeman's humane and energetic interposition.

At the end of July the Honours conferred for services in the late Afghán war were announced. General Haines, the C. in C. of India (already G.C.B.) was made G.C.S.I.; Generals Stewart, S. Browne, Maude, Biddulph, Roberts and Lumsden, K.C.B.'s; Major Cavagnari, Civil K.C.B.; and Mr. Lyall, Foreign Secretary, C.B. The KHAN OF KHELÁT was appointed Honorary Knight Grand Commander of the Star of India; Mr. Egerton, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab; Lieutenant-Colonel Owen Burne (then Political Secretary India Office) and Colonel Colley (Private Secretary to the Viceroy), Nawab Ghulám Hassan Khan (Native Envoy to Kábul and *ad interim* Governor of Kandahár), and MAJOR SANDEMAN, were made K.C.S.I.'s.

In congratulating Sir Robert on his decoration, Lord Lytton wrote as follows:—

"I have performed few such pleasant duties during my Viceroyalty as of recommending you for the K.C.S.I., and, as Grand Master of the Order, I cordially welcome you to your present place in it as a brother knight. From the signature of the Jacobábád Treaty up to the present moment your management of our relations with the Khan and his

Sirdárs has not only been most successful, but has been marked by an ability, energy, and judgment which place you conspicuously in the first rank of our Frontier Political Service."

The Foreign Secretary, Mr. Alfred Lyall, wrote :—

"The general opinion is that the political officers did as much for their decorations as the military, and it is true that the whole campaign has been rather political than military, and has taxed the abilities and exertions rather of the politicals than of the army. It is my firm opinion, which I declare on all occasions, that the Government of India has never been better served in all its history by its political officers than during this last Afghán war."

And Colonel Hills (now Lieut.-Gen. Sir James Hills-Johnes), A.A.G. with the south Afghanistán field force :—

"Of all the congratulations you have received, there are none more sincere than the General's, Chapman's, and my own, for the right good work you have done for Government in this war."

On August 5 votes of thanks to the Government of India and the Army were passed in both Houses of Parliament, and in the course of his speech the Secretary of State for India (Viscount Cranbrook) said with reference to Sir Robert Sandeman's services :—

"Perhaps as I am speaking of civil services your lordships will allow me to say one word of another officer, Major Sandeman, who had charge of the negotiations at Khelát. It was necessary that these should be in perfect harmony with what was done elsewhere, and the satisfactory condition into which that country has been brought is in no small degree due to the admirable qualities which Major Sandeman brought to bear upon the mission he had in charge."

And in a despatch to the Government of India, dated August 7, he wrote :—

"The value of Major Sandeman's personal influence on the Khan of Khelát and the Balúch Sirdárs can hardly be overrated."

The services of the British Balúch Chiefs who had so loyally assisted Major Sandeman, Sirdárs Imám Baksh Khan, Mazári and Jumál Khan Loghári, were not forgotten. They received from the Government of India the title of Nawáb, and Hittú Rám, Major Sandeman's native secretary, was granted the honorary prefix of Rae.

## CHAPTER XIV.

THE AFGHÁN WAR (*continued*).

Sir Robert Sandeman at Kandahár—News of massacre of British Embassy at Kábul—Movement of troops—Effect of news in the Assigned Districts—Action taken by Sir Robert Sandeman—Events in northern Afghanistán—General Stewart's division relieved by a division from Bombay in view to his marching to Kábul by Ghazni—Increased work and responsibility thrown upon the Balúchistán Agency in maintaining peace and furnishing supplies—Splendid exertions of Brahúi Chiefs—Railway from Indus to Pishín commenced—To be taken up the Harnái valley—Arrangements made for protection of working parties—Captain Showers, Commandant of Balúch Guides, killed by Panizai Patáns—Sir R. Sandeman attacks and disperses the tribesmen in the Chappar mountain, but receives a bullet through his helmet—Sirdár Abdurrahmán Khan enters Afghán territory—Negotiations opened—Policy of "disintegration of Afghanistán"—Sirdár Sher Ali Khan recognized as *Wali* of Kandahár—General Stewart's victory over tribesmen near Ghazni, and entry into Kábul—Change of Government in England—Lord Lytton resigns Viceroyship, and is succeeded by Marquis of Ripon—Policy of "disintegration" abandoned.

AFFAIRS having become comparatively tranquil, Sir Robert Sandeman thought the opportunity a good one for obtaining a little much needed rest. Insomnia, cramps, and other disagreeable symptoms had made their appearance, and change of scene and release, for a time, from the cares of office were very necessary. So he again sounded the authorities on the subject of leave of absence; but instead of obtaining leave of absence, he received instructions to

proceed to Kandahár to discuss with General Sir Donald Stewart, who had been ordered to evacuate Kandahár, the question of demarcating the boundary between Kandahár and Pishín.

The troops had already started on their return to British territory, and the only tent unstruck was that of the General commanding (who had remained behind to write despatches), when intelligence was received of the outbreak at Kábul on September 3, 1879, and the massacre of Sir Louis Cavagnari, the British Resident, with his entire staff and escort.

Information of the tragical event reached the Government of India at Simla on September 5. On the 6th Major-General Sir F. Roberts was on his way from Simla to Kurram to arrange for an immediate advance on Kábul, and by the 11th Brigadier-General Massy, in command at Kurram, by a successful *coup de main* had seized the crest of the Shutargardan Pass. At the same time Lieutenant-General Stewart, whose division had just evacuated Kandahár, was ordered to re-occupy the town and hold himself in readiness to march to Kábul.

As might have been expected, the news of the Kábul massacre caused a profound sensation throughout Balúchistán and the Assigned Districts. Sir Robert Sandeman's first act was to proceed with all haste to the Khojak and re-assure the tribes. In this he succeeded, and by September 14 he was able to report all well in the pass, and no prospect of interruptions of communication between Kandahár and Quetta.

By September 24 Brigadier-General Sir Thomas Baker, commanding the advance column of Major-General Roberts' force, had crossed the Shutargardan, and on the 27th the Amír took refuge in the British camp. Major-General Roberts marched straight to Kábul, and after some severe fighting entered the Bála Hissár in triumph on October 12.

Soon afterwards the Amír, who was considered, on further inquiry, to have shown incompetency, or treachery, or both, abdicated his position, and was deported to British India, where he is still detained as a State prisoner. Kábul and the surrounding country were placed under military law, and a grand inquest was held into the events of the past few weeks. Those proved to have taken a prominent part in the massacre of September 3 were executed, and attempts were made to effect a disarmament of the population.

On November 11 an amnesty was proclaimed on certain conditions, but had little effect in pacifying the country. On all sides bodies of insurgent soldiery and tribesmen gathered about the capital, and by the beginning of December Kábul was beleaguered by some 30,000 fighting men. Between the 9th and 14th of December there was constant but somewhat desultory fighting, and Major-General Roberts found it necessary to abandon the citadel and concentrate his forces in the cantonment of Sherpur, two miles from Kábul. Meanwhile, Brigadier-General Charles Gough's brigade was ordered to advance from Gandamak, and by December 23 the insurgents and their following were completely defeated and driven off. But the disturbing elements collected at Ghazni, and it was felt that, until they were dispersed, there was no prospect of permanent tranquillity in northern Afghanistan.

During all this time Kandahár, under the rule of Sirdár Sher Ali Khan and the British authorities, was tranquil; with the exception of some outrages by fanatics, the conduct of the people was orderly; cultivation was extended, and trade began rapidly to develop. In the far west, indeed, there were rumours of an intended advance by Ayúb Khan, the younger brother of Yakúb, but no great importance was attached to them by the Kandahár authorities; and it was ultimately arranged that Lieutenant-General Stewart's



column should be relieved by a division from Bombay, and return to the Bengal Presidency *viâ* Khelât-i-Ghilzai, Ghazni, and Kábul, and break up any opposition he might meet with on the way.

These arrangements threw a vast amount of work and increased responsibility upon Sir Robert Sandeman. Since the outbreak of September, fanatical priests and other emissaries from Afghanistán had done their best to stir up religious excitement among the tribes of Pishín and Sibi, and to undermine the fidelity of the Brahúis in the Bolán Pass; and it required all the reassuring powers of the political officers, in concert with the military, to preserve tranquillity.

It unfortunately happened also that, in this critical position of affairs, the military outposts had to be transferred from the charge of Bengal regiments, whose men and officers had learned to understand the tribes, to the charge of Bombay regiments new to the work; and it was to this circumstance that Sir Robert Sandeman attributed, in some measure, the subsequent rising of the Kákar Patáns and Panizais. This is mentioned, not with a view of casting the slightest reflection upon the regiments in question, but simply to show how vast and various were the difficulties to be contended with.

Again, the matter of carriage and supplies had become very serious. The dreadful mortality among the camels and other beasts of burden in the campaign of 1878 had well nigh exhausted the supply, and but for the splendid exertions of the Brahúi chiefs, inspired by Sandeman, the march of the troops would have been seriously harassed, if not altogether checked.

In view of these grave difficulties, the Government of India, early in September, 1879, sanctioned the construction of a broad gauge line from Sukkur on the Indus to Dádar

at the mouth of the Bolán Pass, and, under direction of Colonel Lindsay, R.E., aided by all the resources of the Bombay Government, and the inspiring energy of Sir Richard Temple, it was pushed on with great rapidity. Before the end of the year the line was completed from Sukkur to a point 24 miles beyond Jacobábád, and was opened as far as Sibi—133½ miles—in January, 1880. Ultimately it was arranged, on the recommendation of Sir Robert Sandeman, supported by Sir Richard Temple, that the main line should proceed, not through the Bolán Pass, but up the Nári gorge to the Harnái valley (3000 feet above the sea-level), a route explored by Sir Robert Sandeman the previous autumn, and thence through a chasm in a limestone range, known as the Chappar Rift, to Gwál on the Pishín plateau. This route, besides avoiding the difficulties of the Bolán Pass, had the advantage of passing to a great extent through territory under the direct administration of the British Government.

The construction of the line by this route, though, undoubtedly, a wise proceeding, led to the employment of vast gangs of labourers in very exposed positions, and it became Sir Robert Sandeman's duty to arrange, in concert with the military authorities, for their proper protection; but as the number of troops available was limited, reliance had to be placed to a great extent upon a good understanding with the surrounding tribes. Part of the line ran through hills inhabited by Marrís,—formerly the greatest plunderers on the border,—part through the lands of Patán tribes, more or less excited by recent events. In the case of the Marrís, Sir Robert called a meeting of the chiefs of clans, and arranged with them for the protection of the working parties, and all went on well until the fatal disaster at Maiwand, when the tribe "went out of hand." In the Patán country the Taríns, a trading tribe,

were our good friends, but the Kákars and Panizai and Lúni Patáns, excited by the preaching of fanatical priests, gave much trouble.

Early in the spring of 1880, Captain Showers, Commandant of the Balúch Guides, was proceeding from Dirgai to Quetta across the Chappar mountain, accompanied by a slender escort of Balúch horsemen and two Panizai guides. On reaching a pass named Uzda Psha, he was fired on by a party of Panizais, who had been placed in ambush by their chief, Faiz Muhammad Khan. Captain Showers fell at the first discharge, and his party were all either killed or dispersed. Three days afterwards (April 28) some of the same tribe attacked a railway survey party under Lieutenant Fuller, R.E., wounding an English sergeant and two sepoy. Sir Robert Sandeman, who happened to be at Harnái at the time, received from the rebel chief at Chappar a written communication to the following effect—"We have killed Showers; if you are afraid, go back; if not, come on and we will kill you."

Needless to say, Sir Robert at once accepted the challenge. His escort was reinforced by a few troops, being thus brought up to 300 infantry and 80 cavalry, while a force of about 500 rifles was collected at Gwál to operate from the north, and, on April 2, a reconnaissance was made by the southern force through the Chappar Rift, along which the railway now passes, and the left flanking party became engaged with the enemy, whom they drove back to their main position on the mountain. The skirmish produced a salutary effect, for during the night the tribal gathering dispersed, and next morning their position was occupied without resistance, and the village towers at Dirgai blown up.

But Sir Robert had a narrow escape. "During the skirmish the well-known figure of the Agent of the

- \* Governor-General," wrote an eye-witness, "conspicuous in white garments and a solahtopce (pith-hat), drew a good deal of fire. His orderly was hit in the shoulder, and while engaged in binding up the wound Sir Robert himself received a bullet through his hat." The chief got away for the time and took refuge in Zhob, but there can be no doubt that the Agent's prompt and vigorous action nipped in the bud what would otherwise have been a formidable rising of Patán tribes along the line of our communications.

At this time there was apparently a lull in the condition of affairs in Kandahár, and Balúchistán was tranquil; so again Sir Robert sought for, and obtained, a promise of leave. It was granted on the understanding that he did not avail himself of it until August, but before August events occurred which rendered leave impossible.

Towards the end of March, 1880, Mr. (now Sir Lepel) Griffin arrived in Kábul and took over charge of political affairs from Lieutenant-General Roberts, and about the same time Sirdár Abdurrahmán Khan (the present Amír), who had been twelve years a pensioner of the Russian Government, proceeded from Tashkend into Afghán territory, and communications were opened with him by our political officer. The policy of Her Majesty's Government was at the time in favour of the "disintegration of Afghánistán," and, as a step in this direction, Sirdár Sher Ali Khan, in a letter from the Viceroy, dated March 13, was recognized as independent Governor, or Wali, of Kandahár, on the understanding that a force of British troops should remain at or near his capital (which was to be connected with British territory by railway), and that a British

officer should be appointed to reside in cantonments as a medium of friendly communication, and to conduct the relations of the British Government with states upon the frontier.

Soon after this recognition, Lieutenant-General Stewart, having now been relieved by a Bombay division under Lieutenant-General Primrose, was in a position to march to Kábul. Accordingly, early in April, the Bengal troops, 7000 strong, marched for Ghazni in three columns, uniting at Khelát-i-Ghilzai. On April 19 the force reached Ahmad Khel, 25 miles south of Ghazni, when a large gathering of tribesmen—about 1000 horsemen and 15,000 foot—was observed. The engagement which followed was remarkable for a fierce onslaught made on our troops by a body of from 3000 to 4000 gházis or fanatics; the attack was successfully repulsed, with a loss to the enemy of about 3000 men, our loss amounting to 17 killed and 124 wounded. The next day Ghazni was occupied, and by the end of April Lieutenant-General Stewart's force entered Kábul.

Meanwhile important events had occurred in England. A General Election, largely turning on the Afghán question, placed the Liberals in power. Lord Cranbrook was succeeded as Secretary of State for India by the Marquis of Hartington; Lord Lytton resigned the office of Viceroy and was succeeded by the Marquis of Ripon. The "policy of disintegration" was abandoned, and, after much correspondence and not a little hesitation, Sirdár Abdurrahman Khan was, on July 22, 1880, formally recognized as "Amír of Kábul." And here it may be noted that the new Amír was at first recognized as Amír of Kábul only—because the Government of India had not, at this time, finally decided what course to pursue in regard to southern Afghanistan.

In anticipation of the events which are dealt with in the next chapter, it may be briefly added that on August 9, after Ayúb Khan's victory at Maiwand, Lieutenant-General Roberts' division left for Kandahár, accompanied by representatives of the new Amír, and immediately afterwards Lieutenant-General Stewart, with the rest of the British army, evacuated Kábul. On October 16 Kurram was also evacuated, and as by this time the Government had determined to make over the Kandahár province also to the Amír, the Duráni Sirdár, Sher Ali Khan, was, on November 29, induced to resign his position of "Wali" of Kandahár, which he had no chance of holding against the Amír if the British troops were recalled, and retired to Karáchi as a pensioner of the British Government. On April 21, 1881, Kandahár was evacuated by British troops, and handed over to Sirdár Muhammad Hassan, the Amír's representative.

## CHAPTER XV.

## AYÚB KHAN.

Ayub Khan's advance—Sir Robert takes a more serious view of the situation than the Kandahár authorities—Disaster at Maiwand—Prompt action of Sir Robert Sandeman at Quetta—Railway works in Harnáí valley abandoned—Loyal conduct of the Khan and Chiefs of Khelat—Excitement amongst the Páitún tribes—Members of the Marri tribe attack a British convoy—Tribe afterwards punished by Sir Charles MacGregor—March of General Roberts—Battle of Kandahár—Difficulties of supply—Sir Robert Sandeman obtains six months' supply of food—Transactions with General Roberts—Crossing the Khojak Sir Robert Sandeman has to force his way through robbers—End of war—Sir Robert Sandeman's services acknowledged by the Viceroy and by the Secretary of State in Parliament—Sir Robert avails himself of leave to England—Farewell letter from the Khan of Khelat.

REPORTS of an intended movement by Ayúb Khan against Kandahár had reached the Government of India from time to time, commencing so far back as December, 1879, but no great importance was attached to them by the Kandahár authorities. Early in June, 1880, intelligence was received that he had actually started from Herát with a considerable force, but information as to its strength and character and as to the attitude of the tribes was singularly defective. Sir Robert Sandeman had no political jurisdiction in Kandahár, but the information he had received at Quetta led him to take a serious view of the situation, and he is said, before the end of June, to have warned the Government of India that the

Wali's troops were not to be trusted. But the warning, if sent, was not heeded.\* Again, on hearing of Ayúb's advance, he recommended, in conjunction with his old friend and comrade, Major-General Phayre,† then commanding at Quetta, that the latter's division, then quartered

\* Whether the alleged warning was ever sent is one of the many *vexatæ questiones* of Indian history. On the one hand, (1) the *Times of India* of February 6, 1892, contains the following positive statement:—"We are in a position to say that had the Government of India taken due notice of his [Sir R. Sandeman's] warning that the troops of the puppet Wali of Candahar were not to be trusted, we should, probably, have been saved the indignity, humiliation, and disaster of Maiwand; he having reported to this effect, a clear week before the ill-fated force led by General Burrows left Candahar." (2) The tenor of Sir O. St. John's telegram, recommending the despatch of Burrows' brigade (given below), indicates that doubts were felt as to the fidelity of the Wali's troops.

On the other hand, (1) no such warning is included in the "Papers relating to the Advance of Ayoob Khan on Kandahár," presented to Parliament in 1880. This, however, is no *conclusive* proof that the warning was not sent, seeing that Sandeman's important telegram of July 21 (given below) is not included—though it certainly was sent to the Government of India, and, presumably, reached its destination. But (2) in a Memorandum of Services in the Afghán war, recorded by Sandeman in 1882, in which he claims credit for having sent the telegram of the 21st, he makes no mention of the specific warning referred to by the *Times of India*; he simply asserts that he "recognized from the first the importance of the movement of the tribes in favour of Ayúb Khan."

The question at issue could be easily settled by the Calcutta Foreign Office; but meanwhile there is a consensus of opinion that, whether he sent the specific warning or not, Sir Robert Sandeman "appreciated the situation" (to use a Foreign Office phrase) more accurately than the authorities at Kandahár.

† Major-General Phayre, it will be recollected, had been formerly Political Superintendent of the Sind frontier, where he worked in hearty sympathy with Sandeman; but he was removed from this post and replaced in military employ in consequence of his inability to work harmoniously with Sir William Merewether. The two friends now found themselves again side by side, working together with perfect accord, though under altered conditions.



in Pishín, should be at once mobilised. The suggestion was not acted upon.

Meanwhile, in spite, it is said, of Sir Robert's warning, the troops of the Wali were allowed to proceed to the Halmand to check Ayúb's advance, but, on the recommendation of Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, in a telegram dated the 27th June, a brigade was despatched, under the command of Brigadier-General Burrows, to "confirm the fidelity of the Wali's troops, overawe the Zemíndáwar tribes, and establish confidence."

On July 13 the troops of the Wali, which had crossed the Halmand near Girishk, mutinied and moved off to join the enemy. Part of Brigadier-General Burrows' brigade thereupon crossed the river in pursuit, attacked and dispersed the mutineers and captured their six guns; then re-crossed the river, and, with the rest of the brigade, took up a position at Khushk-i-Nákhud, a place where several routes from the Halmand to Kandahár converged, and where supplies were plentiful.

Hearing this, Sir Robert Sandeman, in concurrence with Major-General Phayre, recommended that the troops at Tal Chotiáli should be relieved from Bombay, and set free to act as a movable column along the Gwál-Chaman line of communications. Time did not admit of this being done.

On July 21 Sir Robert telegraphed to the Government of India as follows :—

"The following news has been communicated by me to General Phayre. Ayúb Khan meditates night attack on Burrows' camp with cavalry and *gházis*, and on line of communications in the Gulistán direction from Shoráwak. There is much excitement among the tribes. Mullas of influence are moving about preaching *jihad*. The movement in Ayúb Khan's favour is more extended and determined than I think is believed in Kandahár."

This news was duly sent on by Major-General Phayre to Lieutenant-General Primrose, commanding at Kandahár,

and appears to have been acted upon to some extent, for on the 23rd Lieutenant-Colonel St. John telegraphs as follows :—

“Being apprehensive of a night attack by the enemy's numerous cavalry, General Burrows has shifted his camp to a new position, in which the stores, sick, and baggage animals are in an enclosure.”

No night attack was made on our camp, and on the morning of July 27 General Burrows, with a brigade of 2500 men and 6 guns, marched from Khusk-i-Nákhud to intercept Ayúb Khan, who was advancing by Maiwand on Kandahár, with a force of *gházis*, cavalry and tribesmen, numbering in all about 12,000 men, and from 30 to 35 guns. After a long artillery duel, in which the superior number of the opposing guns told heavily against us, the enemy's cavalry and *gházis* made a fierce onslaught on our left and front. Some of the Native Infantry regiments, new to Afghanistán, failed, as well they might, to withstand the attack, fell back in confusion, and, in spite of the most gallant exertions of the general commanding and his officers, could not be rallied. The result was a disastrous defeat of the whole force, with the loss in killed and missing of 1200 men, 19 officers, 2 guns, and nearly all our ammunition.

The terrible news reached Quetta on the morning of the 28th. Sir Robert immediately conferred with General Phayre, and, the same morning, sent the subjoined telegram to the Government of India :—

“News of this morning from Kandahár. General Phayre and I have consulted together, and these are our views : That our line of communication with India for troops must be the Bolán Pass. The question we beg to refer to Government is, what is to be done under present circumstances with the railway line under construction? We consider that the force from Thal-Chotiáli to Quetta should be concentrated in Pishín with the least possible delay, and we recommend that the protection of the railway line and Thal-Chotiáli should, if

possible, be taken by Punjab troops. The Bombay troops, in which we include the whole of General Phayre's division, ought to be concentrated here at once. . . .

"We are quite aware of the very bad political effect the abandonment of the railway line and Thal-Chotiáli by the present garrison must have upon the country, unless troops from the Punjab can be sent to relieve them, but state of country and strength of tribes, in our opinion, leave no alternative."

The abandonment of the line of railway in which Sir Robert Sandeman had taken so deep an interest, and the withdrawal of our troops from territory which he had just succeeded in bringing under British influence, must have been a sore trial, but he saw the sacrifice was called for, and accepted it unhesitatingly.

To this telegram the following reply was received :—

"Viceroy entirely approves the measures proposed by yourself and General Phayre, and decides that the forces employed for protection of railway line must be at once withdrawn as proposed. We are sending reinforcements from Bengal, and will re-occupy railway line when possible, but present exigencies necessitate pushing forward all available forces toward Kandahár. Viceroy relies on you to use all exertions to co-operate with Phayre in relieving posts and pushing forward reinforcements."

And the telegram was followed up by a letter from the Foreign Secretary, from which the following is an extract :—

"Our trust is mainly in you and Phayre, who are both experienced and courageous frontier officers. I may say that Lord Ripon very highly appreciates your attitude and your energetic proceedings. I was in Council on the 28th, when we were deliberating on the news that morning from Kandahár, and I was just declaring that you might be relied on to do all that man can do, when in came your telegram, and was read out with universal applause."

It need hardly be added that both Sandeman and Phayre were equal to the occasion. In a second telegram, despatched on the 28th, the former says—

"General Phayre has issued necessary orders for troops now protecting railway line to concentrate on Pishín. I have directed political officers to heartily co-operate with commanding officers in carrying out General's orders, and to arrange as best they can with headmen of villages to take care of stores, telegraph, line, etc., left behind. I am in constant communication with General Phayre, who is strenuously exerting himself to push forward all available forces towards Kandahár. Viceroy may rely on myself and officers using best exertions to aid General Phayre."

By August 8 Ayúb Khan had invested Kandahár, and on the 9th, Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts, with a picked force, 10,000 strong, had commenced his memorable march for its relief. At the same time, Major-General Phayre's division pushed on, and there was a friendly race between the two columns for the prize of victory.

It is right here to mention that the conduct of Sir Robert's *protégé*, the Khan of Khelát, during this important crisis was worthy of all praise. On hearing the news of the disaster, he telegraphed as follows to Sir Robert Sandeman—

"I am certain the enemy will get their reward soon. I am glad to afford help. My head and my all belong to the British. I shall never draw back. Whatever grain or money is required by the British Government, I am ready to supply."

Soon afterwards, Ayúb Khan sent a letter to the Khan, announcing his success, and calling upon him, "with all his cavalry, infantry, and tribesmen, to join in the religious war."

But the Khan at once decided to cast in his lot with the British Government. He dismissed Ayúb Khan's messenger, and sent on the letter to Sir Robert Sandeman, at the same time despatching 400 baggage animals for the use of General Phayre's advancing force. The Brahúí chiefs were summoned, and expressed their resolution to stand by the Khan and the British Government, and when

shortly afterwards the Afgháns of the Khan's body-guard mutinied, they rallied to his side, whereupon the mutineers fled to Shoráwak and dispersed.

The Patán tribes of Pishín and Sibi were more or less excited, but, thanks to a salutary reminiscence of the chastisement of the Panizais, most of them abstained from outrage; but the Achakzais of the Khwája Amrán, until recently quite friendly, assumed a hostile attitude, and seized the Khojak Pass; while a body of 2000 tribesmen, under command of Shah Jahán and Faiz Muhammad Khan of Zhób, attacked our outpost at Kach Amadán. By prompt military action from both sides of the pass, the Achakzai gathering was dispersed after two days' fighting; and, with the help of Sir Robert's chief engineer, the Ghazaband Pass (connecting Quetta with Pishín) and the Khojak were fortified against tribal attack, and the attack on Kach Amadán was beaten off.

A more serious outrage was committed further south, where the temptation of plunder proved too strong for the Marrís of the Iarnái valley. To Sir Robert's deep regret, a section of this tribe, which had for sixteen years faithfully observed its engagements, attacked a British convoy in a mountain gorge, killed two soldiers and ten railway transport and commissariat *employés*, and succeeded in carrying off nearly two lakhs of rupees, and a few weeks after made a raid on Mal, near Sibi. As all energies had to be devoted to pushing on Lieutenant-General Phayre's relief column, the chastisement of the marauders had to be postponed. But on the return of the troops from Kandahár, a brigade was despatched under command of Brigadier-General Sir Charles Macgregor to the Marri country to exact reparation. The object was effected without bloodshed, the chiefs submitted, and agreed to pay a fine of Rs.200,000, and place in our

hands the village of Quatmandai as security for payment. Since that time the conduct of the tribe has been excellent.

To return to Lieutenant-General Roberts. After leaving Kábul and disappearing for nearly three weeks, his division arrived in excellent condition at Robát, 20 miles from Kandahár. Before his arrival the Afgháns abandoned the investment of Kandahár, and took up a strong defensive position behind the Baba Wali Pass—the precipitous range which shuts off the Argandáb from the plains of Kandahár. On the 30th his force encamped at Mohmand, 11 miles from the city. On the 31st he made a reconnaissance in force of Ayúb's position. On the morning of September 1 the position was attacked and carried in dashing style by two of his brigades, composed of Highland, Ghurka, Sikh, and Balúch regiments. After the capture of the village of Párpaimál (the key of the position) by the 1st brigade, led by the 92nd Highlanders and 2nd Ghurkas, Ayúb's regular troops fled; the camp at Mazra was then attacked and carried by a final charge of the 92nd Highlanders, a portion of the 2nd Ghurkas, and the 23rd Punjab Pioneers, and at one o'clock our troops were in possession of Ayúb's camp and all his ordnance. The flying enemy were pursued by the 3rd Sind Horse and the 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, and "of the thousands serving with pride under Ayúb's orders on the morning of the 1st but a few horsemen and a small party of Herát Infantry accompanied him in his flight,—the rest were not."\*

The enemy had dispersed, but a difficult problem remained—how to feed the great body of troops serving north of the Bolán. The matter was urgent and caused great anxiety to the military authorities; but the

\* D. th. from Lieutenant-Colonel E. Chapman, R.A., D.Q.M.G. to O.M. D. th. dated Kandahár September 7, 1880.

commissariat officers were powerless, for no flour was to be got in the country.

In the emergency, Sir Robert Sandeman was sent for and met Lieutenant-General Roberts at Gulistán in Pishín to confer regarding this and other important matters. As usual, Sir Robert was ready with help, and was able by his influence with the local chiefs to arrange to dispatch to Kandahár and Quetta from the base at Sibi six months' supply of food. But for this opportune assistance the troops north of the Bolán would have severely suffered.

To English ears the bare statement that Sir Robert Sandeman was successful in sending up supplies conveys little notion of the magnitude of the work done,—work which no one of less commanding influence than the Agent to the Governor-General could have possibly accomplished. It must be remembered that the railway at this time had only been completed as far as Sibi, 100 miles from Quetta, and 250 miles from Kandahár. Over this long line of road the only way to transport supplies in any large quantity was by camel caravan, and to organize a camel caravan in the wilds of Balúchistán is no easy matter, especially in time of war.

"The first difficulty," says Mr. Barnes, "was to find the camels and to persuade the numerous nomad camel owners to undertake the work. The next difficulty was to keep the camels when they were obtained, and only those who have had dealings with the shy, wild tribesmen, and know how easily any affront or any difficulty in obtaining immediate payment for their work frightens them away, can appreciate the excellence of arrangements which could keep 20,000 Brahúi camels regularly at work on commissariat duty. The third duty was that of organizing the relays of camels in such a way that the greatest efficiency of

supplies might be moved in the shortest time. It was in obtaining the camels that Sir R. Sandeman's magnetic influence made itself most immediately felt. The tribesmen could only be reached through their chiefs, and the chiefs, though devoted to Sir Robert and ready to do more for him than for any one else, had all the Oriental's keen sense of a good bargain, and would fight valiantly for their own hand."

"On an occasion of this kind," Mr. Barnes continues, "it was a useful lesson in frontier tribal management to watch Sir R. Sandeman in *durbár* surrounded by an eager, noisy crowd of Balúch notables, encouraging, threatening, and persuading in fluent Hindustani, never losing his temper, patient to hear all that was urged in reason, but putting his foot down at once on all extravagant claims, making the best terms he could for the Government while recognizing the legitimate claims of the chiefs to fair and generous treatment, and finally clenching the bargain by stirring appeals to the loyalty and public feeling of the Sirdárs. His cheery high spirits, which made light of all difficulties, were extraordinarily infectious. He had the happy knack of infusing some of his own superabundant energy and vitality into all who worked under him, and no chief left his *durbár* on occasions of this kind without feeling that he was on his mettle to exert himself to the utmost, and that earnest eager work was sure of generous and cordial recognition. The effect of Sir Robert's influence and good management was shown in the speed with which supplies were poured into Kandahár at a time of great emergency."

It must, however, be remembered that this occasion is only a more prominent instance than usual of the sort of work thrown on the political officers throughout the campaign. From the beginning to the end of the war, Sir



Robert and his officers could never relax their efforts in constantly beating up all the supplies and transport that the country contained, and it is not easy to over-state the value of the service rendered to our troops in this matter by the local knowledge, the tact, the energy and the personal influence of the ubiquitous and untiring Agent to the Governor-General.

In the latter part of September he proceeded, at the request of Lieutenant-General Roberts, to Chaman, and arranged with Brigadier-General Baker, commanding the Second Brigade, for the punishment of the Achakzai tribe who had attacked our outposts on the Kadanai. Returning through the Khojak by night, with a small cavalry escort, he found the entrance of the pass occupied by robbers, and had to force his way through them at no small risk to his life. Then he conferred with Lieutenant-General Roberts regarding the expedition against the Marri tribe, afterwards conducted by Brigadier-General Sir Charles MacGregor; and subsequently (in September) he accompanied the Foreign Secretary to Kandahár, and there drew up a memorandum of the policy to be adopted towards the new Amír, which has since been published as a State paper.\* In it he expressed the opinion that 'the new Amír, whoever he may be, can never be our friend, so long as the most valuable portion of the Afghán kingdom is in our possession,' and argued strongly in favour of the ultimate evacuation of Kandahár. The value of the information and advice afforded by Sir R. Sandeman on that occasion is acknowledged by Sir Alfred Lyall in his "*Reminiscences*" (see chap. xxvii.), and we have it on the authority of one who ought to know,† that "the action

\* Memorandum regarding the present position of affairs at Kandahár, Afghanistan, Blue Bk. (1881), No. 5, p. 16.

† Sir Charles Dilke, "*Problems of Greater Britain*."

of H.M. Government in evacuating Kāndahār was based in no small measure upon Sir Robert's recommendation." Lastly, he proceeded to the Marri country and set to rights certain hitches and misunderstandings which had taken place in carrying out the settlement effected by Sir Charles MacGregor, and was at length free to depart.

• On April 21, 1881, Kandahār was evacuated, and the remaining troops returned to India, and the second campaign of the second Afghán war was finally concluded.

Honours were deservedly showered upon the army. Generals Stewart and Roberts were appointed Knights Grand Cross of the Bath; and the Generals commanding divisions and brigades were made K.C.B.s. Some surprise was felt that Sir R. Sandeman—the political *adlatus* of the victorious Generals; the protector of communications between Jacobábád and the Khojak Pass; the officer responsible during the entire period for the peace of Balúchistán, and the districts of Pishín and Sibi; who had risked his life on more than one occasion in the performance of arduous duties—was not honoured with a K.C.B.ship, but his services were in other respects handsomely acknowledged. In a letter dated September 23, 1880, Lord Ripon wrote as follows:—

"I gladly avail myself of this opportunity to express to you personally my sense of the valuable services which you have rendered to the Government during the trying crisis through which we have been passing since General Burrows' defeat. I highly appreciate the zeal and energy you have displayed."

While the Marquis of Hartington, in proposing to the House of Commons a vote of thanks to the army of Afghanistan, thus referred to Sir Robert Sandeman's services:—

"It has not been usual in votes of this character, and I have not thought it necessary, to make special mention of the services rendered in

this campaign by the political officers. But it would not be right that I should conclude without reminding the House that in wars of this description the services which are rendered by the political officer are not only of the highest importance, but are frequently attended by personal risk. Sir Robert Sandeman, our Agent in Balúchistán, has, throughout this campaign, rendered services of the most signal and valuable character. He has preserved with great ability the best relations between our Viceroy and the Khan of Khelát, who has shown loyalty to his allies, and has on several important occasions rendered the greatest service to our army. Sir Robert Sandeman was also placed at the head of the whole lines of communications, and the value of his services cannot be over-estimated."

But what gratified Sir Robert even more than such flattering recognition was a letter he received, on the eve of his departure, from the Khan of Khelát, a translation of which will appropriately conclude this chapter.

FROM THE KHAN OF KHELÁT TO MAJOR SIR ROBERT SANDEMAN,  
AGENT TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN BALÚCHISTAN.

"Whereas you, my friend, are going on leave to your home, and, in accordance with our old friendship, came yourself to pay me a farewell visit, permit me to say that although it is a great happiness to you to go to your native place after so long a time, yet, for your friends and well-wishers, separation from a friend so faithful and trustworthy is sad indeed. As they say, 'Complaint flows from stones at the time of parting of friends.'

"It is now full five years since you came into Balúchistán, and devoted yourself to the settlement of the disputes of the frontier tribes, to opening up the trade routes, and providing for the administration of the country and the peace of its inhabitants. Many difficulties, hard as granite rock, stood in your way, like a mountain without supports from the high road; they were such that my tongue cannot express them, and the two-tongued pen becomes mute before them. But by the boldness, endurance, and perseverance of you who are desirous of peace, all difficulties were put aside and peace and tranquillity were established on all sides.

"Any one who knows aught of the past and present state of this land of Balúchistán can justly appreciate what has happened. The excellence of your management of affairs and your services are as clearly seen as the sun by the British Government and by all people great and small. There is no need to dilate upon them

particularly, but being deeply indebted to your valuable services, I with heartfelt sincerity write these few words by way of thanks, and I hope you will accept them, and considering me as an old and sincere friend will not permit remembrance of me to fade from the page of your recollection, and that, from time to time, when in your own country, you will think of the sincere friend who is ever with you like a second kernel in one almond. May God protect you."

Seal of Mir Khodádád Khan,  
Khan of Khelát.

Dated 3rd Muharram, 1297.

Perhaps one of the best proofs of the value of Sir Robert Sandeman's influence over the chief who wrote this letter, and with whom for sixteen years he maintained the most cordial relations, is to be found in the fact that a year and a half after Sir Robert's death the Khan was deposed for an act of savage barbarity and is now a State prisoner. It is hardly too much to assume that had Sir Robert lived and remained as Governor-General's Agent at Quetta, the Khan would still be governing his dominions as the trusted ally of the British Government.

## CHAPTER XVI.

## FURLOUGH.

Question of the retention of the "Assigned Districts"—Description of them—Sir Robert Sandeman's arguments in favour of their retention—Decision of the Government—Marriage.

AFTER nearly twenty-five years' service, of which nearly twenty-four had been spent in India (chiefly on the frontier). Sir Robert Sandeman, in the spring of 1881, proceeded on furlough to England for a year—a period afterwards extended to one and twenty months. No one ever deserved a holiday more thoroughly than he did, but, at first, there was little repose vouchsafed to him.

On arrival in England, he found a question of deep interest occupying the attention of Her Majesty's Government—the question whether the districts of Pishín and Sibi, which had been assigned to us by the Treaty of Gandamak, should be restored to the Afgháns, or retained under British administration?

Their restoration, along with the territory of Kandahár, was strongly advocated by such weighty authorities as General Sir Henry Norman, Sir Evelyn Baring (now Lord Cromer), and General Lord Wolseley, whilst strong advocates of the retention of Kandahár, such as General Sir Henry Rawlinson and Sir William Merewether, objected to the retention of Pishín and Sibi in the event of Kandahár being restored.

Sir Robert at once gave up all thought of rest and

spent nearly six months in pressing upon the authorities the paramount importance of retaining the territory under British administration, and completing the railway (already partially constructed) through the Harnái valley to Pishín.

He wrote letters, prepared memoranda, interviewed everybody who had anything to say to the decision; haunted the chambers of the Political Secretary at the India Office, worried the Members of Council, was not unknown in the Foreign Office, or in the lobbies of the House of Commons; and—what was more to the purpose—gave substantial reasons for the course he advocated.

The occasion is a suitable one for giving a fuller description of the territories referred to.

PISHÍN.—The Pishín district, as we now know it, is that portion of the Afghán plateau which lies between the Quetta district and the Khwája Amrán and Sarlatti ranges of hills. It comprises the two Afghán districts of Pishín proper and Shorarúd. Pishín proper comprises—

(1) An alluvial plain, 30 miles by 40, lying between Quetta and the Khwája Amrán range. This plain has an average elevation of 4500 feet above the sea, and is fringed with cultivation, irrigated by the streams from the surrounding hills. The river Lora runs through the centre of it, and, after passing through the neighbouring Afghán district of Shoráwak, loses itself in the desert near Nushki.

(2) The highland plateau of Toba, bounded by the Kadanai river on the north, and the main Pishín plain just described on the south. This plateau has an average elevation of about 8000 feet, and is nearly equal in extent to the plain below. Though barren and treeless, a good deal of wheat is grown upon it when rain is abundant,

and it is frequented in the summer months by large numbers of nomad Achakzais with their numerous flocks of sheep and goats. (3) The Kákar-Lora valley; a valley over 40 miles long, which joins the Quetta District on the south, and the head of the Zhob valley on the north-east. It is inhabited by Kákar Patáns, and is full of their villages. Parts of it are very highly cultivated. It forms the eastern side of the Pishín District, and a railway runs through a portion of its length. (4) The Bazár valley, which runs between the Kákar-Lora valley and the main Pishín plain. It is separated from the latter only by some low clay hills, and about the centre of it, near the village of Old Bazár, is now the head-quarters of the civil station and a large fort in which a regiment of native infantry is usually stationed. At its north-eastern end the Bazár valley joins the valley of Barshor, which is a mountain glen some 30 miles long, running between the eastern side of the Toba plateau and the Kand mountain, which separates it from Zhob.

Shorarúd was not originally part of Pishín. It was included in the Afghán district of Shoráwak, but as it is cut off from Shoráwak by the Sarlatti range, and is itself only a continuation of the plain of Pishín, it was retained as part of Pishín when Shoráwak was restored to the Amír. The Shorarúd plain is about the same size and the same elevation as that of Pishín, but is much less fertile, for the water, as the name denotes, is mainly brackish.

In all, the area of the whole district is probably nearly 5000 square miles, but owing to the scanty rainfall and the necessity for artificial irrigation the amount of cultivation is comparatively small. Where water for irrigation is available the soil is very fertile, producing wheat, barley, maize, millet, hemp, lucerne grass, melons, madder, and tobacco; and when, as sometimes happens, the winter

rainfall is timely and abundant, the area usually under wheat is doubled and trebled in extent.

It is now connected with India by railway, and at its eastern end has access over *kotals* (or passes over the line of water-parting) into three valley systems leading to the plains of the Punjab or Sind ; viz. the Zhob valley, draining north-east into the Gúmal river, which enters the Indus valley near Koláchi ; the Bori valley, which runs due east towards Déra Gházi Khan, and the valleys draining into the Kachi plain near Sibi.

The population was estimated in 1886 at 81,000 souls, but no reliable statistics of population exist, and the true figure is believed to be much higher than the number given above. Excepting in Shorarúd, where Brahúis predominate, the population consists chiefly of Sayyads and Tarín Afgháns, with a fringe of Kákars and Achakzais. Generally employed in agriculture, or engaged in mercantile pursuits, they are decidedly peaceable in their habits, and well pleased to be defended from the incursions of their more war-like neighbours who live in the hills which bound the north-east and west sides of the district.

Since our occupation of these districts, the attitude of the mass of the population has been peaceable and friendly, but several murderous outrages by individuals, generally fanatics, have unfortunately taken place, and, as we have seen, in 1880, after the disaster at Maiwand, the Achakzais of the Toba plateau gave trouble, but the appearance of the force under Sir T. Baker soon induced them to sue for peace. They are now very well behaved and aid in the protection of the frontier.

SIBI.—Though till lately an Afghán district, Sibi is geographically the most northern portion of the Kachi plain of Balúchistán, from which it is separated by a



low stony ridge, broken in two places by wide gaps, through one of which the Nári stream flows, and through the other the Tal. Its population is extremely mixed. At the time of our first occupation in 1878, the cultivation was scanty and the valley more or less depopulated owing to internal quarrels and the marauding attacks of Marrís. But a great change has taken place. The railway runs through the district, and near the Sibi station a new township has sprung up, with 1000 houses, 800 shops, and a population (in 1886) of 5000 souls, while the revenues have risen from Rs.35,382 in 1879 to Rs.120,512 in 1885.

Of the valleys connecting Sibi with Pishín, the most important is Záwar or Harnái, through which the railway runs. It is 65 miles in length, is 5000 feet above sea level, and is watered by the Mángi and other tributaries of the Nári. Immediately to the north is Mount Kalípat, rising perpendicularly 7000 feet from the level of the valley. To the west is the Chappar Rift, a chasm in the limestone range, through which the line ascends over the Kach Kotal to Gwál in the Pishín plateau. The valley is fertile, and has good pasture, but until our advent was harried by the raids of hillmen. Higher up the watershed are the valleys of Kach-Amadán, and Khawás—fertile and well cultivated, with forests of juniper extending over the mountain sides. South of Záwar are the valleys of SÁNGÁN and Bahdra. The population of these valleys consists of Taríns, Panízai, Isakhel and other Afghán tribes. But their occupation, as will be shown further on, was all important for the proper control of the Marrí tribe.

Tal Chótiáli is a large plateau situate at the extreme east of the Assigned Districts, extending like a wedge between the Bori valley and the Marrí hills. It is cut up by torrent beds with few trees and little cultivation—for before the advent of the British each of its four

townships was at feud with its neighbour, while the Marrís and Kákars harried them all.

These valleys and the plain of Tal Chotiáli were no part of the Sibi district, when the latter was assigned to us, but were a kind of no-man's land ; but previously, under the Duráni Empire, had with Sibi formed part of Záwaristán. Sir Robert Sandeman, however, lost no time in utilizing the claim which Sibi gave us to extend our authority over the entire tract, the inhabitants of which were only too glad of our protection ; and ultimately, for reasons which will be explained further on, Tal Chotiáli, Harnái and the other connecting valleys were formed with Sibi into an administrative district under the name of Tal Chotiáli, which is the head-quarters of its officers in the hot season.

In the Indian Census Report for 1890-1, the population of the Assigned Districts, at a rough enumeration, is given as 145,417 persons ; but the Census Commissioner believes that the number is understated.

Such is a brief description of the two districts, the restoration of which was under contemplation at the time of Sir Robert Sandeman's arrival in England, an event he felt it his duty to do his utmost to prevent. He showed—

‘First. That the Afghán claims to these districts, based upon possession and use, were of the slenderest description ; that, in fact, they had ceased, for more than 100 years, to form an integral part of the kingdom of Afghanistán, from which they were physically cut off by high mountain ranges.

‘As for Sibi, it had been, in the time of Ahmad Shah Duráni, granted in fief to the members of an Afghán family ; but no attempt was made to govern or protect

it, and for fourteen years previously to our occupation no revenue of any kind was realized ; so that it became a kind of no-man's-land, the prey of Marrís and other plundering tribes, and the centre of intrigues against the ruler of Khelát.

‘The situation of Pishín was very similar ; moreover such little authority as was spasmodically exercised by the Afgháns was directed to the oppression of the Taríns, the original inhabitants, who hailed the advent of the British with delight.

‘Again, from an ethnological point of view, the Afghán claims were, he contended, equally untenable. Sibi was occupied by mixed races of Patán and Balúch origin, quite distinct from the Afgháns north of the Khojak ; and the Patán population of Pishín, though less mixed in its character than that of Sibi, had no tribal sympathy with the races of the north.

‘So distinct, indeed, in every way were these districts from Afghanistán proper, that, at the close of the Afghán war of 1839, they were not restored to their nominal suzerain, but conferred by the British Government upon the Khan of Khelát, who only refrained from occupying them because they were so exposed to incursion by marauding tribes. So they remained from that date until the outbreak of the late Afghán war in the same unsatisfactory position—under the nominal suzerainty of the Amír of Kábul, but practically under no government at all.

‘This state of things was put an end to by the Treaty of Gandamak, which formally assigned these districts to the British Government. Subsequent events may have rendered that instrument more or less inoperative, but the fact remains that we have been in possession of and administered the territories since 1878 (much to the benefit of the inhabitants), and have incurred obligations to the population

from which we could not withdraw without discredit and even humiliation.

‘So much for the legal and historical aspect of the question; but if we regard it from the point of view of expediency, there could be no question of the extreme importance of retaining the territories under British rule.

‘In the first place, their possession enables us to secure the safety of at least three important caravan routes between Kandahár and Central Asia on the one hand, and different parts of British India on the other, thus benefiting the Afghán people as well as our own subjects, while the railway will not only develop trade, but establish a bond of union between the Afghán, Patán, Brahúi, and Balúch races and ourselves.

‘But it is from a strategic point of view that the retention of these districts is most important. They provide us with lateral communication with Quetta and the north, through regions more fertile, accessible, and healthy than the Bolán Pass, and, what is more important, with an impregnable boundary for upwards of 100 miles between Kandahár and British territory in the mountain barrier known as the Khwája Amrán range, and its prolongation, the Sarlatti hills. So that, with these districts in our possession, we shall be ultimately enabled to substitute for our present military frontier between Dera Gházi Khan and Karáchi a frontier at once shorter and more healthy—namely, a line running from Dera Gházi Khan through Pishin to the desert beyond Nushki. Of this the portion between the Khojak Pass and Nushki is a wall of mountain overlooking desert, and thus requires little or no military protection. So that the length of the new frontier requiring defence would be 300 miles only, and for its protection a considerable portion of the Indus valley garrisons could be transferred. In

short, by the acquisition of Pishín and Sibi, and the resulting control of the intervening tribes, we could have a frontier of 300 miles, guarded by an adequate force living under healthy conditions, in lieu of 700 miles inadequately garrisoned in the debilitating climate of the Indus valley.

‘As for the resources of Pishín and the surrounding country, they were ample for the support of a large force, and would steadily increase under the influence of our protecting power; while the climate, though it had been maligned in consequence of its effect on troops inadequately housed, was beyond question far more salubrious than that of Indus valley stations.’

After protracted discussion, it was decided—chiefly, it is alleged, through the strong support of Sir Charles Dilke—that the districts in question, with the exception of the Shoráwak valley, which, much to Sir Robert Sandeman’s regret, was restored to the Amír, should be retained under British administration. The retention was at first sanctioned as a temporary arrangement, but ultimately as a permanent one, and the fact that they had ceased to form part of Afghanistán was duly notified to the Kábul ruler.\*

In 1883 a further discussion took place as to whether the Tal Chotiáli and Harnái should be occupied, but Sir Robert pointed out that their occupation was essential for the security of Sibi and for completing our control over the robber tribe of Marrís; for Tal Chotiáli was the only remaining outlet for their raids, and when this

\* It should be explained that the Treaty of Gandamak, under which the districts were originally assigned to the British Government on certain conditions, was abrogated by the deposition of Yakúb Khan, and the new arrangements made at the conclusion of the Afghán wars. The British Government had, consequently, a perfectly free hand to deal with them as it thought fit.

was closed they would be compelled to settle down to peaceful pursuits. His earnest representations won the day, and with the happiest results, for since 1883 our relations with the Marrís have been of the most cordial kind. Though occasional outbreaks of savagery now and then occur, there is no serious difficulty in getting offenders punished, and every year, as the new generation grows up, the tribe is forgetting its marauding habits and betaking itself to agriculture.

In 1884 the railway works, which had been suspended in 1880, were again proceeded with, and in 1887, by a Resolution of the Indian Government, the Assigned Districts, including the connected valleys and the plain of Tal Chotiáli, were formally incorporated with British territory under the somewhat inappropriate designation, "British Balúchistán."

The remaining portion of his furlough was much more pleasantly occupied. In January, 1882, at the parish church of Dunboyne, County Meath, he was united in marriage with Helen Kate, daughter of the late Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Gaisford, formerly of the 72nd (now Seaforth) Highlanders, and grand-daughter of the historic Dean of Christchurch.

## CHAPTER XVII.

## RETURN TO INDIA.

Account by Lady Sandeman of her husband's reception—Review of the work accomplished up to date—Its subsequent history to be divided into two periods.

SIR ROBERT SANDEMAN returned to his post at the close of 1882, refreshed with more than a year's rest, and strengthened for the duties before him. He was received by the Khan and his chiefs and all classes with demonstrations of hearty welcome, which will be best described in the words of Lady Sandeman :—

“On Sir Robert's arrival at Bombay he received many telegrams, including one from His Highness the Khan, and also from the principal Balúch and Brahúi Sirdárs, welcoming him back to India. On arriving at the borders of Balúchistán he was met at every station by Balúch and Brahúi chiefs, who had travelled down from their homes to meet him. Their delight at seeing him once more was great, and it was a curious sight to see them rush at his carriage, directly the train stopped at the stations, climb up and hang on by the windows and doors, stretching out their hands to grasp his, and some of them actually kissing his hands with every expression of affection. The carriages of the train rapidly filled with the delighted sirdárs, who all accompanied him to Sibi. The train arrived at the Sibi platform towards dusk, where a large concourse of

natives and some European officers were assembled, to welcome him back to Balúchistán after his hardly earned holiday.

"An address of welcome was presented by the town-people, but the view of Sibi from the train was in itself a welcome. Every house was illuminated, the edges of the walls and the roofs of the houses presented a line of light; handsome arches were erected up the principal streets from the station to the Residency, adorned with appropriate mottoes of welcome, including 'Cead Mille Failtha.' The Residency garden was dotted with tiny lights attached to every branch and rose-bush, presenting a very fairy-like appearance. As evening wore on, more illuminations appeared and a fine display of fireworks took place.

"Sir Robert remained at Sibi for about a week, during which time he conferred with and entertained the Commander-in-Chief of India, and also the Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, and arranged much local business; but he was anxious to get back to Quetta, and started, accompanied by many of the chiefs, as soon as he could up the Bolán Pass, a distance of 84 miles, the railway then not going further than Sibi. On the third day he reached Quetta, having travelled for the most part up the bed of the river, the fine military road up the Bolán which now exists not having been then begun. It was a curious sight at intervals on the road to see occasionally a head on the sky line, a horseman, motionless until he saw the cavalcade, when he immediately disappeared to carry the news of Sir Robert's approach. In an incredibly short space of time he appeared again, followed by numerous horsemen, who tore down the face of the hill over the rocks and stones at break-neck speed, their long white garments flying in the wind and their carbines and shields rattling; they did not stop until they were about



twenty yards in front of Sir Robert, when they flung themselves from their horses and came forward on foot to welcome back their chief. (These were for the most part Marrís and others in charge of the Bolán.) After greeting him, they fell in behind the party and accompanied it, the cavalcade growing in size as it advanced.

"At Quetta the welcome was as enthusiastic as at Sibi, triumphal arches being erected along the road to the Residency and in the principal streets in the bazaar. At night the whole place was illuminated, and a display of fireworks took place. At Quetta too Sir Robert was welcomed back by those of his officers who had not met him at Sibi, all of whom seemed delighted to have him back.

"A very handsome illuminated address was presented by the municipality."

Sir Robert lost no time in actively resuming the duties of his office.

But before proceeding further, it may be well, at the risk of some repetition, briefly to review the situation up to date.

In the preceding chapters we have seen how, on Sandeman's first advent to the Punjab Frontier, the "close-border system" was in force; how he won the hearts of the tribes in Déra Gházi Khan by conciliatory treatment of the chiefs; how he boldly set aside traditions by crossing the border and sojourning with the hill-tribes; how he used the influence thus gained for the prevention of raids, the restoration of plundered property, and the pacification of Khelát, and ultimately succeeded in revolutionizing the attitude of the Supreme Government, if not of the Punjab Government, towards the tribes and states upon the border; how, during the Afghán war, he provisioned our army in Pishín and the Bolán Pass, and protected its

communications, and at length secured for the Empire two frontier districts of immense strategic importance.

We have now to trace the development of his work and policy in different fields of activity.

And from this time it will be convenient to divide the history of his political and administrative work into two periods, viz. the five years between 1882 and 1887 (the date of the Incorporation of the Assigned Districts and his advance to the rank of Chief Commissioner), and the four years between 1888 and the beginning of 1892, the date of his decease.

The first was a period of organization, during which he was able, now that the strain of war was over, to direct more attention to his work as arbitrator under the Treaty of 1876; settling outstanding disputes between the Khan and various tribes of the Balúch confederacy and between the tribes themselves, and bringing them all under the spell of his friendly but powerful control. While in respect to the Assigned Districts, he was able to establish British authority over the Patán tribes inhabiting them as successfully as over the Balúchís of the South; treating all with kindness, forbearance and patience, but at the same time with firmness and decision. He established courts of justice with simple procedure; constructed roads and employed the tribes in their protection; opened post-offices and dispensaries, and commenced the work of forest conservancy. He was further able to take the first steps in extending British influence over the war-like tribes in the mountainous tract between the Assigned Districts and the Punjab Frontier, and for laying the foundation of order and good government among them.

During this period also the great Imperial line of railway from the Indus to the Khojak Pass, which he had

advocated, was continued and well nigh completed, and important lines of communication connecting Pishín with the Punjab were planned and carried out.

The Second Period was one of peace, progress and development upon the lines laid down during the first, but terminating sadly in the tragical death of the prime mover of all. In the Khanate of Khelát British influence was extended to the tribes adjacent to the Persian Frontier, and a border chief, who had been for 50 years a determined foe of Khelát and the British Government, was reconciled and induced to rejoin the Balúch confederacy. In the Assigned Districts regulations based on legislative sanction took the place of executive orders, and the system of government in all departments was elaborated. Outside the Assigned Districts the Zhob valley was taken under our protective management at the request of the inhabitants, and the British Protectorate was extended to the tribes of the Bori valley, the Khetráns, the Sheránis, and other tribes between Balúchistán and the Punjab. In other words, a territory larger than Switzerland, on our immediate frontier, capable of much development, but torn with inter-tribal feuds and a menace to the peace of the Punjab border, was brought under our control and influence; while the Gúmal Pass, the chief caravan route between south Afghanistan and the Punjab—hitherto impassable, except for large bodies of armed men—was opened for traffic under the safe conduct of Wazíri tribesmen. Thus, two of the great trade routes mentioned in chapter ii. were now completely safe, while our “sphere of influence,” from Pishín to the Gúmal river, became coterminous with settled Afghán territory.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

1882-1887.

External events affecting Balúchistán—Work in the Khanate—Settlement of outstanding disputes—Reconciliation of Ázáf Khan of Khárán—His loyal conduct and death—Sir Robert's services in connection with Colonel Ridgeway's Mission, and the Panjdeh incident.

IN this and the following chapters, after reciting the principal external events affecting Balúchistán, we shall deal with Sir Robert Sandeman's work under three heads—(1) His work in the Khanate as Arbitrator and Referee under the Treaty of Khelát ; (2) his work as Administrator of the Assigned Districts and those portions of the Khanate vested in the British Government for administrative purposes, namely, Quetta and the Bolán Pass ; and (3) his work in connection with the tribes between Balúchistán and the Assigned Districts and the Punjab Frontier.

As for external events affecting Balúchistán, many events of importance occurred in the adjoining territory of Afghanistán. On the anniversary of the battle of Maiwand, Sirdár Ayúb Khan defeated the Amír's general at Kandahár, but on September 20, 1881, was himself disastrously defeated by the Amír Abdurrahmán, and fled to Herát, and eventually to Persia, where, after an unsuccessful attempt to effect a rising in Afghán territory, he finally (in 1888) surrendered to the British Government.

He arrived at Karáchi in May of that year with 1000 followers, and was despatched as a political *détenu* to Rawalpindi. One grave element of disquiet in Afghanistán was thus happily removed, and the chances of a peaceful succession, in the event of the Amír's demise, enormously increased. These events were anxiously watched, but caused little effect in Balúchistán. On the Perso-Balúch border there were disturbances between the Khárán chief and the Persian authorities, and raiding by the Rinds of Mánd, but nothing of great moment occurred.

WORK IN THE KHANATE.—We have seen that, under the terms of the Treaty of 1876, the British Government, represented locally by the Agent of the Governor-General, became the supreme arbiter in all disputes between the Khan and his sirdárs. From that date, accordingly, "the Agent of the Governor-General has practically taken the place of the Khan as head of the Balúch confederation. His Highness is still the nominal head; the Sarawán and Jhalawán chiefs still sit on his right hand and his left in *durbár* as of old, and till he is invested by the Khan with the *khilat* or mantle of succession, a sirdár is not to be legitimized as the representative of his tribe. But in the essential questions of the nomination of sirdárs, the summoning of *jirgahs* for the settlement of inter-tribal disputes, and the general preservation of peace in the country, the Agent of the Governor-General is recognized all over Balúchistan as having taken the place of the Khan, and his mandate naturally commands a great deal more respect and obedience than did ever that of His Highness." \*

During the period named at the heading of this

\* See Agency Report for 1886.

chapter—that is to say, the five years following the conclusion of the Afghán war—Sir Robert's work as *de facto* suzerain of Balúchistán was specially onerous and important, and carried out with characteristic prudence and determination. All inter-tribal disputes and many questions of an administrative character were referred for the consideration of *jirgahs*, or committees of chiefs. With the consultations of these committees the Agent interfered as little as possible, but in all important cases he was represented on the committee by Rae Hittú Rám, or some other trusted native subordinate; and all awards were subject to his confirmation, or that of the officer to whom the case was delegated. Latterly, a standing council of chiefs was appointed, which met in the cold season at Sibi, and in the hot season at Quetta, and all important cases which would keep were referred to this tribunal. But all cases could not be so dealt with; some called for immediate action, others required careful investigation on the spot before they could be referred—work involving much labour, tact and patience, and many a long journey on the part of himself or his subordinates.

It would be tedious to describe in detail all the various disputes so settled by Sir Robert Sandeman and his assistants. A fracas between the Khan's officials and Brahúi tribesmen about an irrigation dam, rival claims to the chiefship of the Rind-Balúchis, feuds between the Zahris and the Musiánis in Jhalawán, between the Gitchkis of Panjgúr, between the Zágar Mingals of Nushki, between the Naushirwánis and Kaodais of Kolwah, between the Bezonjos and the Mirwánis, between the Marrís and Búgtis and Bozdárs of the eastern frontier—are a few among a multitude of cases which called for intervention, and which, but for such intervention, might have led to bloodshed. The result was peace and good order, a

remarkable extension of tribal cultivation throughout Balúchistán, and many expressions of gratitude, especially from the poorer and weaker classes, for being protected from oppression.

But one case occurred deserving of more special notice, namely, the settlement of a long-standing dispute between His Highness the Khan of Khelát and Ázád Khan of Khárán, the aged Chief of the Naushirwáni tribe. This remarkable man was the hereditary head of a small but powerful family of freebooters, inhabiting an oasis in an ill-defined tract of desert between Nushki and the Persian frontier. From this isolated lair, defended on two sides by trackless deserts and two others by rocky mountains, Ázád Khan and his men, mounted on fleet camels, would make plundering raids on the territories of Khelát or Persia, as the case might be; and as Khárán commands the western end of the Mulla Pass (connecting Khelát with the plains) and the caravan routes from Persia and Afghanistan, he was able to do a vast amount of mischief with impunity, and for more than 50 years had been a terror to the border. He was born before the commencement of the present century, and during the Afghán war of 1839 took a prominent part against the British Government in the revolutionary movement which followed the capture of Khelát. He was the holder of a fief in Panjgúr, and Nasír Khan II. was married to his daughter; but owing to a domestic quarrel his fief was confiscated, and from that date he became the restless opponent of the Khan and his successor—alternately giving his allegiance to Persia or Afghanistan as suited his convenience. In the Persian war of 1856 he joined the Persian camp; in 1871 he took part in the rebellion of the Brahúi sirdárs; in 1876 he made raids on the Persian frontier; in 1880 he furnished to Ayúb Khan, on his advance against

Kandahár, a tribal contingent, which was present and took part in the battle of Maiwand; and in 1883 a force of Nushirwánis, under the command of Nauroz Khan, his son, harried Panjgúr, and in an engagement that followed, Mir Gajian, the Gichki Chief, was slain. In the eyes of the Khan and his officials, his character was hopeless, and even in the Calcutta Foreign Office, "bandit," "traitor," "irreconcilable," were the fashionable epithets applied to him.

Sir Robert, who had a shrewd suspicion that the devil was less black than he was painted, had long been anxious to visit this historic personage and hear what he had to say, but had been prevented by more pressing duties. But at the end of 1883, in view of the serious turn affairs had taken, he felt it his duty to proceed to Khárán. Accordingly, having sent a friendly message to the "freerbooter," he marched from Quetta to the Khárán desert, a dreary journey of nearly 200 miles. On the border he was met by the veteran Chief—then 97 years of age—who received him with the greatest friendliness. In the Report to the Government, Sir Robert thus describes the sirdár's appearance and character:—

"In spite of his great age, Ázád Khan retains his mental faculties unimpaired. Bowed by age, he is unable to mount a horse without assistance, but once in the saddle his endurance is greater than that of many a younger man. Possessed of unflinching resolution, impatient of wrong, generous to reward, stern and relentless in punishment, Sirdár Ázád Khan has above all things enjoyed a reputation for unswerving honesty. He is never known to depart from his word once given, and has a sincere contempt for chicanery or falsehood."

The sirdár's grievances against the Khan and others were duly heard and inquired into, and found, for the most part, to be genuine: an equitable settlement was proposed and accepted by all parties. Ázád Khan, after



years of estrangement from the Khan, rejoined the Balúch confederacy, and gave evidence of his changed feelings towards the British Government by furnishing 150 camels for the use of Colonel Ridgeway's mission, for which he refused to receive payment, making a friendly return visit to the Agent at Quetta, and arranging in co-operation with our officers for the protection of trade-routes in his territory.

Ázád Khan died in 1886, after reaching (according to Muhammadan computation) his 101st year, and was succeeded, according to his own wish, by his son Nauroz Khan, who has recently been appointed by Her Majesty Knight Commander of the Order of the Indian Empire.

Having regard to the position of Khárán, the friendship of its chief is a matter of no small moment. "There can be no doubt," wrote Sir Robert in December, 1883, "that politically this march is a very valuable one to the Government. I could easily supply 10,000 troops with food along the whole route we have as yet marched."

But the expedition was important, not only for its political results, but from a geographical point of view. Sir Robert was careful to take with him a party of trained surveyors under Lieutenants Talbot and Wahab, R.E., who were able to make a rough survey of 20,000 square miles of almost unknown territory.

Two other acts of service, which Sir Robert's influence in Balúchistán enabled him to render at this time, and for which he received the thanks of Government, may here be mentioned. He provided carriage and supplies for Colonel Ridgeway's mission—from Rindli (the terminus, at that time, of the Sind-Pishín Railway) through Pishín and across the desert to the river Halmand, a distance of 350 miles; and, on the occurrence of the Panjdeh incident and a prospect of war with Russia, he organized

a train of 20,000 camels for conveying food, forage, and fire-wood from the railway terminus to Quetta.

Of the difficulties of collecting and keeping together for transport duty such an enormous train of camels, owned by men who are mostly unaccustomed to and shy of Europeans, we have already spoken (chapter xv.), difficulties often much enhanced by the complicated rules and regulations of the Commissariat and Transport Departments; which, however necessary in more civilized parts, and under a system of supply by army contractors, very often defeat their own object in places where their intricacy is not understood, and unnecessarily fetter the energies of the departmental officers. When, on the occasion now mentioned, orders were issued for the collection of supplies for an army corps in Pishín, Sir Robert Sandeman offered to collect the necessary camel-carriage, provided the control of all the arrangements and the payment of the camel-men were left entirely in the hands of his own officers.

The offer was accepted; Sir Robert at once assembled and discussed the details with the Brahúi chiefs, who alone had it in their power to collect the requisite number of animals, and at no time, perhaps, has a more signal instance been given of what personal influence *plus* knowledge of the people and good organization can accomplish in the way of transport in Balúchistán. The camels had to land their supplies at distances from 100 to 150 miles from the railway terminus at Rindli, and at one time, when the business was in full working order, no less than 13,000 *maunds* (520,000 lbs.) of stores were being daily loaded and despatched from the rail head.

"This result," says Mr. Barnes, "was mainly owing to the excellence and extreme simplicity of the arrangements made for the prompt payment of the camel-men. Payment

was made at the rate of so much per *maund* per stage. Each camel-man received a way-bill from the commissariat officer at Rindli, showing the number of *maunds* his camels were carrying. On arrival at his destination, this way-bill was receipted by the commissariat officer, who accepted charge of the goods, and the camel-man at once took the receipted bill to the political officer stationed at each post, who paid the hire without further question, and the camels were thus enabled to leave within a few hours of their arrival to fetch more supplies from Rindli. Under the regular departmental system the hire would probably not have been paid for weeks, and not half the camel-men would have remained on duty."

The same talent for simple and effective organization was shown in the arrangements made for the passage of the Balúch Desert from Nushki to the Halmand by the Afghán Boundary Commission and its escort in 1884. At that time very little was known of the Registán, or great sand desert, which extends for the whole distance of 170 miles from Nushki to the river Halmand. Parts of it had been traversed in recent years by Colonel MacGregor and Major Lockwood, but their published accounts of its waterless, sandy wastes were anything but encouraging, and much doubt was felt whether it was possible to transport across it so large a party as that of the Commission, consisting, as it did, of 1500 men, and the same number of transport and other animals. The attempt, however, had to be made, as the Amír objected to the Commission marching through Kandahár, and Sir Robert Sandeman, as usual, was full of zeal, and sanguine that all difficulties could, by proper arrangements, be successfully surmounted. He deputed to Mr. H. S. Barnes, one of his most trusted assistants, the duty of exploring and selecting the most suitable route, and of supervising on the spot the laying

out of supplies, and despatched him to Nushki with full instructions and unlimited credit, in August, 1884, about two months before the Mission was expected to arrive. Mr. Barnes was ably assisted in the exploration of the desert by Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Maitland of the Indian Intelligence Department, who was sent from Simla for the purpose. A very interesting account of the difficulties met with, and the way in which they were conquered, is given in Captain A. C. Yates's able letters to the *Pioneer* newspaper, which have since been published in book form, and to which the reader may be referred for more detailed information on the subject. It will, perhaps, be enough to say here that, in order to provide sufficient water along the route selected, it was found necessary to dig no less than 800 wells; that in order to dig these wells, and to collect wood and grass at each stage, the only supplies the desert was capable of furnishing, food had to be sent from Nushki to every stage to feed the labourers employed. And in the mean time the necessary amount of flour, corn, lard, sheep, and other supplies requisite for the Mission at each halting-place had to be purchased, loaded on camels, and despatched under trustworthy subordinates to each camp to await the Mission's arrival. Even when the wells were ready, the supply of water was still so scanty that the Mission on arrival at Nushki had to be divided into three parties, marching on successive days, and additional water was carried on the march in goat-skins slung on the loaded camels.

Complete success, however, attended the arrangements made, and the Mission crossed to Khwája Ali on the Halmand without a single mishap. During the whole time Mr. Barnes was employed upon this duty he received daily letters of sympathy, encouragement, and advice from his Chief at Quetta, and, on one occasion, hearing that his

officer was ailing under the fierce heat in tents at Nushki, in the month of August, Sir Robert at once despatched to Nushki at his own expense a consignment of wine and creature comforts from his own cellars. Nushki, it may be mentioned, is just 100 miles from Quetta, and is only reached by difficult mountain roads.

On another occasion, having learnt incidentally that some often requisite supplies were only to be obtained with great difficulty at Nushki, and then only by sending many miles into Afghanistan, Sir Robert loaded a caravan in Quetta with the necessary stores at a few hours' notice, and despatched them to Nushki, where they arrived in time to enable Mr. Barnes to partially stock an alternative route across the desert, by which a few of the survey officers of the Mission were sent.

## CHAPTER XIX.

1882-1887 (*continued*).

Work in the Assigned Districts—Objects in view—Military arrangements—Employment of tribal levies in protection of roads—Formation of districts—Courts of justice—Police—Revenue arrangements—Communications—The railway—The new road connecting Pishín with Déra Gházi Khan—Operations in the Zhob valley with a force under Sir O. Tanner—Submission of Shah Jahán—Other roads—Postal arrangements—Trade—Dispensaries—Irrigation works—Forests—Sir Robert takes short leave to England—Review of work done during first ten years of Balúchistán agency.

WORK IN THE ASSIGNED DISTRICTS, QUETTA, AND THE BOLÁN.—Sir Robert Sandeman's work in bringing the Assigned Districts of Pishín and Sibi (now known as British Balúchistán) under the direct administration of the British Government, though less attractive, perhaps, than his work as a "political," is hardly less important.

These districts are inhabited chiefly by Patán tribes, of all frontier races the most unmanageable—turbulent, fanatical, priest-ridden, full of fierce enmities and factions, and unaccustomed to orderly government of any sort.

Yet in the space of a few years he succeeded, by firm and kindly treatment, in bringing these unruly elements into perfect order ; so that, at the present time, there is no part of British India in which our Government is at once more efficient and more popular.

No attempt was made for the first few years to introduce an elaborate system of administration. Sir Robert's main object was—

To establish and maintain peace and order.

To administer justice promptly, with as little interference as possible with native usages.

To promote the good feeling of the chiefs and tribesmen by associating them with us as far as possible in the work of government.

To improve communications, promote trade, provide medical aid for the people, develop irrigation, preserve forests.

Much was done, but much, of course, remained and still remains to be done, for time was short and funds were very limited.

For MILITARY purposes, detachments from the Quetta garrison were stationed in the Pishin valley, and in 1886 a cantonment was formed at Loralai in the Bori valley, with detachments at important points.

In connection with the regular troops there were located along the principal lines of communication on the frontier, and in the principal passes, defensible posts, held by tribesmen in the pay of Government—a proportionate number of appointments being given to each of the tribes of the locality. The arrangements made in reference to the Bolán Pass have already been described; these were extended and developed, and in 1883 the whole system was revised by a committee in connection with the abolition of the old corps of Balúch Guides. A large number of military posts, occupied by detachments of the regular army (to the great detriment of discipline), were handed over to the LEVIES, and levy posts from 40 to 50 in number located at suitable points along the main lines of road.

The levy men and their immediate officers were nominated, subject to approval, by the tribal chiefs, but worked under the supervision of the political officers, who were *en rapport* with the military authorities and had command of

the police. Their duties were to watch and patrol roads, give information of tribal movements or impending raids, help to prevent and detect crime, and make themselves generally useful to military and police authorities. In this way many of the wildest spirits of the frontier were usefully employed, and many of those who have fought against us—the Achakzais, the Panizai Kákars, the Marrís, the Bori and Zhob Patáns, the Shcránis of the Takht, the Dotánis of Zao, the Wazírís of the Gúmal Pass, and others, are now co-operating with our officers for the maintenance of order. Altogether, at the end of 1887, the number of tribesmen employed was about 2000 (chiefly mounted men), and the total expenditure about Rs.450,000 per annum. All inter-tribal disputes were settled by *jirgah*, and the existence of tribal service payments afforded a ready means of enforcing obedience.

For EXECUTIVE and JUDICIAL purposes the province was divided into two districts—(1) Quetta and Pishín; (2) Tal Chotiáli. Each district was placed in charge of a Political Agent with a staff of assistants, English and Indian, invested with executive and judicial powers, all acting under the control of the Agent to the Governor-General, who was invested with the judicial powers of a high court. Each district was further divided, for revenue and police purposes, into sub-districts, with native sub-collectors invested with judicial powers in petty cases, so that redress is ordinarily close at hand. In populous places inhabited by mixed races a regular police was organized; elsewhere the tribal chiefs and village headmen were held responsible for maintenance of order and prevention and detection of crime within the local limits of their jurisdictions. In the administration of justice the Indian codes were applied in the case of natives of India and Europeans, but in cases between natives of the locality the provisions



were not rigidly enforced, and the assistance of tribal chiefs, village councils, and arbitrators was freely resorted to.\*

The POLICE, REVENUE, POSTAL and TELEGRAPH establishments were largely recruited from the tribes in the manner adopted in the outposts service.

This system of governing, so far as possible, through tribal chiefs, working under the firm but friendly control of district officers, is similar to that adopted with excellent effect upon the Punjab frontier in early days. For the time being it works well, and may continue to do so, but the fact should be remembered that the system to be successful must be carried out by officers of special experience and aptitude, having much sympathy with the wild races they control, strong powers of physical endurance, and a minimum of desk work. Whether officers combining these

\* On one point Sir Robert Sandeman was particularly determined. He would allow no professional agency in courts of justice, except by special permission, which was rarely, if ever, accorded. With the permission of the Court parties might be represented by relatives or friends, but the pleader or the barrister had no place in the Courts of Balúchistán. This prohibition of professional agency is doubtless a desirable measure in the case of a new province in a backward condition of civilization, and it was in force in the Punjab for nearly 20 years with great advantage. But in the course of time, as wealth increases and interests become more complicated, and procedure more elaborate, professional agency with all its drawbacks becomes a necessity; and so it was found in the Punjab, where a class of professional agents gradually sprang up, working outside the Courts—all the more unscrupulous for being unrecognized. In these circumstances the question of admitting professional agency in the Punjab Courts became a burning question, which had ultimately to be decided by the late Sir Donald McLeod, the last of the so-called "patriarchal" school of administrators. Sir Donald was the determined enemy of lawyers, but the facts of the situation were too strong for him, and he was reluctantly compelled to acquiesce in their recognition with the following characteristic remark:—"If you must have scoundrels about your Courts, it is better that they should be under control than not under control."

qualifications will be continually forthcoming remains to be seen.

In the matter of COMMUNICATIONS the first place belongs of course to the RAILWAYS. Starting from Rukh, a point near Sukkur, on the Indus valley line, the "Sind-Pishin State" Railway, as it is now designated, proceeds by Shikárpur to Jacobábád; then for 90 miles along the Kachi desert to Sibi; then up the Nári gorge to the Harnái valley, 3000 feet above sea-level; then through a chasm in a limestone range, known as the Chappar Rift, to Gwál (5500 feet), and across the Pishin plateau. It is constructed on the same gauge as the Sind-Punjab and Delhi and Indus valley lines, the broad gauge of 5 ft. 6 in. A subsidiary line was constructed from Sibi, through the Bolán Pass, to Quetta, and joined the main line at Bostán in the Kuchlák valley.

The latter was commenced in September, 1879, under Colonel Lindsay, R.E., and was opened as far as Sibi—133½ miles—on January 16, 1880.

In July of that year the works on both lines had to be temporarily abandoned, under circumstances already explained. Then there was a change of Ministry in England, which delayed matters until 1884, when the work was re-commenced.

The work both on the Harnái line and in the Bolán Pass was in many cases very difficult, but was resolutely carried through, in the face of fever, cholera, and floods, and every kind of difficulty, in a manner most creditable to all concerned, especially to Colonel James (now Sir James) Browne, C.B., C.S.I., the Engineer-in-Chief of the main line, and Mr. F. L. O'Callaghan, C.I.E., of the Bolán Pass line.

Up to the close of the period now being dealt with it had not been decided how to reach the Chaman outpost on the further side of the Kwája Amrán range—

whether by tunnel through the Khojak, or by steep gradient over the Kwája Pass, or round the western side of the Amrán range by Nushki. Sir Robert Sandeman strongly advocated the latter route as less expensive, better suited for commercial purposes, and less open to political objection. But the decision was ultimately in favour of a tunnel.\*

ROADS suitable for carts were made, connecting Sibi with Quetta by the Bolán Pass, and Quetta with Chaman on the far side of the Khojak. Another, suitable for guns or camels, connected Quetta with Khelát and Pishín with Tal Chotiáli; and another proceeded through the Bori valley and the Rakni plain by Fort Munro to Déra Gházi Khan and the Punjab, a distance of nearly 300 miles. The completion of this line of communication through a country which a few years since was *terra incognita*, in friendly accord with the twelve warlike tribes, with 29,000 fighting men, through whose land it passes, is a remarkable achievement, and an event of importance not only to trade and civilization, but as furnishing an alternative route from India to our new territories in the event of the road by Shikárpur, Jacobábád, and Sibi being closed by inundations from the Indus.

In connection with communications, POSTAL ARRANGEMENTS may be mentioned. Up to the close of 1887 there were 19 post offices and 450 miles of postal line in addition to the railway. They were freely used by the people, and a village delivery was organized. The parcel post and postal order system were extended to the

\* Sir Robert's anticipations were justified. The cost of the tunnel was upwards of six millions of rupees, more than double the original estimate. And its construction was followed, it will be seen (ch. xx.), by a series of incidents indicative of apprehension and irritation on the part of the Amír of Kábul and his people.

province, and postal orders soon became much appreciated by Afghán merchants as a means of remittance. There were 225 miles of telegraph in addition to that of the railway, and the Indo-European line which passes along the coast through Lus Beyla to Gwádar in Makrán.

With regard to the promotion of TRADE, good government, good communications, and good postal arrangements go a long way ; but two other beneficial measures may be noted here—the abolition of transit duties in the Bolán Pass, and the establishment of a horse fair at Sibi, which has proved a great success.

One of the most important means of conciliating border races is undoubtedly the DISPENSARY. All along the Punjab frontier, from Hazára on the north to Roján on the south-west, dispensaries and hospitals have been located, and have done good work. They are freely resorted to by members of the wildest tribes, and there can be little doubt that the steadily increasing friendliness of our frontier neighbours is attributable in some measure to their influence.\* Nine of these institutions (for indoor and outdoor patients) were opened in different parts of the new territory and one in Khelát—affording relief to more than 50,000 patients (male and female) annually. Of these a large portion are people of the country, and not a few tribesmen from the hills. VACCINATION was introduced, and in most cases eagerly received.

Not much was done directly for the development of IRRIGATION, but loans were granted on easy terms to cultivators for sinking wells, and constructing tanks, water-courses, or *karezes*.

The last but not the least of the objects aimed at was

\* During the late Afghán war, when the frontier town of Támk was pillaged and burnt by Wazíri raiders, the dispensary was spared.

the preservation and development of FORESTS. As a rule the Assigned Districts are singularly bare of foliage; fuel and timber are consequently scarce. Owing to this, and to the extension of cultivation resulting from the *pax Britannica*, there has been a serious drain on the more accessible sources of supply. In Sibi alone more than 11,000 acres of juniper were completely denuded of trees in two years; in Pishín acres upon acres fairly covered with pistacia became bare. In these circumstances the establishment of a proper system of forest administration became a matter of pressing importance. Fortunately, forest resources were discovered which promised, when properly exploited, to furnish an ample supply. In the plains there were at Sibi, at the close of 1886, 5000 acres of juniper already reserved, and other forests not yet reserved on the east side. In the hill country, east of the Pishín plateau, there were at Gwál four square miles of pistacia forest, and more at Siríáb; blocks of juniper at Shárig and Harnái, and in Khawás the hillsides are covered for miles with juniper, forming a vast forest, called the Ziárat forest, many square miles in extent. It was Sir Robert Sandeman's intention to have this forest scientifically managed, and connected by roads with the railway which was not far distant, and to recruit the foresters from the hill tribes, and interest their chiefs in forest management by training their sons to fill superior posts. How far he was able to carry out his ideas will be shown in subsequent chapters.

WORK AMONG FRONTIER TRIBES.—One important and beneficial work effected among the frontier tribes has been dealt with already under the head of Communications—that is, the construction of the new line of road between Déra Gházi Khan and Pishín by the Bori valley.





But another event of importance deserves to be specially recorded.

In 1883 and 1884 a series of murderous attacks were made upon British subjects in Tal Chotiáli by different clans of Kákar Patáns under the influence of Shah Jahán, the fanatical Chief of Zhob, culminating in an attack made on the night of April 21 on a camp of labourers employed on the new cantonment buildings, seven of whom were killed.

At length, in the cold season of 1884, a force of 4800 men and 10 guns, under the command of Major-General Sir O. Tanner, accompanied by Sir Robert Sandeman, was despatched to the Zhob country. The expedition was completely successful. The chiefs of the Bori valley quickly yielded; Shah Jahán's fort at Achtazai was captured; and after a body of 500 fanatics had been attacked and dispersed, all the principal chiefs of Zhob submitted, excepting Shah Jahán, who fled the country.

Thereafter the Bori and Zhob chiefs executed a document formally accepting the supremacy of the British Government, agreeing to stop all raids, pay a substantial fine, and to allow the British Government to locate troops in their respective valleys; and a representative of the older branch of the family was recognized provisionally as Chief of Zhob. Subsequently Shah Jahán himself submitted to the British Government, and, with the consent of the tribes, his provisional representative was recognized as chief.

In 1886, when it was decided to construct a frontier road from Déra Gházi Khan to Pishín, the Bori valley was occupied, and a cantonment located at Loralai, half-way between Pishín and the Punjab. Up to the close of 1887 the Zhob valley was not occupied. But a few years later, in connection with the opening of the Gúmal Pass, it was made the head-quarters of a new Political Agency.



A fuller account of this important measure and its results will be given later on.

In the spring of 1887 Sir Robert proceeded on short leave to England; on June 19 Balúchistán was elevated into a First-class Residency; and on November 1 the Assigned Districts, including the tracts of Pishín, Shorárúd, Kach, Khawás, Harnái, Sibi, and Tal Chotiáli, were formed into a Chief Commissionership under the name of British Balúchistán, the Agent to the Governor-General in Balúchistán being appointed *ex-officio* Chief Commissioner.

Between 1885 and 1887 Quetta received visits from many distinguished persons. It was twice visited by the Commander-in-Chief and once by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab; in December, 1886, by Lord Rosebery; in January, 1887, by the Duke and Duchess of Manchester, and Lady Alice Montague; in March, by His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, accompanied by the Duchess, who was kind enough to open the great railway bridge over the Chappar Rift—called, in her honour, the Louise Margaret Bridge.

Such is a brief description of the work done by Sir Robert Sandeman and his colleagues during the first ten years of the Balúchistán Agency, a period full of difficulty, and danger, and worry, and “grind,” of every description, but ending in triumphant success. The contrast between the Balúchistán of 1876—with its tales of decaying cultivation, caravan-routes closed, with rapine and murder rampant everywhere—and the Balúchistán of 1887—with peace and order reigning supreme, cultivation rapidly extending, and commerce developing by leaps and bounds; no longer bounded on the north by

a neglected Afghán dependency, the haunt of predatory tribes, but by a thriving British province, connected by roads and railways with the markets of India—is indeed striking and suggestive of a commonplace about the “magician’s wand.” But there was no magic in the matter. It was mainly the work of one honest, persevering, cheery, and intelligent Scotchman, with plenty of “go,” no fear of responsibility, and a warm sympathy with his fellow-creatures.

A more detailed apportionment of praise will be found in the article on Balúchistán,\* to which reference has already been made, an extract from which will appropriately end the present chapter :—

“For the success which has been attained credit is chiefly due, of course, to the Agent of the Governor-General, Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman, an officer who has combined firmness, indomitable energy, and perseverance under difficulties with a remarkable power of winning the confidence of border chiefs and tribes; but no small share of credit is also due to those who have worked with him—Mr. Bruce, Major Wylie, Mr. Barnes, Captain Hope, Dr. O. T. Duke, Rae Hittú Rám, Pandit Súraj Koul, Diwán Ganpat Rae, Khan Bahádur Haq-Nawáz Khan, and others, as well as to the distinguished military officers and engineers whose services have already been referred to. But while praising the agents, we must not forget the principals—the statesmen, civil and military, to whose courage and foresight we owe the new departure in Balúchistán, taken in 1876-1877. Whatever opinion may be held regarding the policy and proceedings which plunged us into the late Afghán war, few will deny that our action in respect to Balúchistán—action initiated by Lord Northbrook’s Government, and vigorously developed by Lord Lytton—has been productive of marked benefit to the people and the Empire. To all concerned in the good work done, the Empire in general and Balúchistán in particular owe a hearty vote of thanks.”

\* *Asiatic Quarterly* for January, 1888.

## CHAPTER XX.

1887-1892.

## LAST FOUR YEARS.

Sir Robert's return to duty—Events during his absence—External events—Work in the Khanate—Disputed succession in Lus Beyla—Description of the State—Conduct of Jám Ali Khan—Temporary administration of the State by Rae Hittú Rám—Jám Ali Khan recognized—Result.

SIR ROBERT SANDEMAN resumed his duty, on return from furlough, on December 9, 1887, having now in the political service the rank of First-class Resident, and in respect to the Assigned Districts, or British Balúchistán, as they must be hereafter designated, the status of Chief Commissioner.

During his absence several events of some importance occurred. A feud amongst the Marrís led to bloodshed, but was settled at the Sibi *jirgah*. The Bozdár tribe had, at the request of the Punjab Government, to be blockaded for a time, and affairs on the Zhob frontier gave some trouble—a cousin of the titular chief, Shah Báz Khan, having set himself up in opposition and commenced a series of depredations on the frontier road. A serious rupture took place between the Jám of Lus Beyla and his son, which necessitated decisive action by the officiating Agent (Sir O. St. John), and ultimately the confinement of the rebellious son in the fortress of Quetta, as a political prisoner.

In November Quetta was honoured by a visit from the

Earl of Dufferin, who proceeded by the Harnái route to Pishín and the Khojak pass and returned by the Bolán Pass line, but was unable to stay for any length of time, nor hold any public receptions; and lastly, the Resolution of the Government of India was passed, incorporating the Assigned Districts with British territory.

We proceed to give a brief history of the remaining four years of Sir Robert's administration under the general headings given in the last chapter.

With respect to EXTERNAL EVENTS affecting Balúchistán, the Perso-Balúch border was disturbed by quarrels between the officials of Persian Balúchistán and the Khárán chief, and by raids committed in Persian territory by the Rinds of Mánd.

Events of some importance also occurred on the Afghán frontier:—

The revolt of the Ghilzai tribe in 1887-1888 led to some disquietude on the Pishín border, and a large influx of refugees, who, however, were speedily absorbed as labourers on railway and irrigation works.

In 1888 the district of Chághai,\* an outlying pastoral settlement north of Khárán by the Hamún-i-Lora, situate on a trade-route between west Afghanistan and Quetta, and formerly Balúch territory, was occupied by Afghán officials, who proceeded to levy transit duties on goods passing to British territory.

On July 27, 1890, twelve gunshots were heard near New Chaman (the terminus of the Khojak Pass railway), and one of the Sepoys on duty in the British camp was wounded in the leg. The offenders were reported to have fled into the Amír's territory, and the Governor of Kandahár was addressed with a view to their apprehension.

\* Sometimes (erroneously) spelt Cháŕeh.

The Governor in reply promised to endeavour to arrest the men, but in his letter commented on our "encroachment" on Afghán territory, and expressed it as his conviction that this and other outrages were the outcome of resentment felt by the Afghán people at the said encroachments.

In 1891-2 other indications of hostile feeling manifested themselves. At length, in January, 1892, two Afghán officials appeared at Gul-Kach, on the Gúmal river, visited places in Zhob territory and left a detachment on the north side of the river, threatening our levy post, and causing much excitement among the Wazíri tribes.

These matters, being of Imperial importance, could not be dealt with by Sir Robert Sandeman, but were duly reported to the Government of India, and formed a subject of discussion at the late conference between the Amír of Kábul and Sir Mortimer Durand. All misunderstandings are believed to have been removed ; but Sir Robert Sandeman is entitled to the credit of having foreseen them.

WORK IN THE KHANATE.—Throughout the period the relations between the British Government and the Khan were of a friendly character. A multitude of minor tribal disputes were settled, some between the Khan and the tribal chiefs, others between the tribes *inter se*, but as the details are of little interest, and the names more or less appalling to the general reader, it will suffice to say that the *pax Britannica* was well preserved with a minimum display of force, chiefly through the agency of *jirgahs* acting under the friendly direction of British officers. But there were two matters dealt with in the Khanate during the period which call for more detailed notice, viz. (1) the disputed succession in Lus Beyla, and (2) the affairs of Makrán and Panjgúr.

LUS BEYLA.—Early in January, 1888, Jám Mír Khan the Jám, or Chief, of Lus Beyla, died, and the succession was disputed. The eldest son, Jám Ali Khan, was, as we have already seen, on the worst of terms with his father, who had disinherited him, and before his death appointed as his successor a younger son by another wife.

Here were the elements, under the old *régime*, of a protracted struggle, for the disinherited son had powerful connections, while the Khan was far too weak to interfere decisively. But the settlement of the question now devolved upon a stronger power,—the British Government in its position of Lord Paramount in Balúchistán.

Lus Beyla is a lowland province of about 8000 square miles in area, between the highlands of Jhallawán and the sea, with a pastoral population (chiefly Lumris of Rájput origin) of about 30,000 souls, occupied principally in the breeding of camels, cattle and goats. The chief, or Jám, is tributary to the Khan, to whom he was bound, in time of war, to furnish a military contingent of 2700 men. Jám Mír Khan, the late Chief, was not a faultless character. Three times he conspired against the Khan of Khelát—at once his suzerain and brother-in-law—and was consequently detained for some years as a political prisoner in Sind, and afterwards in Ahmad Nagar in the Bombay Presidency; but, on the occasion of the execution of the treaty of 1876, he was, at the request of the Khelát Chief, released from exile and restored to his chiefship on certain conditions. He had three sons, the elder by the sister of the Mingal Brahúi Chief; two, much younger, by a Delhi lady whom he had espoused while in exile. The Delhi wife attained ascendancy, and *more Asiatico* used her influence to secure the succession of her own offspring. The result was that Jám

Ali Khan's life became intolerable, and being a high-spirited Brahúi, he took up arms against his father, and was first exiled by the British Government to Sibi, but he escaped from surveillance, and had ultimately to be detained a prisoner in the fort at Quetta, where he was still confined at the time of his father's death.

Sir Robert Sandeman's *locum tenens*, Sir Oliver St. John, having regard to the grave misconduct of Jám Ali Khan, had already recommended the recognition of the younger son as heir-apparent, and doubtless there was much to be said in favour of this course ; but Sir Robert Sandeman, on the death of the Jám, felt that the matter deserved further inquiry and consideration, and arranged that meanwhile the affairs of the state should be managed temporarily by an officer of the British Government. The officer selected was Rae Bahádur Hittú Rám, C.I.E., who, as will be seen, discharged his duties with great benefit to the State and people, and credit to himself.

Ultimately, after duly considering the feelings of the people, the present character of the eldest son, and the circumstances which had led to his misconduct,—the fact that the eldest son was of mature years and a Brahúi on the mother's side, while the second son was a mere boy and the offspring of a foreigner,—he considered that, upon the whole, it would be the wisest course to recommend that the succession of Jám Ali Khan should be allowed on certain conditions, due arrangements being made for the protection of the late Jám's family and the education of the younger sons. His recommendation was approved by the Government of India, and on January 21, 1889, Jám Ali Khan was duly placed upon the throne by the Agent of the Governor-General in public *durbár*, and, thanks to Rae Hittú Rám's successful management, the State was handed over to its new chief, free from debt, with a

number of new roads, a school and a dispensary, a cash balance of more than Rs.50,000, and a well-organized system of administration.\*

The course adopted by Sir Robert Sandeman, though criticized at the time, has been justified by its results. Jám Ali Khan has proved himself a good ruler, and has received from Her Majesty the Queen the honour of Knight-Commandership of the Indian Empire ; meanwhile his two brothers are being educated at the Lahore College for the sons of chiefs.

But Jám Ali Khan has had in his turn to suffer from the misconduct of an unruly heir-apparent. In 1891 Mír Kamal Khan, his eldest son, quarrelled with him and fled to Quetta for redress ; and it was partly with the object of effecting a reconciliation between the Chief and his son that Sir Robert Sandeman made his last journey to Lus Beyla.

The affairs of Makrán and Panjgúr will form the subject of another chapter.

\* The *durbár* was held close by the spot which was afterwards selected for Sir Robert's burial-place. It was a time of drought, but the salute fired at the conclusion of the ceremony brought down a shower of rain. This greatly impressed the people, who regarded the occurrence as an indication of the favour of the Almighty and a good omen for the future.



## CHAPTER XXI.

## WORK IN BRITISH BALÚCHISTÁN.

Improvement of the Administration—Appointment of Revenue Commissioner—Balúchistán Code of Laws and Regulations—Administration of justice—Police and tribal levies—Public works—Railway extension—Roads—Postal and Telegraph communication—Trade—Dispensaries and Hospitals—Irrigation—Petroleum—Coal—Gaols and Public Buildings—Quetta Water Supply Works—Description of Quetta as it is—Forests—Education—Surveys—Visits of distinguished persons to Quetta—Viceregal Durbar of November 20, 1890.

AT the time of the incorporation of British Balúchistán with British India by the Resolution of November 1, 1887, the tract was divided for administrative purposes into two districts; the district of Quetta-Pishín and of Tal Chotiáli. Each district was in charge of a Political Agent, with one English and one or more native Assistants, and a staff of sub-collectors of revenue (located in subdivisions, called *tahsils*)—all invested with limited judicial powers.

This arrangement has been maintained, but the Political Agent is now designated Deputy-Commissioner, or District Officer, and the number of courts of justice has been gradually increased from 17 to 25.

Moreover, since January 1, 1891, the Chief-Commissioner has been allowed the assistance of a trained civil servant as Revenue Commissioner, who, in addition to the general supervision of the revenue administration,

is also entrusted with the duties of Inspector-General of Police and Jails, of Commissioner of Excise and Stamps, Auditor of Municipal Expenditure, Registrar-General and Settlement Commissioner. Mr. H. S. Barnes, the officer first appointed,—an officer who had already served with credit as First Assistant and as District Officer in British Balúchistán—soon justified the selection. Order and system were introduced into all departments to an extent previously impossible; the revenue, police, and judicial establishments were re-organized on a graded system; the provincial revenues were economically administered; the accounts put in thorough order; and increased efficiency in all departments was accompanied by an increase of revenue, which reached in 1891-92 the respectable sum of Rs.591,589,—an amount almost sufficient to cover the expenditure.

Hitherto the LAND-REVENUE, or Government share of the produce, had been collected, save in a few exceptional cases, by actual division of the crop,—a system necessary in backward tracts or unirrigated tracts with an uncertain rainfall, but open to great objection both from the Government and cultivator's point of view. Measures were now taken, in regard to lands in Quetta and Pishín, to substitute gradually cash assessments for terms of years in lieu of the old system. Owing to the growing demand for produce of all kinds, the proposed change is very popular.

Measures were also taken, under the provisions of 33 Vic. cap. 3, to substitute for the rules, orders, and instructions heretofore in force a suitable CODE OF LAWS, composed partly of existing enactments of the Indian Legislature, with or without modification, partly of regulations made originally for the Punjab and Burmah frontiers, but more or less applicable to Balúchistán,

and partly of regulations made specially for the new province.

Similar regulations, or "Laws," as they are officially designated, were passed (under a different Act of the Imperial Parliament), in respect to territory such as Quetta, the Bolán, the Khetrán, Dori and Zhob valleys, in regard to which the Agent of the Governor-General exercises administrative powers at the request or by consent of the Khan of Khelát or the tribes concerned.

Both classes of regulations have been collected and published in an octavo volume, entitled the "Balúchistán Code." From this code it appears that the existing enactments declared to be in force in British Balúchistán and the other districts named are sixty-eight in number—a mere fraction of the statutory law of the rest of India—and comprise the Indian Penal Code, the Police Code, the Contract Act, the Specific Relief Act, the Registration Act, in their entirety, the Code of Criminal Procedure with modifications, portions of the Code of Civil Procedure, and a Civil Justice Regulation, providing a simpler form of procedure for ordinary civil suits. The *Corpus juris civilis* is thus of extremely moderate dimensions. In the Frontier Regulations power is given to the district officer to make use of the *jirgah*, or council of elders, as a judicial tribunal; to remove villages on the border to less exposed localities, and to require persons who have blood-feuds with parties beyond the border to withdraw within safe distance. Lastly, there is a special regulation on the important subject of forest conservancy.

Having described the measures taken for reorganizing the government of the new province and the districts administratively attached to it, we proceed to describe the work done during the four remaining years of Sir Robert's administration as Chief Commissioner, and in so doing we

propose to follow generally the order of subjects observed in chapter xix.

In the administration of JUSTICE, the object still kept in view has been that of bringing justice, in a simple and inexpensive form, as near to the homes of the peasantry as possible. Accordingly, the number of courts of justice was gradually increased from 17 to 25. By the Balúchistán Civil Justice Regulation the procedure of the courts has been made less expensive, and ample powers are given to the local Government to prevent the too rapid introduction of professional agency.

The POLICE force was reorganized and brought under the provisions of the Police Act.

The use of the TRIBAL LEVIES has been more and more extended. They have not only taken over a large number of minor military posts, to the great relief of the regular army, but begin to be employed in the detection of crime and the collection of revenue. Their conduct has been excellent, and there has been a considerable diminution of heinous crime.

In the matter of PUBLIC WORKS, that of RAILWAY EXTENSION claims the first place. In November, 1887, the Government of India decided to carry the railway over the Khojak Pass to Chaman, piercing the ridge of the Khwája Amrán range by a tunnel about two and a half miles in length. The work was commenced on December 1, 1887, under the superintendence of Mr. F. L. O'Callaghan, C.I.E., and prosecuted with great vigour; and, in spite of an abnormal winter season in 1890, when snow, rain, and blizzards did serious damage to the works and caused great mortality among the labourers, the tunnel was completed, and the line to Chaman opened for traffic on January 1, 1892. The work is highly creditable to the engineers, but, as Sir R. Sandeman predicted, has proved far more

expensive than was anticipated—the tunnel alone costing no less than 25 lakhs of rupees per mile, or over six millions of rupees in all.

The portions of the two lines between Sibi and Pish/n—that by the Harnái valley and that by the Bolán Pass—also suffered severely from floods. The latter was constructed originally, under pressure of the war-scare of 1885, as a temporary line pending the completion of the Harnái valley line; but it was afterwards, in opposition to the advice of Sir R. Sandeman, retained as a permanent line on its original alignment in the river bed. It was completely wrecked in the floods of 1890, and in November, 1891, a new line was commenced, proceeding from Nári bank, near Sibi, through the Mushkáf valley, and joining the old line in the Bolán Pass near Kohlu, a distance of 57 miles.

The Harnái valley line was also constructed, in the first instance, without proper preliminary inquiry, and the result has been that parts of the Shárig section are so unstable from recurring landslips, that a costly re-alignment may be necessary before the line can be regarded as a reliable means of communication.

Besides the Railway, numerous Military Roads were constructed north and east of Quetta, and the great Imperial line of communication between Quetta and Déra Gházi Khan by the Bori valley was finally completed and bridged in 1890–91. Considerable progress was also made with another Imperial line, connecting Loralai with the Zhob valley, and the Zhob valley with the Gúmal Pass and the Punjab; and roads were made between the Harnái railway station and Loralai, through the Mahráb Tangi, one of the grandest passes in Balúchistán, and between Harnái and Quetta. Altogether, at the end of 1891 there were in Balúchistán 1520 miles of road, of which 376 miles were bridged and metalled.

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DIKHINA RILL ON THE HARVAT MOUNTAIN



POSTAL COMMUNICATION was energetically developed, and at the close of 1891 there were 39 post offices and 908 miles of postal line ; and in connection with the post offices, savings banks were established, and the deposits amounted in 1891 to nearly Rs.500,000.

The miles of TELEGRAPH line open in 1891 were 966.

TRADE was still hampered by the heavy transit duties imposed by the Amír of Kábul, but the value of the merchandise passing between Chaman and Kandahár amounted in 1891 to more than Rs.4,500,000.

The annual horse fair, held in the spring at Sibi, still flourished, and another was held at Quetta in October, which promises to be a great success, as it is patronized by Afghán horse-dealers with classes of animals well suited for remounts.

The DISPENSARIES and HOSPITALS were increased in number from nine to fourteen, and the number of patients from 50,000 to upwards of 100,000.

As for IRRIGATION—about five lakhs of rupees were spent in the construction of an irrigating canal (called the Shebo Canal), taken from the Kákar Lora, a stream flowing between precipitous banks and fed from the snows of the Zarghún and Takatú mountains. It has 20 miles of distributing channels, and when fully developed will irrigate a tract of 16,000 acres.

About the same amount was spent, up to the end of 1891, on a large reservoir, known as the Reservoir of Khushdil Khan, intended to store and utilize the snow water which in spring comes down the Barshor river in the north-east corner of the Pishín valley. The lake formed is three miles long by one in width, with a central depth of 30 feet. The area irrigable amounts to about 20,000 acres. Both these works were in operation in 1891.



The existing irrigation from the Nári river near Sibi was improved by the construction of a permanent head, and an underground conduit, called the *Zhára Kares*, was also completed, and loans were granted on easy terms to agriculturists for the construction of minor irrigation works.

Five and a half lakhs of rupees were expended on experimental borings for PETROLEUM at Kattan. There was for a time great promise of success, but the oil was soon exhausted and the works had to be abandoned.

COAL was discovered in 1886 in the vicinity of Khost, on the right bank of the Mángi river, within two miles of the railway. There are five seams, but only one of any practical value, and that is but two feet thick. It was used on the railway and at the Khojak tunnel works. Up to the close of 1891, 37,000 tons of coal were taken from the Khost mines. Coal was also discovered near Shárigb and in the hills east of Quetta, and at the close of 1891 nearly 5000 tons had been procured from these new sources of supply.

During the same period JAILS were erected at Sibi and Quetta, and COURT-HOUSES, DISPENSARIES and HOSPITALS in different parts of the province, and WATER-SUPPLY works for the town and cantonments of Quetta were completed and opened in March, 1891. The supply is taken from the Hanah stream, where it debouches from a gorge in the Zarghún mountain, thirteen miles from Quetta, and amounts to 750,000 gallons per diem. Its advantage was strikingly shown in a cholera attack which took place in the following July. In the town of Quetta, with a population of 9346 souls, there were only 26 cases, and it was found on inquiry that all the victims had used wells or open stream water, and not the proper water supply. In a like manner Khost, Shárigb, and other places where the water supply

was good, escaped entirely, while places dependent upon river supply suffered severely.

And here it may be of interest to compare briefly the Quetta of to-day with Quetta as it was twenty years ago :—

“The town of Shálkot (Quetta),” wrote Captain Wylie in 1875, “is in a most dilapidated condition. It is small, and built nearly in a square round a mound on which is a mud fortification. The town has a mud wall round it and two fortified gates, but part of it is in ruins, and is so shaky that it looks as if the vibration from its one mountain gun (placed at the corner of the citadel) would bring it to the ground. . . . The garrison consists of one gun’s crew, a company of infantry, and 20 mounted men.”

The dilapidated native town has been moved out of the enclosure and re-built further south on the further side of an affluent of the Shálkot stream, known to the British residents as “Thames;” the new town, consisting of broad bazaars intersecting at right angles, contains a population of about 10,000 souls. Adjoining the town on the south side of the “Thames” is the civil station, including (according to the “Quetta Directory”) a town-hall, a market place, three hospitals, a bank, a public library, a club, an institute, two hotels, two small places of worship, and a Parsce Fire-Temple, the premises of the C.M.S. Medical Mission, the Residency buildings, Government offices, the railway terminus; and further west a recreation ground, the finest piece of turf in India, including a race-course and polo plain extending to the banks of the Shálkot stream. On the north side of the “Thames” is the fort, completely modernized, cantonments and parade ground, with a garrison of two English, two native regiments, a native cavalry regiment, and three batteries of artillery; a handsome church, with sittings for 2000 persons, and a Roman Catholic chapel. Quetta is also the head-quarters of the Balúchistán Rifle

Volunteers, a body consisting of clerks, railway employés, &c., under the command of the Chief Commissioner. The civil station and cantonment are connected by a broad road, with triple avenues on either side, and the numerous cross roads, both in cantonments and in the civil station, are planted with trees, which are growing rapidly.

The progress of FOREST development and conservancy has now to be noted.

The publication in June, 1890, of the Forest Regulations for British Balúchistán gave considerable impetus to the work, and by the end of 1891 the area of State forests and plantations exceeded in the aggregate 78 square miles. The forests and plantations making up this area are twenty-three in number, and divided for administrative purposes into three ranges, with centres at Quetta, Sibi, and Ziárat—the head-quarters of the new hill sanitarium for Quetta—the whole being under the control and management of a trained officer of the Imperial Forest Department, who also acts as adviser to the local Government and its officers in relation to forest operations generally.

The State forests consist chiefly of *juniper*, which covers the side of the Zarghún and neighbouring ranges; but a tract of 5440 acres at the foot of the Chihiltán mountains is covered with *pistacia* and ash trees; one of 1313 acres at Popalzai in Pishín with tamarisk jungle; and in the valley of Wámtangi, near Harnái, there is a forest of *shísham* (*dalbergia sisso*) 1218 acres in extent. In addition to the above, 1700 acres of *tarai* jungle near Thalli were selected for demarcation, together with 1100 acres of juniper forest on the northern slopes of the Zarghún, and an olive forest of 2300 acres in Wámtangi; and further extensions in the country east of Quetta and near the railway at Spintangi were in contemplation.



A F F BELTS IN THE ZIMBAWESI



The greatest care was taken to avoid unnecessary interference with village grazing and cultivation, but when grazing rights were interfered with, liberal compensation was given. The Regulations were enforced with judgment and gave rise to no ill feeling, and during the year 1891 not a single forest fire occurred.

Grass preserves and nurseries have been formed in the vicinity of the Shebo canal, and the great reservoir at Khushdil Khan; and much was done in the way of experimental planting of fruit and forest trees from India and England. The horse-chestnut, the *pinus excelsa*, the walnut and the plane did well, but frosts in winter and the locust in the summer played havoc with many of the seedlings.

In the Bolán Pass plantations have been formed at Mach and Rindli, and all places in that dreary locality, wherever land and water are available, will in a few years' time be covered with trees.

At this early stage, forestry in Balúchistán can hardly be expected to be self-supporting; in 1891 the receipts amounted to Rs.15,763 and the expenditure to Rs.29,450.

Two subjects not dealt with in chapter xviii. remain to be noticed—Education and Surveys.

In regard to EDUCATION, a fair commencement has been made, but the progress is less than could be wished. At the close of 1891 there were five schools open, an Anglo-vernacular school at Quetta, known as the Sandeman school, with an average attendance of 185 pupils, of whom 38 were local Patáns and Brahuís; another Anglo-vernacular school at Sibi, with an average attendance of 83, of whom, however, only 10 are natives of the country; a vernacular school at Pishín, with an attendance of 30 scholars—14 being Patáns; another at Khushdil Khan, opened at the request of the village headmen. There

is also at Quetta a girls' school, founded by Lady Sandeman, with 54 pupils, which has proved a great success.

The local tribes are at present far from enthusiastic in the matter of education, but the action of the village headmen in Khushdil Khan is an encouraging sign, and more recent reports indicate a steadily increasing appreciation of elementary school training.

Between the years 1887 and 1892 very important SURVEY WORK was done in Balúchistán and the adjacent territory.

During the Afghán war troops in the field were accompanied by trained topographers, who were enabled by the intelligent manipulation of small instruments of the theodolite class to effect square surveys of large tracts of hitherto unmapped country. Since the war, operations have been extended to the Perso-Balúch frontier, the shores of the Arabian Sea, the districts of British Balúchistán, the Zhob valley, and the territories adjoining the Punjab frontier,—with the result that the great network of triangulation, extending from the Arabian Sea to the Oxus, and from Eastern Persia to the Indus, has, with few exceptions, been successfully accomplished, and that in respect to Balúchistán, which is enclosed within this area, the topographical survey may be said to be complete.

In addition there have been surveys in connection with the Sind-Pishin railway, and its extension to New Chaman and the Mushkáf valley line; and surveys for railway purposes have been made of the country between the Punjab frontier and Pishin by the Gúmal Pass and the Zhob valley, and between Karáchi and Khárán *via* Lus Beyla and Panjgúr.

There have been special one-inch scale surveys of the Khwája Amrán range of mountains, a two-inch scale survey of the country surrounding Quetta; many routes have been scientifically reconnoitered, and all the existin<sup>g</sup>

ports on the south coast have been examined and reported on.

And in connection with these surveys valuable descriptions of unknown tracts have been furnished by officers of the Department, such as that by Captain Wahab, R.E., of the Marri country ; that by Captain F. B. Long, R.E., of the territory of Bhagwána, Khozdár, and Zidi ; that by Mr. G. P. Tate, Assistant Surveyor, of the country adjoining the Perso-Balúch frontier ; and the valuable ethnographical and historical notes on Makrán prepared by Colonel T. H. Holdich, R.E.

These operations were organized and arranged for by the Survey Department of the Government of India, and it is, of course, to that Department and its officers that the credit for the success achieved principally belongs, but there can be no question that the work in Balúchistán was stimulated and advanced by the warm interest taken in it by Sir Robert Sandeman. Whenever he made an expedition he took care to have a survey party with him, and his influence with the tribes and tribal chiefs secured the safety of survey parties in tracts which would have been otherwise inaccessible. On his recommendation revenue surveys were commenced in Quetta and Pishín, with a view to the gradual substitution, in these localities, of cash assessments of land revenue for terms of years in lieu of the existing system of division of the crops, with all its attendant inconveniences to the people and the Government.

During the four years dealt with in this chapter Quetta was honoured by a series of visits by distinguished persons, including two Viceroys, the Commander-in-Chief (three times), the Governors of Bombay and Madras (twice), the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab ; His Royal Highness



the Duke of Connaught, the Right Hon. Hugh Childers, Sir Charles Dilke, Mr. Bryce, the Hon. G. Curzon and others, and also Núr Muhammad Khan, the Governor of Kandahár.

The visit of His Excellency the Earl of Dufferin has already been referred to ; it was somewhat hurried, and no public *durbár* or reception was held. Their Excellencies Lord and Lady Lansdowne were able to pay a longer visit, extending from November 16 to 21, 1889. The Viceroy and Lady Lansdowne, accompanied by the Commander-in-Chief and a brilliant staff, were received at the Quetta station by the Governor-General's Agent, His Highness the Khan of Khelát, the Jám of Lus Beyla, and the principal sirdárs of Balúchistán, and presented with an address of welcome from the Municipal Committee. In his reply, the Viceroy thus referred to Sir Robert's services—"I have heard with satisfaction the testimony you have borne to the wisdom and energy with which the affairs of the district have been administered by the Agent to the Governor-General, Sir Robert Sandeman, an officer who has the confidence of the Government of India, and whose name for all time will be honourably connected with this portion of the Indian Empire."

The next day was spent in visiting hospitals and schools. On the 18th His Excellency proceeded to the Khojak Pass, returning to Quetta on the 19th, when a Balúch entertainment was given. On November 20 a grand *durbár* was held in the Institute, attended by His Highness the Khan, the Jám of Lus Beyla, the principal Balúch and Brahúi chiefs, Duráńis, Sayyads, Kákar Patáns, Barozais, Taríns, Ghilzais, and other chiefs from British Balúchistán and the border.

In his address His Excellency reviewed the results of the Treaty of 1876—the pacification of the Bolán Pass,

the abolition of transit duties, the construction of roads, the strengthening of the bonds of friendship between the Khan of Khelát and the British Government, the increased sense of security from external attack, and the establishment of a permanent line of railway communication between the regions lying east and west of the great passes. He expressed appreciation of the loyal services of the Khan of Khelát and his sirdárs and subjects during the late Afghán war, and then addressed a few words to the "Khans, Arbábs, and other gentlemen present who are now subjects of Her Majesty."

"I hardly ten years have elapsed," said His Excellency, "since your districts have come under our administration, but during these years you have had ample opportunity of learning what British rule means. You will, I hope, have learnt that it is founded on Justice; that the British Government neither exacts heavy taxes nor interferes with your private affairs; that it has no wish to meddle with your religion; that it desires to respect your ancient customs so far as it is possible to do so without injustice to individuals."

And in reference to Sir Robert Sandeman, His Excellency observed—"The distinguished officer now entrusted with the Balúchistán Agency has from the beginning been your Highness's sincere friend, and has, I believe, gained the full confidence of your Highness and your sirdárs. One of the chief reasons of Sir Robert Sandeman's success, and of the support he has received both from the Government of India and from those with whom he has been brought in contact, is to be found in his complete realization of the fact that we desire in all we are doing to respect your rights, to have regard to your traditional customs, and to avoid as much as possible interference with your private and local affairs."

## CHAPTER XXII.

## WORK ON THE PUNJAB FRONTIER.

Description of territory between British Balúchistán and the Punjab, and the tribes inhabiting it—The Zhob valley—The Bori valley—The Bárkán valley—The Takht-i-Sulimán—The Sheránis—The Mándokhel, Músakhel, and minor tribes—The Khetráns—Marpánis, etc.—The Kákars—Relations of the British Government with the tribes—Sir Robert Sandeman visits the Zhob valley in 1888, proceeds within twenty-five miles of the Gúmal Pass, and on his return march receives petition from the Zhob chiefs praying to be taken under British protection—The Gúmal Pass—Attempt to open it made by the Punjab Government fails—Sir Robert proposes occupation of Zhob valley, and then to arrange for the opening of the pass—His proposal accepted—Sir Robert starts on December 19, 1889—Assumption of the Protectorate proclaimed at Apozai, and Captain MacIvor placed in charge—Negotiations with the pass tribesmen—Situation at Apozai described—Satisfactory arrangements—Sir Robert Sandeman proceeds—March to the Punjab by the Gúmal Pass—*Durbár* at Tánk—Congratulations—Opinion of the Press—Letter from the Government of India—Name of Apozai changed to Fort Sandeman.

WE proceed to record the important work done by Sir Robert Sandeman in bringing under British control and influence the independent Patán tribes between British Balúchistán and the Punjab.

The territory they inhabit is a wedge-shaped tract of mountainous country west of the Sulimáns, bounded on the north and north-west by the Wazíri hills and the Gúmal and Kundar valleys, on the west by the eastern

frontier of British Balúchistán, and on the south by the Marri hills; a tract some 18,000 square miles in extent, that is to say, larger than Switzerland and more than twice the size of the Principality of Wales. Under the Duráni Empire this tract was known as *Sewistán*—i.e. the country of the *Sewahs*, a Hindu race once dominant in the Brahúic plateau; but latterly it has borne the generic designation of Yághistán,—a name applied to all tracts inhabited by independent and unruly tribes.

It includes three main valleys,—the Zhob valley, extending for upwards of 130 miles from Hindú Bágh, near the east end of Pishín, in a crescent shape and a north-easterly direction, to the Gúmal river, with an average breadth of from seven to fifteen miles; little cultivated in 1891. The Bori valley, running from east to west; upwards of 100 miles in length and about twenty in breadth (including the hill-sides), and draining through a wide gorge in the south range known as the Anambár Gap, in a south-westerly direction towards the Kachi plain; its lower portion well cultivated “with orchards peeping above enclosures, and fields extending from village to village.” The Bárkán valley, watered by the Kaho stream, which enters the plains of the Punjab near Harrand;—and a multitude of minor valleys—all more or less capable of cultivation, but many desolate owing to inter-tribal feuds,—with an average altitude above the sea of upwards of 3000 feet.

The mountain ranges are for the most part barren and forbidding—the highest portion being the lofty ridge known as the Takht-i-Sulimán, or “Solomon’s Throne,” which rises grandly between the north-east end of the Zhob valley and the plains of Déra Ismáel Khan.\*

\* According to Muhammadan legend, King Solomon having espoused an Indian princess—Balkís—was carrying her through the

But the general dreariness of the mountain ranges is subject to exception. Forests of juniper clothe the hill-side between Pishin and Loralai; luxuriant growths of cypress and other trees were noticed by Sir M. Biddulph on his return march through the Bori valley; the sides of the Zhob valley are in parts well wooded and the mountain slopes well covered with grass; pine woods crown the heights above Apozai; olives abound in the valley of Kapip, and forests of *chilgoza* (*pinus gerardiana*) cover the summits of Mizri Koh and the Takht.

Of the tribes inhabiting this area, those on and around the Takht are Sheranis—a wild race with some 3500 to 4500 fighting men, once the terror of the Punjab border, but since 1853, when they were severely punished, fairly quiet and well behaved until 1883, when a section of the tribe resisted the advent of the survey party.

On the west side of the Takht are the Mando Khel, a clan of Kakers, whose chief settlement, Apozai, is the head-quarters of the new Agency; the Musa Khel, a race of shepherds, inhabiting a highland tract, called Sahra, which drains eastward into the Vihoa and Luni streams; and a number of minor tribes, such as the Zmarais, of

air to her new home, when, at her request, he rested for a while on the Takht to enable her to give a last look towards the home that she was leaving.

In 1883, with the consent of the chiefs of the Sherani tribe (the occupants of the range), the mountain was ascended by a survey party under Major Holdich, R.E., accompanied by a military escort. They found the summit of the ridge to consist of a long valley between two high rims—covered with the *chilgoza* or edible pine (*pinus gerardiana*). At the north end of the western rim is the highest peak, known as Kaiser Ghar, 11,300 feet above the sea-level; at the south end of the eastern rim is the Takht, properly so called, 11,060 feet above sea-level. After some resistance by a small section of the tribe, the survey party reached the highest peak. The Takht, strange to say, was formerly a place of pilgrimage for Hindus.

Mizri Koh, the Kibzais, the Isots, the Jáfirs of Drug, the Kharshíns (an inoffensive race of Sayyads), the Lúni Patáns;—and lastly, the Khetráns occupy the Bárkán plain and a series of upland valleys connected with it.

These Khetráns are a mixed race, partly Patán, partly Balúch, and partly Hindú, and speak a dialect of Jatki. They are Muhammadan in religion and call themselves Patáns, but in appearance are Balúch and have Hindú marriage customs. As their name implies, they are tillers of the soil, a well disposed and friendly race. The area of their settlements is about 1000 square miles, and they can supply some 2250 fighting men. So far back as 1880 their principal chiefs had petitioned for the establishment of a British protectorate in their borders and expressed their willingness to pay revenue; but their prayer was not acceded to at the time. In consequence, however, of the construction of the frontier road from the Punjab to Pishín it was deemed expedient that a closer control should be exercised over the administration of the country. Accordingly, in September, 1887, a small official establishment was stationed at Bárkán; tribal levies were organized for the protection of the main roads and a light revenue collected,—the people being in other respects left to govern themselves as far as possible. When the Zhob Agency was formed the Khetráns were placed under its jurisdiction, but they were re-transferred to Tal Chotiáli in 1892.

Further west are Marpánis, Lisiánis, Taríns, and Zarghúns, etc., but the principal tribe is the Kákar Patán. This tribe, divided into numerous sub-sections, extends in a belt of varying breadth in a north-easterly direction from Quetta to the banks of the Gúmal river; occupying the plateaus of Zarghún, Toba, and East Pishín in British Balúchistán, and the valleys of Khawás, Púi, Smalán, Bori,

and the greater part of Zhob outside British Balúchistán. They number in all some 40,000 fighting men, but as they have no recognized head they are less formidable than their numbers would seem to warrant. Most of the tribe are agricultural, but some are pastoral, and others earn a livelihood as carriers of asafetida from the region of Herát to British territory. As a rule they are well behaved and peaceable, but during the Afghán war, especially after the massacre at Kábul and the disaster at Maiwand, some of the clans, inspired by Shah Jahán, the fanatical chief, gave trouble, and in 1884 had to be coerced by a military force.

The relations of the British Government with the Kákar tribes of Bori and Zhob up to the year 1887 are described in chapter xviii. By that date the Bori valley had been occupied, and a military cantonment established at Loralái, but, though the chiefs of the Zhob valley had submitted, no attempt had been made to control or administer the territory.

Towards the close of 1887, a band of discontents having their head-quarters at Mína Bázár, the principal village in the lower Zhob valley, committed a series of outrages on labourers employed upon the frontier road; and it was determined that the Agent of the Governor-General should visit the locality, punish the guilty, and take security for their future good behaviour.

Accordingly in 1888 Sir Robert Sandeman, after accompanying His Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief, along the new frontier road, moved with a small force and a following of Balúch and Brahúi chiefs through the Músakhel country to Mína Bázár. An attempt was made to arrest his progress by barricading a narrow pass between Murga and Abdullazai; but, thanks to the influence of the tribal chiefs of the escort and Sir Robert's

firmness, there was no collision. At Mína Bázár most of the delinquent chiefs submitted, and one (Umar Khan by name, chief of the Abdullazai) who had fled was ultimately captured after an exciting chase. From Mína Bázár the Agent proceeded to Apozai, where he received a hearty welcome from Khan Khánán, Chief of the Mándokhel; and from Apozai he advanced to within twenty-five miles of the Gúmal Pass. During his return march, the chiefs of the Mándokhel and Apozai, and Shah Jahán, chief of the Jogizai family, once the determined enemy but now the firm friend of the British Government, and other headmen of Zhob, submitted petitions, praying the British Government to take Zhob under its protection, and expressing their willingness to pay revenue in return for peace and order.

Hitherto our dealings with the Zhobis had been conducted without any idea of occupying their country, but with the sole object of protecting our frontier road from attack. But Sir Robert's visit to Apozai led to an important development of policy.

Sir Robert at once saw the importance of occupying the Zhob valley; an importance based partly on commercial and political, and partly on military grounds—as a means, on the one hand, of opening for traffic the Gúmal Pass, and improving our relations with the adjacent tribes, and, on the other, of shortening, strengthening, and improving our line of frontier defence.

Looking at the matter, first, from a commercial and political point of view, it will be seen from the map that upon the Gúmal Pass two important caravan routes converge; one by the Gúmal valley from Ghazni, Kábul, and north and east Afghanistan; one by the Kundar stream (which flows into the Gúmal at Domándi) from Kandahár and western Afghanistan.



Year by year, at the commencement of the cold season, long trains of laden camels, escorted by wild tribesmen, emerge from the pass on to the plains of India, returning at its close with piece goods, indigo and copper and other products of the west. Year by year the adventurous traders have to fight their way through independent hills, subject to the attacks of hostile tribes, and as yet no efforts, either from the side of Kábul or of British territory, had made any serious impression upon the clans of ruffians which occupy the hill country between Afghanistán and the Punjab frontier. Efforts were made years ago to induce the tribes to agree to a truce for certain seasons of the year, or to exempt trade routes from attack, but in vain. More recently it was thought that the friendly occupation of the pass by British officers and the organization of its defence by the tribes themselves might be a step in the right direction. At length, in February, 1888, an attempt was made by the Punjab authorities, with the help of a large escort of Wazíri tribesmen, to reach the Gúmal valley, and effect a survey of the pass and its surroundings. But owing to the misconduct of the Wazírís the attempt failed.

Sir Robert Sandeman now pointed out that, by availing ourselves of the offer of the Zhob chiefs and occupying their valley, we should be in a far better position for obtaining command of the Gúmal Pass than by efforts directed from the Punjab side. For the Zhob valley, while it commands the western entrance of the pass and the caravan routes converging on it, also turns the whole of the difficult country about the Takht-i-Sulimán, and dominates the tribes occupying the range. He urged that by these means we should obtain command not only of the Gúmal Pass itself, but of numerous other passes to the south, and thus open out new channels for trade, and promote the growth of

friendly intercourse between the Punjab and the tribes in rear of the Sulimáns.

But it was from a military point of view that the occupation of the Zhob valley was, in his judgment, of the chief importance. By its occupation we should acquire a new and easy route between the Punjab frontier and Pishín, through a country capable of being made, at small expense, tranquil, prosperous, and productive; and should thus be able to connect the line of frontier defence in the upper Punjab with our line of defence in Pishín under most favourable conditions, and effectually dominate and control the tract of no man's land between British Balúchistán and the Punjab.

Another reason for the course he advocated soon presented itself. Fresh disturbances took place in Zhob, and it became evident that, without some central authority on the spot to enforce order, the quarrels of the Zhobis would lead to continual disturbance on the frontier.

So matters remained until the cold season of 1889, when the Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, visited Déra Ismáel Khan. Here the question was considered by a committee of experts, including the Commander-in-chief (Lord Roberts), Sir James Lyall, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and Sir Robert Sandeman; and it was ultimately decided by the Government of India, within a few days after the Viceroy's return to Calcutta, to adopt Sir Robert's proposals.

Sir Robert was accordingly charged with the important duty of occupying and arranging for the administration of the Zhob valley, and making a renewed attempt, in friendly communication with the tribes interested, to occupy and open the Gúmal Pass. And, with this view, the services of his old subordinate, Mr. Bruce, then District Officer of Déra Ismáel Khan, and in political charge

of the Wazíri and Sheráni tribes, were placed at his disposal.

His instructions were sent by telegram on December 13, 1889. On the 19th Sir Robert Sandeman started from Loralai. He was accompanied by his personal staff, his chief engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel Biggwither, R.E., a survey party under Lieutenant-Colonel Holdich, R.E., and Mr. Bruce, C.I.E., and, as usual, a large party of Balúch and Brahúi chiefs, including Shahbáz Khan, chief of the Búgti tribe. His escort consisted of one infantry regiment (23rd Punjab Pioneers), one cavalry regiment (6th P.C.), and two mountain guns.

The party journeyed through the imposing scenery of the Hamzazai and Kibzai hills up a valley to Morga, 5500 feet above sea-level; then over two steep ridges and through a defile four miles long to Lakkaband in the Kákar country, in full view of the Takht-i-Sulimán, arriving at Apozai on the 26th.

In the vicinity of Apozai the mission was met by a deputation conveying the sad news of the death of Khánán Khan, the friendly chief of the Mándokhel; but a letter was presented, written by the chief upon his death-bed, expressing his pleasure at hearing of Sir Robert's coming to occupy Zhob, and his regret at having no hopes of seeing him, and commending to Sir Robert's care his sons and family. The letter concluded with the touching remark, that if his sons were late, he hoped Sir Robert would excuse them, as they had stayed behind to see their father die.

A grand *durbár* was held at Apozai on December 27, at which the assumption of the protectorate of the Zhob valley by the British Government was duly proclaimed, with the cordial assent of the chiefs, and Captain MacÍvor, the Political Agent at Tal Chotiáli, was placed in charge

# Jergibek



*Shahri Khan*

*Musta Khan*

*Caubay Khan.*

RAWAB SHAHLÁZ KHAN, CHIEF OF THE TUGGIS, AND HIS SONS



of the new Agency, which was made to comprise not only the Zhob valley, but also the Bori and Bárkhán valleys, and political control over the Patan tribes on the western slopes of the Sulimáns. A place near Apozai was selected for the station; the construction of a road to the Gúmal promptly commenced (the labourers being Wazíri tribesmen), and a large number of Mándokhel enlisted for its protection; a dispensary was opened, and streams of wild tribesmen flowed day by day into the hospital tent for medical advice. Lastly, invitations were issued to the headmen of the Sheráni, Wazíri, and other tribes interested, to attend at a friendly conference regarding the opening of the Gúmal Pass.

Meanwhile, pending the arrival of the *jirgahs*, survey operations were commenced in the valley of the Kunder, and amusements were organized in camp for the delectation of the tribesmen. Tent-pegging, games, races for levies, etc., caused great excitement, and on January 9 Shahbáz Khan, the Búgti Chief, who had just been created a Nawáb, honoured the event by organizing a "grand day," by the gift of prizes contended for by wild horsemen with much enthusiasm.

Then the pass tribesmen began to assemble; Sheráni highlanders from "Solomon's Throne," with "strongly marked features of Jewish type, long black hair hanging down in straggling ringlets, a peaked cap secured on the head by the folds of a puggery that once was white, a dirty linen shirt and broad Patán trousers, a leathern belt, from which depend an eastern sword, a pair of English pistols and a powder-horn, the feet clad in large canoe-shaped shoes, and the whole surmounted by a heavy *postín* descending to the ancles;" Dotánis from the Zao Pass, and Wazírís from beyond the Gúmal, similar in appearance, but bristling with arms of every description,

Martini-Henry, Snider, and Winchester repeating rifles, revolvers and pistols of English make, swords and knives.

The situation at Apozai on January 15 is thus described by the correspondent of the *Pioneer* :—

“At the present moment we are in close contact with the Waziris, numbering 16,000 fighting men; the Zhobis, exceeding 10,000; the Mandokhel, Kibzai, Músakhel, Hamzazai, Izot, Sheránis, Kapíp and Haripál, 10,000 more; and we have on both flanks the Sulimán-Khel, Khoidizai, Násir and Zollikhel clans. In the Political Camp there are over 500 representative headmen belonging to the Mahsúds, Zollikhel, Zhobi, Sheráni, and Kapíp clans, who have come to pay their respects to the Governor-General's Agent, and daily the cry is, ‘Still they come.’ For generations past these tribes, their divisions and sub-divisions, have been involved in endless quarrels and blood-feuds, which have rendered the whole of the country they inhabit totally unsafe for trade and the following of agricultural pursuits. The result of this has been that nearly every other man has turned robber, and anarchy has been allowed to reign supreme.”

But all was now to be changed. Sir Robert Sandeman set his friendly chiefs to work, and the following incident, mentioned in a letter to Lady Sandeman, dated January 12, shows what was going on :—

“Yesterday the Wazíri headmen interviewed the Búgti and Marri chiefs. The Wazíris said, ‘How do you like the British? We are like birds in the jungle and know nothing; we have no corn to eat and are very hungry.’ The Búgti chiefs replied, ‘We were more of jungle birds than you are when first the British Government took charge of us. We are now happy and contented, and do not wish to return to the jungle. If you are wise you will follow our example.’”

At length the representatives of all the pass tribes summoned had appeared, with one exception,—the Lárgha, or lowland section of the Sheránis, who occupy the eastern slopes of the Sulimán adjoining the Punjab—with the remainder satisfactory agreements were entered into.

All arrangements being now complete, the Political

Agent of Zhob was left with a portion of the escort at Apozai to organize the administration; while Sir Robert Sandeman and his staff, and Mr. Bruce, with the rest of the escort, and a large following of tribal chiefs, numbering about 700 persons, proceeded to the Gúmal Pass. A letter to Lady Sandeman, dated Mogulkot, January 4, 1890, gives an account of this portion of the march:—

“This morning we made a march of twenty-two miles to this place. The morning was very beautiful; we went for fifteen miles through low hills, and then came out of the hills into a comparatively open country. On our right flank were the peaks of the Sulmán Mountain, the Takht-i-Sulmán and Kaisar Ghar, about 11,000 feet above the sea-level; eight miles further brought us to camp. . . . The Wazíri headmen up to date have behaved in a most exemplary way, not even a petty theft has occurred, and we have 700 in camp, many of them most accomplished thieves. They (the Wazíris) have clearly made up their minds to serve us loyally.”

On January 27 the party encamped at Khajúri Kach, in the country of the Mahsúd Wazírs,\* a high plateau overlooking the point of junction between the Zhob and Gúmal rivers, and were now entering the most dangerous portion of the whole journey. From Khajúri Kach to the Punjab the distance is twenty-six miles only, as the crow flies, but the route is full of difficulty. The river bed is impracticable, as the stream flows in parts between precipitous cliffs, so the journey has to be made across the adjoining hills. First a steep ridge, known as the Guléri Kotal, has to be passed over; then comes the pass proper; then another ridge has to be crossed before the Punjab frontier is reached. Besides being toilsome and, in parts, precipitous, the route abounds in spots suitable for ambushes, and places where rocks and stones can be hurled with

\* Whether this tribe should be designated *Wazírs* or *Wazírís* was once a burning question. The Punjab Government decided in favour of *Wazírs*, but the decision has not been generally accepted.



impunity upon the heads of passers-by; while the tribes in the vicinity have the reputation of being among the most fanatical and treacherous of all the border clans.

Sir Robert had arranged that the military escort should proceed next morning in advance, and that he and his personal staff should follow later in the day, under the safe conduct of the Wazíri headmen. But, unfortunately, at this juncture, an untoward event occurred. During the night of the 27th a native non-commissioned officer was shot dead by some Wazíri miscreant. The news spread through the camp, and many believed that it was the commencement of a bad time. It was suggested to Sir Robert that he should reconsider his marching arrangements, and either accompany the troops or, at any rate, have the protection of a military escort. But Sir Robert declined to do so, and—at the risk of his life, but, as it turned out, rightly—decided to trust to the good faith of the tribal chiefs.

Early on the 28th the troops and baggage-camels were on the move, and passing slowly over the Gulcéri Kotal, which had been previously 'improved' by pioneers, encamped at Nilai Kach. At 11.30 Sandeman, escorted by the tribal chiefs, with a wild following of 600 men, armed to the teeth, moved up to the crest of the pass and watched the train of camels filing by. When the last of them had passed, Sir Robert followed to Nilai Kach and found, to his relief, that all was well. That night he dispensed with sentries, and placed the entire camp in charge of the Wazíri chiefs. The night was quiet, and early the next day (January 29) the entire force proceeded through the Gúmal Pass proper, a bare defile, some four miles long, then surmounted the second ridge, and at length emerged triumphantly on the plains of Tánk in the Punjab. A few shots had been fired en route by individual malcontents,

but little harm was done, and upon the whole the tribes carried out their engagements with strict fidelity. Three posts were established in the pass, and tribal service given to Mahsúd Wazírís and Sheránís, and measures taken to make the pass "a royal highway instead of a difficult route infested by desperadoes, and impassable except by strong bodies of armed men."

The following letter to Lady Sandeman describes his feelings during this most anxious time :—

"Camp Tánk,  
"January 30, 1890.

"My last letter was written from Khajúri Kach, the entrance to the Gúmal Pass. I have not written for two days, but before telling you the reason I must say how delightful it is to be once more in British territory and the tension on one's mind over. I thank God for it, and for having placed it in my power to say that I do believe I have done real good service to our country, and to these brave, but very poor people.

"On the night of the 27th, towards morning, a noncommissioned officer, who had gone some distance from camp, contrary to all orders, was shot dead. This occurrence was at once reported to me. I had the previous night arranged that the troops were to march at half-past six with all their baggage. I was to remain in camp and come on with the headmen after breakfast at half-past eleven o'clock. There were several reasons for adopting this plan of a very cogent nature.

"On hearing of the murder of the Havildar, I at once called up all the headmen. They had been in charge of my camp, and we had been perfectly free from disturbance of any kind. I was quite satisfied with the headmen, and decided to adhere to the programme just given. The troops marched and I followed at half-past eleven as previously arranged. I must say I felt the responsibility of remaining with my own officers, but I knew half measures were no good.

"But the headmen were quite loyal, and we got every animal and every load into camp without a petty theft even occurring. That night I placed the Mahsúd headmen in charge of the whole camp, and we passed a perfectly quiet night."

The expedition was ended by a grand *durbár* at Tánk, at which the Governor-General's Agent announced that the fine which had been imposed upon the Wazíri tribe

for past misconduct would be remitted, and rewards and dresses of honour were liberally bestowed upon the tribal chiefs and others who had done good service in the expedition. And, meanwhile, as the pass was declared 'open,' amid salutes from mountain guns and much firing from matchlocks, it was felt that a great work had been accomplished, and a grand step in advance taken in the policy of 'peace and goodwill.'

The congratulations of the camp were echoed by the Press from every part of India; as a specimen, we quote the following from the *Pioneer* of February 14:—

"Probably no expedition organized for operations on the north-west frontier, since we acquired it, has been more successful in its work or more important in its results than Sir Robert Sandeman's last achievement in the Zhob valley. It practically amounts to this, that by a masterly piece of strategy a position almost impossible to attack in front has been turned and occupied, though held in great force by some of the most turbulent border clans we have had to deal with, without the loss of a man. The whole affair reflects the greatest credit on the combination of enterprise, tact, and military skill, which has secured an enormous advantage, with little outlay, no bluster, and no bloodshed. In the whole scheme of frontier defence, no measure can rank with the occupation of the Zhob valley and the passes inwards for completeness and effectiveness. And the way in which it has been brought about may be regarded as in all respects a model of border administration. Sir Robert Sandeman throughout his meritorious course of service to the State has never done a better piece of work than this."

And on June 11 a despatch was addressed to Sir Robert from the Foreign Office, concluding thus:—

"I am to convey to you the cordial thanks of the Government of India for the able manner in which you have conducted one of the most brilliant and successful frontier operations of recent years. Your skill and judgment in the management of frontier tribes have never been more signally displayed than on this occasion, and the Government of India cordially acknowledge their obligations to you for the solution you have effected of a very difficult problem."

In further recognition of Sir Robert Sandeman's services, the official designation of the head-quarters of the new Agency was changed from Apozai to Fort Sandeman.

Sir Robert's own feelings are described in a letter from Simla, dated August 2, 1890:—

"Every one here seems inclined to treat me as a hero. I hate that sort of thing. I am happy, though, at the thought that perhaps I may have done good work for my country."\*

\* A circumstance may here be mentioned which is at once characteristic of Sandeman and has a bearing on recent events and future possibilities. When engaged, with a map before him, in planning the occupation of Zhob and the opening of the Gúmal Pass he drew, with a blue pencil, a circle round Wáno, and said, "There is where we ought to be if we are to have full control over the Waziris, and open the Tochi Pass;" and proposed, accordingly, when making arrangements for opening the Gúmal, to advance to Wáno and arrange for its friendly occupation. But in view of the susceptibilities of the Amir of Kábul this part of the programme was not allowed. The objection has been since removed in consequence of Sir M. Durand's late Mission, and we have now a free hand in dealing with the Waziri tribe.

Wáno, it need hardly be stated, is a large valley in western Waziristan, some 4000 feet above sea-level, and easily accessible from the Gúmal river. Its inhabitants, being harried by Pawindah raids, have more than once petitioned the British Government for its protection. But priestly influence is powerful amongst the Waziri tribe, and stimulated the opposition which has led to the recent hostile attitude of the eastern sections of the tribe.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

WORK ON THE PUNJAB FRONTIER (*continued*).

Administration of the Zhob valley—Hostile conduct of outlaws at Thanishpa, and of the Khidderzai section of the Sheráni tribe—Military occupation of Thanishpa and exploration of the Zhob valley—Occupation of the Sheráni hills by a force operating from the Zhob valley and the Punjab—Surrender of the Khidderzai and complete success of the expedition—Letter of congratulation from Lord Lansdowne—Sir Robert leaves for Makrán—Progress of the pacification of the Zhob valley—Question between Sir Robert Sandeman and the Punjab Government as to jurisdiction over frontier tribes.

WE return to the proceedings of Captain MacIvor, whom we left at Apozai with a portion of the escort, engaged on the delicate task of introducing order and good government amongst an armed population, which had never been subjected to rule, and of realizing revenue from tribes who had lived hitherto tax-free.

To assist him in this important work, he was allowed the services of one English and two native assistants, and four native sub-collectors with the necessary clerical help—an establishment, it will be admitted, of singularly moderate dimensions, considering the vast extent of his jurisdiction and the nature of the duties to be performed.

For administrative purposes the territory (larger, be it remembered, than Switzerland) was divided into four sub-collectorates—Lower Zhob, Upper Zhob, Bori and Bárkhán; a police force—mounted and foot, ultimately about 120 strong—was gradually organized; tribal levies were enlisted to protect main roads and passes, and the telegraph, and

to convey letters. Justice was administered, as far as possible, in accordance with native usage ; a dispensary was opened, and medical aid and medicine freely supplied ; and money liberally expended on the construction of roads, police posts, shelter for troops and station-buildings.

As might have been expected, violent crime was rife at first, but thanks to firm and friendly treatment by the officers, and the influence of the tribal chiefs, order was soon established and well maintained, and a light land-tax collected without difficulty. In all, during the first year of occupation, the receipts of the Agency amounted to Rs.335,520, and the expenditure (including administration and public works, but not military charges) to Rs.269,004—leaving a credit balance of Rs.66,516.

But there were two causes of uneasiness. In the first place a band of marauders, under the leadership of one Dost Muhammad and his son Bangal, took up a position at Thanishpa, a district on the west of the Zhob river,



THANISHPA FROM KHURIAWANTA.

overlooking the valley of the Kundar, and thence made harrying raids upon our new subjects, and once indeed essayed to make a night attack upon Fort Sandeman, but failed. In the next place, a section of the Largha (or lowland) Sheranis—the Khidderzai, who had resisted the survey operations in 1883, and declined to attend the conference at Apozai—made their almost inaccessible

hills a base from which outrages were committed on our soldiers and subjects in Zhob.

Sir Robert Sandeman felt it would be highly impolitic to allow such outrages—committed, as they were, upon persons who had just placed themselves under our protection—to go unpunished, and that a public exhibition of our power was necessary in the interests of peace. He accordingly recommended that a force should be assembled to dominate the Khidderzai, and that advantage should be taken of the assembling of this force to capture or drive off Dost Muhammad and his band of desperadoes, and thoroughly explore the country north of the main Zhob valley.

The proposal was sanctioned, but, in view of the Amír of Kábul's susceptibilities, operations were confined to the Zhob side of the Kundar.

Accordingly, at the end of August, 1890, a force consisting of one British, the Yorkshire L.I., and two Balúch regiments, two squadrons of Bengal Lancers, a British Mountain Battery, and a company of Bombay Sappers and Miners, assembled at Hindu Bágh, under the command of Major-General Sir George White, K.C.B., V.C. (now Commander-in-Chief in India—then commanding at Quetta), and was there joined by Sir Robert Sandeman as chief Political Officer.

An interesting account of the operations of this force has been kindly furnished by Sir George White himself, who bears generous testimony to the value of Sir Robert's services, and to the "combination of kindness and strength" which characterized his treatment of the tribes. The force, divided into three separate columns, first thoroughly explored the Kundar valley up to its junction with the Gúmal, and various cross-routes between the Kundar and the Zhob; then concentrated at Thanishpa, where Banóal

had built himself a stronghold on a rocky peak, 8800 feet above the sea. On the arrival of the troops Bangal and his followers decamped, but a party of 50 men of the 3rd Balúches ascended the precipitous hill and blew up the robbers' fastness.



THE TOP OF BANGAL HILL (8800 FEET) \*

\* Showing the place where Bangal's fastness stood, which was blown up on the 11th October 1890.

The force was then divided into two columns, and continued the exploration of the country without resistance, meeting again at Apozai on October 29, when measures were taken for the chastisement of the Khidderzai. No satisfactory reply having been received to an ultimatum, it was arranged that the offending tribe should be approached by four columns—two operating from the Zhob side and two from the Punjab, the entire force being under the command of Sir George White. The column under Sir George's immediate command scaled the lofty heights of Máramázh, and thence descended upon Anmár Kalán, the tribe's principal settlement, while the other columns closed all avenues of escape.

On November 6 Anmár Kalán was occupied without resistance, and most of the headmen taken prisoners; the principal chief, Murtaza Khan, escaped for the time, but



afterwards surrendered. By November 13 all the principal points in the Sheráni country were occupied with hardly any opposition, and the roads and passes connecting them made practicable for troops. Sir R. Sandeman, with an escort of two mountain guns and 300 rifles, marched from Dhana Sir to Mogalkot through the Chua Khel rift—one of those weird waterways which give a character of their own to the drainage channels of the Sulaimáni range; while a small party of British and native troops, accompanied by Sir George White himself, ascended the Takht from the east side,—an affair of great difficulty and considerable danger.

At Karam a grand inquest was held into the conduct of the tribe, and suitable fines imposed, and the proceedings were fitly terminated by a *durbár*, at which the submission of the tribe was formally received, and rewards conferred upon the deserving.

The expedition was thus entirely successful, and congratulations were freely bestowed on all concerned in it. The Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, wrote to Sir Robert Sandeman as follows :—

“Your letter of November 21 gives a very full and complete account of the recent operations in the Kákar country, and against the Khidderzai section of the Sheránis. Nothing could have been more successfully carried out from find to finish, and I heartily congratulate you upon its results.”

The only qualification of the success of the expedition was the fact that in the course of it Sir Robert had a severe accident. His horse fell with him on stony ground and crushed his knee, and its condition ultimately necessitated his going to England in the spring, during a somewhat critical state of affairs.

But his presence was now required at Makrán and Panjgúr, and though a trying journey from the extreme

east to the extreme west of his jurisdiction was, under the circumstances, very undesirable, he determined to proceed at all hazards.\*

Meanwhile, under Captain MacIvor's vigorous *régime*, the pacification of the Zhob valley and the rest of the wild tract comprised within his Agency advanced rapidly. A vast number of tribal disputes were settled; roads and buildings were pushed on; violent crime diminished, and not a single act of resistance to authority occurred; and in 1891 the Agency receipts were Rs.303,415, and the expenditure Rs.213,767, leaving a surplus of Rs.89,648.

But a question arose in respect to the future management of the tribes immediately adjacent to the Punjab which deserves some notice.

Sir Robert Sandeman, having, during the recent expedition, effectually brought under control sections of the Mahsúd Wazírs, and the Sheránis, lowland and highland, as well as the other tribes of the Zhob valley, was anxious to extend his beneficent protectorate to *all* the tribes between the Punjab and British Balúchistán; including, that is to say, those on the east side of the Takht, as far as the Indus valley, as well as those upon the west; urging that, unless this was conceded, a dual system of managing frontier tribes—strongly condemned at the Mittankot Conference of 1871—would be developed with disastrous results.

The Punjab authorities, however, as on a former occasion,† objected to give up their political control over tribes such as the Hadiánis and Usteránas, which had settlements in the plains of the Punjab as well as in the independent hills, and desired also to retain control over the Largha, or lowland section of the Sheránis, as they considered such

\* See ch. xxiv

† See ch. xiii.

control essential for the management of the Gúmal Pass, which they also desired to retain in their own hands.

The Government of India decided, as before, in favour of the Punjab Government; but made arrangements for securing, so far as possible, harmonious action between the two sets of officials.

Against this decision Sir Robert Sandeman, in a letter to Lord Lansdowne, protested with all the earnestness of an enthusiast. His letter is too long and too confidential in its terms to be quoted *in extenso*, but the following are the concluding paragraphs:—

“I trust that having read this paper and my official report, His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council may be pleased to consider that my representations afford sufficient cause for reconsidering the orders lately issued in regard to the Sheránis. In making this representation, I have felt no desire to cavil at these orders, but rather a feeling of despair as to the policy of the future, and its effect on the tribesmen in Balúchistán. I have never spared myself; I have exerted myself, and done all in my power to claim for the tribes a uniform system of management and reference to a single authority, as provided for at the Mittankot Conference. As the only official left who took part in that conference, I believe that it conferred on the frontier a policy which, had it been persevered in, would have given the Government of India in time a body of allies who would in peace have served well as the most useful frontier police we could enlist, and in time of war would have been quite invaluable as our allies.”

But the protest was in vain, and the subject is still a political *vexata quæstio*. And the consequence of the present arrangement is that in the frontier tract between the Punjab and Balúchistán, two distinctly different systems of tribal management are in operation side by side; on one side the “Sandemanian” system, on the other that of “Lawrence.”\* The former has been briefly described

\* As has been forcibly pointed out by Sir Andrew Scoble, the juxtaposition of two differing systems of tribal management, besides being highly inconvenient from an administrative point of view, is

as "a system of conciliatory intervention tempered by lucrative employment and light taxation," and the other as "a system of non-intervention tempered by expeditions."

But epigrammatic descriptions of policy are seldom true, and, in the present case, there is doubtless more to be said from the Punjab point of view than would, at first sight, appear.

In these circumstances, it would be presumptuous for an outsider to express a confident opinion upon this thorny subject; but perhaps it may be permitted to one who, as Indian Foreign Secretary in 1876-77, was cognizant of the aim and object of the Government in re-establishing the Balúchistán Agency, to go so far as to say—that, *primò facie*, Sir Robert Sandeman's case appears a very strong one, and in accordance with the original intention of the Government of India.

It must, however, be admitted that no evil appears as yet to have resulted from the existing state of things; for it is recorded in the Frontier Reports of 1891-2 and 1892-3, that crime has greatly decreased on the Zhob border; that, notwithstanding a certain amount of excitement caused in 1891-92 by the action of the Amír of Kábul and the conduct of certain sections of the Wazírs, the arrangements for the protection of the Gúmal Pass have worked well. Four posts have been maintained in and near the pass in charge of Mahsúd levies, who have kept the pass open for traffic, and have also acted as tribal escorts to railway survey parties; while road-construction has been carried on without interruption or loss of life; that the Sheránis have behaved excellently calculated to be specially embarrassing to traders from Afghanistán, who first pass through the region of conciliatory intervention, where redress for injury can be obtained, and then through the region of non-intervention, where nothing can be done—both regions being under the political supremacy of the British Government.

—the Zao and Chuhar Khel passes being maintained in almost perfect safety, and regularly used by traders and others passing between the Punjab and Zhob; that the peace and security prevailing on the Déra Gházi Khan frontier have led to a marked extension of cultivation in the hill tracts.

But these satisfactory results are, doubtless, attributable, in some measure, to the fact that the Punjab is fortunate in having, as its commissioner, an officer trained under Sir Robert Sandeman—Mr. Bruce, C.I.E., and in Mr. Donald, a young officer with a special aptitude for dealing with Patáns, and may be said therefore to be attained not in consequence of, but in spite of, the present anomalous arrangements. And of one thing there can be no question, viz. that the results would never have been obtained but for the successful occupation of the Zhob district—the work of the subject of this memoir.

Many indeed are of opinion that the time has now arrived when the present arrangements for managing the long line of Punjab frontier should be reconsidered, deeming it too “big” a business to be tacked on to an administration, already overworked, and becoming, necessarily, more and more absorbed in the internal affairs of the great province it controls. But this is a question for statesmen and experts, not for a biographer no longer behind the scenes.

Meanwhile, whatever may be the merits of the dispute as to the extent of the jurisdiction of the Balúchistán Agency, all must admit that the peaceful conquest of the Zhob valley, the pacification of the adjoining territory, and the opening of the Gúmal Pass for traffic, are among the most brilliant achievements of Sir Robert Sandeman's career.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

LAST FOUR YEARS (*continued*).

Work in the Khanate continued—Makrán and Panjgúr—Description of Makrán—Races—System of administration—The Naushirwánis—Ázád Khan's quarrel with the Khan—Settlement of 1883—Fresh disturbances—State of Kej—Nauroz Khan inclining to Persia—Khan of Khelát gives Sir Robert Sandeman full power to settle affairs of Makrán, and Gitchki chiefs ask for the intervention of the British Government—Sir Robert Sandeman's tour through Panjgúr and Kej—Proceeds to Sibi—Major Muir attacked and wounded at Kej—Sir Robert returns and settles affairs—Letters descriptive of his march and proceedings—Proposals for the administration of the country submitted, and meanwhile Sir Robert goes on leave to England—His proposals not sanctioned and troops ordered to retire—Sir Robert returns to India, and prevails on the Government to withdraw its order—Prepares to proceed to Lus Beyla—Letters to the Hon. G. Curzon—Retrospect.

MAKRÁN AND PANJGÚR.—For the purposes of this chapter the term Makrán and Panjgúr will be used in the widest sense, so as to comprehend all the territory of Balúchistán west of the Brahuic Plateau described in chapter xi. In this sense it includes, besides Panjgúr, the valleys of the Mashkhel, of Parom, Bolída, and Kolwah, between the second and the first scarp; Kej, Tamp, and Mánd, between the first scarp and the sea; and also the small ports of Pasni, Khor Kalmat, and Ormára on the coast. A brief description of the physical features of the tract has already been given, but a somewhat fuller account of its condition—political as well as physical, potential as well as actual—is now required.

"In physical aspect," says the writer of the "*Gazetteer of Balúchistán*," "Makrán may be said to consist of alternate hill and valley. Parallel ranges, more or less lofty, traverse it from east to west and occupy a large portion of its surface. Themselves dry and barren and repulsive in aspect, it is only in the intervening valleys that the settlements of men are to be met with. Perennial streams there are none, at least in the vicinity of the sea-coast."

Its area, he adds, is about 32,000 square miles; its population 110,000, or three persons to the square mile, and "upon the whole a more hideous region can scarcely be imagined."

"To give an idea of the physical nature of Makrán," says MacGregor, "I should say, take one of those big brown stones one sees all over Balúchistán which, looking as if they had just come out of a fire, very aptly represent Makrán, and just dot a few specks of green on it and the picture is complete. The people are a very wretched lot, very dirty, very greedy, and very uninteresting."

Sir Robert Sandeman took a far more favourable view of the locality.

"It has been too readily assumed," he says, "that the Makrán districts are arid and waterless wastes which will not repay the labour and cost of administration. This is far from being the case. Barren and waste tracts undoubtedly exist in Makrán just as they do throughout Balúchistán, but these are varied by numerous well-watered valleys, comparing favourably in fertility with any part of the Agency in my charge. Such valleys are Jao, Panjgúr, Bolída, Kolwah, Kej, and Mánd, besides the district of Mashkel. Even Khárán itself, though generally thought of as a desert, already possesses considerable cultivation which is capable of great development. The state of anarchy into which Makrán is fallen has seriously affected the amount of its products, while the stoppage of all trade has made its surplus products valueless."

"But even now," says Cook ("*Topography of Balúchistán*"), "there is nothing to prevent a large force of irregular Asiatic cavalry from marching from the borders of Persia through the Makrán and appearing on the borders of Sind. The first Nasír Khan marched to Kej and then to Bampur (in Persian territory), and back by way of Khárán and Nushki, accompanied by 10,000 troops."

Again, the port of Pasni—at present a miserable fishing

village—has, in Sir Robert Sandeman's opinion, great capabilities, while at Khor Kalmat there is a land-locked harbour, fit to contain 500 of the largest ships, which could be made accessible by dredging through the bar.\*

The principal races of Makrán and Panjgúr are the following:—Gichkis (of Sikh or Rájput origin); Boledis (of Arab extraction); Naushirwánis (Perso - Balúch); Nharúis, Rinds, and other Balúch tribes.

From a political point of view, they may be divided into two main classes, viz. (1) herdsmen and tillers of the soil, of a peaceful and unwarlike disposition, and (2) members of dominant races and their allies, who are ordinarily possessors of some rights or interests in the land entitling them to share its produce or to collect dues.

The chief among the dominant races is the Gichki clan, which obtained supreme power in Makrán about the middle of the last century, by ousting the Boledis. The Boledis sought the assistance of Nasír Khan I., who having afterwards conquered the whole of the country, including Makrán, Panjgúr, and the valley of the Mashkhel, annexed it to his dominions; but he allowed the Gichkis to retain a considerable portion of their former power, and established a system of government, under which the administration was carried on jointly by a *Naiib* representing the Khan, and the local Gichki chief, between whom the revenues were divided in certain fixed proportions.

This system of administration might have worked fairly well but for the intrusion of a third element. This was the appearance on the scene of the Naushirwánis, a Balúch family of Persian extraction, with its head-quarters at Khárán, on the borders of the desert,

\* Unfortunately, in the opinion of engineers, the cost of dredging through the bar and keeping it open would be so enormous that the idea of making Khor Kalmat a seaport is chimerical.



owners of countless droves of camels, sheep, and goats; a race of strong-willed, bold, adventurous and able men, bitter opponents of despotism, and stern upholders of the rude justice which animates the administration of tribal bodies, but, according to western ideas, inveterate freebooters.

The tribe managed to get a footing in Panjgúr, and with a view of securing his influence, the Khelát ruler, Nasír Khan II., granted the Naushirwáni chief a fief or assignment of part of the Panjgúr revenues. Mir Khodádád Khan, Nasír Khan's successor, quarrelled with the chief of Khárán (the well-known Ázád Khan), and confiscated his fief, while the latter, in conjunction with a local Gichki chief, Isa Khan by name, who had also quarrelled with the Khan, revenged himself by raiding in Panjgúr. Ázád Khan had also quarrels with the Persian authorities, who had occupied the districts of Jalk and Kuhak, and a succession of raids on Persian territory was the result.

The settlement of this complicated tangle of conflicting interests was obviously desirable, and one of the first measures pressed upon Sir Robert Sandeman after the treaty of 1876 was to proceed to the frontier and endeavour to effect a pacification of the territory.

The Afghán war and other pressing affairs led to the postponement of his projected tour, but in 1882 the affairs of Makrán were again brought into prominence by a raid from Khárán on Panjgúr, led by Nauroz Khan, in which the Gichki sirdar, Mir Gajian, who was also the Khan's *Naib*, was slain.

Accordingly, in the latter end of 1883, Sir Robert Sandeman, as already mentioned in chapter xviii., proceeded to Khárán, and succeeded in effecting a satisfactory settlement. The confiscated fief of the Khárán chief was restored, and he was granted an allowance of Rs.6000

per annum in consideration of protecting trade routes ; Amír Ján, the son of the late Mir Gajian, was recognized as Sirdár of Panjgúr, and Muhammad Ali Khan, his uncle, was recognized as the Khan's *Naib* and guardian of the young sirdár.

The settlement worked fairly well for a time, but, thanks to the appearance of a new claimant to the chiefship of Panjgúr in the person of one Muhammad Hassan, and intrigues of the Naushirwánis, difficulties and disturbances arose, while the Khan of Khelát, powerless to interfere decisively, secretly supported both sides in hopes of weakening both parties and thereby strengthening his own position.

The state of Kej was somewhat less disturbed, but there were dissensions between the local Gichki Chief and the Khan's *Naib*, while the Rinds of Mánd plundered caravans on the Persian border.

Meanwhile Nauroz Khan, the son of Ázád Khan, the Khárán chief, being hopeless of receiving assistance from the British Government in recovering the territories he claimed from Persia, thought it well to come to terms with his enemy, and began to move in the direction of recognizing her supremacy.

Such being the state of affairs, Sir Robert Sandeman, as was his wont, took counsel with the Khan, the Brahúi sirdárs, and the Chief of Khárán, as to the best course to be pursued, and it was the opinion of all that the best solution of the difficulty was the assumption by the British Government of the administration of Makrán, and accordingly the Khan executed a formal instrument, giving Sir Robert Sandeman full power to effect a settlement of affairs in western Balúchistán.

No action was taken at the time upon these proposals beyond instructing the Political Agent of south-eastern

Balúchistán to proceed to Makrán and Panjgúr on tour, and report upon the state of affairs.

Makrán and Panjgúr were accordingly visited in 1889 by Mr. Crawford, acting Political Agent, and in 1890 by Colonel E. S. Reynolds. Both officers submitted reports, and the latter received and forwarded petitions from the principal Gichki chiefs, praying for the intervention of the British Government; and, in view of these petitions, and the similar application by the Khan, made definite proposals for the future administration of the territory. Sir Robert Sandeman was thereupon instructed to proceed himself to western Balúchistán, and report on the advisability of accepting the Khan's offer. Sir Robert was hardly in a position to take so long a journey, for unfortunately, during the expedition against the Sheránis in the autumn of 1890,\* he had met with a severe accident, his horse having fallen and rolled over him, crushing his knee. But he decided to proceed at all hazards.

Accordingly, in December, 1890, Sir Robert Sandeman, armed with the Khan's commission, and the petitions of the Gichki chiefs, proceeded with his staff to the locality, accompanied by Major A. M. Muir, Political Agent, south-east Balúchistán; Mr. G. P. Tate, an officer of the Survey Department; and also by His Highness the Jám of Lus Beyla; Sirdár Assad Khan, chief of the upper highland Brahúis, and three other chiefs, and an escort of 160 men of the First Balúch Battalion, 60 sabres of the 6th Bombay Cavalry, and two mountain guns.

He proceeded by Lus Beyla along the old caravan route between Balúchistán and southern Persia,—now almost deserted. Crossing the Lak, or pass, which separates Lus Beyla from Makrán, a pass formerly trying and difficult, but now, thanks to Hittú Ram's exertions

\* See ch. xviii

*Devil.*



SIRDAR SIR ASAD KHAN, K C I E , LATE CHIEF OF THE SAYAWAHS



as regent of Lus Beyla, comparatively easy,\* he marched by Goko and the Ára plain, past ruins of old townships, to Jao, head-quarters of the Bizanjo tribe, a valley with some thirty square miles of fertile soil, but uncultivated for fear of raids; thence in five dreary marches through a dry torrent-bed to Isai Panjgúr, home of the Gichki Chief,—a mud fort surrounded with fine date groves and a miserable looking population. Here he encamped two weeks, and decided, in council with his followers, a number of tribal disputes, and disputes between the Khan and local magnates. During his stay, he was visited by Sir Nauroz Khan of Khárán, by the Reki Chief of Mashkel, who came from a considerable distance for the purpose of paying his respects, and by every person of note and influence in the locality.

From Panjgúr Sir Robert proceeded to Kej, and heard complaints of grievous oppression committed by Mir Shahdád Khan, the Khan's *Naib*, whom His Highness had already decided to dismiss from office. After staying a week at Kej and disposing of pending questions, and opening up friendly communications with the Persian Governor of Bampúr, in view to his co-operation in maintaining the peace of the border, he left Major Muir

\* This pass is the subject of a legend of the ordinary type. Shirín, the beautiful daughter of a local chief, wished to marry Farhad, a person of low birth; the local chief, hoping to "end" the affair, refused his consent until Farhad had cut a roadway through the pass, an achievement then believed to be impossible. Farhad, however, succeeded, and claimed his bride. The father was in a difficulty, but an old woman agreed for a consideration to "see him out of it." So she persuaded Farhad that Shirín was dead. Whereupon Farhad died of grief. Unfortunately, Shirín, on hearing the news, died too. So the father did not gain much by his bargain. The two lovers were buried side by side in the pass, and a shrine exists in their honour. And every traveller throws a stone at the grave of the old woman, who is supposed to be buried near the entrance of the defile.

with Mr. Tate and part of the escort at Kej, to complete the investigation and collect the revenue due to the Khan and the Gichki chiefs, and himself with the rest of the escort returned to Karáchi, in hopes of being permitted to proceed to Calcutta and explain the situation more fully than was possible by letter. This was not allowed, and while at Sibi, attending the annual Horse Fair he had established some years previously, he received news which necessitated his immediate return to Makrán. While Major Muir was continuing his investigations into the conduct of Mir Shahdád, the latter, aided by an attendant, attacked and severely wounded Major Muir, killed a levy footman, who went to that officer's assistance, and escaped beyond the border.

Sir Robert at once returned to Gwádar, and as Major Muir was incapacitated for work, sent him to Bombay by troopship, leaving Mr. Tate in charge, and returned to Karáchi and Quetta.

The following extracts from letters to Lady Sandeman, written during Sir Robert's tour in Makrán and Panjgúr, will be of interest :—

“Camp near Lus Beyla,

“Christmas Day, 1890.

“We are halted here ten miles from Beyla owing to heavy rain ; it has rained heavily since we left Karáchi, but otherwise the weather was splendid, and it is very nice in camp. All the officers of the escort dine with me to-night, and Mr. Bux \* has been decorating the shamiánahs (a kind of tent) ; he has joined two together, and has done the decorations very nicely. Everything is going on well with us, and the country is perfectly quiet. Jám Ali is doing very well, and a little oppression he did in several cases I have got him of his own accord to make reparation for . . . I do believe we shall open the old caravan routes with Persia . . . Jám Ali is doing well as to income ; in transit dues alone his income is four times as great as it was four years ago, when you and I put him on the throne.”

\* Sir Robert's very efficient native butler, a faithful servant of 27 years' standing, and a well-known personage in Balúchistán.

"Camp, four marches from Panjgúr,

"January, 1891.

"I have just heard that the Persian Governor of Kirmán (the principal city in the south of Persia) is at Jalak, about fifty miles from my camp when it reaches Panjgúr. I have wired to Foreign to propose a meeting between the Governor and myself to settle certain disputes in a friendly way, but whether the Viceroy will approve is doubtful. This country since we left Lus Beyla is a mass of Balúch hills, and often Sir Charles Napier's words have occurred to me, 'that Balúchistán is the place where God threw the rubbish when He made the world.' But for the last three marches since we left Jao, we have been marching through a long river-bed which connects Balúchistán with the Panjgúr district. Jess is flourishing, and runs along beside me every march." \*

"Camp, Panjgúr,

"January 14, 1891.

"I am getting on first rate with my tour. We arrived here on the 12th, and with the exception of a few chiefs all were glad to see us. I held a big *durbár* yesterday, and shall have plenty of work for ten days settling cases. All the routes apparently converge here—from Persia, Herát, Seistán, and Quetta. The commerce, *viâ* this place and Karáchi, would be considerable if I could put down the existing anarchy. I have just wired to the Government to give me permission to appoint Tate governor of Panjgúr district. I sent through Ffinch the *Patrick Stewart* steamship to examine Pasni harbour. The commander has reported by wire that he has examined the harbour, and reports most favourably. He says there is a splendid land-locked harbour (Khor Kalmat), capable of holding 500 of the largest war vessels, with 46 feet of water, but has a shoal at the bar. It is a great discovery." †

"Camp, Kej,

"February 12, 1891.

"I am going to try and get the Viceroy's permission to let me open a good road to Seistán. Now that I have seen this country I quite concur in all Bell's ‡ views. We could easily have a railway to Seistán, and even to Herát, and if they would make a light railway

\* His favourite Scotch retriever.

† Unfortunately this shoal at the bar proved on further examination to put Khor Kalmat out of the pale of discussion as a future port.

‡ Colonel M. S. Bell, V.C.R.E., who made an adventurous journey to Seistán in 1888



it could be done easily. You may remember a chief called Sher Muhammad shut himself up in his fort and fired at Reynolds,\* and the latter had to move. The chief has given himself up, and the fort too. One ought to be most grateful for the opportunity of doing good to so many poor people."

"Karáchi,

"February 24, 1891.

"I can get no orders out of Government about troops for Makrán and Kej. The country is in a state of anarchy."

"Sibi,

"March 3, 1891.

"You may remember I was anxious to put Mr. Tate in charge of Makrán and Kej. I couldn't get orders. I had therefore to leave Muir to finish off the work. He got into an altercation with a minor chief (the latter is a regular scoundrel well known to me), and he drew his dagger and attacked him, severely wounding him. He then fled to the hills, and the troops are after him. The unfortunate attack occurred at Kej, eighty miles from Gwádar, where Mrs. Muir is. I have asked for permission to employ a British India steamer to go to the rescue of the Muirs, but it is no easy matter to get orders or permission to spend a penny on the rescue of the unfortunate pair. It was fortunate I left my escort with him and a doctor. I had telegraphed more than once that the country was in a state of anarchy. They said, 'Report by letter.' I replied, 'I cannot report till I get back.' And I was 300 miles from Karáchi. I sent at last a wire to say, 'No report could alter facts,' and that I left the troops to take care of the country."

"Sibi,

"March 6, 1891.

"I asked for orders on the 6th February, one month ago to-day, and up to this hour I have not got them. The Government have sanctioned my proposals about Mr. Tate. They wouldn't do it when I first asked, but now poor Muir has been wounded they take my advice."

"Karáchi,

"March 12, 1891.

"We sail this afternoon for Gwádar. Now that poor Muir has been wounded the Government of India have accepted all my

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\* Col. E. S. Reynolds, Political Agent for south-east Balúchistan.

proposals. Mr. Tate has been placed under me, and I can make any arrangements I like for the country. I fancy we don't know all the outs and ins of the matters. That there are two parties I am certain. One for the policy I represent, and another party against it. Anyway we have triumphed this time, and I have got my own way. I had a letter from Sir George Chesney a few days ago to say he was entirely in accord with me. Poor Mrs. Muir has been at Gwádar all by herself for the last fortnight, no one seemed to know what to do. Muir is getting on quite well, and has been moved to Gwádar."

"Camp, Gwádar,

"March 15.

"We got in here last night, but didn't get in till late, as there was a strong wind blowing from the land. We found that Muir had arrived in the morning, and is, all things considered, very well. I don't think that the Government either know or appreciate what their officers have to go through in a country like this. Muir is such a good patient creature, and never repines or murmurs; she also has behaved very well, and has been most brave and good. It does one's heart good to see the care the officers of the Balúch regiment have taken of Muir. I am writing under great difficulties. Picture to yourself a traveller's bungalow, with Mr. Southey, Mr. Spence, Dr. Fullerton, and Dr. Smith in the verandah, having early breakfast and talking away like anything; the Muirs in a side room and their baby squalling; camels roaring outside, while I am sitting in a centre room answering telegrams."

"Quetta,

"April 19.

"My last tour is perhaps the most important I have ever taken. . . . To be successful on this frontier a man has to deal with the hearts and minds of the people, and not only with their fears. The possession of the country is of vital importance to us, yet we do not go about obtaining it in the right way. . . . Were it not for my belief in my own system I would not remain here. To be successful requires much labour, and this is what — and others will not take. I have taken it, and have had a hard life, but a happy one, in the feeling that I have helped men to lead a quiet and peaceful life in this glorious world of ours."

From Quetta he submitted despatches to the Government of India, reporting his proceedings and making definite proposals for the administration of the territories

on the Kej-Makrán frontier. After fully describing the situation, and referring to the terms of the treaty of 1876 and Lord Lytton's former instructions, he recommended that the Political Agent for south-east Balúchistán should henceforth have his head-quarters at Panjgúr, with one European and one native assistant, and an escort of 60 sabres, 200 rifles, and two mountain guns ; and should collect the revenue due to the Khan and the Gichki chiefs in the customary proportions, and conduct the administration through the local chiefs in accordance with native usage. In connection with these proposals he strongly recommended the construction of a railway from Karáchi *via* Pasni, or Lus Beyla to Panjgúr, and ultimately to the Persian frontier.

Before receiving a reply to his despatch it became unfortunately necessary for Sir Robert Sandeman, for the sake of his health, to take short leave to England. But before departure he left instructions with Mr. Tate to carry out tentatively the arrangements he had proposed.

Soon after his arrival in England he received the melancholy intelligence of the death of his *locum tenens*, Colonel Sir Oliver St. John, R.E. The latter took over charge from Sir Robert Sandeman on May 9, 1891. On the 26th he visited the Khojak Pass, and on return to Quetta was attacked by fever, which developed into pneumonia, of which he died on the night of June 3.

In September Sir Robert received further depressing news. When he left India he had every reason to hope that his proposals for the administration of Makrán and Panjgúr would be accepted, but he was doomed to disappointment. It appears that Mr. Tate's proceedings in collecting the Khan and chiefs' revenue were reported to have caused a flutter of excitement ; so the Government

of India became alarmed, and in September Sir Robert received the unwelcome intelligence that his proposals had not been sanctioned, and that orders had been issued for the return of the escort, and the discontinuance of all attempts at direct administration in Makrán.

This was a severe blow to Sir Robert, whose fond hopes of completing the great work on which he had been engaged since 1876 were, for the moment, frustrated. He did what he could in England, and received no little sympathy in high quarters, and returned to India with good hope of ultimate success. He lost no time in respectfully remonstrating, and found, to his relief, that the withdrawal from Makrán was to be gradual, not immediate. Ultimately the Government of India relented, and sanctioned Sir Robert Sandeman's proposals so far that the small escort of troops was allowed to remain, and he was permitted to settle the country in British interests up to the boundary of the Khanate in the neighbourhood of Hassanábád in Persian Seistán, and the Halmand river about Rudbar.

Such was the situation when he made his last journey to Lus Beyla—one of the chief objects of which was to meet the Political Officers and chiefs of Makrán, and devise means of administering the country in the interests of the chiefs and people, with a minimum of military support or direct interference by British officers. His thoughts during his last illness were connected with Makrán, and his distress at being obliged to keep the chiefs waiting was a touching incident in his last hours.

The following interesting letters relating to this period—the last dated only a few days before Sir Robert's fatal illness—have been kindly placed at our disposal by the Hon. G. Curzon—

## I.

"Quetta,

"November 22, 1891.

"MY DEAR CURZON,

"I was rejoiced to see in Reuter's telegrams that you had succeeded Sir John Gorst at the India Office. I congratulate you most heartily, and also myself, for I feel there is one friend at all events at the India Office who knows this country and some of our wants.

"I am trying to prevent the Government of India from withdrawing most of the troops from Panjgúr. They are inclined to reduce them to 50 Infantry, with a native assistant in political charge of the country. I do not think the Government are aware of the value of the province of Kej, Panjgúr, and Mekrán to our Government. My expedition of last year established our influence up to Persian Seistán (or about 400 miles from Herát), a similar distance to that between Jacobábád and Dera Ishmail Khan. I first interfered in the affairs of Panjgúr by order. I then composed the quarrels between the Khan of Kalát and the Chief of Khárán, Mír Azád Khan. There is, however, a flaw in the settlement which I could not heal. The Khan of Kalát and the Chief of Khárán had been bitter enemies for many years. Although nominal friends, and although the Chief of Khárán re-entered the Brahúi confederacy, still the Nousherwáni Chiefs of Sib and Isfandak in Persia (instigated no doubt from Khárán) made raids on Mekrán, Panjgúr, and Kej, and devastated the country. Many lives were lost, and much property carried off, estimated in value at three lakhs.

"At length I assembled the Khan of Kalát, the sirdars of Khárán, and the chiefs of Panjgúr and Kej-Mekrán at Quetta. Without British influence they said that they could not keep the peace. Under the Kalát treaty I agreed to arbitrate, and with this object I obtained the sanction of Government to sending 250 Infantry, two guns, and 60 Cavalry to Panjgúr. I not only established peace in the province, but also great prosperity. I administered the country in the name of, and for, the Khan of Kalát. I established our authority up to Hasanábád (marked Nasrábád on the map) in Seistán, 400 miles from Herát. I have paid for the cost of the civil administration, with a balance of 18,000 rupees to the good. New *karezes* are being opened out, and old ones resuscitated.

"When taking over the administration, I advised the Government in the interests of our frontier, to accept the Khan's offer of the country at a quit-rent, as we took over Quetta. During my absence the Government have not only rejected this, but propose withdrawing, and handing back the country to anarchy. And yet I think its importance

is fully demonstrated by the recent advent of Russian officers to Gwádar and southern Balúchistán. I hope, however, I shall get the matter reconsidered. . . . I think that Government have not realized that my policy of 'peace and goodwill' is far better and stronger in the long run than a policy of pure coercion.

"I am

"Yours very truly,

"R. G. SANDEMAN."

## II.

"Camp, Sibi,

"January 12, 1892.

"MY DEAR CURZON,

"I beg to acknowledge with many thanks your kind letter dated the 16th of last month. In reply to it I am most thankful to be able to tell you that, after all, the Government of India have sanctioned my proposals so far that the small escort of troops are to remain in Mekrán. I am also to be allowed to settle the country in British interests up to the borders of the Khanate in the neighbourhood of Hassanábád in Persian Seistán, and to the Halmand river about Rudbár. . . .

"I have been trying a 'peace and goodwill' policy for many years, and hold the country in consequence of it from the sea at Gwádar to the Gúmal Pass—not bad.

"I have spent two days with the Khan of Kalát, who is in camp about 16 miles from this. He told me he had no wish whatever to alter the policy that had done so much for his country, or depart from the settlement he had agreed to about Mekrán and Panjgúr. In fact His Highness gave me a most hearty welcome. In durbar he announced his great sorrow at hearing of the death of Lord Lytton. . . . I do not say that the Khan is all we could desire—very far from it. He has his own aims of course, and he cannot forget or forgive the sirdárs for their successful rebellion. But acting as a paramount power we can retain both sides as friends, and still prevent civil war and their doing injury to each other and to ourselves. In fact we can do much more. We can make both sides most useful.

"I hold to-day my final interview with the Khan's wazír to settle certain details. To-morrow night I leave this for Karáchi, and from there march to Lus Beyla, where I meet the Koj-Mekrán and Panjgúr chiefs, and settle with them about the protection of the trade-route and the collection of revenue, and other matters of importance. . . .

"I cannot tell you the great relief it is to me that matters have ended so well. I have seen the country under discussion, and know its value to our Government; and the idea of abandoning it to its fate when it

was within my grasp, as it were, was too distressing to contemplate with equanimity. There cannot be a doubt of the fact of the Russians being most active on the Seistán frontier; our Government out here seem now to admit it.

"It is very pleasant to think of the gallant conduct of our officers at Gilgit. In writing to Durand the other day I expressed a hope that the opportunity might offer of settling with the tribes and securing peace there also.

"I am

"Yours very truly,

"R. G. SANDEMAN."

With the second Panjgúr Expedition Sir Robert Sandeman's career practically terminates, and there is little left to record but the closing scene. It will be well therefore, at this point, to look back for awhile, and briefly review, for the last time, the work that he accomplished.

If the reader will turn to the introductory chapter and read the opening paragraphs, he will see that every statement in the short survey of Sir Robert's career there given has been more than substantiated.

When he first took charge of the Déra Gházi Khan district, eighteen years ago, he found the British Balúch tribes disorganized, the Marrís and their congeners unfriendly, and their hills a *terra incognita*, the Khelát State 'desolate from anarchy and civil war of years' duration, the trade routes to Afghanistán and Khelát—the Khaibar, the Tochi, the Gúmal, the Khojak, the Bolán, the Mulla—either closed altogether or infested by marauding tribes.

During the eighteen years of his strong and sympathetic rule all this is changed. With marvellous skill he won the hearts of the Balúch tribes on both sides of the border, then used his influence to terminate anarchy in Khelát, and, thanks to his system of tribal service, three out of the five passes, namely, the Khaibar, the Gúmal, and the Bolán, are now safely guarded, the latter being almost superseded

by a railway, which he strongly advocated in the first instance, and pushed on to completion after its temporary abandonment, while a new road, connecting the plains of the Punjab with the highlands of Pishín, has been constructed by the labour of the tribesmen through whose territory it passes.

Through his persistent advocacy two frontier districts of great strategic importance have been acquired and administered with perfect success; British influence has been extended throughout Balúchistán to the borders of Persia, and the Patán tribes of the Sulimán's have come voluntarily under our protection. The clans of Waziristán will soon, it may be hoped, follow their example, and be dealt with, in common with other border tribes, on the system of "subsidized control," and thus—thanks to Sandeman—the limits of the *Pax Britannica* will be extended from the Indus valley to the confines of Afghanistán, and our entire western boundary become coterminous with comparatively stable Governments.

During the Afghán war his influence in Balúchistán was a tower of strength, and by his peaceful conquest of Zhob and the surrounding hills he has indeed "revolutionized the military situation along 200 miles of frontier." But perhaps his greatest and most abiding achievement is the revolution he effected in the attitude of the Supreme Government of India towards the frontier tribes. It was Major Sandeman's success in the south which first broke the spell, and revealed to the statesmen at Simla the possibility of more daring and conciliatory methods of dealing with these tribes, and made our recognized "sphere of influence" on the north-western frontier "not merely a diplomatic expression, but a reality."



## CHAPTER XXV.

## LAST DAYS.

*(By Lady Sandeman.)*

Sir Robert Sandeman's last days at Quetta—Ball on New Year's Eve—Leaves Quetta on January 9, and proceeds by Sibi and Shikarpur to Karáchi, and thence by steamer to Sonmiáni, where his camp and escort awaited him—Marches to Lus Beyla, where he meets the Jám and Chiefs and Political Officers from Makrán—On January 22 Sir Robert becomes unwell—Particulars of his illness and death—Funeral—Lady Sandeman's subsequent visit to Lus Beyla—The tomb and its inscription—The dome erected by the Jám to the memory of his friend.

THE following is Lady Sandeman's account :—

The circumstances under which Sir Robert Sandeman left India on short leave in the spring of 1891, and the decision arrived at during his absence to withdraw the troops from Panjgúr, have already been described. On his return to Quetta in November he found a great deal of work awaiting him. During his six months' absence there had been two officiating Agents to the Governor-General, and many important matters had been held over until his return. Soon after his arrival at Quetta His Excellency Lord Harris, Governor of Bombay, paid him a visit of several days' duration, and visited the frontier defences at Quetta ; and a little later Sir Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary, and Lady Durand came to Quetta and spent Christmas with him. He much enjoyed these visits, though his hands were very full of work at the time. The

Government of India gave a reluctant consent to his repeated and urgent request that the escort of troops should be left at Kej and Panjgúr, at all events for a time, and until the country had settled down, and he had been able to arrange for the proper administration of this part of the frontier. But he had only two young officers in charge of this important district, and he thought it hardly right or fair to leave them in such an isolated and responsible position during the ensuing hot weather until he had properly mapped out their work for them.

The Jám of Lus Beyla also had had a misunderstanding with his eldest son, Kamal Khan, so that, all things considered, Sir Robert decided to make another tour in the public interests through the Lus Beyla State before the weather became too hot for travelling in that part. He therefore made arrangements to leave Quetta on January 9 for Lus Beyla, where he summoned the Political Officers to meet him, as well as the chiefs from Kej and Panjgúr, so as to arrange any matters under discussion, and provide for the proper carrying on of the administration during the approaching hot season.

Before leaving Quetta Sir Robert and Lady Sandeman gave a ball, on New Year's Eve, to the residents of Quetta and the neighbourhood. The dancing was in the large *durbár* hall adjoining the Residency, and the programme was so arranged that at twelve o'clock all the company were dancing Sir Roger de Coverley. At that hour the band of the Durham Light Infantry struck up "Auld Lang Syne," and all joined hands and sang it. Lady White (the wife of the present Commander-in-Chief), who was dancing with Sir Robert, remarked at the time that it was strange how, in the changes of the dance, all his own young officers had come round him by chance at that moment

On January 7, 1892, Sir Robert and Lady Sandeman gave a dance and entertainment to the wives and children of the railway employés at Quetta, and all remarked with what zest Sir Robert entered into the dancing and games, apparently enjoying it all as much as the children themselves.

On the 8th he was busy all day making the final arrangements for his tour, and for the carrying on of the work during his absence. On coming out of office in the evening he drove round the station to call and say good-bye to several of the officers' wives, and early on the morning of the 9th he and Lady Sandeman left Quetta for Sibi, Karáchi, and Lus Beyla, many people seeing him off at the station and the usual salute being fired.

He halted for a day at Sibi, at the foot of the Bolán, where he transacted a good deal of business, and received a telegram from Colonel Mayhew, collector of Shikárpur, begging him to halt there on his way to Karáchi and distribute the prizes at the Horse Show. He decided not to remain for the prize-day, but halted there on the 12th, and visited the show with Colonel Mayhew, spoke to the principal native gentlemen, spent some time looking at the horses, and in the afternoon visited the Fruit and Flower Show, and also the bazaar and gaol, leaving by the night mail for Karáchi, which was reached on the morning of the 13th.

At Karáchi Sir Robert and Lady Sandeman were the guests of Mr. Ffinch, Director-General of Persian Gulf telegraphs, and on the evening of the 15th he embarked on board the Government steamer *Patrick Stewart* (Captain Townsend) *en route* for Sonmiáni on the Lus Beyla coast, accompanied by Lady Sandeman, Surgeon-Major Fullerton, Captain Stratton, First Assistant Rae

Bahádur Hittú Rám, C.I.E., and Diwán Ganpat Rae, C.I.E.

The party arrived at Sonmiáni on the morning of the 16th. Here Sir Robert joined his camp and escort. He halted at Sonmiáni on the 17th (Sunday),\* and then proceeded on his march to Lus Beyla, to meet there the Political Officers and instruct them as to the carrying on of the work on the Kej-Makrán and Lus Beyla frontier during the ensuing hot weather, and also to meet the chiefs from Kej and Panjgúr and settle many pending cases. Sir Robert was escorted by a guard of the 1st Balúch Regiment and 60 sabres of the 5th Bombay Cavalry (Sind Horse) under a native officer. These troops were afterwards to proceed to Panjgúr in relief, the escort from there joining Sir Robert at Lus Beyla to return to Karáchi.

The march was a pleasant one and all enjoyed it, the only untoward circumstance being that Sir Robert appeared to have caught a cold *en route*, but this he made light of. On the 20th they experienced heavy rain in camp, and on the 22nd they reached Lus Beyla. Sir Robert was met some distance from the town by the Jám of Lus Beyla and the Political Officers.

On arrival at the camp the English mail was received, bringing, amongst other letters, an especially welcome one from General Chapman, C.B., of the Intelligence Department of the War Office. This officer was one of Sir Robert's most valued, able, and sympathetic friends, who ever encouraged and understood his single-minded efforts for the public good. After breakfast on the 22nd Sir Robert remained most of the day with his officers, explaining to them at length the position of affairs and the objects to be aimed at; speaking, though his voice

\* Sir Robert always when practicable halted on Sunday.

was far from strong on account of his cold, for several hours. He inquired as to whether the officer in charge of the Survey had arrived in camp, and was disappointed when he heard he had not done so, as Sir Robert was anxious to learn whether the Survey Officer was able to corroborate his own opinion as to the suitability of the country for a railway connecting Karáchi with Quetta direct, and ultimately with Kej, Makrán, Panjgúr, and the Persian frontier. This line of railway Sir Robert was most anxious to see made, not only on account of its strategical importance, but also for the benefit of opening up trade and friendly relations with Persia. It would also have the advantage of connecting Karáchi and the sea by an alternative route with Quetta, avoiding the existing danger of our communications being cut off by the breaking of the embankment at Kasmore.

In the afternoon of the 22nd Sir Robert paid a visit of ceremony to the Jám, and at 7 p.m. he walked out to view the illuminations given by the Jám and people in his honour. He then dined as usual and played a game of whist afterwards.

The next day Sir Robert complained of feeling very unwell and kept his bed, and the following day the doctor decided that he was suffering from an attack of influenza ; his lungs became affected, and pleurisy set in for a time.

But his mind, in spite of his sufferings, was full of his work, and he more than once sent for Rae Hittú Rám, his faithful subordinate, and gave him various instructions about the pending cases. He impressed upon the Rae that justice should be done to all, and especially in one case, where land was to be taken up by Government, that a full *quid pro quo* should be given, and that in no case was there to be *zulum* (oppression). "My mind is not easy," he said, "at not being able to see about these things

myself. I beg you, *Rae Sahib*, to see that they are properly attended to." He also expressed his great regret that the *Makrán* chiefs should have been kept so long waiting. The *Rae Sahib* assured Sir Robert that all the officers would do their best to carry out his wishes, and added that the chiefs cared nothing for the delay ; all they wanted was to see him restored to health. At this he appeared to be despondent, as if he had not much hope of recovery.

All this time the *Jám* and the principal chiefs waited near his tent to hear news of him, and the *Jám* arranged a service of horsemen along the road to *Karáchi*, a distance of 115 miles, to fetch medicines or anything that might be needed.

Sir Robert often spoke with much regret during his illness of the death of the Duke of Clarence, the news of which had reached him shortly before, and expressed a wish that a message of condolence from the Khan and the Agency should be sent.

In spite of the devotion of his medical attendant Sir Robert daily appeared to grow worse. He rarely spoke ; when he did, it was generally about the people and his work, or to thank those in attendance on him for any trifling service. Always courteous and gracious in his manner to those who waited on him, this trait in his character was never more marked than during his last illness, even when suffering greatly from pain and the depression of spirits inseparable from the disease.

On the evening of the 28th he, for the first time, appeared to be better ; the fever was less, and the patient appeared to be easier. He asked to have prayers said, and later to see the young European officers to say "good-night" to them ; but this was not thought advisable. He also asked if the English mail had arrived, and if the

Survey Officer and the troops from Panjgúr had joined the camp.\*

The next morning Sir Robert was not so well, the fever returned, and he appeared to be weaker. He spoke but little, once or twice repeating the text from Scripture:—"If the trumpet give forth an uncertain sound, who shall prepare for battle?"

Towards the afternoon he rapidly grew weaker and fainted; on being given a restorative towards sunset, after he had fainted, he said, "Where are the people? I cannot speak without the people." The Jám and chiefs and his native Assistants, who were all waiting outside, were called in and he spoke a few words in Hindústáni, bidding them "good-bye." They then, each in turn, passed by his bed, touched his hand, and said, "Salaam, Sahib;" some with the tears running down their cheeks. To each he replied, "Salaam, Sirdár." After they had all passed he fell back on his pillow. The European officers were hastily sent for, but before they arrived he had breathed his last. Almost his last words and his last look were for the people he had loved, for whom he had worked, and in whose service and that of his Queen and country he had laid down his life.

The day after his death numbers of chiefs and people begged to be allowed to look on his face once more, and permission was given. He lay on his bed with his sword and decorations beside him; Captain Stratton and the other Political Officers were in attendance in uniform, and numbers of people came to gaze once more on his countenance and make their final *salaam*.

The Political Officers themselves paid their last visit to his remains the night before the funeral.

\* They did not arrive till after his death, some not till the morning of the funeral.

At first it was proposed to take his body to England, but finally it was decided that he should be buried at Lus Beyla, in accordance with the Jám's earnest solicitations.

He was buried on February 1, 1892. The site selected for the cemetery was about three-quarters of a mile from camp,—the place where Sir Robert held the *durbár* in 1889, and proclaimed Jám Ali Khan Chief of Lus Beyla. It is in view of the town, and plainly visible from the top of the Jám's house, where, as he remarked, he can look at it when saying his prayers. It is close to the road leading to Khárán, and overlooks a branch of the Paráli stream, which descends from the Jhalawan hills, but is out of the reach of inundation.

The funeral took place about 4 p.m. The coffin was covered by the Union Jack flag, and bore his helmet, sword, and decorations. It was carried by men of the 1st Balúch Regiment, and was followed on foot by Lady Sandeman and the following officers—Surgeon-Major Fullerton; Captain Stratton, I.S.C.; Captain F. P. MacDonald, I.S.C., Political Agent; Captain A. L. Sinclair, D.S.O., 1st Balúch Light Infantry; Captain Ronald Mackenzie, R.E.; Surgeon-Captain J. B. Smith; and G. P. Tate, Esq., Officiating Political Officer; and was escorted by the detachment of Cavalry (Sind Horse).

On nearing the cemetery, the road was lined by the 1st Balúch Regiment and the Jám's troops. The guns (a half section of the Kohát Mountain Battery) were drawn up under the command of Lieutenant D. Seagrim, R.A., and the firing party of the 1st Balúchis was under the command of Lieutenant Southey, 1st Balúch Regiment.

The funeral service was read by Captain W. Stratton, First Assistant to the Agent. The coffin was lowered into its place by the military officers, three volleys were fired



over the grave by the firing party, and there was a salute of thirteen guns.

Large numbers of natives were collected at a respectful distance and witnessed the ceremony.

Lady Sandeman remained at Lus Beyla until the arrangements at the grave were for the time completed, and left on February 6 for Karáchi, the Political Agent, Captain Macdonald, and his Assistant remaining some time longer at Lus Beyla.

Six months afterwards the Jám of Lus Beyla erected a handsome dome over the grave, and in January, 1893, Lady Sandeman, who had returned from England for the purpose, accompanied by Colonel Garwood, R.E., and Mrs. Garwood, again visited the spot. They were met at the Hab river, which separates Lus Beyla territory from Karáchi, by an escort of troops sent by the Jám under the command of his son, who accompanied them during the march. They were also escorted by a small detachment of the 1st Balúchís, under the command of a native officer, sent by orders of our own Government. The Jám of Lus Beyla provided the camels for transport and all the supplies for the march, and firmly refused all payment, giving as his reason, that but for Sir Robert Sandeman he would have been an exile from his country.

On the arrival of the party at Lus Beyla, it was found that the Jám had had the camp pitched in a convenient spot, and a road made connecting it by a short and private way with the cemetery, to enable Lady Sandeman to visit the grave quietly when she wished.

The tomb sent by her from England, made of Aberdeen granite and white marble, was set up under the personal supervision of Colonel Garwood, R.E., and under the dome

erected by the Jám. The tomb bears the following inscription : —

IN LOVING MEMORY

COLONEL SIR ROBERT GROVES SANDEMAN, K.C.S.I., B.S.C.,  
CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF BALÚCHISTÁN AND AGENT TO THE  
GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

BORN AT PERTH, SCOTLAND, 25 FEBRUARY, 1835.

DIED AT LUS BEYLA, BALÚCHISTAN, 29 JANUARY, 1892.

HE DIED, AS HE HAD LIVED, IN THE DISCHARGE OF HIS DUTY.

*"FERVENT IN SPIRIT, SERVING THE LORD."*

The garden round the dome was carefully planted, and iron railings were put up around the grave and outside the dome. The wall round the cemetery is closed by an iron gate, the gift of Colonel Garwood ; the gardener in charge of the place living in a small house outside.

The whole has been placed under the care of the Balúchistán Agency to be permanently looked after. A telegram, informing her of this, was sent to Lady Sandeman by the Viceroy's orders before she left Lus Beyla.

On a marble tablet in front of the dome is the following inscription in English and Urdú : —

THE DOME OVER THIS TOMB

WAS ERECTED BY

H.H. SIR JÁM ALI KHAN, K.C.I.E.,

JÁM OF LUS BEYLA,

IN MEMORY OF

HIS KIND AND BELOVED FRIEND,

COLONEL SIR ROBERT SANDEMAN, K.C.S.I.,

AGENT TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND CHIEF COMMISSIONER  
FOR BALÚCHISTÁN

## CHAPTER XXVI.

## PUBLIC SORROW.

Reception of the news of Sir Robert Sandeman's death—Public meetings—Announcement in the *Gazette of India*—Letters of condolence—Remarkable letter from the Khan of Khelát—Obituary notices in the Press—*Persian Chronogram*—Memorials at Quetta and elsewhere.

THE death of Sir Robert Sandeman, being quite unlooked for, caused, as might have been expected, a profound sensation throughout Balúchistán.

On February 1, 1892, a crowded public meeting, convened by Khan Bahádur, Burgorjee Patel, was held in the Sandeman School Hall at Quetta, and passed a resolution expressing "the deep grief and bereavement which filled the hearts of the inhabitants at the irreparable loss they had sustained." Similar meetings were held at Bostán and elsewhere.

On February 6 the following notification was issued by the Government of India :—

"The Governor-General in Council has learned with great regret of the death of Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman, K.C.S.I., Governor-General's Agent, and Chief Commissioner in Balúchistán.

"Sir Robert Sandeman had served for more than thirty years on the North-West Frontier, where his loss will long be felt. His untiring energy and the force and steadfastness of his character had acquired for him a commanding influence, upon which the Government of India could always rely. He was a brave and devoted servant of the Queen, and died, as he had lived, in the discharge of his duty.

"The death of such a man is a public misfortune, and the Governor-General in Council deeply deplores it."

On March 3, at a *durbār* held at Sibi, the Officiating Agent of the Governor-General (Mr. H. S. Barnes) referred to the event in an address to the assembled chiefs. Rāe Bahadur Hittu Rām, C.I.E., and Sirdar Assad Khan, C.I.E., principal Chief of the highland clans,\* also addressed the meeting, eulogizing in respectful and affectionate terms the services rendered by Sir Robert Sandeman to Balú-chistán and its people. And at the close of the *durbār* a sum of about Rs.22,000 was subscribed by those present toward the erection of a suitable memorial to the late Agent of the Governor-General.

In England, as we have already seen, the event was little noticed, but in the little village of Ardmore on the south coast of Ireland, where Sir Robert used to spend his leave, the greatest sorrow was exhibited by young and old. A sermon was preached in the Roman Catholic chapel on his loss, and all flags were flown half mast high on that part of the coast.

Meanwhile telegrams and letters of condolence reached the bereaved widow from all parts of India and from all classes. From the Viceroy and Governors of provinces, from officials of all ranks, from feudatory chiefs, from communities of Hindus, Muhammadans and Parsees, from the pupils of the Lady Sandeman's Girls' School at Quetta, and from individuals of comparatively humble position—some of the latter expressing in quaint but touching language their feeling of sorrow and deep sympathy. One native official writes that "his heart is broken." "We," he continues, "are but arms and legs, and the Head is gone." Another says, "We and the people are as sheep who have lost their shepherd."

From the Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, Lady Sandeman received a letter, from which the following is an extract —

\* Afterwards Sir Assad Khán, K.C.I.E.—recently deceased.

"The sad news which we received yesterday has shocked me deeply. . . . To me his death is a very great misfortune; no one can fill his place or continue without difficulty the work which he has been doing. The service which he has rendered to the Government of India stands by itself; I do not think there is any living official who can point to an achievement so distinct and so complete as his; it will remain and be remembered so long as India has a frontier to hold."

The Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts, wrote as follows :—

"I cannot resist writing a few lines, which I hope you will receive before you leave India, to tell you how much I deplore Sandeman's loss. I know, perhaps, better than anyone what magnificent work he has done the last sixteen or seventeen years, and how very different our position would be on the Balúchistán frontier but for his administrative skill, his untiring energy, his indomitable spirit, and above all his marvellous influence over the wild frontier tribes. I always felt that with Sandeman in Balúchistán an army operating in the direction of Kandahár and the Halmand would have a strength behind it which could not be calculated; and I always hoped that if it were my fate to be in command of that army, your husband would be the controlling authority behind me. God has, however, willed it otherwise, and though everyone who, like myself, had the privilege of being intimately acquainted with Sandeman, cannot but deplore his sudden removal from a sphere of such usefulness, we know that everything is ordered for the best, and that for some good reason God has taken unto Himself the soul of our dear Brother."

Sir Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary :—

" . . . I have never heard a more general expression of real regret and grief. Even those who did not know your husband say to me, 'It is a great loss. You will find it hard to replace him'—and I know only too well how true it is. The Government of India has lost one of its strongest and most earnest servants—perhaps the strongest personality in India—and the frontier will mourn him for many a year."

The Commissioner in Sind, Mr. H. E. N. James :—

" . . . It may be a little comfort to you to know how honoured and respected he was, not only in his immediate province, but all over Sind. His name was familiar not only to us officials who knew well his achievements, but all natives spoke admiringly of his firm, strong, just rule."

His Highness the Khan of Khelát telegraphed his

condolences to the Officiating Agent, and wrote to Lady Sandeman a letter, most kindly intended, but somewhat remarkable in terms.

In it His Highness expresses his profound grief at the loss of his friend, but adds an expression of surprise that it should be intended to bury the remains at Lus Beyla. "The remains of Sir Robert Sandeman," he proceeds, "should be buried either in his native home in England or in my dominions ; and if," he adds, "the Lus Beyla Chief objects, I am prepared to send an army and forcibly convey the body from his territory to Quetta."

The spectacle here presented of Muhammadan chiefs contending for the body of a deceased Christian Resident is probably as unique in history as it is significant.

Some extracts from the obituary notices in the Indian Press have been given in the introductory chapter. We add a few more here.

*The Pioneer* :—

"It is not too much to say that the loss sustained by the Government of India through the death of Sir Robert Sandeman is altogether irreparable. He had an unsurpassed knowledge of the tribes of the north-west frontier, and a quite peculiar facility in managing them. If almost alone amongst the provinces of the border-land of the Empire, Balúchistán has passed under the ægis of British rule without the shedding of a drop of blood, it is due to the skill with which Sir Robert Sandeman has managed the Balúchis for so many years and the extraordinary influence he had over the native chieftains. Love for the natives among whom our lot is cast, tact in dealing with them, power to command their respect, and resolution to control them—these are the qualities which have so often advanced the lines of British dominion in the East, and brought peace and order out of conflict and chaos, and no one ever possessed them in happier combination than Sir Robert Sandeman. His death deprives the Government of India of one of their ablest, most experienced, and trusted servants, and will be widely and deeply deplored."

The *Times* of India, after a review of his career, observes :—

"Sir Robert Sandeman's stalwart figure, bonhomie, strong Scotch accent, clear cool judgment, and tenacity of purpose gave him pronounced individuality, and thus it was almost to be expected that he was the right man to deal successfully with the complex circumstances he was often called upon to face. With the chiefs and people of Balúchistán he had unbounded influence, his name, *Sinjeman Sahib*, being a household word among the neighbouring Afgháns as well as among the Balúchis and Brahúis. During the last two campaigns in Afghanistán he rendered priceless service to the State. And had due advantage been taken of the supplies which he offered to provide from local sources at his command, enormous sums would have been saved in the cost of transport and commissariat stores. Further, we are in a position to say, that had the Government of India taken due notice of his warning, that the troops of the puppet Wali of Kandahár were not to be trusted, we should probably have been saved the indignity, humiliation, and disaster of Maiwand, he having reported to this effect a clear week before the ill-fated force led by General Burrows left Kandahár."

In England, Sir Robert's character and services were the subject of a leading article in the *Times*, and were favourably referred to in the *World*, but the event was little noticed elsewhere.

In the *Scotsman* there was a sympathetic notice of his career in an article entitled, "What a Scotchman has done for the Empire."

In Ireland there were numerous friendly but brief notices in the local papers.

The Persian ode or elegy on Sir Robert's death (by a native poet writing under the name of *Ahmad*) has already been referred to. It concludes, *more Asiatico*, with a chronogram, in which the letters, taken as numerals, express in the following terms the date of the event which it records :—

اوز عالم رفت و برج ماند بهارش یادگار

"He departed from the world,  
But a monument remained to his memory."

The following particulars regarding memorials at Quetta and elsewhere have been furnished by Lady Sandeman :—

“At Quetta a beautiful memorial east window has been placed in the church by Sir Robert’s European friends. The window has four lights; the left hand one represents the Angels appearing to the Shepherds, with a scroll inscribed, ‘On Earth Peace, Goodwill towards Men’; the remaining three lights illustrate the parable of the Talents, the Good Shepherd, and the Angel at the Sepulchre.

“The following inscription on a brass tablet has been placed in the church :—

THE EAST WINDOW IN THIS CHURCH  
WAS ERECTED BY HIS FRIENDS IN MEMORY OF

COLONEL SIR ROBERT GROVES SANDEMAN, K.C.S.I.,  
AGENT TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND CHIEF COMMISSIONER  
FOR BALÚCHISTÁN.

HE WAS BORN AT PERTH, IN SCOTLAND, FEBRUARY 25, 1835,  
AND DIED AT LUS BEYLA, BALÚCHISTÁN, JANUARY 29, 1892,  
AND IS BURIED THERE. HE SERVED WITH DISTINCTION IN  
THE INDIAN MUTINY, UMBEYLA CAMPAIGN, AND FRONTIER EX-  
PEDITIONS, RESTORED PEACE TO BALÚCHISTÁN AFTER 20 YEARS  
OF CIVIL WAR, AND SEVERAL TIMES RECEIVED THE THANKS OF  
HER MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT.

A LOYAL SERVANT OF THE QUEEN, A BRAVE AND HONOURABLE  
SOLDIER, AND A TRUE FRIEND,

HE DIED, AS HE HAD LIVED, IN THE DISCHARGE OF HIS DUTY.

“*PERVANI IN SPIRIT, SERVING THE LORD*”

And a fine portrait by the Hon. John Collier (from which the frontispiece has been taken) has also been presented by them to the Residency at Quetta.

“The native population of Balúchistán, sirdárs and people, have subscribed to erect a handsome building at Quetta, containing a *Jirga*-hall, in which to hold their



meetings, and have obtained a replica of the portrait to hang at the end of the hall, so that, as one of the sirdárs remarked, 'they might look upon his likeness when assembled at their meetings and think that he was amongst them again.'

"Besides these monuments at Quetta, his old friends among the sirdárs and native gentlemen of Déra Gházi Khan have erected a memorial *jirga*-hall at Fort Monro, the hill station of Déra Gházi Khan, founded by him, and have hung in it a large photograph of his picture.

"In St. John's Church at Perth his brothers and sisters have placed a memorial tablet.

"But in Balúchistán itself there is a monument even greater and more enduring than all of these. 'Here'—says a writer in the *Pioneer*—'*si monumentum quæris circumspice.*'"

## CHAPTER XXVII.

### IMPRESSIONS AND REMINISCENCES.

By H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, General Lord Roberts, Sir Richard Temple, Sir Alfred Lyall, Sir Charles Aitchison, Sir Charles Dilke, and the Hon. G. M. Curzon.

HIS Royal Highness the DUKE OF CONNAUGHT, who twice visited Quetta, once in 1887 and again in 1890, has intimated that his visit to Balúchistán "left upon him the conviction of the great and permanent value of Sir Robert Sandeman's work, and of the great political and administrative ability of its author."

GENERAL LORD ROBERTS writes :—

"Sandeman was a man of whom I had a very high opinion and for whom I had a very great regard. He proved himself a forward, plucky soldier when he was with Wale's Cavalry in the Mutiny, and my native A.D.C., Resaldar-Major Ganda Sing, who was in the regiment at the time, often spoke to me about 'Sinnaman Sahib's' dash and forwardness ; and when I last visited Lucknow, about fifteen months ago, he took me all over the Músabágh, and showed me where Wale was killed and where he saved Sandeman's life.

"I met Sandeman off and on when he was in the Punjab Commission, but I knew him best after he went

to Quetta. It was in Balúchistán he proved himself to be the great man he undoubtedly was. In 1886 we marched from Déra Gházi Khan to Quetta through the Marri-Búgti country with only a small cavalry escort. The people of the country looked after us, not a shot was fired, and we experienced the greatest civility and kindness. Such a thing would have been impossible a year or two before, and it would have been impossible then, but for the extraordinary influence Sandeman had obtained over the tribes. He knew everyone, and everyone knew and was glad to meet the Commissioner Sahib. His position amongst the wild, lawless Balúchis was quite unique.

"I made several trips with him after 1886 with the same result, and each time I was more and more impressed by the power he possessed over and the respect he was treated by everyone on the frontier. He certainly was a remarkable man, and what a kind hospitable fellow he was! I stayed several times at the residency in Quetta, and always received the warmest welcome from him and Lady Sandeman. He was the beau-ideal of a frontier officer."

SIR RICHARD TEMPLE:—

"Before the year 1879 I had been acquainted with Sir Robert Sandeman as an able and zealous officer, in civil and military capacities, on the southern portion of the Punjab frontier. But my particular acquaintance with him began late in the autumn of 1879.

"In the autumn of 1878 the second Afghán war had begun, and forward movements from the British side on the southern, or Bolán, end of the frontier, as well as on the northern, or Khaibar, end. The forces under General Sir Donald Stewart had on the southern, or

Bolán, and advanced upon Kandahár. This war was suspended for a while in the early part of 1879 by the Treaty of Gandamak. One of the consequences of that treaty was this, that certain districts of Afghanistan adjoining Balúchistán, and lying near the Sind border, were assigned by the Afghán Amír to be administered by the British Government. The districts in question were those of Sibi and Pishín. Then in the autumn of 1879 there had been a recrudescence of trouble with Afghanistan. Again had British forces been moving upon Kandahár. The line of advance had during this autumn of 1879, as in the preceding autumn of 1878, been by the Bolán Pass. There had been much anxiety regarding the military transport across the long sandy tract between the Sind border near Jacobábád and the foot of the Bolán Pass—a tract subsequently known to British officers as the Sibi desert. The condition of Balúchistán, including all the dominions of the Khan of Khelát, was satisfactory. The districts of Sibi and Pishín were secure under British administration; Sir Robert Sandeman, being accredited to the Khan of Khelát, was Agent to the Governor-General for His Highness's dominions, and British administrator in these Assigned Districts.

"It was in the autumn of 1879 that I, as Governor of Bombay, was instructed by the then Viceroy, Lord Lytton, to proceed to the Bolán Pass—to complete the organization of the transport on the line from our base in Sind towards Kandahár—to confer with the Governor-General's Agent in Balúchistán, Sir Robert Sandeman—to cause a railway to be constructed across the sandy tract above mentioned to the town of Sibi, not far from the foot of the Bolán—and to consider the best means of continuing such a railway onwards in the direction of Kandahár.

"While acting under these instructions from the

Viceroy, I was at the beginning of November, 1879, in camp at Dádar, near the foot of the Bolán. Sir Robert Sandeman came to visit me there, and we at once began conferring about the railway. There was no question as to what ought to be done in the sandy tract above mentioned so far as some point near Sibi. But there was the difficult question as to what ought to be done for railway communication beyond this point in the direction of Afghanistan—in other words, whether the railway should be taken by the ancient military line of the Bolán Pass—by which line our military transport was still proceeding—or whether another and a better line should be struck out. Sandeman at once told me that there were great difficulties in the Bolán Pass, and that very possibly a preferable line might be discovered in the Sibi and Pishin districts.

“We accordingly, Sandeman and I, first proceeded to inspect the Bolán Pass as far as the Dozan ravine below the desolate plain known as Dasht-i-be-daulat. His conversation was bright, suggestive, and refreshing—a better travelling companion I never met. We rode together up and down this famous, historic, and romantic pass, admiring its bold bluff, its blue pellucid streams, its grand backgrounds. We observed the military road constructed in zigzags up the very stiffest part, for which General Robert Phayre and the Bombay Brigade were gratefully remembered. Sandeman pressed on me the engineering difficulties, and the cost of carrying a regular railway with a broad gauge along this pass. He spoke with just pride of the peace and security under which the vast quantities of British stores had for months streamed along this pass in the jurisdiction of the Khan of Khelát or Balúchistán.

“This was my second visit to Bolán, and on both

occasions the late Major Stirling Rivett Carnac accompanied me as military secretary.

"We then retraced our steps to Dádar, and thence to Sibi; and prepared to enter the mountainous region of the assigned district of Sibi. Hitherto we had been marching in assured safety. Now, however, we were to traverse districts which, though administered under British authority, were still Afghán, and were not yet free from the risks and uncertainties, perhaps even the lurking dangers, with which Afghán territory had ever been fraught. In the wild bridle roads a shot might be fired from beneath a bush, an assassin might spring from behind a boulder. On Sandeman then, as administrator-in-chief of these districts, devolved the care and responsibility of guarding our party—and the charge was a grave one, as any accident to any of us would at that juncture have been politically most untoward. Nothing could exceed the alacrity, the promptitude, the watchfulness with which he discharged this duty—together with that self-possessed and cheery manner which exercised a good moral effect on everyone, European or native, with whom he came in contact. Everything depended on his local knowledge, which was both extensive and accurate, and upon the promptitude with which he obtained intelligence of every kind. None could discern from his aspect, conversation, or bearing that he had some anxiety in his thoughts, and that as he rode along amidst the mountains, '*post equitem sedet atra cura*'!

"So we entered into the Nari gorge, with a rapid stream in many branches rushing through light friable rocks with fantastic shapes, and came out on the broad valley of Harnái, with the great square castellated mountain of Kalípat in the background. We did not pursue this valley far, but turned up on our left towards

of Quetta. At night we were in camp long pass which led up to the plateau. Now outridden our mounted escort, and I Sandeman's anxiety regarding the situation. As a small party of European officers well we were on the alert, and the risk was probably For the Afghán is somewhat like the tiger, not used to attack unless he can catch his victim unawares. Next morning we ascended a long pass which is the neck of the Quetta plateau, and then with an excited curiosity we beheld the basin of Quetta itself. In those days Quetta, though it had a historic name, was only an ordinary Balúch town in appearance, with a small British cantonment close by. But its surroundings were magnificent, and I well remember how Sandeman pointed out mountain after mountain of the ranges surrounding the plateau or basin—limestone formations from 10,000 to 12,000 feet above sea level—Murdâr, so called because the desolation of its rugged peaks is death-like; Zarghún, dark with juniper forests; Takatú, with its serrated summit. With pride and glee he directed my gaze towards them all when in the morning they stood out grey against the golden sky, in the evening when they glowed and blushed in the radiance of sunset.

"The next day we went to see the famous Plain of Desolation, called Dasht-i-be-daulat, where Sandeman had sent his tents to shelter us. The altitude (6000 feet above sea-level) hardly accounts for the chilliness of the air; that effect arises from several causes into which I need not enter. We were fortunate in escaping the worst of the phenomena known in that quarter—the driving tempest of sleet and snow—the dust-storms, not heated, but deadly cold—the blast which seems to penetrate the wayfarer, going in at his chest and out at his back. But we had

just enough experience of these things to enable us to realize the well-known descriptions. With all this there is a dryness in the air which causes extreme thirst after exercise on foot or on horseback. In all my life I never was so glad of afternoon tea as on that occasion in Sandeman's camp. The Balúches too gave us melons with juice of delicious coolness, most refreshing at the moment, but somewhat treacherous in effect.

"Returning to Quetta, we marched northwards, and passing round the base of Mount Takatú, we suddenly gained a memorable prospect, to which Sandeman with pride and pleasure drew my attention, for beneath us lay the broad plain of Pishín, and in front our horizon was bounded by the blue range of the Khwája Amrán, separating us from the province of Kandahár. Crossing the Lora river, we encamped for the night at a town named Gulistán-Karez—the name indicating an irrigated rose-garden in a region of scanty vegetation. The next morning Sandeman conducted us to the summit of the range by the Khojak road, the historic pass by which invaders, commanders and soldiers, have crossed and re-crossed for many centuries. Then he drew my attention to the roughly engineered road by which the year previously the British guns had been drawn on the march towards Kandahár—terminating in the little green sward of Chaman, a miniature oasis in the wilderness. Thence we gazed together over the low undulating tracts, at the end of which with our glasses we could descry the series of castellated hills behind Kandahár, and even the ranges of northern Afghanistan in the dim distance. On our left front we soon perceived mighty clouds of dust rising up from the desert which flanks Kandahár on the south-west. With amazing velocity the wind was wafting it towards us. Seeing its rapid advance, Sandeman and I tethered our



horses under shelter of rocks, and ourselves stood on the summit to watch the phenomenon, though we could scarcely stand upright facing the storm, as the pall of dust enveloped us in passing darkness, and then driven onwards lifted the veil and restored the great landscape to our view. We together lingered in imagination over the conquerors, the kings, the heroes of the ancient and the middle ages who must have looked with diverse feelings on this very scene. Before turning away we thought on the statesmen and soldiers of our own nation, who from this spot had taken the first and then last look towards Kandahár.

"For the extension of the railway to Kandahár, Sandeman thought that the route over this Khojak Pass would be too arduous, and that the expense would be prohibitory. We had not been contemplating the work which in later years has been undertaken, namely, the tunnel piercing the base of the mountain. He was then in favour of taking the line through the Gwája Pass, some distance westwards, where a sort of dip in the range would offer facilities. I was then to ride to Kandahár without him, as the affairs there were beyond his jurisdiction. Returning thence after visiting Sir Donald Stewart, who was then in chief command, I was to meet Sandeman in camp at the Gwája Pass. This was accordingly done ; and meeting there we inspected the pass, and then set out on our return march towards India, through the Pishín valley.

"At the end of this valley we found ourselves at the crest of the mighty wall with which Nature flanks the elevated plateau of Balúchistán and Pishín ; and then a glad surprise was in store for us. For we found immediately that the stream from the Pishín valley passed through deep rifts and ravines in this flanking wall, thus opening a natural channel for communication. This chasm no doubt was a

fortunate find, as it afforded a comparatively easy passage for the railway. We had from the beginning known that the crux of the line to Pishín would be the surmounting of this great flank. The Bolán Pass was, as we had seen, well-nigh insuperable. The other pass by which we had ascended to Quetta was almost as bad, and we had not yet been able to hear of anything better. But here was a ready made opening ; and Sandeman pressed the point on my consideration. The winter had now set in as we re-entered the Harnái valley already mentioned. Sometimes when marching at sunrise the cold so benumbed our hands that we could not hold our bridle-reins. Then we once more passed through the Nári gorge and came upon the broad plains beyond Sibi—a wondrous contrast after the rugged scenery amidst which we had been for some time living.

"During these days I had prepared my report on the railway line for the Viceroy. This I did in a Minute dated 25th November, 1879, with the assistance of my Engineer advisers, Colonel Lindsay and Colonel De Bourbel. This Minute went to Bombay, and was thence forwarded to the Government of India. Then, according to the recommendation therein contained, the railway through the Harnái valley and the Chappar Rift to Pishín was undertaken, with a branch from Pishín to Quetta—instead of the line by the Bolán to Quetta and thence to Pishín. I was the responsible authority for making this recommendation, but I made it at the instance of Sandeman, as the Political Officer, and on the professional advice of Colonel Lindsay, as the Engineer Officer. The project has since been carried out ; and if it is deemed to be fraught with Imperial advantages, then Sandeman deserves great credit for its conception and initiation. The only difference between our initiation and the ultimate

execution is this, that instead of passing over the Khwaja Amrán range by the Gwája Pass, the engineers have tunnelled the range underneath the Khojak Pass.

"The above narrative is given after consulting the notes and sketches I made at the time. But for better verification of the part which Sandeman had in this matter, I will cite some passages from the Minute of 25th November, 1879, which Sandeman certainly saw in draft before it was despatched. In paragraph 4, I begin by stating, 'I have been considering for the past month this question in company or in communication with the chief political authority, namely, Sir Robert Sandeman, the Agent to the Governor-General.' Later on, in paragraph 19, I state, 'When we were instructed to carefully consult the political authorities regarding the selection of the line in this quarter, Sir Robert Sandeman urgently drew our attention to advantages of the line by the Nári river system.' Next, in paragraph 25, when considering the point in Pishín whence the branch could be taken to Quetta, it is stated that 'I concur with Sir Robert Sandeman in thinking that this point is near enough to Quetta for practical purposes.' In the next paragraph, when summarizing the whole line, I state that 'here is a line which Sir Robert Sandeman, the officer in charge of this part of the country, advises me is excellent in a political and administrative point of view. Indeed, Colonel Lindsay describes the Sibi route as incomparably superior to the Bolán route for a railway. In this description Sir Robert Sandeman and I concur.'

"Concluding the argument, I set forth in paragraph 41—'Sir Robert Sandeman has a decided opinion in favour of the Sibi route. The opinion of so high an officer, who has so much local experience, and who has done so much for this part of the country, will doubtless carry great weight.' Further on, I finish by writing, 'I am authorized to state

that Sir Robert Sandeman concurs entirely in this Minute, and that Colonel Lindsay concurs in all those parts of it which relate to engineering and constructive points, subject always to detailed survey. The joint recommendation of us three is, that the Sibi route, as above described, be adopted.'

"Very soon after the despatch of this Minute Sandeman and I looked together at the rapid progress that was being made, at the rate of one and a half miles a day, across the desert plain near Sibi—the crowds of workmen encamped in the sand—the water-tanks conveyed by the rail as it advanced into the heart of the arid waste. Then he departed towards Khelát, the capital of Balúchistán, and I towards my head-quarters at Bombay, which a few months later I quitted on my return to England.

"Though I met him afterwards in England, my political association with him never happened to be renewed. But on hearing afterwards of his premature and lamented death, I felt that a strong man had fallen in the battle of Imperial life. My strong impression was that this manly strength, this noble vigour, had been undermined by the vicissitudes of climate and temperature which were incidental to his jurisdiction, which stretched from the burning plains of Sind to the frigid altitude of the Balúch mountains, and to uplands swept with chilly dust-storms and tempests of sleet. Some time after my departure from India, I heard in the south of Europe that a disaster had overtaken a British force at Maiwand, beyond Kandahár, and then I rejoiced to think that the Pishín frontier was safe in Sandeman's keeping. He was, in short, a member of that band of resolute, vigorous, and patriotic men which has existed for a century and half for the founding, the constructing, the extending, the consolidating of the British Empire in the East—a band of which the full number has been ever

maintained ; some coming forward when others fall and make a gap ; some arising as fast as others pass away. With a soldier's discipline originally, he had a long education in civil affairs, and a rare experience in that Oriental diplomacy which overcomes turbulent, wayward, and fickle tribes with firmness, good humour, tact, and insight."

SIR ALFRED LYALL:—

"My acquaintance with Sir Robert Sandeman dates from the beginning of the Afghán war in 1878. He had previously shown great skill and enterprise in the establishment of British influence over the Khan of Khelát and the Balúch tribes ; and he was thus in a position to superintend and direct all the arrangements for the passage through Balúchistán of the troops that marched up by the Bolán Pass to Quetta and Kandahár. His knowledge and command of the resources of the country, his relations with the chiefs, and his extraordinary aptitude for the management of the tribes, were uniformly valuable in these operations. And throughout the period of our occupation of Kandahár, from 1878 to 1881, it was an immense advantage to the Government of India that so able and experienced an officer, who was so thoroughly versed in frontier affairs, remained in charge of the lines of communication with India. His energy and activity, combined with great shrewdness and force of character in dealing with wild folk, who had never previously been under English management, enabled him gradually to extend and impress his personal authority over wide tracts of country, inhabited by a population of warlike and independent borderers.

"In July, 1880, a crisis occurred which tested the strength of his hold on the people and showed his soldierly

qualities. An English force was completely defeated at Maiwand, in south Afghanistán. Our garrison was shut up behind the walls of Kandahár, and the news of our reverse spread instantly through Balúchistán. The whole country between Kandahár and the Punjab frontier fell away into momentary confusion. The tribes rose and plundered, the outposts were attacked, the roads blocked, the scanty detachments on the lines of communication could barely hold their ground. As Major Sandeman wrote, the political work of many months had collapsed in a few days. I have now before me the telegram which reached me one morning in Simla, announcing the 'total defeat and dispersion of General Burrows' force', and I remember that the Viceroy at once summoned the Council to decide what reinforcements could be most rapidly pushed forward. Some high military authority expressed his fear that the Political Officers would insist on retaining the local detachments for the preservation of order and Government property within their own jurisdiction; and I replied that Major Sandeman might be relied upon to send every available soldier to the front. Within a few minutes came a telegram from Sandeman, reporting that he was concentrating all intermediate posts, that were not absolutely needed, for military purposes, making over the stores, telegraph-lines, and station to the charge of the village headmen, and co-operating vigorously with the General in command at Quetta for the concentration of all scattered detachments and guards upon our foremost position towards Kandahár. I read out the telegram with much satisfaction, and telegraphed the Viceroy's entire approval of the measures he was taking.

"Those who know how commonly, in times of disturbance and confusion, both military and civil officers look first to their local responsibility and declare that

they can spare not a man for other needs than their own, will appreciate the clear-headed promptitude with which Sandeman saw and acted upon the right view of an emergency. His services during the troubled period that intervened before General Roberts defeated Ayúb and relieved Kandahár were excellent. I find that in a letter dated August 24, 1880, I wrote as follows :—‘ I quite agree with you that the situation is most serious. The Viceroy cordially recognizes all your exertions, and has full reliance on your energy and experience for aid in holding our ground and recovering it. In writing yesterday to the Queen about this unfortunate affair (Maiwand), Lord Ripon mentioned your zeal and energy.’ The leading Balúch chiefs were kept well in hand, and when our power had been restored in Kandahár, Sandeman easily put down the pillaging and brigandage that had broken out in the outlying parts of the country.

“ In the autumn of 1880, he rode up with me from Quetta to Kandahár. My business was to form some opinion on the important question whether Kandahár should be retained by the British or given back to the Afghán ruler, and Sandeman gave me most valuable information and advice upon the point. Shortly afterwards he went home and I quitted the Foreign Secretaryship.

“ I have always regarded Sir Robert Sandeman as impersonating the special characteristics of the men of action who have contributed so greatly to the enlargement of our Indian Empire. He was indefatigable in mind and body, always able to write long letters or to take long rides ; his plans and policy were always bold and forward ; his temperament was essentially positive and practical ; he had a remarkable pertinacity of purpose, spared no pains to carry out his views, and would press

them on the Government with every kind of argument and confident affirmation. He usually got his own way, because though he would risk much to gain his political ends, and allowed himself a very free hand as to ways and means, and often attempted to over-ride authorities who would not follow his leading, yet he was too long-headed and sagacious to take a road that would lead to the failure of anything he undertook.

“He had a restless adventurous spirit that was never satisfied with quiet administration behind a settled frontier, but continually discovered excellent reasons for advancing beyond it and annexing fresh territory. He was absolutely without any fear of responsibility, and consequently he was rather impatient of control, so that his very considerable administrative capacities were best seen in a rough half-subdued country where he could have his own way, choose his own methods, and bring into full play his special faculty of influence over Asiatics. For laws, financial rules, and official regulations generally he had no predilection.

“It should always be remembered of Sir Robert Sandeman that he made the political settlement of Balúchistán. I mean, that our dominion over that extensive tract of country which lies between India and south-eastern Persia was founded and consolidated by him. He also was the first British officer to penetrate into the valleys and passes of that region, inhabited by independent tribes, which stretches from Balúchistán northwards on the Afghán side of our Punjab frontier, and he led the explorations which have opened out new roads and given us new connections between Balúchistán and the Punjab. In one of his earlier expeditions, among the tribes on this edge of Balúchistán, he nearly lost his life. He showed me afterwards the hole made by a matchlock ball in his helmet



very near his head, and I notice that in one of my letters I congratulated him on his narrow escape.

"In short, he was a man who was very admirably fitted for the work which he had to do in Balúchistán, where he has left his mark, and where his name will long be remembered."

In 1885, SIR CHARLES AITCHISON, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, wrote thus to the Viceroy (Lord Dufferin):—

"Sandeman is doing noble work at Quetta; he knows personally all the heads of the tribes and all the leading men, and has great influence over them. The people are rapidly settling down and learning respect for law and order. I believe the change between Quetta now and Quetta five years ago is greater than between the India of to-day and the India as I knew it before the Mutiny, and that is saying a great deal. For this we have mainly to thank Sandeman, whose personal influence in the country is something marvellous. Cultivation is rapidly extending on the Quetta plateau, and villages with refreshing foliage are springing up all round the cantonment. There is abundance of water, which the people utilize for irrigation.

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"If I might advise, I would say, give Sandeman larger administrative powers, say the powers of a Chief Commissioner. He is full of zeal and enthusiasm for his charge. . . . He is said to be 'irregular,' but the 'irregularities' are entirely due to zeal in the public service, and with extended powers both the opportunity and the temptation will disappear. I cannot speak too highly of the work he is doing. It is noble pioneer work, and I heartily wish him more power to his elbow within his own domain."

In his "Problems of the Greater Britain" (1890), SIR CHARLES DILKE gives an account of his visit to Balúchistán in 1888, and earnestly recommends that the control of the whole frontier should be placed in the hands of Sir Robert Sandeman, who would be "cheap at a peerage and the salary of a Governor of Madras or Bombay." He adds:—

"So complete is the belief in the India Military and Foreign departments, that the side which has the tribes with it in a frontier war will win, that it is difficult to explain how it is that the Khaibar system arrangements of Colonel Warburton has not been extended to the Afridis of the Bazár valley, and to the Kohat Pass, or the Sandeman system to the Waziris beyond the Gúmal."

THE HON. G. CURZON :—

"May 29, 1894.

"DEAR LADY SANDEMAN,

"I have very great pleasure in complying with your request, and setting down on paper a few of my recollections of your late gallant and distinguished husband. It was, as you may remember, in January, 1888, that I first made his acquaintance, when I stayed at your house at Quetta. At that time the Khojak tunnel had not begun to be pierced, though digging had commenced. Together we went out by train to the then terminus of the railway, and rode thence to Shela Bágh, the head-quarters of the workmen, crossing the pass and riding down to Chaman Fort the next morning.

"While in his company on this trip, and while your guest at Quetta, I enjoyed many prolonged conversations with him on the subject to which he had devoted his life, and in which I was already beginning to feel an interest that so far from dwindling since, has grown to be my most absorbing political pre-occupation. It was then that I first became acquainted with his policy, his methods of work, above all with his high-minded and resolute, but never intemperate patriotism.

"His policy he constantly described to me in letters as a 'peace and goodwill' policy; and certainly no words could better indicate the temper in which he fought, the aims which he set before himself, or the bloodless victories which he gained.

“Balúchistán and the frontier fringe as far as the Zhob valley and Gúmal Pass are a standing monument to his system. This consisted in reconciling conflicting local interests under the common ægis of Great Britain; in employing the tribes as custodians of the highways and guardians of the peace in their own districts; in paying them for what they did well (and conversely in fining them for transgression); in encouraging commerce and traffic by the lightening or abolition of tolls and the security of means of communication; in the protection, rather than diminution, of tribal and clan independence, subject only to the over-lordship of the British *rāj*; in a word, in a policy not of spasmodic and retributive interference, but of steady and unfaltering conciliation. If I may quote Virgil, *parcere subjectis pacisque imponere morem*, far more than *debellare superbos*, was his motto.

“Others will speak with much higher authority and wider knowledge than I can about his consolidation of the Balúch confederacy, from his first visit to the country in 1875, down to the hour of his death; to his popularity with the Khan, the sirdárs, and the local chieftains; and to his influence with his own subordinates and with the Indian Government. I feel myself that were it not for the powerful arguments that he addressed to the then Liberal Government, when Lord Hartington was at the India Office in 1880, it is very doubtful whether we should now be in Pishín.

“It was said of your husband that he sometimes acted upon the frontier in a spirit of somewhat greater independence of the central Government than a rigid officialism either encourages, or readily condones. For my part, though I have been an official and may possibly be so again, I do not set this down to his discredit; believing that a certain freedom of action is necessary

to men occupying the position that he filled, that a courageous, though never rash, assumption of responsibility is one of the marks of greatness, and that in his case independence was tempered by a loyalty to his superior officers and to the Government which was absolutely beyond suspicion. It is no good to have a 'Warden of the Marches' unless you give him a comparatively free hand.

"In the latter part of his life Sir Robert and I were jointly much interested in his scheme for pacifying and placing under British protection the south-west corner of Balúchistán, at that time in a state of perpetual anarchy and bloodshed, and in extending the pacific control of the suzerain power as far as the confines of Persian Seistán.

"During his last visit to England in 1891 he came and lunched with me, and we had a long talk over this project. He continued to write to me about it afterwards; and I cannot give a better illustration of his policy, as described by himself, or of his intense and patriotic convictions, than by sending you considerable extracts from the last two letters that I received from him. I am the more disposed to do so, because the policy which he therein so strenuously advocated, of the maintenance of a small British force in Panjgúr, and of British authority as far as the borders of Seistán, is one at which the Indian Government is supposed at intervals to have looked askance, but with which I am in the most ardent sympathy. The second of the two letters was written on the last and unfinished expedition in the course of which he died, and it only reached me a few days before I read in the papers the telegram of his untimely and pathetic decease.\*

"It will always be a pride to me to have known so fine

\* See ch xxiv.

a type of the British officer and the English gentleman ; above all, so rare and withal modest an example of what the frontier statesman should be, and of what a patriot may still perform for his country.

“ I am, dear Lady Sandeman,

“ Yours sincerely,

“ GEORGE N. CURZON.”

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

### SOME SPECIAL FEATURES OF SIR ROBERT SANDEMAN'S POLICY.

- (1) His work on the frontier viewed from a military standpoint (by Lieutenant-General E. F. Chapman, C.B.).—(2) His method of dealing with Frontier Tribes (by H. S. Barnes, Esq.).

I.—SIR ROBERT SANDEMAN'S WORK ON THE FRONTIER VIEWED FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT (by Lieutenant-General E. F. Chapman, R.A., C.B., Head of the Intelligence Department of the War Office):—

“It is impossible to estimate rightly the value of the work accomplished by Sir Robert Sandeman, without considering the effect it has had on the military policy, throughout the long line of our Indian frontier.

“He may be taken as a typical figure, in the working out of the remarkable change which has been brought about; the central one, I may say, in an important group of men, who have laboured to this end.

“He realized that the great number of independent tribes might be converted into peaceable tillers of the soil, and that the great herds of camels, which they possessed, might be utilized as transport, in peace time, and be available in war for an army, in trans-Indus operations—that, in fact, they might be carried with us, in any military movement we might be called upon to make, in consequence of the advance of Russia.

“Nomad races for the most part, wandering to secure

the winter and summer grazing for their flocks and herds, the law of the strongest had at all times given the right to choose their encampments. By systematic and continued effort, in the interests of peace, by unceasing endeavour to settle their disputes, in small as in great matters, Sir Robert Sandeman led the chiefs of this heterogeneous mixture of tribes, to recognize that they had one head, and gradually to believe in the stability of British rule, knowing that, in every case, right would be done, however summarily the award was meted out.

"The boundary which the Amír of Afghanistan has accepted, as the dividing line between our territory and his, at the present moment, is the best proof of what Sir Robert Sandeman has accomplished. But how has this been brought about? By personal relations with the chiefs of all the tribes, now included within our frontier, by familiar and particular dealings with heads of families, and individuals of every race, throughout the territory extending from Gwádar, on the Persian Gulf, to Koh Malik Siah immediately west of the Halmand river, along its southern bank, across the desert of Reghistán, till the Pathán country is reached, and Achakzais are merged with Kákars, and Kákars with Ghilzais.

"Déra Gházi Khan and Jacobábád were our outposts in old days, and, though the war with Afghanistan has been mainly instrumental in the advance of our border line, the ruler of the Frontier Province, who held it throughout the war, developed it at its conclusion, and laid down the plan of its growth, must surely be remembered, in recording the success which has attended the completion of the proposals he made, for the progress of the territory over which he ruled.

"In 1889, when it was a question whether, or not, we should extend our influence over the Zhob valley, Sir

Robert Sandeman was at Loralai with some 500 men, Brahúis, Balúchis, and Marrís, waiting for a telegram from the Viceroy, authorizing his taking a step in advance. He kept them together on the pretence of a *durbár*, and suddenly, as soon as permission was received, he advanced into the Zhob valley, and entered on a peaceful occupation. As soon as the Kákar Patháns of Zhob recognized by whom he was supported, they accepted his ultimatum, and a large tract of territory was acquired, without moving a soldier. This instance is given, and many others, of a like nature, might be quoted, to prove the steadiness of purpose, and the consistent character of plan, by which he employed one tribe, or section of a tribe, to overcome the hostility of another, using the troops always, as a support, in his enterprises to enforce submission, and by rapidly seizing points of territory behind the tribes, he at once dominated them, and they acknowledged a master. It required the genius of a ruler, who could understand the instruments with which he was dealing, and who knew the temper of the men he had to work upon, to accomplish such considerable measures, with comparatively small means.

“Balúchistán may now be regarded as an entirely new province, under British rule, extending from the sea-coast, on the Persian Gulf, to Domándi on the Gúmal river; its conquest has been, for the most part, a peaceable one, a railway has been pushed forward, through it, towards Kandahár, but since first Sir Robert Sandeman accepted the responsibility of controlling it with the small military force which holds this outpost of the Empire, it has steadily progressed, by measures which I should call political, rather than military; its revenue has been sufficient and has justified its development. It stands now, as a bastion in our frontier system, from which we may advance at pleasure



on Kandahár or Ghazni. It does not threaten these important towns, but, possessing good communications, what was formerly an inaccessible country may now be easily traversed by troops, and until we suffer a reverse, the tribes, throughout this portion of our frontier, will surely welcome our advance, for every forward movement has meant, hitherto, the inflow of money to them, has been to their material advantage and growth in civilization; they are 'for us,' and not 'against' us, and this is the meaning of the work that has been accomplished by such men as Sir Robert Sandeman.

"In the settlement of a district, after a period of disturbance caused by war, the methods employed are always far reaching, either involving the State in costly outlay, or, if they have been well thought out, leading to the introduction of a useful economy in all things.

"Sir Robert Sandeman, as the head of a great province, the wants of which were always growing, endeavoured to make his civil administration rest on what he managed to acquire of State Revenue. He worked the country of Balúchistán in the interest of the people; at the same time, recognizing that he possessed the great highway of trade between India and Afghanistán, he endeavoured to create facilities for traders, and to cultivate relations with Kandahár. If one looks back to the fourteen years, which have passed since the termination of the war, one sees that, spite of the craze of 1885, when the strategic railway was pushed on to Chaman, Sir Robert Sandeman was determined, if possible, to make the Agency, over which he presided, pay its way.

"His instincts were always those of a soldier, rather than a civilian; his methods were of the 'rough and ready' order, and, as such, commended themselves to the people, who were not yet prepared for a full draught of civilization,

but they were inspired by thoughts that looked forward to the great results, that are in a fair way of being achieved.

"By consolidating Makrán and Khárán on the south and west of Khelát, and organizing a peaceful possession of all this country to the flank of Karáchi, he made the advanced position we have taken up in Pishín doubly secure, intending always to secure a second port on the Persian Gulf at Gwádar or Chabar Bay, where the produce from Balúchistán might be shipped.

"Others may have pressed forward measures which, like the great strategic railway, revolutionized his province, but seeing the advantage such a main line of communication afforded, and the strength for war thus attained, he fully assisted in its completion, and welcomed all comers who were bent on exploiting the country; he interested himself keenly in the attempt to make the discoveries of coal and petroleum of value, he readily turned his attention to road making, and the development of a proper water supply for Quetta. He entered into the idea of fortifications to cover the position at the head of the railway.

"He was willing to help any man whose object was to improve our position in Balúchistán, but through all the schemes and projects the last fourteen years have given rise to, his chief thought was the good of the people, of the countries he administered, and his name will long live amongst the tribes as a household word, a terror to the evil doer, but, to the loyal, the embodiment of right and justice, calling always for affectionate devotion."

II.—SIR ROBERT SANDEMAN'S METHOD OF DEALING WITH FRONTIER TRIBES (by H. S. Barnes, Esq., late Revenue Commissioner of Balúchistán):—

"The method adopted by Sir Robert Sandeman is generally known as the system of tribal service.

"There is still much controversy as to the merits of this policy, and by many, who do not understand it, it is stigmatized as blackmail. It has also been said that it can only succeed with the less fanatical Balúch tribes among whom the clannish spirit is strong, and who usually acknowledge and respect the authority of their tribal chiefs.

"The latter objection has been very effectually silenced by the success of Sir Robert's arrangements with the Wazírís and Sheránís, two Patán tribes who have for forty years successfully resisted all attempts from Punjab to open the passes through their hills. And judging from his success directly he took the matter in hand, it is not too much to assert that if Sandeman in earlier days had been Deputy Commissioner of Déra Ismáel Khan instead of Déra Gházi, and had been equally well supported by his Government, we should have seen the Gúmal Pass opened a dozen years ago.

"As regards the first objection, it may be explained that of recent years the policy on the Punjab border (a policy known locally by the name of the '*Close border*' system) is to discourage all attempts on the part of our officers to cross the border or to make friends with the tribes, who are regarded as dangerous enemies and as foreigners, to be kept strictly to their own limits. Outrages are prevented, as they used to be in old days on the Marrí and Búgti border, by the watchfulness of our military and militia frontier posts. When outrages do occur the tribe is fined, that is to say, it is told it is fined, though there are rarely any means of realizing the fine imposed; and when fines accumulate to an unbearable extent, the tribe is punished by a blockade, or a military expedition, only to offend again when the effect of the punishment has worn off.

"Now, if a payment is made to a tribe solely to induce

them to be of good behaviour, and outrages are punished by merely deducting the fine from this payment, that is a system of blackmail pure and simple. But this system is removed as far as possible from the methods on which Sir Robert Sandeman worked.

"It was one of Sir Robert's favourite sayings that you cannot tame a Patán or Balúch tribe by '*sor*,' that is to say, merely by coercion and threats, backed up though they may be by the spasmodic force of repeated military expeditions. In the slang of the day, you may 'hammer' them as often as you please, but though you may cow them for a time, the men to whom a blood feud is a cherished hereditary possession will be even with you when an opportunity occurs. See, for example, what occurred on the Miranzai border in 1891. Our troops were withdrawn without any arrangement being made with the tribes, and before a month had elapsed the Orakzais had taken their revenge, and a second expedition was inevitable—a double trouble and a double cost.

"Sir Robert Sandeman, therefore, in the first place, encouraged his officers by every means in their power to make friends with and secure the confidence of the neighbouring tribes, just as he made friends years ago with the Marri chiefs when he was Deputy Commissioner of Dera Gházi Khan. In the second place, he never assumed as a matter of course that an offending tribe was solely the sinner, and never sinned against, and he always made known his readiness to settle by tribal *jirgas* any grievances they had against those whom they had attacked. Thirdly, he was always ready to offer the headmen allowances to maintain a certain number of armed horsemen and footmen, by whose means he expected them for the future to keep order in their tribe.

"When outrages occurred he never docked the tribal

allowances. To do so would obviously be to punish the very men who were engaged in doing us service. But the lever of the allowances was used to compel the headmen to produce the actual offenders, who were then tried by their own people in tribal jirga, and punishment was awarded in accordance with tribal custom. If a jirga imposed a fine, and recommended for special reasons that it should be cut from the tribal pay, then only were the tribal allowances touched, but usually fines were paid up at once in cash or kind.

"It needs very little consideration to see the difference between this system and one of mere blackmail. Sir Robert's methods were based upon two assumptions.

"The first was, that in every Patán or Balúch tribe, however democratic, there do exist headmen of more or less influence and a system of tribal authority, which, if effectually supported, can compel obedience. In a Balúch tribe this authority is easily recognized, and is usually centred in one man. Among the Patáns the authority is more subdivided and less powerful. Owing to the democratic feeling of the race, it is often the case that the headmen, if unsupported, cannot enforce authority over the more unruly spirits, and, in order to preserve what influence they possess, are compelled to follow in the path where the unruly spirits lead. But the balance of power is turned directly the headmen are given the means to entertain armed servants of their own, and when supported by suitable allowances and the prestige of connection with our power, they both can and do exert themselves successfully to keep their tribes in order.

"The second assumption is, that it is absurd to expect any man, least of all a wild frontier tribesman, to do work for us without being paid for it. This assumption seems scarcely to need support by argument, but nevertheless it

has been attacked. It is all very well to say, as has been said, that the British Government *does* expect frontier tribesmen to behave themselves without any '*quid pro quo*.' They ought to do so possibly, but to *expect* them to do so, with the many opportunities for loot close at hand and their impregnable Hills to take to when pursued, is as reasonable a position as that of the '*Rusticus expectans dum defluat amnis*.' Sir Robert Sandeman was no such rustic, and his native Scotch shrewdness easily taught him that if we are to expect a frontier tribesman to exert himself on our behalf, we must make it worth his while to do so.

"Such then briefly is Sir Robert Sandeman's simple system, and its soundness and truth have been established to demonstration over and over again. His policy is still scarcely believed in on the Punjab frontier, but there are signs in the recent service granted to the Black Mountain tribes that the value of his methods are once again beginning to be recognized. We say '*once again*,' because it is only fair to Sir Robert's memory to state that he never claimed to have invented the tribal service system. He always declared that in the matter of policy he alone was the true descendant of Edwardes and Nicholson, and Major James, the Commissioner of Pesháwur, under whom he first learnt his work as a frontier officer. His principles were once, he used to say, the principles of the Punjab Government, and the 'Close Border' system is a modern growth, the offspring of the exaggerated notions and the irresolute counsels, which must inevitably accompany too much centralization, and the administration of frontier affairs from a distance by men with no practical knowledge of the border."

## CHAPTER XXIX.

## CHARACTER SKETCH.

Secret of Sir Robert Sandeman's success—No self-seeker—A staunch friend and determined foe, but open-minded—Masterful, but knew when to stop—No one better served—His checriness and accessibility—Instinctive insight into native character—No favourites—Scrupulous in payment for supplies on march—Fondness for investigation *in situ*—Sympathy with humanity—quotations from letters—Shrewdness and caution, and resources for effecting amicable adjustments—Instances given—Dexterity in tribal management—High aims and motives—The Sandemanian system of frontier administration—Criticisms of his policy—Accused of organizing blackmail—His defence—Regarded as dangerous—Had ideas in advance of his time—Said to be one-sided—No favourite with officials—But his defects were as nothing to his merits—Domestic life and habits—Hospitality and generosity—Studies and favourite books—Religious views—Friends—Amusement—India and on leave—His portrait—Farewell.

SOME of the more prominent features of Sir Robert's character—his unflinching courage, moral as well as physical, his indomitable energy and tenacity of purpose—are sufficiently apparent from the record of his life; and the impressions recorded, in the preceding chapters, by the distinguished men who have from time to time visited Balúchistán or the Punjab frontier and seen the work which he accomplished, do much towards the completion of the picture. But a somewhat closer survey of his character—from within as well as from without—and a glance at his domestic life and surroundings are necessary

before we can fully realize his personality, and understand the rare power he possessed of conciliating and controlling the wild races with whom he had to deal.

What then was the secret of his success?

One cause of his success—in addition, of course, to the great qualities already mentioned—was, doubtless, the unbounded faith which he inspired among the Balúches in his reliability and honesty of purpose. He was no self-seeker, and they knew it. These characteristics are not, indeed, peculiar to Sir Robert Sandeman; they are fortunately common in the services in India. But they deserve prominent notice as among the chief elements of his success.

Another was the fact that he was a staunch friend, in deed as well as word. The *tumandár* (chief) who helped him, the subordinate, English or Indian, who did his duty heartily, felt that his services would never be forgotten; in the case of natives, official or non-official, titles, decorations, *jágirs*, and grants of revenue-free land, rewarded those who had served him faithfully; all felt that their interests were safe in Sir Robert's hands, and that, if in difficulties, they had a powerful defender, who was prepared to take an infinity of trouble to save them from injustice. The following instance is given by Mr. Ivie Hamilton: \*—

"An uncovenanted officer who had done good service wished to remain in Balúchistán. Sir Robert had started home on leave, and at Bombay, just before embarking, received a telegram that the officer had been transferred to a neighbouring province. He proceeded to Calcutta by the first train, obtained an interview with the Viceroy, and had the order cancelled. It may well be doubted whether any other man, on the point of starting home

\* *Calcutta Review*, April, 1893.



after a long exile, would have given up a part of his hard-earned leave and gone to the personal expense of a journey of nearly 3000 miles from Bombay to Calcutta and back, merely for the sake of benefiting a subordinate."

*Per contra*, the oppressor of the poor, the faithless or corrupt official, had in Sir Robert Sandeman a determined foe ; and the chief who intrigued against him, the subordinate not earnest in his work, the dubious "friend" and the suspected self-seeker, had, to say the least, an unpleasant time. In these matters his diagnosis of mankind, especially the Asiatic, was generally accurate ; and he had the courage of his opinion. At the same time—says Mr. H. S. Barnes, for years Sir Robert's chief assistant—"no one was more ready to listen to explanation, or to reconsider his conclusions, where good reason for doing so was shown."

Again, no one was more anxious than Sir Robert to hear all sides ; in fact, he delighted in discussing questions of policy with his officers, and always encouraged them to come to him and state their views, and he would always listen patiently to what they had to say. But when all parties had been heard and a policy decided upon, he brooked no opposition. In the Parliament of Balúchistán "obstruction," under a Sandemanian *régime*, would have had short shrift. But masterfulness was always tempered with sound judgment. He knew precisely when and where to stop.

And the practical result was this, that no man was better served by his subordinates, European or native, or by the troops placed under his orders, or by the tribal chiefs with whom he was brought in contact, than Sir Robert Sandeman.

Another point in his favour, which may appear

unimportant, but had no small share in the result, was his cheery and genial temperament—a great attraction for the Asiatic generally, and especially for the wild spirits of the western border. “His conversation,” says Sir R. Temple, “was bright, suggestive, and refreshing—a better travelling companion I never met!” Again, “On Sandeman devolved the care and responsibility of guarding our party. . . . Nothing could exceed the alacrity, the promptitude, the watchfulness with which he discharged this duty—together with that self-possessed and cheery manner which exercised a good moral effect on every one. . . . None could discover from his aspect, conversation, and bearing that he had anxiety in his thoughts.” This underlying cheeriness of disposition is well illustrated in the letter from which we have taken a motto for the title-page. That letter was written on return from a particularly toilsome journey, at a time when he was suffering constant discomfort from a crushed knee, while he was grievously disappointed and wounded at the rebuffs he had received at head-quarters. But the letter reveals no trace of sourness or the “blues.” “I have had,” he says, “a hard life, but a happy one, in the feeling that I have helped men to lead a quiet and peaceful life in this glorious world of ours.”

In his intercourse with native friends Sir Robert was, indeed, a model of accessibility and almost impervious to boredom. He would spend hours in small talk with his chiefs, and his native secretary tells us that even when busily engaged with office-work he was always ready to have a *sirdár* or two at his side, with whom he could exchange observations during intervals of business. “To one who has witnessed the reserve often existing between politicals and rajahs in other parts of India, it was a

wholesome spectacle," says Mr. Hamilton, "to watch the chiefs, say at such a gathering as Sibi fair, come up to 'Senaman Sahib' and accost him with a friendly slap on the back and a hearty shake of the hand, preliminary to a conversation as if they were boon companions."

As for his subordinates, "No officer," says Mr. Barnes, "lived on terms of more cordial fellowship with those who served under him. His house was open to them at all hours, and all his assistants felt confident, when in difficulties, of an immediate and patient hearing from Sir Robert, and of shrewd and kindly advice and encouragement in his work."

But though genial and courteous, he never forgot his position, and no one dared to presume upon his condescension. He had a rapid insight into native character, and instinctively gave every man his due, and kept every man in his proper place. On one point he was scrupulously particular, namely, in invariably showing the nominal ruler of Khelât, in spite of his provoking waywardness, the respect and honour due to his position, and insisting upon others doing the same.

Another feature in his character deserving special mention is the fact that, though he had many friends, he had no "favourites," in the Oriental sense, and was absolutely inaccessible to backdoor influence. Under the Sandemanian régime, the secret informer (the curse of Asiatic governments, and not unknown elsewhere) had a poor time, and the defamer who whispered slander in Sir Robert's ear soon found that he had to justify his statements in public *durbâr*. None feared that his reputation would be clandestinely undermined. All good men worked heartily for the great chief who did everything above-board.

Another cause of popularity among the inhabitants

of countries traversed by him—a cause appreciable by all acquainted with camp life in India—was his scrupulous care in seeing that supplies on the march were adequately paid for. His advent to a district was thus regarded as an unmixed blessing, and not, as too often happens, as something akin to a descent of locusts.

Another, was his predilection for investigation *in situ*. He would ride for miles and undergo the greatest personal inconvenience even in unimportant cases, for the advantage of “seeing with his own eyes.” And his promptness and rapidity of action in such cases were extraordinary. And the result was that he acquired a reputation, not only for thoroughness, but for “ubiquity,” which had a powerful influence over wrong-doers. “There was no use in fighting *Senaman Sahib*,” was a common saying, “as he knew everything and turned up everywhere.”

For illustration of his promptness of action generally and readiness for emergencies we may refer to the Zhob valley expedition of 1889. The orders for the advance into Zhob were received on November 13. On the 19th the expedition, consisting of a British force and a large tribal following, was under way.

“I remember,” says General Chapman, “being in the Bolán Pass with Sir R. Sandeman, Lord Roberts, and Sir Alfred Lyall in rather ticklish times. The latter received a telegram which necessitated an immediate return to Kandahár. But Sandeman was ready. Horses and camels were produced and an escort forthcoming in a marvellously short space of time, and Sir Alfred got to Kandahár in good time for the business in hand.”

“Sandeman,” says Sir Donald Stewart, “was always ready to help, and rarely said anything was impossible, and when he said a thing could be done it always was done.”

Again, to give a more domestic illustration, which has

the advantage of reflecting credit upon more than one person,—Sandeman was pressing the Government of India to grant funds for working certain mineral oil sources discovered at Kattan, near Sibi. The engineers had reported unfavourably of the project, urging, *inter alia*, that the approach of the oil source from the nearest railway station was impracticable for carts. Sir Robert immediately despatched his dogcart and horses by train to the station in question (about 100 miles from Quetta), and proceeded thither himself, accompanied by Lady Sandeman, whom he then and there *drove* to the oil source—a distance of twenty-eight miles. He at once telegraphed the fact to the Government of India and thus saved his project from rejection. The money was found, and a good deal of oil secured and usefully employed as fuel on the railway.

But perhaps the most potent cause of his influence over others was his intensely affectionate and sensitive disposition; a disposition which developed in later years into a manly and generous sympathy with his fellow-creatures in general, and Balúches in particular. “To be successful on this frontier,” he says in his letter of April 19, 1891, “a man has to deal with the hearts and minds of the people, and not only with their fears.” And his generous sympathies were by no means confined to the Balúch. Like Gordon, he was particularly fond of children, and when on leave would stand for a quarter of an hour at a time watching a small boy playing at marbles with as keen an interest in the game as the lad himself; he was a devoted friend of the British soldier, and after a few months’ residence at a small port in Ireland he became the idol of the fishermen. Latterly, his “humanity” became more marked and almost amounted to a religion.

Thus, in 1889, when in England on short leave in consequence of a severe accident, and contemplating the possibility of retirement, he thus writes to Lady Sandeman:—

“We must try always to do as much good to as many as we can. We must not confine our minds to home affections. We can love our own with all our heart, and yet do good, so far as we can, to all.”

Again:—

“I feel deeply for your sorrow” [Lady Sandeman had just lost her father], “but though the world will never be the same to you again, I hope to see you live in it with the hope of life beyond the grave; and the heart of man cannot conceive the bliss that he is heir to if he loves God and keeps his commandments, which Christ sums up in the injunction of ‘peace and good-will to all men.’”

Again, in a letter from Simla, dated April 8, 1891, he writes:—

“Last evening ——— said to me, ‘I believe they are all coming round to your views on frontier matters,’ or words to that effect. I am very glad—for, after all, what are my views! Those simply which every Christian man or woman ought to feel towards their less fortunate neighbours.”

To all these qualities Sir Robert Sandeman added great natural shrewdness, remarkable caution, and an intuitive perception of the equity of a case from an Oriental as well as from an English point of view, which enabled him to suggest solutions acceptable to both sides. He thus came to be regarded, to quote the language of an English traveller in Balúchistán, “as the best friend of both chiefs and people, and as justice incarnate.”\*

Sandeman’s resources for effecting amicable adjustments were, indeed, endless. We have seen how, in early days, he settled a long-standing blood-feud between two Balúch tribes by arranging for an intermarriage—here is

\* Sir Charles Dilke—“Problems of Greater Britain.”

another instance. Complaints were made to him by British officers of the insolent bearing of one of the chiefs in charge of the Bolán Pass. He sent for the chief, but instead of censuring or punishing the delinquent, made him his equerry, and in six months' time turned him out a model of courtesy! Again, the inhabitants of a village on the border of British Balúchistán complained that their water-supply had been wrongfully cut off by villagers living outside our boundary. Sir Robert Sandeman, being satisfied of the truth of the complaint, made a sudden raid upon the offending village and carried off the headmen. They were treated, as prisoners of war, with every kindness compatible with safe custody, but were made to march with his camp for some ten days to Quetta. At Quetta they were shown all that was to be seen, and then presented to Sir Robert in *durbár*. He received them very kindly, "chaffed them" about their recent conduct, then loaded them with presents, and sent them on their way rejoicing, with a *verbum sap* never again to cut off water from a British village—and they never did.

Then his dexterity in playing one tribe against another, so as to excite emulation, without making any one tribe paramount, was marvellous, with the result that all the tribes—Marrís, Rúgtis, Khetráns, Kákars, Achakzais—forgot their quarrels, and joined heartily in the great work of maintaining peace.

Lastly, so far as can be judged from letters and the testimony of intimate friends, his conduct, whether in public or private life, was dictated by the highest motives, and a deep religious conception of duty to God and man.

Honours and decorations were by no means despised by him, and he was the last person in the world to allow himself to be ignored. But all this was deemed secondary

to the great work he had in hand and the mission he believed to be entrusted to him. "Nothing," he says in his last letter from Simla to Lady Sandeman, "nothing but the strongest sense of duty would have induced me to come here to fight the battle of our future frontier policy. But there is no use in putting one's hand to the plough and then turning back."

And, in answer to the question with which we started, we shall be probably not far wrong if we assert that it is to the qualities which have been described above—courage, energy, perseverance, unselfishness, sympathy, justice, and good sense, dominated by religious feeling and a strong sense of duty, and blended together in a constitution of unusual vigour—that the success achieved by him as pioneer, pacificator, and ruler, is mainly to be attributed.

The so-called "Sandemanian" system of frontier administration, which has been fully dealt with by Mr. Barnes in the preceding chapter, is, indeed, little else than the ordinary principles of justice and common sense sympathetically applied. His canons of tribal management are very simple. "Never," he says, "assume misbehaving tribes to be in the wrong, until you have made careful inquiry, and the result of such inquiry will generally show that there is a good deal to be said from their point of view. And when inquiry is instituted, every allowance should be made for excited feeling on their part or on the part of individual members." Again, "Do as you would be done by is as good a rule of conduct in dealing with frontier tribes as with Christians." Again, "It is unfair to expect tribes or tribal chiefs to do your work and carry out your policy unless you make it worth their



while ; but when you have made it worth their while—when you have given them the *quid*, be careful to exact the *quo*. Let there be liberal payment for service rendered, but no blackmail." Again, "Work, as far as possible, through existing institutions and in conformity with existing usage." "Accord the local chiefs respect and honour, and let tribal disputes and complaints be settled as far as possible by the *jirgahs*, or committees of leading men. This is a vital point in tribal management." "Be as ubiquitous as you can, and influence as much as you can, but interfere in details as little as possible." These were the principles he not only unceasingly advocated, but consistently carried out, and the result has been shown in the preceding chapters.

It could hardly be expected that one who trod severely upon vested interests and had ideas beyond his time should escape obloquy and criticism, and Sir Robert escaped neither. We care not to deal with personal attacks upon him, but it may be well to consider some of the criticisms which have been passed upon his policy.

Early in his career he was denounced as the author of "a gigantic system of disguised blackmail." We have shown the accusation to be groundless ; it was exploded, indeed, at the Mittankot Conference, when his system of tribal service—the development of a system already in force in the Punjab—was unanimously approved and its extension recommended, and it has been further discussed by Mr. Barnes. But as the accusation has from time to time been made and will probably be repeated, it may be well to give the following extract from a letter to his father, dated from Dera Gházi Khan, August 5, 1875, where he deals with the question :—

"I am very glad indeed to get George Turnbull's views about

the blackmail question. I was anxious to see if an outsider would be misled by ——'s writings. As you say, blackmail is a payment enforced by a powerful neighbour on a weak one. I subsidize the weak neighbour and use his services for the good of all concerned. For instance, I have 57 Marri horsemen, two-thirds of them live in the hills and one-third in our territory. I pay them Rs.14,000 yearly, in which sum is included the pay of a man at head-quarters to write accounts, and one at the tribal head-quarters to write news, etc. This year I fined the Marri Chief Rs.4000 for value of property plundered in the Bolán Pass by his followers. I also, by using the horsemen, some of whom are stationed in our territory, recovered this year 97 % of plunder carried off by hill robbers from British subjects into the hills beyond our border. I have a border extending 225 miles, and political jurisdiction to the head of the Bolán Pass. By my arrangements I have for the last six years prevented bloodshed within our border entirely. The lives on this frontier lost formerly from causes beyond our control averaged thirty-three yearly. No British subject has been killed for years by hill-men. Yes, I get a full *quid pro quo* for my money.'

And seldom has better value been received for outlay than that received from the tribal levies of Balúchistán. They guard roads, lines of communication and traffic, protect posts, trace, discover and surrender criminals, recover stolen property, bring in witnesses and accused persons, carry out *jirgah* decrees, bring information, make independent inquiries, carry letters all over the country in places where there is no imperial post, produce fodder, grain, and commissariat supplies, escort prisoners, protect survey parties, and assist in the collection of revenue, without difficulty or friction, and all this at the mere fraction of the cost of regular establishments. The system has been extended, with variations of detail, to the districts of the Deraját, Kohát, Pesháwar, and the Khaibar Pass, and everywhere with great success.

By others Sir Robert was regarded as a *dangerous* man. Yes, he was "dangerous"—in the sense of having ideas a good deal in advance of his time, ideas which he

persistently pressed upon his superiors, and sometimes carried into effect on his own responsibility in anticipation of approval. Nevertheless, judging by results, it may be asserted, with some confidence, that the British Government never had a *less* dangerous political adviser than Sir Robert Sandeman; for, during a service of nearly thirty years upon the frontier in responsible posts, he never, so far as we are aware, committed a single serious mistake, or brought the Government into difficulty. The fact is, that though his policy and proceedings were bold and vigorous, and even startling, they were the result of careful forethought and consideration.

For instance—he believed in and predicted the occupation of Quetta when the idea was considered outside the range of practical politics. Quetta has been occupied with the best results.

He believed he could terminate the civil war between the Khan of Khelát and his sirdárs by friendly intervention; and his belief, at first, was laughed to scorn. But he was right.

He believed in the annexation of the Assigned Districts when many men of "light and leading" were opposed to it; and after years of persistent effort succeeded in inducing the Government to sanction, first their temporary retention, and ultimately their incorporation with British territory.

He believed that, if allowed a free hand, he could bring under his control and influence, without expeditions or blockades, the independent tribes upon the Punjab frontier. After years of opposition, he was allowed his chance, with the result that the Marrís and the Búgtis, the Khetráns, the Sheránis, the Patáns of the Zhob valley, the Wazírís of the Gúmal Pass, once our unfriendly neighbours and inaccessible to European influence, are now

our friends, and their hills, with few exceptions, almost as safe as the safest parts of British India.\*

He believed in and strongly urged the fixation and demarcation of the Afghán boundary, and his views are being carried out.

He believed in other things which have not yet come to pass. He believed, for instance, that all the tribes between British territory and the Afghán border might be dealt with as successfully as the Patáns of Zhob, and the Wazírís of the Gúmal Pass; and who can say that he was wrong? He believed in the future of a railway from Karáchi, connecting Lus Beyla and Panjgúr and Quetta with Seistán, the granary of Persia—and he may be right.

Again, it is urged that he was one-sided. Yes, it is true that, like most enthusiasts, he was apt to see only one side of the shield; and, in his case, the shield was Balúchistán. He believed in Balúchistán and its people, as Colonel Tod, of old, believed in his Rájputs, as Henry Ramsay believed in his Kumaonis, or, to come a little nearer home, and compare great things with small, as Canon Barnett believes in the East End. But as Governor-General's Agent for Balúchistán, he was none the worse for that. And, though an enthusiast, he was, as we have seen, no rash adventurer.

With the average head-quarters' official, indeed, 'Sir Robert Sandeman was no favourite. However patriotic his aims, his procedure was not always in accordance with red tape; he was apt to place a broad interpretation upon

\* This was written before the recent occurrences at Wáno. But these occurrences in no way discredit Sir Robert's policy, though they make us more and more regret his loss.

instructions, and was suspected on more than one occasion of turning a blind eye to signals of recall.\* In important matters, he rarely accepted an official negative as final; the official refusal was replied to by an unofficial protest, or a request for the favour of a personal interview with His Excellency the Viceroy; and the result was not unfrequently a withdrawal or modification of the obnoxious order.

Then he was no trained writer of despatches, and his semi-official communications were not always models of compression or lucidity. Thus, in his correspondence, there is a letter from the Foreign Office complaining that, in replying to a simple question, he had sent "a telegram of five sheets containing matter more or less irrelevant."

Again, he was impatient of intermediaries, and was fond of circumventing opposition by direct communications with the higher powers, thereby sometimes securing his immediate object, but incurring the wrath of the circumvented.

The ways of Sir Robert Sandeman in these matters are not to be unreservedly commended, or held up for imitation—indeed if generally adopted they would make government impossible. But Sir Robert Sandeman had an exceptional position, and required and received (but not so fully as he deserved) exceptional consideration. Subordinate officials shook their heads, and not without some reason, but statesmen weighed his defects against his sterling merits, and found the former to be as dust in the balance. The very fact that, in spite of irregularities of procedure, which would have wrecked the career of

\* *Per contra*, Sir G. White, in his narrative of the 4th Zhob Valley Expedition, dwells particularly on the "scrupulous delicacy with which Sir Robert carried out the spirit of his instructions"

many a smaller man, he was retained in office ; and that, in spite of somewhat involved sentences and an illegible handwriting, he was the valued correspondent of five Viceroy's and a Prime Minister, are significant proofs of the value of his services.

A few words regarding Sir Robert's domestic life. His personal tastes were of the simplest and most inexpensive character, but he was the last to neglect the social duties of his office. As a host, he was geniality itself, and his hospitality was unbounded. But though generous almost to a fault, he never lived beyond his means. It was his boast that since the date of his first arrival in India he never cost his father sixpence, and that he never was in debt ; but owing to his liberality in entertaining, to his open-handed contributions to various charities and many unknown acts of generosity, the fortune he left is inconsiderable. "The greatest pleasure he had," says Lady Sandeman, "was in spending the money which he had earned for the good or pleasure of others ; to give was to him a delight." And this delight is touchingly expressed in the following letter to his father :—

"Déra Gházi Khan.

"April 6, 1875.

"MY VERY DEAR FATHER,

"I write a line to send you the enclosed. . . . Dear good old man to write and tell me when you are a little hard up ! I call that behaving like a true parent, for it is a great pleasure to be able to send you anything you require. . . . The enclosed is a gift from 'young Bob' to 'old Bob,' to enable the latter to spend a little more time this year than he did last at the sea-side."

The following personal details have also been furnished by Lady Sandeman :—

"Sir Robert had a great love of nature and of everything beautiful ; this love of beauty was shown even in

small things, and he had a great love of cleanliness and order. No one could support hardship and roughness better than he did when necessary, but his nature and tastes were essentially refined. By far the greater part of his life was spent in tents and travelling about, but he liked to have things as nice as was possible, and he thoroughly appreciated the comforts and beauty of a home. This love of beauty was shown even in his last illness, for one of the last things he noticed was a pretty rug which I had pinned to the wall of his tent to keep off the draught.

“His favourite books were chiefly those relating to subjects of the day—politics, travels and biographies—though he enjoyed, too, a good novel, and read the papers most carefully. He was fond of Scott’s novels and poems, also Burns’ poems, out of which he constantly quoted, his favourite quotation being :—

“‘Wad some power the giftee gie us,  
To see oursels as ithers see us,  
It would frae monie an error free us  
And foolish notion.’

Dean Ramsay’s stories too were household words with him, and he thoroughly enjoyed laughing over them.”

And here we may add a few words regarding Sir Robert’s writings. As before observed, he made no pretence to be a master of style, but his official writings and memoranda, as might be supposed, are extensive and important. A collection of his despatches, however, would be far beyond the scope of the present work ; but many of them will be found in the Parliamentary Blue Books on Balúchistán ; and a selection from some of the memoranda recorded by him is given in the Appendix to this Memoir.

Unfortunately, some of the most important of his official writings are buried in the secret department of the Calcutta Foreign Office or the India Office in London.

Sir Robert's religious views have already been referred to; latterly they were deep and earnest and ever-present, but never paraded, and were without a trace of bigotry. His position prevented his taking an active part in missionary enterprise in India, but he sympathized with missionary effort, attended missionary gatherings in London, and it was through his influence that an excellent site was provided at Quetta for the premises of the Medical Mission. But this did not prevent his being on the most friendly terms with the R. C. Chaplain at Quetta, as will be seen from the following letter to Lady Sandeman:—

“ Quetta,

“ January 11, 1886.

“ Mr. Hillenkamp, our old friend the R. C. priest, came to see me and gave me a most warm welcome back. He said that my return brought to him the feeling of a father having returned to his family! I do think he was glad to see me. I have been seeing, too, to the comfort of some of the engine-drivers in the pass, and this has pleased him greatly.”

As for his friends—Sir Robert's greatest friend in India was one who will long be remembered in the Punjab; a man who combined great powers of writing and administration with a rare acquaintance with native character and customs, the most unselfish devotion to duty, and religious convictions similar to those of Robert Sandeman; we refer to the late lamented Colonel Wace, an able servant of the Government and devoted friend of the people, who, after years spent under canvas in securing the rights and adjusting the liabilities of the peasantry, died prematurely, as Financial Commissioner of the Punjab, in 1888. Though



in no way related, the two were on terms of the closest intimacy and regularly corresponded. And in many administrative matters Sir Robert owed much to his friend's advice. It is matter for regret that little or none of their correspondence appears to be forthcoming.

With regard to amusements, Sir Robert, during his later years in India, had little time for them. By nature, indeed, he was a keen sportsman, as well as a keen soldier; he soon found, however, that devotion to sport was incompatible with the engrossing work of his life, and latterly indulged little in either shooting or hunting, but he would spend hours in the saddle with his chiefs upon the march, or in making explorations of new routes. For the same reason he was not an adept at whist, or billiards, or racquets, or tennis, though he was ready to join in all these games upon occasion, and when he played he did so *con amore*.

When on leave, his chief amusement, says Lady Sandeman, was fishing, "which was a sport he loved, not only for its own sake, but for the feeling of rest to the mind which he always had when out in a boat with the water around him and the sky above." Chiefly for the pursuit of his favourite sport, he, about eight years before his death, took a little house on the Waterford coast in Ireland, and there used to spend the greater part of his leave when at home. According to his wont, he soon took a keen interest in the welfare of the fishermen round his home, and did all he could to help them. Finding it impossible for them to keep large enough boats for deep-sea fishing, owing to the rocky shore, and the absence of a pier or shelter of any kind, he helped them to send a petition to the Irish Government, and wrote an able paper on the Irish Fisheries, and in 1887 gave evidence before

a Royal Commission on the subject. Mainly at his instance, the place was officially inspected by the Irish Fisheries Commission; and, though the pier was not granted, this and other acts of kindness endeared him to the people who deeply mourned his loss.

His great wish during the last three years of his life was to obtain, on retirement, a seat in the Council of India, where he could still support the policy he had so long advocated and pursued towards the frontier tribes; or, failing this, a seat in Parliament, where he might, at any rate, make his voice heard on their behalf. But if these objects of ambition could not be realized, the office he desired above all others, not for its emoluments, for these were a matter of indifference to him, but for the sake of its congenial work, was the post of Irish Fisheries Commissioner.

In the preceding paragraphs we have endeavoured to present a brief, but, so far as it goes, a faithful sketch of the various traits of the remarkable character, which, for nearly twenty years, was the ruling spirit of the Western Frontier of India—a character with human faults and imperfections, but a marked predominance of all that is brave and good and lovable. To understand it thoroughly, one must have known him as the writer knew him; but some of its leading features—his warm sympathy with his fellow-creatures, dauntless energy, high aims, and everlasting cheeriness—will have been gathered, it is hoped, from the pages of this Memoir. His main endeavour, so he tells us, was to ‘deal with the hearts and minds of the people, and not only with their fears’; he succeeded, and he had his reward, for, in spite of years of toil, passed for the most part on a remote frontier, in spite of sorrows and disappointments, and all the work and worry of a singularly

responsible position, he had, he says, a happy life—happy from the consciousness of having spent it in benefitting others and in the promotion of a policy of peace.

Let us now pass from the consideration of particular traits of character to take a last look at the man himself. His portrait, drawn by a master's hand, is given in the frontispiece and tells its own tale. The face and bearing of a true soldier, full of honest strength, but with a touch of the "something feminine," which Coleridge, in a striking passage, declares to be characteristic of all really great men. Few will deny that Robert Sandeman was one of them. All will agree with Sir Alfred Lyall, that he was "an impersonation of the characteristics of the Men of Action" who won India for England; and few will dissent from the opinion of the Government of India—that he was "a brave and devoted servant of the Queen," who "died as he had lived, in the discharge of his duty," and that "his death is a public misfortune."

Here, then, let us leave him, his earthly remains at rest in the garden at Lus Beyla, far from kith and kin, but among the people whom he loved, and for whom he lived and worked till death. Hot winds from the desert may sweep over his grave; torrents from dreary hill-sides flow and foam around. They cannot disturb his repose. For the great end for which he strove—the peace, the enduring peace, of this wild frontier—now stands assured. If he had faults—they will be forgotten; *quidquid ex illo amavimus, quidquid mirati sumus manet mansurumque est.\**

July, 1894.

\* *Tacitus Agricola*:—"All of him we loved, all of him we admired, remains, yea, will remain."

## POSTSCRIPT.

NEARLY three years have now elapsed since the death of Sir Robert Sandeman, and much has occurred during the time to test the value of his life and work, and the principles and policy he advocated. It will not be out of place, then, before closing the Memoir, to take a brief survey of events since 1892.

In the first place, Mir Khodádád Khan, the ruler of Khelát, whose strange personality had for thirty years figured conspicuously, for good or evil, in Khelát affairs, was deposed in 1893 for an act of savagery, and is now a State prisoner.

This is a sad termination of the career of one who, with all his faults, had proved himself a loyal friend and ally of the British Government in times of difficulty.

With many vices, of which occasional ferocity was one, Khodádád Khan had one redeeming virtue,—intense affection and respect for the subject of this Memoir. For sixteen years Sir Robert's personal influence kept him straight, and effectually checked the outbursts of vindictiveness which characterized the Khan's earlier years; on its removal the Khan's recurrence to old ways, however regrettable, was, perhaps, no matter for surprise.

Again, it is noted, in the last chapter, that some of Sir Robert's "great ideas" had not yet come to pass. He wished, as we have seen, to extend our influence north of the Gúmal, and by the friendly occupation of Wano to open the

Tochi route to Ghazni, and settle for ever our difficulties with the great Waziri tribe. But this was not to be. Difficulties with the Amír intervened, and before they were overcome Sir Robert Sandeman was dead. Nevertheless, his policy has survived him, and his unvarying success and the constant and persistent iteration of his views have done much to discredit the policy of non-intervention. Evidence of this is to be found in the action taken by the Government of India in Chitrál, and Hunza, and Nagar, and still more clearly, perhaps, in Sir Mortimer Durand's Mission to Kábul last year, which has led to a distinct understanding with the Amír as to the limits of our sphere of influence, and has left the Indian Government free to occupy Wano, and to carry out the policy of making friends with the remaining independent tribes without fear of misunderstanding with our ally at Kábul.

But perhaps the most important testimony to the success and soundness of Sir Robert's policy is to be found in the following passages from Lord Lansdowne's farewell speech delivered at Calcutta in January, 1894 :—

"In political geography," said his Lordship, "nature abhors a vacuum, and if one thing is certain it is that, under present circumstances, any spaces left vacant upon our Indian frontiers will be filled up by others if we do not step in ourselves. And thus it has come to pass that districts which we could afford to regard with indifference as 'no man's land,' or as border Alsacias with which we need have no concern, have suddenly become of vital importance to us as forming part of the marches of the Empire.

"On our western frontier there is a special reason for which we cannot afford to observe a policy of mere abstention as regards the border region. We are under a solemn obligation, in certain circumstances, to assist our ally, the Amír of Afghanistan, in maintaining the integrity of his possessions. The pledges which we have given to him are, no doubt, carefully guarded, and accompanied by indispensable reservations, but they are pledges which no British Government can ignore—pledges which may compel us in a certain event to meet an enemy beyond our own frontiers. In such an event we should have

to make use of the great natural avenues leading from British India towards Afghanistan, and we have consequently built a line of railway through the Bolán Pass, we have fortified Quetta as an advanced post, while, more lately still, the Gúmal Pass has been opened, and our communications between Quetta and the mouth of the Gúmal, through the Zhob valley, have been considerably improved.

"Now it is under these circumstances that there has grown up the idea of that which is conveniently described as a 'sphere of influence' adjoining the frontier, properly so-called, of the Indian Empire; a sphere, that is, within which we shall not attempt to administer the country ourselves, but within which we shall not allow any aggression from outside.

"The principal conditions upon which it is, in my opinion, necessary to insist in dealing with the tribes and petty States falling within the limits of such a sphere of influence as I have described, are these:—First, that, within that sphere, we should ourselves hold direct relations with the tribes, but allow them to hold relations with no other power; secondly, that we should reserve to ourselves the right of free access and the right of making roads, and, if necessary, posts, for the protection of those roads; thirdly, that we should respect the independence of the tribes, and not attempt to interfere in the management of their internal affairs, or to bring them within the operation of our courts and codes.

"Arrangements of this kind have been tried, and have met with success. The policy is, I believe, the right one under the political circumstances, which now confront us, and it is less likely, in the long run, to involve us in trouble and expense than the old policy of punitive expeditions, followed by a precipitate and complete withdrawal, a policy which Lord Lytton very aptly described, in a speech delivered in Council, as one of 'alternate vengeance and inaction.'"

But while we write another testimony to his services reaches us from Quetta, where, on November 6, the present Viceroy, Lord Elgin, held a grand *durbár*, and thus referred to them:—

"Nearly five years have passed since my predecessor met you here. By the inexorable laws of human existence, such a period must bring in its train changes, whether for good or evil. To one of those changes which I know everyone here deplores I should like to allude at the outset. Lord Lansdowne described the officer standing by his side as one who had the confidence of the Government of India, and whose name would for all time be honourably connected with this portion of

the Indian Empire. I had not the privilege of the acquaintance of Sir Robert Sandeman, but there are some cases in which the record is plain beyond dispute. There can be no doubt that by Sir Robert Sandeman's premature death the Government of India lost an officer to whose indomitable courage and perseverance they owed much, and the people of Balúchistán lost a friend whose knowledge of them and trust in them they recognized by returning to him the largest measure of confidence. I have been glad to observe in Quetta many signs that his name is fresh in your remembrance. . . . We can, in my opinion, find no better means of honouring him than by carrying on what he began."

With Lord Lansdowne's deliberate approval of the policy of "spheres of influence"—a policy persistently advocated by Sir Robert Sandeman, and proved by him, if prudently conducted, to be as feasible as it is beneficial,—and Lord Elgin's handsome tribute to Sir Robert's memory, we may appropriately conclude this brief record of his LIFE and WORK.

*Dec. 1894.*



SIR ROBERT SANDEMAN'S TOMB.

# APPENDIX.

*CONTAINING A SELECTION FROM SIR R. SANDEMAN'S  
WRITINGS.*

- I. ON THE RECTIFICATION OF THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA (1879).
- II. OUR FUTURE POLICY IN AFGHANISTÁN (1886).
- III. ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER (1887).
- IV. BRITISH RELATIONS WITH THE WAZÍRÍ AND OTHER FRONTIER TRIBES (1890).
- V. STATUS AND POSITION OF THE BALÚCHISTÁN AGENCY (1891).
- VI. RAILWAY EXTENSION IN BALÚCHISTÁN (1891).
- VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE IRISH FISHERIES (1889).



## NOTE.

THE following is a selection from Official Memoranda recorded by Sir Robert Sandeman on subjects likely to be of some present interest—together with his “Statement of the Case of the Irish Fisheries,” written while he was on furlough. So far as the writer is aware, none of them have been before published. One important Memorandum on the “Present position of affairs in Kandahár,” dated October 31, 1880,—a Memorandum which is said to have had great weight with Her Majesty’s Government when considering the question of evacuation—will be found in *Afghanistán Blue Book* (1881), no. 5, p. 16; and there are several letters of importance in the *Balúchistán Blue Books* (1877); *e.g.* his letter to the Commissioner in Sind of March 6, 1872, pointing out the errors of Sind policy in reference to Khelát, and that of March 16, 1874, explaining his policy towards frontier tribes, but space does not admit of their inclusion here.

## APPENDIX I.

MEMORANDUM ON THE RECTIFICATION OF THE NORTH-  
WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA (1879).

[This Memorandum was written on Sandeman's return to Quetta after seeing General Stewart's Force across the Khojak Pass on their way to Kandahar. In it he combats Lord Lawrence's opinion in favour of the Indus line of frontier, and proposes, for the first time, the permanent occupation of Pishin and Sibi.]

"THE importance of the question of the rectification of the frontier has been fully recognized, and all generally admit that on the way the point is settled mainly depends the future protection and permanent tranquillity of our frontier. On the one hand, many writers, who know more or less of the present *status quo*, argue strongly against any rectification of the frontier whatever, declaring it to be unnecessary and morally inexpedient, while, on the other hand, many others assert that our present position, military and political, requires our taking up certain strategical positions in advance of our present frontier, and occupying these with troops.

"In illustration of these remarks I will quote here, firstly, Lord Napier of Magdala's opinions on the subject, because they give the views of a high military authority; and secondly, in answer to these, I will record those of an equally eminent civilian, Lord Lawrence. Having done this, I will endeavour to show by facts the results of our present position on the frontier, as it actually exists, with the object of aiding us in arriving at a just conclusion as to whether the rectification of our frontier at the close of the present war is a necessity or not.

"Lord Napier's latest views of the military position on the frontier are as follows. His Lordship writes: 'We find Russia herself advanced towards our Empire not by expeditions, but by absorption of territory. In a bold advances have greatly alarmed our neighbours and tributaries, more regard our quiescence as timidity. By remaining shut up within our own borders we leave all that is outside necessarily to fall within the views of a bold advancing power, and our own people inside and our neighbours outside are losing confidence in us. I have

therefore come to the conclusion that we have remained quiescent long enough. We have not a fortification in India except Fort William. If any shock on our frontiers occurred, our civil administration all over India would be paralyzed by panic from having absolutely no place for our treasure and helpless non-combatants—no point of support for the centres of administration. I am therefore of opinion now that there is less danger by advancing than sitting still. If all had been done that might have been done during the last ten years India would have been much more secure, but the necessary measures were neglected because the money was withheld. Our quiescence has actually led the Russian papers to ask what we mean by going to Khelát or Quetta—that fact alone is sufficient to vindicate our right to be there. I therefore consider the military disadvantages which led to my former opinion less than the moral and political evils we shall incur by letting the frontier be disturbed as it has been by our abstention, leaving just cause or plausible pretence for Persia and Afghánistán to interfere to protect their own borders.

“In reply to such opinions as those given above, Lord Lawrence’s views, recorded in his recently published letters, would appear to be that the state of things in India, caused by the advance of the Russians in Central Asia and the late mission to Kábul, should be met as circumstances might dictate, but not by an advance of our frontier; at the same time, he distinctly says he has never advocated letting the Russians alone in their intrigues with the Afgháns. These, his lordship thinks, should not be met by a rectification of the north-west frontier, for the simple reason that the present frontier, as it now exists, is the best we can adopt, and his lordship assures us it is by no means a haphazard frontier, but one which the Sikhs, who preceded us in the government of the Punjab, deliberately accepted. That when in 1842 the British army returned from Kábul, our Government contemplated making over to the Sikhs the defiles of the Khaibar up to and including Jelálábád, but this offer they without any hesitation rejected. That our present frontier is so advantageously situated that it could be easily rendered much stronger, but his lordship is of opinion that before this question is finally decided it should be considered in all its bearings, political, financial, as well as military.

“The opinions just given by these two eminent high authorities do not seem to me to be wholly irreconcilable. They agree that the advance of Russia in the direction of India has to be met. Lord Napier’s views point to a rectification of our frontier as the proper course to be adopted, while Lord Lawrence would meet the trouble

(for such he declares it to be) 'as circumstances might dictate,' and he would be satisfied with strengthening our present frontier. I do not think, however, that the fact as stated by his lordship of our having offered to the Sikh Government in 1842 the Khaibar Pass and Jelálábád, and that this offer was rejected, is a safe argument against the *British Government under present circumstances* in the year 1879 taking possession of these places. The circumstances are altogether different, while it is a well-known fact that the rule of the Sikhs, especially on the frontier, was one of fear, and that it was with the utmost difficulty they maintained their hold on the Pesháwur and Yusufzai valleys and the plains of the Deraját, while the little revenue they realized from these provinces was collected by means of an army marching through them at fixed periods.

"Now, although the country named is inhabited by a wild people, and crime is more prevalent than in the more settled tracts of India, still the yearly revenue is collected by the British revenue collectors as regularly, and the power of our Government is as firmly established and as much respected as in any other part of our Eastern Empire.

"But to return to the task I have set before me, viz. to demonstrate what course our Government can with safety pursue under the circumstances as they exist. I believe a fair consideration of this question in the light I shall endeavour to place it, arising out of the facts I am about to record, will show that the interests of British India, as well as the interests of Khelát and Afghanistan, demand that such arrangements should be made for the future as will prevent the possibility of complications like the present ones arising which have led to war with the Amír of Afghanistan. I trust to be able to show this result can only be secured by a rectification in this direction, not merely of the British frontier, but of the frontiers of the three kingdoms of India, Khelát, and Afghanistan, and that political and moral considerations have rendered this a necessity.

"Lord Lawrence states in his recent letters, a summary of which I have given above, that the Sikhs did not adopt a haphazard frontier, but deliberately selected one, viz. our present Punjab frontier. Doubtless when our officers first took possession of the Punjab frontier this appeared to be the case, and they reported to that effect to Government, and doubtless therefore the late Viceroy has good grounds for making this assertion, yet my own experience does not permit of my accepting it as a fact. On the contrary, I can prove that as our officers became more intimately connected with the tribes and people along the Lower Deraját, circumstances arose which have convinced them that the frontier line that had been adopted by our officers when first taking possession of the country, however convenient it may have

appeared at the time, and expedient to adopt, has proved disastrous to our subjects, and to the frontier clans, and rendered the administration of the frontier tract itself a matter of extreme difficulty.

"These remarks apply more especially to the Balúch frontier, and I make them advisedly, knowing from long experience what I am writing about, having held political charge of the Lower Deraját for twelve years, and the facts I am about to relate came during that time under my own personal knowledge. To keep silent regarding them now, however much other considerations might incline me to do so, would not be right, and would not, I am certain, be desired by Lord Lawrence himself.

"To thoroughly appreciate what I have now to record, it is desirable for the reader to consult a map of the Punjab, showing the Lower Deraját and the neighbouring frontier of Balúchistán. I will, in illustration of my subject, select that portion of the frontier line of the Déra Gházi Khan district opposite the village of Choti, the headquarters of Nawáb Jumál Khan, Chief of the Logháris. Were the Nawáb's opinion of our present frontier line asked, in reply he would say that it has been most unjustly and unfairly fixed. That his possessions extend 100 miles beyond it to Loghári Barkhán, a valley situated at the entrance of the Hann Pass, and that our frontier line as adopted by our Government cuts in two his own possessions and those of his tribe, which has resulted in grave complications in the management of his people and in grievous loss to them and to himself; as the portion of the tribe unfortunately occupying the country outside the arbitrary border line fixed by the British authorities were left helpless and weak, and unable to contend in battle with their hill neighbours on fair terms, on account of the operations of our laws, which forbade their clansmen residing on the British side of the border helping them; resulting in many of them being unfairly killed, thereby causing much distress to the whole clan, who viewed the arrangement as most oppressive and unjust. The Nawáb, moreover, explains that he himself was born at his Fort of Barkhán, where the best of his hereditary lands lie, but that he cannot now visit them to see to their proper cultivation on account of the depredations of the Marri clan, subjects of Khelát, whose lands bound his own. That even in the days of the Sikhs some protection was afforded to that portion of the clan now considered beyond the pale of British protection, and in proof of this he states, 'he can show where the Sikh soldiers were cantoned at Barkhán situated many miles beyond our present frontier.' All this and much more he will tell, leading to the belief that, as far as the Loghári tribe are concerned, the fixing of our present frontier was haphazard, and was not even the one held by the late Sikh Government.

"But the state of things just described does not merely apply to Nawáb Jumál Khan and the clan Loghári. Let us proceed to the fort at Harrand and hold an interview with Sirdár Ghulám Haidar, the Chief of the Gurchánis. In reply to our inquiries he will tell us precisely the same tale as Nawáb Jumál Khan, and will show that the frontier line adopted by our officers had brought results still more deplorable, if possible, to himself and his clan.

"His story is simply this. The district of Harrand Dájál was formerly a portion of the Khelát State. A Deputy Governor of the Khan resided there. During the time of the Sirdár's grandfather the Sikhs seized on Harrand, and the Naib fled. But the Gurchánis never submitted to the Sikh rule, but kept up a guerrilla warfare against the usurpers. Some years elapsed in this way, the clans of Khelát still holding out against the Sikhs, until their rule ceased and the British Government took possession of the country. But so far from the clan benefitting by the change, the whole of the Gurchánis suffered. He will explain this by pointing to our frontier line, which placed half of the clan within British and the other half in Khelát territory, thereby weakening the tribe in the way I have just described as having occurred to the Logháris. This was at once taken advantage of by their hereditary enemies, the two powerful Khelát highland clans of Marris and Búgtis, who lost no opportunity of attacking and killing them, and in this way many hundreds of Gurchánis had been destroyed. The Sirdár will explain that the fighting that took place would not have resulted so disastrously for the Gurchánis under the Sikh rule as it had done during British rule, simply because the power the Sikhs held over their country was not of a nature to prevent the hill and plain portions of the clan making common cause against their Khelát enemies. This the British positively forbade. Another consequence being that by far the finest portion of the Gurcháni country was ruined and is now a desolate waste. The chief would farther explain, that if an appeal was made to the Khan of Khelát, and His Highness was asked to interfere, he always replied that he was helpless, and that the matter should be taken up and disposed of by the British Government, who alone held the power to deal with it properly.

"However, it has to be remembered, in considering the whole question, that for many years the two frontiers were administered under two separate jurisdictions, and that this fact—as the records show—led to many difficulties; still it was really the arbitrary and haphazard line which was adopted to demarcate the two frontiers which led to the severe losses the Gurchánis suffered at the hands of Khelát subjects.

"It must not, however, be supposed that the state of the tribes just described, which applies more or less to almost all the Balúch tribes

along our Balúch frontier (for they, like the Loghárís and Gurchánís, have been split into two divisions by the frontier line that was arbitrarily adopted by our Government), has never been brought to the notice of the Government. I have frequently done so, and the state of affairs on the frontier, as described above, has been verified, by the present Commissioner of the Deraját, Colonel Munro, in a report he submitted to Government, showing that the British frontier on the Harrand border had never been properly demarcated. The matter was then taken up by the Government of India, and a representation made to the Home Government on the subject, who accorded permission to a conditional rectification of the British Balúch and Khelát frontiers being made, and this will be carried out directly I can be spared from Quetta and Pishín to meet the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Gházi Khan. The instructions issued directed that I should submit proposals in concert and communication with him for its rectification. For further particulars on this subject the correspondence should be referred to.

“Having made the above exposition, showing the *status quo* as it exists at the present time on the Khelát and Punjab frontiers, I think the lesson to be derived from it is that no hasty conclusion should be arrived at regarding the rectification that may be necessary for the frontier generally, for that some rectification is necessary can, I feel certain, no longer be disputed.

“But in considering this in all its bearings, it has to be remembered that by the treaty of 1876, entered into between the British Government and the Khan, the integrity of the Khelát State from foreign aggression has been assured. Such being the case, the whole question as to the best and most convenient place for the British Government to place its troops to enable it to carry out its engagements should be carefully inquired into. It is quite clear that in its own interests the point is one of paramount importance.

“This brings me to a consideration of the military position of Quetta, and the necessity for arranging the future basis upon which the Government might desire to conclude its future arrangements with Afghanistán, and in considering these our responsibilities towards Khelát cannot be forgotten or ignored.

“The Government of India will doubtless, in arranging for the future with Afghanistán, desire to avoid annexation, and this can easily be accomplished in this direction, by detaching from Kábul, Pishín, and Sibi, and placing them under a political protectorate, and managing them by British officers, with the least possible interference in the affairs of the local chiefs or people, in the way I will now propose; and that some such step is essential to a fair rectification of the British,

Khelát, and Afghanistán frontiers, and to a proper settlement of the difficulties arising out of our present position, I will here endeavour to explain.

"The district of Sibi is simply a continuation of the Kachi plain, and during the first Afghán war it was administered from Quetta under the orders of the Political Agent. It is situated more than 200 miles from Kandahár, and is quite detached from the country under Afghán rule. In 1842 it was offered to the Khan of Khelát by the British Government, but he did not then accept the gift, but as it is situated in the heart of the Khelát State it might be desirable under certain conditions to include it within its boundaries, and should Government call upon me to take up this question I will do so separately and report upon it, giving due consideration to all the different interests involved.

"Again, the position the Pishín valley holds with reference to the Khelát State and the British frontier generally cannot be set aside. It is a fact which is not generally known, that Nádir Shah himself, doubtless conscious of the value the Pishín valley must be to the Khan of Khelát's possessions, when rewarding him for service done in India, among other grants of land included it in the Khelát State. The valley of Pishín, in much the same way that the Sibi district is part of Kachi, is a continuation of the Quetta and Kuchlak valleys, while it is separated from Kandahár by the Khojak range of mountains. Territorially, therefore, it ought to belong to Khelát and not to southern Afghanistán. A good map of the country would illustrate this satisfactorily, and conclusively show that the Khojak Range (popularly known as the Kwájah Amrán mountain) is the natural boundary which should separate Khelát from southern Afghanistán. As just explained, it belonged to the old Brahúi Khans, who held it until the reign of Ahmad Shah Duráni, who forcibly annexed it to Kandahár. Under existing circumstances, in the interests of all concerned, there can be no question as to the desirability of including it in the Quetta Protectorate. Doing so would secure the safety of our own Empire, and give our Government a strong hold on the country, which our acknowledged responsibilities in regard to Khelát and Afghanistán render it necessary for us to possess.

"With reference to these remarks I will now briefly consider the strategical position of the Pishín valley, and describe the immense importance from a military and political point of view its possession is to the Power who holds it. From Pishín all the chief routes leading to Kandahár, Gházni and Khelát set out, and were we securely established there we can at any moment, as the Khojak Pass would be in our possession, descend on the plains of Kandahár, or advance to meet our



adversary in the open field. We would securely hold the command of all the southern passes leading to the Punjab and Sind, and from Déra Ismail Khan to the sea, a distance of nearly 700 miles, our frontier would be securely guarded. In military possession of Pishín and Quetta, our position would in this direction be very strong indeed, while from it we can really secure our friends from the fear of aggression, and render their countries equally so—no unimportant advantage, as recent events have shown us. Were the arrangements I propose seriously contemplated by the Government, doubtless a great consideration would be the light in which the people and sirdárs of the two districts would regard their severance from Afghánistán, and the question the Government would probably ask is, ‘Would such severance be acceptable or the reverse?’ I can answer that the Sibi people will openly rejoice at being brought permanently under the protection of the British Government, and so would in a lesser degree the people of Pishín also. I have every confidence in making this statement, from the fact that the attitude assumed by the sirdárs and people of both districts has been most friendly, and the only consideration which has induced the people of Pishín to hold back, and which they have themselves expressed, is to them the all-important one, viz. whether, should they cast in their lot with our Government and aid us heartily, they may not at the close of the war find themselves at the mercy of the Amír’s officials, who would soon find means of punishing them for any assistance rendered at the present time.

“If Pishín were permanently placed under British protection the safety of the Balúch-Afghán frontier would be secured in a way our present responsibilities absolutely require. The Khan of Khelát has actively aided the British in the present war against the Afgháns. This act they will never forget or forgive, and it is therefore only right we should in arranging for the future secure his country from the chance of aggression.

“Another important consideration is that, although the military position at Quetta doubtless covers the approaches to Sind through the Bolán Pass, the Punjab is in no way protected, as Quetta could at any time be masked if an enemy were strongly posted at Kandahár and holding possession of the Khojak Pass. A descent could then be made on Déra Ismail Khan and Déra Gházi Khan *via* Tal Chotiáli and Bori, while Khelát itself could be threatened *via* Shorawak, Nushki, and the Mungachar valley.

“As already stated in this paper, the interests of Khelát, British India, and Afghánistán, viewing the question as a whole, require a rectification of the frontier of the three kingdoms, with the object of securing the interests of each, and in my opinion it is the plain duty

of the Government of India under present circumstances to see that this is carried out.

"I trust what I have said above will conclusively show that the rectification of the three frontiers of British India, Khelát, and Afghanistán in this direction, as proposed by me, if carried out, will bring to each Power many substantial advantages ; that is to say, if we view England, as she desires to be viewed, in the light of a powerful ally and friend of both Khelát and Afghanistán. So far from there being political dangers in carrying out the proposed measure by adopting it, we remove those that exist, while we enormously strengthen our military hold on the country. The only remaining consideration is the expense. We were told that the occupation of Quetta would prove financial ruin to India, and owing to the outcry that arose regarding this, the people of England believed it had cost many millions of money, the truth being that a few thousand pounds would cover the entire cost.

"The cost of the rectification of this part of the British frontier need not be great. But this will depend entirely on the way it is set about, and I doubt not the Government of India will take care, should it issue orders for this being done, that the cost of carrying out their measure shall not be greater than the finances of the Indian Empire can safely bear.

"R. G. SANDELMAN, Major,

"Agent Governor-General, Balúchistán.

"*January 9, 1879.*"

## APPENDIX II.

## OUR FUTURE POLICY IN AFGHANISTÁN (1886).

[This note was written before Sirdár Ayúb Khan's surrender to the British Government, and before the death of the Amír's son, Sarwar Khan, but it is valuable as containing Sir R. Sandeman's views as to the course to be pursued in the event of there being a disputed succession in Afghánistán.]

"THE latest news from India tells us of the serious illness of the reigning Amír of Afghánistán, and that His Highness has expressed the wish that, in the event of his death, his son Sarwar Khan shall succeed him. No one who has studied the question of the succession to the Afghán throne can have any doubt as to its being one of the very greatest importance to England.

"Until the present Amír appeared to claim the Afghán throne (after the ex-Amír Yakúb Khan was deported to India, where he is now a State prisoner), the policy of the British Government has been, on the Afghán throne becoming vacant, to allow the claimants to it to take the field, without any interference from us, and settle the matter by force of arms, thus involving the country in all the horrors of civil war.

The near approach of Russia towards our frontier, and the part she took in our quarrel with the late Sher Ali, resulting in the second Afghán war, and the occupation of Kábul and Kandahár by our armies, rendered it necessary for us to strongly support the present Amír Abdul Rahmán against his cousin, Mahomed Ayúb Khan, the brother of the ex-Amír. We, therefore, made over the country to Abdul Rahmán, and supported him with large subsidies of money as well as munitions of war, which enabled him to firmly seat himself on the throne after a brief struggle with his cousin for the possession of Kandahár. Since then he has raised a regular army, estimated to number 60,000 men of all arms, and we have lately sent him from India some rifles and a siege train to be placed in the fortifications of Herát.

Under these circumstances, on Abdul Rahmán's death, it cannot be supposed for a moment that we are quietly to stand aside and permit the ex-Amír's family to renew the struggle for the throne with the heir of the Amír, whose power we have just firmly established. If we do so we shall force the necessity for taking a side on the newly raised army, than which nothing could be more detrimental to the

country ; one result would be almost certain, namely, that the army would take different sides and thus a portion at all events of our rifles and guns would fall into the hands of a pretender to the throne inimical to British interests. We should, on the contrary, take such steps as will, if possible, secure to Abdul Rahmán's son an undisputed succession.

It cannot be doubted that it is England's plain duty on the Amír's death to be prepared with such decided measures as shall convince the Afgháns and their ruler that she is able and willing to protect them, in so far as she has the power, from the horrors of civil war, attendant on a disputed succession. It is expected by the Afgháns themselves that, on the Amír's death, Sirdár Ayúb Khan will be permitted to seize Herat, and that he will at once lay claim to the throne. Should this occur, we ought to be prepared at once to occupy Kandahár in our own and the Amír's interests. Kandahár is situated only 60 miles from the nearest British outpost, and could be taken possession of by our troops in four marches after they had crossed the frontier. This move would at once reassure the Afghán nation, by telling them in no uncertain way that we were alive to our mutual interests, and would not permit them to be trifled with. Kandahár is so situated that our possession of it effectively blocks Ayúb Khan's road to Kábul, and isolates him from Afghanistan proper, placing him in an exactly similar position to the one he held when he opposed Abdul Rahmán on his brother's banishment to India. With Kandahár secured to Abdul Rahmán's son, Mahomed Ayúb Khan could not long hope to maintain his hold on Herát ; our occupation of Kandahár would also secure peace to southern Afghanistan, and afford the young Amír the time and opportunity for securing his father's throne, and the allegiance of the army.

Undoubtedly those who object to a policy of this nature will say that even friendly occupation of Kandahár would turn her people against the British Government. I do not believe that this would be the case ; the people of Kandahár are altogether exceptionally situated with respect to the rest of Afghanistan, and its occupation by our troops would not be resented by them ; certainly not if they knew that it was done with the intention of preventing civil war, and in their own and the young Amír's interests. They would quite understand that to a great extent it prevented anarchy spreading through the length and breadth of Afghanistan. I firmly believe a hearty support of Abdul Rahmán's son and lawful successor would be successful, and would meet with the approval and gratitude of the bulk of the Afghán people.

“ROBERT SANDEMAN.

*“Ireland, July 20, 1886.”*

its influence in Central Asia ;—the natural suspicion that the Afgháns may feel that we are yielding to *force majeure*, and the consequent distrust in our ability to preserve their country from absorption by Russia. The necessity of maintaining unimpaired our present preponderance in Afghán policy, must also make us cautious that Russia is not allowed to place herself in such a position as to enable her to either overawe or entangle the Amír in her diplomatic toils. Doubtless the object the Government had in view when undertaking the responsibility of delimiting the Russo-Afghán frontier was to preserve Afghanistan, with its barren and waterless wastes, as a principality under British protection, lying between Russia and England's possessions in Asia. But for these considerations the greater or less amount of territory ceded to Russia would be a matter of secondary importance so far as India is concerned, but the credit of its Government is involved in seeing justice done to the Amír ; and our interests in the future demand that no undue advantages should be given to Russia at the expense of our ally. The measures which appear most suitable for ensuring the success of this policy I shall specify in another paragraph.

"5. Our anxieties with regard to Afghanistan are of a threefold character : (1) the dangers that may arise from a disputed succession ; (2) dangers from internal rebellion ; and (3) the risk of the Amír's subjects giving substantial cause of offence to the Russians.

"With regard to the Afghán succession, I have stated my views at length in my note dated 20th July, 1886. Happily the probability of that question becoming of immediate importance is for the time averted, but it is not the less necessary that it should be kept steadily in view. Past experience has undoubtedly taught us that the wish of the Amír himself with respect to his successor is not to be lightly disregarded. Should the Amír live until his son Sarwar Khan attain an age at which he would be capable of ruling, the convulsions which have followed on previous vacancies of the *masnad* would, it may be hoped, be avoided. But it would be gratifying to the Amír, and conducive to the tranquillity of his dominions, if it were clearly understood that we recognized his nomination, and were prepared to give moral and material support to his son—unless actually disqualified. Such an assurance would do much to bind the Amír to our alliance, and to encourage him to hand down his authority and his dominions unimpaired to his successor ; and this line of policy is so advantageous, that if neglected by us, it would in all probability be immediately taken up by Russia.

"The dangers from internal insurrection are by no means slight, but with these it may be presumed the Amír himself is in a position to

deal. The present formidable insurrection of the Ghilzais, the hereditary enemies of the Amír's house, will doubtless tax his power and resources to put it down ; but that the struggle will end as previous outbreaks of the same tribe have done, in the complete vindication of the Amír's authority, there is every reason to feel assured.

"With regard to the prevention of revolution or rebellion in his Balkh-Turkistán territories, the Russian occupation of Penjdeh places a new obstacle in the way of the Amír, while the presence of Russia on the Oxus imposes upon His Highness stronger obligations than before for the maintenance of order, as well as introduces elements which may be conducive to disturbance. The necessity for establishing a strong government in Balkh has already, I believe, been recognized by the Amír, and a good road is already under consideration by His Highness.

"But there remains the risk of the Amír or his Balkh subjects becoming involved in disputes with Russia which might be fomented into a *casus belli*, and is not so easily to be safe-guarded against. It is worth considering whether we, as the makers of the Boundary Treaty—should it become a fact—should not also be the executors of its provisions, and whether the presence of British officials on the boundary line between Afghanistan and Russia would not afford the best security both to the Amír and ourselves against Russian intrigue or Afghan lawlessness stirring up an international quarrel. We have always yielded to the susceptibilities of the Amír with regard to the presence of British officials in his dominions ; but the present moment, when His Highness is apparently extremely anxious regarding the danger of further Russian aggressions, seems favourable to our urging that the Russo-Afghan frontier should be placed under direct British supervision. At the same time the presence of British representatives on the Oxus would greatly aid him in maintaining his authority in Balkh-Turkistán. I know of no reason why the British Government should not, when a fitting opportunity presents itself, act in its turn the part in Afghanistan that Russia acts successfully in Bokhara and Khiva. Time, patience, and determination to succeed in the task we have undertaken would, I strongly believe, prove successful. I know of nothing to prevent our succeeding. The very fact of the Amír, of his own action and at his own expense, undertaking to make a good road towards Balkh, is proof so far of his good intentions and sincerity of purpose. He may not accept any offer we make him of official aid in its entirety, but doubtless, as time passes and his difficulties increase, he or his successors will gladly welcome the presence of our officials in Afghanistan.

“6. From what has been said, it follows that our relations towards the Amír, while continuing to be friendly and conciliatory as before, should take into account the new difficulties which the Russian advance has imported into his position. We have to impress still further upon His Highness the identity of British and Afghán interests; to convince him that we are neither indifferent to the difficulties by which he is beset, nor indisposed to assist him in the hour of need; and above all, to show him by ocular demonstration that we have the power as well as the disposition to sustain him against assaults from whatever quarter. There are two sentiments among the Afgháns, not altogether unfounded, that have prevented them from giving a cordial response to our alliance—the first, a suspicion that we are using them merely to serve our own purposes; second, a fear that if they are attacked by a great power like Russia, our strength is not sufficient to prevent them from being absorbed by the invader. To remove these impressions we should use our best exertions, both by friendly assurances and by exhibiting our military strength as much as possible before the eyes of the Afghán people. It is also desirable that they should be made aware that a considerable portion of their country is not so absolutely necessary to the defence of India as they generally credit us with believing.

“7. This leads me to make a few remarks on the defensive strength of our present frontier; on its sufficiency for the protection of India against invasion by a European power; on the influence which our position upon it exercises on the Afghán tribes; and on the measures which might be taken with a view to increasing its efficiency with regard to both these objects. But I assume that Government has decided to maintain as far as possible the position of Afghanistan as a protected State, whose resources would naturally be at our disposal, for offensive or defensive purposes, in the event of war between England and Russia. If we do not keep this in view in the measures which we adopt towards Afghanistan, her actual value to us must be regarded as greatly lessened.

“8. Beginning at our north-west corner, the Khaibar Pass is already understood to be strongly fortified; the railway is to be extended to the foot of the Pass at Fort Jamrud, which is also to be placed in a condition of strong defence. At Attok strong fortifications are to be erected, and the Punjab Railway will connect it with Dera Ismael Khan. All this has been carefully seen to by the Government of India, and the Commander-in-Chief has twice recently visited that portion of the frontier, and closely considered the subject of its defences. We may, therefore, consider ourselves secure in that direction. Even if aided by Russian counsels, the Amír, single-handed, could not do

more than annoy our frontier at this part. And it is more than doubtful whether he could stir up against us such tribes as the Afridis, the Bonérwáls, and other strong though minor tribes who know our power, and are not altogether unamenable to our influence, and who would be as likely to take part with us as against us. But with a view to such an eventuality as an Afghán Amír for a time joining Russia, an occupation of the Gumal Pass by Zhob is a precaution that is not merely of the highest value as a strategic movement in view of future invasion, but would also prove of immediate service to both our Afghán allies and ourselves. To the Afgháns the occupation of the Gumal would at once be made to appear an earnest of our intention to support them in the event of invasion of their territories, and would be a guarantee to the Amír for the peace of that portion of his dominions which adjoins the Gúmal Pass. To the British Government the occupation of the Gumal would afford a position of strong natural defence, and would present the power of occupying Ghazni, which, with a garrison at Kandahár, would place us in a position to outflank the Russians, did they attempt at any time to march on Kabul. It would, moreover, serve to naturally connect our defences on the northern and southern portions of our frontier. It would also, I believe, make both Russians and Afgháns feel that Ghazni being, like Kandahár, within our grasp, no attack directed by way of Kábul on the Indian frontier, whether by the Russians alone or in conjunction with the Afgháns, would be attempted except at an imminent risk of the invading army being broken up. Kábul is separated from Balkh, as I have already mentioned, by six months of winter weather, and unless the attack of the invaders was made in great force, and was at once successful, they would have to retreat to save themselves from starvation. Both as a political and as a military measure, the early opening-out of the Gúmal Pass by British influence, and the placing of it in an adequate position of defence, seem of the highest importance. From near the Gúmal, if not from the Gúmal itself (see my Memo on Balúchistán, paragraph 2), our actual frontier now runs to Quetta, closing the mouths of the many easy passes opening into the Derajat and Sind, and offering greatly enhanced natural and sanitary advantages to the line we possessed when resting upon the Cis-Sulimáú districts. Quetta and Pishin are not only the key of the Bolán Pass and Sind, but they give us the command of Kandahár, and enable us to control the line of the Helmand. To the extension of the railway from Pishin to Kandahár our best efforts should be applied, and it may be hoped that the Amír's susceptibilities on this point may yield, as they undoubtedly ought to do, in the presence of danger, and before the



prospects of increased prosperity to southern Afghanistan, and of the strengthening of his power in that province. Our defensive frontier has in theory even a wider scope, running, as I pointed out in a previous Memorandum on the Baluchistan Agency, from the Gúmal Pass to Mína Bazár in Zhob, thence by Hindú Bágh, the Khojak Pass, and Chaman, on to Nushki, which covers the allied state of Khelát, a distance of 365 miles, as against the old line of 700 miles which we formerly had to defend. Between Nushki and the Halmand is interposed the waterless Registán desert, which would offer serious obstacles to the advance of a European army, for we have undoubtedly the power to place an adequate force on its banks were an advance made from Herát towards Kandahár. It only remains to notice an invasion from the direction of Gwádar by southern Baluchistan; but here again we are defended by desert, to say nothing of such an event presupposing either the previous absorption of Persia by Russia, or both these powers acting in hostile concert against us.

"9. So long as we maintain the integrity of Afghanistan, and hold our armies free and in readiness to occupy strongly the Afghan towns of Kandahár and Gházni, on the bare danger of the necessity of such a step arising, we need have no real dread of invasion pressing upon us. The danger arises from a possible infringement of the integrity of Afghanistan. Were His Highness the Amír made fully sensible of what our intentions actually were, the suspicion with which he has been inclined to receive our counsels would in all probability be dispelled. If he could realize that it might perhaps be better for British interests if Balkh and Afghan-Turkistan became a complete desert, separating him from the Russians, rather than we should be compelled to take any concern in these territories on his account, he would probably be better able to perceive our disinterestedness. I am not, however, disposed to believe that it is impossible to make the Amír listen to reason; and I think it is deeply to be regretted that so much of an outcry has been raised against His Highness's rule. The space of this memorandum does not, however, admit of my entering into this subject; suffice it to say, the Amír has, like all native rulers, many enemies. But he possesses also many friends. He would tell you, were you to ask why he objected to English Residents, that it was chiefly because it was notorious that every story against him was listened to and repeated, and capital made out of it by his enemies; and in this assertion I believe there is a great deal of truth. I confidently look forward to the day when the barrier that now exists to free intercourse with civilization will be broken down by the Afghans themselves; and if we can only, at

the present time, exercise sufficient patience, I believe the time is not far off.

"10. Another reassuring feature in our position on the Afghán frontier is the good impression which we have succeeded in effecting upon the border tribes. These are all now more or less well-disposed towards us, and in the event of an invasion of India we might calculate, were they convinced of the efficiency of our power by our preparations, if not upon their assistance, at all events upon their neutrality. The Afridis, a tribe 20,000 strong, have passed a large per-centage of their fighting men through the ranks of our native army. Many of the other clans furnish regular contingents of recruits to our service, and their contact with British discipline has done much to familiarize them and their fellow-tribesmen with our power, and to inspire them with confidence in our Government. I may mention that when I recently conducted Sir Frederick Roberts along the southern portion of the frontier, he was escorted by a body of the Kákars and Marris. These two powerful clans have until lately borne as bad a character as any of the frontier tribes. Nor has the Amír's influence been wanting in the same direction. The fact that His Highness was able to bring back the Boundary Commission through the Kohistán, peopled by the very tribes who in the late war drove us into Sherpore, bears testimony to the success with which he has been confirming his authority over the more turbulent races of his subjects. So far as the border tribes therefore are concerned, we need not fear their presence as tending to weaken our defensive position, or as likely to molest us in our endeavours to strengthen it. Isolated cases of lawlessness are naturally to be expected, but we need be under no apprehension of general opposition. Our clear duty is to strongly secure our actual frontiers by fortifications where necessary, and by employing the tribes as our allies.

"11. Having pointed out the promises of security afforded by our own position, I next turn to what we can do towards reassuring the Amír, and inducing him to co-operate heartily with us in taking steps for the defence of his own dominions. We must aim at entirely securing his confidence and that of his successors, if we are to avoid the risk of involving ourselves in the many difficulties by which he is already surrounded; but, as the Power upon which the only hope of preserving intact the independence of Afghanistan rests, we must not shirk from giving firm counsels when our joint interests demand that these should be used. Abdurrahmán Khan is both a strong and sagacious ruler, and has undergone more experience than has fallen to the lot of most of his countrymen. If we can free his mind from the dread of annexation, can assure him that not only himself but his

issue shall be supported on the Kábul *masnad*, and that he can rely upon British arms to aid him in defending his country against aggression, he will be guided by reason. He has already had to submit to sacrifices,—he may have to make even more weighty ones in the interests of general peace, but if he is once inspired with the faith that, on the occurrence of certain given circumstances, he may rely upon British assistance, he will be able to bear his losses with more equanimity. In the mean time, the necessity of putting his house in order cannot be too strongly impressed upon His Highness. Instead of watching Russian movements, and listening to rumours more or less exaggerated, he should put his country in as thoroughly defensive a condition as its means will admit of. I would suggest that the organization of camps of exercise within our frontier beyond the Suleimán range would be of great service, not only in impressing the Afgháns with the appearance of the power which we can bring to their assistance, but by habituating our own soldiers with positions which they might be called upon to defend. These camps would reassure the Amír of our readiness for action. All this I would impress on His Highness, and though little or no way might be made in inducing him to follow our counsels, I would not be disheartened but should continue to offer them in time and as opportunity presented itself. By our acts I would prove to him that we were quite aware of our own interests as far as Afghanistan is concerned, and intended to preserve them in our own way, notwithstanding his neglect of our advice. Farther than this I would not go, unless actually compelled by such conduct as would of necessity bring us into collision with him. If we only consider that it is not merely the Amír's alliance we desire, but that of Afghanistan and the Afgháns, we will be careful to avoid anything on our part that will tend to foment suspicion or ill feeling towards us among the Amír's subjects. Such would be a real calamity. Should His Highness become amenable to advice and alive to our joint interest, I would endeavour to induce him himself to connect Kandahár and Ghazni with our outposts. The moral effect of our preparations must in time be great, not only on the Amír, but on his subjects, and we should consequently display before them our military strength and resources as much as possible. Our advanced posts should be filled with garrisons of picked troops, so that all might the more clearly perceive that we were ready, that we were alive to the approach of danger, and that we were resolutely prepared to meet it. In concluding my remarks on our relations with the Amír, I would urge that His Highness is an Oriental, more than half a despot, and comparatively little accustomed to the rules which regulate civilized intercourse. He is no doubt tyrannical as a ruler, and personally

rough and disposed to be presuming, but this is not to be wondered at when the character of the subjects he has to rule is considered, and doubtless time and experience would bring about greater moderation both in his views and his actions. His present attitude is not unsimilar to that of the Khan of Khelát, who, in a smaller way, was disposed to trouble the Government, but who, as may be seen from the Balúchistán Blue-books, was by my own representations brought to listen to reason, and saved from difficulties which would probably have resulted in the overthrow of his power.

"12. I have avoided making any reference to the financial aspects of the frontier question. It is enough to observe that a policy of precaution is always cheaper in the end than enforced and hurried action.

"13. I have ventured on the foregoing remarks because I am aware that the Afghán question is at the present moment before the Home Government, and I have been receiving very conflicting reports from the officers, both European and native, belonging to the Balúchistán Agency concerning the state of affairs in Afghanistan itself, and on the Afghán-Balúchistán frontier. I consider, therefore, that I am bound in duty to come forward with these remarks at the present critical period. I think it only fair to remind the Government that I took a very important part in the settlement of affairs at the close of the Afghán war. I was a Joint Commissioner with the late Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Donald Stewart, in delimitating the Afghán-Balúchistán frontier, and at the close of the war the then Viceroy, the Marquis of Ripon, deputed me to visit the Marquis of Hartington, the Secretary of State for India, and place before him my proposals for the settlement of the assigned districts, extending from Chaman Choki on the Amrán range, 60 miles from Kandahár, to the Punjab at Déra Gházi Khan. My efforts were successful with the Home Government; and after much delay, my recommendations for retaining under the administrative control of the Viceroy's Agent the districts of Sibi, Pishín, and Tal-chotiál, were finally accepted by the Home Government; and the jurisdiction of the Viceroy's Agent in Balúchistán in consequence extends from a point near the Gúmal Pass, if not to the Gúmal Pass itself, to the sea at Gwádar; and I am thus in a position to speak with confidence regarding our policy on the frontier and in Afghanistan. If I had been in India, I should of course have submitted these remarks in the first instance to the Governor-General in Council. But to send them to India would cause great delay; and as all questions connected with Afghanistan seriously affect the state of affairs in Balúchistán and on the frontier, it seemed to me right to place my views on record. It is an undoubted fact that our Afghán policy,

as now settled, must affect vitally all our dealings with the Afghán tribes, and in a lesser degree the Balúch tribes also. I have spent the best years of my life in studying Afghán and Balúch affairs. I have been in a position to know the affairs of the frontier as few officers have ; and in settling important points of policy, such as the Afghán Boundary question, I venture to think it would be a wise measure on the part of Government to take the Governor-General's representative on the frontier into its confidence, when deciding on measures which not only affect our general policy, but the lives of our officers and people resident in the North-west Frontier for the safety of quite one-half of which I am responsible

“ R. G. SANDEMAN

“ *London, 30th June, 1887* ”

## APPENDIX IV.

ON BRITISH RELATIONS WITH THE WAZÍRÍ AND  
OTHER FRONTIER TRIBES (1890).

[This Memorandum was written before Sir Mortimer Durand's Mission to the Amír of Kábul, and was, doubtless, very useful to our representative in his negotiations, which resulted, *inter alia*, in the Amír's renouncing all claims of suzerainty over the Wazíri tribes. It contains a clear statement of the policy advocated by its author in respect to these tribes ; a policy which recent events have, in no way, discredited, though all must regret that the delicate task of effecting friendly arrangements with these turbulent and priest-ridden clans devolved on officers, who, however able and experienced, had not the commanding influence of Sir Robert Sandeman.]

"OWING to recent events I think the present is a favourable time to explain the policy I consider should be pursued on the frontiers of this Agency, especially towards the Wazíri and other frontier tribes. As considerable misunderstanding seems to have arisen regarding the measures which led to the opening of the Gúmal Pass, and as it has been affirmed in some of the newspapers that we have disregarded the rights of His Highness the Amír, I would explain here that I have constantly advocated, when dealing with such matters, that the susceptibilities of the Amír should be carefully considered, and that no encroachment on his territories proper should be permitted. I cannot, however, believe that our duties towards His Highness and ourselves end here. As the supreme Power we have a very important public duty to discharge, and while respecting the rights of the Amír and his country, we should not neglect the Imperial interests of the Empire entrusted to our care. In considering such questions it should be remembered that the Amír Abd-ul-Rahmán is, in a great measure, indebted to us for his present position. He did not gain the throne by his own efforts alone. At Kábul we recognized him openly as the successor of his deposed cousin, Muhammad Yakúb Khan. There we handed over to him the city with its munitions of war and treasure,

and it was greatly due to our efforts that many of the supporters of the former Government were obliged to fly from Afghanistan. There can be no reasonable doubt therefore that the establishment of the present Ruler in Afghanistan was due in a great measure to us. We pay him besides 12 lakhs a year, and have supplied him with the best rifles from England. It was due by all accounts to these very rifles that General Ghulám Haidar Khan overcame Muhammad Íshák Khan's troops in the recent pitched battle in Turkistán which decided the fate of the country. Besides all this the moral support which the Amír derives from the fact of our continued and active friendship must be of immense value to him. There can be no doubt that Abdul Rahmán recognized the great value of our alliance at Rawalpindi, and I would urge that it is our bounden duty to keep him up to the engagements there entered into. Surely it is possible to do this in a dignified way without encroaching or taking away from the great value which the Afghán alliance, if it is to be an alliance in fact and not merely in name, undoubtedly possesses. Treat the Amír with all fairness and honesty, be conciliatory in all matters in which conciliation is compatible with our own vital interests, but, at the same time, where the welfare and even the existence of the British Empire in India are at stake, we must be firm in protecting them, if necessity arises, and in insisting on their recognition.

"2. In this connection it appears to me that the political status of the tribes on our north-western frontier is of vast importance to the defence of the Empire, and is a question which is open to grave misunderstanding, and I would therefore beg to explain my views on this important subject. I should be the first to advocate full attention being given to the historical aspects of all ordinary questions, but there are affairs in which looking back too far is apt to obscure the vision, just as a glass with a long distance focus only blurs objects near at hand. I do not think that the Government of the present day need be troubled with a consideration of the history of the Sadozai Rulers of Kábul, and the Duráni Empire of Ahmad Shah, nor should too much weight be attached to racial and linguistic considerations which will be found to be very weak when opposed to self-interest. As a rule the tribal communities on our borders have lived in a state of anarchy, and the experience of the last twenty years has amply proved that all such tribes, Balúch, Brahúi and Afghán (the latter as numerous as the other two), when the test of self-interest was applied to them, have heartily and willingly surrendered their lawless life and joined the Government officers in maintaining the peace of their own proper country. This fact has been over and over proved, as, for example, by the settlements come to with the Marrís, Búgtis, and the Brahúis, as

well as with the Kákars, Lúnis, Músa Khel, Mándo Khel and other Pathán tribes, and last, but not least, with the Mahsúd Wazírís. To show how the tribes are mixed together in the Quetta valley we find the Kákars (whose country extends to the Gúmal Pass) of the same race and speaking the same language as the Patháns of Zhob. Kákar villages are found fifteen miles distant from the villages of the Brahúí tribes of Shahwánís who speak the Brahúí tongue only. The difference is even greater at Kandahár itself, where the people speak Persian, and are quite distinct from the ordinary Afgháns. It is evident that as former Empires in Afghanistan have passed away and with them the power of their sovereigns, the various tribes on their borders, whether Baluch or Pathán, have been left in a state of the completest independence. What we have to deal with is the kingdom of Kábul as held by the Amírs from Dost Muhammad downwards. However far the influence of their predecessors may have been extended beyond the present border and even into India itself they only succeeded to the inheritance of Kábul and Kandahár, including Herát and Afghán Turkistán. Our records show that the Afidís, Wazírís and other tribes located on our frontier claimed to be not less independent of the Amír than they were of the British Government. Ask a man of any of these tribes what countryman he is, and he will tell you proudly that he is a Pathán, never an Afghán. Enclosed by rugged mountains accessible only by narrow and easily defended passes only known to the inhabitants, the natural strength of their country for long gave them a confidence in their independence which was not to be wondered at. The Amír Sher Ali felt his inability to coerce them, and for long after this accession to the throne, he did his utmost to maintain an independent belt of tribes between himself and British India. The present Amír has, however, reversed this policy, notably by acknowledging our supremacy over the Kákar tribes, and also by doing his best to encourage us to ourselves maintain the peace along the British and Afghán frontiers. His letters to Azíd Khan of Khárán and the Chiefs of the Násírís are further clear indications of what his policy is. In this connection also may be read his letter to the Foreign Secretary about the Ghilzai rebels after they were defeated and sought refuge in the Kákar country. Clearly he perceived the necessity of not weakening his authority by attempting to extend it too far. He has kept constantly in view the necessity for concentrating and consolidating his force within limits in which he can hope to make his power an actual fact and not only a name. With regard to his north western frontier, he recognized the necessity of delimiting it with Russia. On his south-eastern frontier these semi-independent tribes are in their present state, in my opinion.



a source of permanent danger to the Indian Empire, and they ought not to and cannot be left uncontrolled. Surely we are within our rights if we recognize the necessity for maintaining the peace of the country up to the border recognized by the Amír as the country for which he is responsible. We will see further on in this paper that he himself called on us to define the extent of our responsibilities in regard to the Kákar frontier, and he could not, I believe, complain with the smallest show of justice if we insisted on the same policy being pursued throughout our north-western frontier.

"3 As regards the extension of British control over the frontier tribes not subject to the Amír, I would urge that the policy of conciliatory intervention has been forced upon us. It is an absolute military necessity that we should defend the Kábul, Gházni and Kandahár line in Afghanistan in case of war with Russia. Were this not the case I would be an advocate of masterly inactivity instead of conciliatory intervention, and I should consider it a mistake to make any attempt to include within our control the fringe of independent tribes which lie between ourselves and Afghanistan proper. All military experts, however, without exception, declare it to be necessary to secure Afghanistan from Russian aggression in British interests and for the defence of India. In view of the undoubted duty of defending this vast Empire, the greatest inheritance ever a nation had to defend, yielding at this present moment an income of 85 crores of rupees and embracing the welfare and prosperity of 250 millions of people, I maintain that we are bound by the views of the military experts, who hold that the passes at both ends and the country in which they lie must be held by our troops, so as to enable us in case of danger arising to occupy at once Gházni as easily as we could now occupy Kandahár. Kábul we might possibly entrust to the Afghán army, now fifty to sixty thousand strong. If we cannot come to some such understanding as this with the Afgháns, and if we cannot rely on their holding their own capital in their own and our interests in the event of invasion by their and our enemies, the value of the alliance is simply nil. It is evident that, as long as they were true and so long as we held Kandahár and Gházni, the invasion of Pesháwur and the Khaibar would be almost impossible. The policy which I advocate has given us Balúchistán, the position at Quetta and on the Khojak, in Zhob and on the line of the Gúmal. It is this policy which has gone so far to carry the tribes of this country with us, by creating a community of interests, and showing them that their cause is one with our own. It is this which has enabled us to carry public opinion with us throughout Balúchistán with the power and influence necessary to utilize the resources of the country in time of war. It

is this which has established in this Agency local self-government in a far higher degree than it exists in India. It is no mere theory. It has been tried in the balance and has not been found wanting. It is born of the calm confidence which arises from experience and leads to success. The Waziri, Mando Khel, Sheráni and other tribes do not in any great degree differ from the tribes of this Agency, and some do not differ at all. Where difference of race has existed, we have found human nature the same and amenable to like influences. We have made a commencement with the Waziris, and having placed our hands to the plough, let us avoid nerveless vacillation and maintain a firm continuity of action. Let us not think of turning back, but let us carry to a successful conclusion what has been begun. If we knit the frontier tribes into our Imperial system in time of peace and make their interests ours, they will certainly not oppose us in time of war, and as long as we are able and ready to hold our own, we can certainly depend upon their being on our side.

"4. I do not think that the improvement of our military position in the passes leading through the Suleimán range into Afghanistan and the extension of our railway to New Chaman should so wound the susceptibilities of the Amír as to induce him to think that the British Government is really aiming at the partition of Afghanistan. Even if our policy had not been so fully explained to Ab-dul-Rahmán himself at Kábul and Rawalpindi, the rendition of Kábul and Kandahár are patent facts, and it is impossible that the Amír and his people should not see for themselves that the British Government do not want to touch the independence of Afghanistan. One object of the evacuation of the country was to establish the authority of Abd-ul-Rahmán over his people and country, and the confidence in our intentions engendered by those measures in the past is not likely to be prejudiced by the policy which I am advocating. It would be valuing the influence of the Government of India with the Amír at a quite unduly low rate to suppose that satisfactory explanations could not be given to His Highness with respect to such acts as the extension of the Railway to Chaman—explanation such as would re-assure the Amír and banish any misgivings which may have come into his mind. I represented at the time it was contemplated that the advance to the present position at Chaman was inadvisable, but I am certainly of opinion that we should be altogether wrong to abandon our general policy with respect to Afghanistan, because an error was made with regard to Chaman, more specially if by doing so we risked in any degree the permanent defence of our Empire. I believe in the feasibility of so explaining our policy to the Amír that he would be able to see for himself that our action had not for its object the taking any

portion of his country from him, but that on the contrary it was directed to the maintenance of his independence by enabling us to march large armies with great rapidity into his country to places from which they could operate with the greatest advantage. I believe it is only in the very last resort that the present Amír would throw himself into the hands of Russia, and ask her assistance as Sher Ali did. The example and the misfortunes of his predecessor would serve to deter him, if nothing else did. In addition to this he has himself seen Russia advance, but he has never seen her recede as we have receded. I entirely disbelieve in the possibility of our policy of conciliatory intervention with respect to the frontier tribes endangering the friendliness of our relations with His Highness, if properly directed and clearly explained to him so as to set his mind at rest. To endeavour to conceal from the Amír, by specious explanations, the real object of our frontier policy would no doubt be a very difficult matter, but this is exactly the opposite of what we want to do. Seeing that our objects are the rendering of real assistance to the Amír, and the advancement of his true interests, it should not be a difficult undertaking to convince the Amír of our sincerity unless indeed His Highness is determined not to be convinced, and if this is so, the sooner we are aware of the fact the better it will be for our own interests.

"5. I must now turn to our dealings with the Waziris in particular. In dealing with the Waziris we should undoubtedly continue the policy which was begun long ago when Major Graham, Deputy Commissioner of Déra Ismail Khan, took twenty-five of them into our service. When approving in 1866 of the step which had been taken, the Secretary of State wrote to the Government of India that 'the pacification of border tribes by persevering in the exercise of humanizing influences is more likely to be permanent than their subjection by military force, and I always shall therefore receive with satisfaction such proposals as that now before me, recommended by your officers on the spot, which afford a reasonable prospect of rendering the people on the frontier line between our territories and Afghanistan peaceful and friendly neighbours.' What I have advocated is therefore no new departure. We have claimed ever since we have been on the frontier the right to settle the border tribes, and this policy is far more necessary now than it was in 1866. I do not think, with the opinion of military experts as it stands, it is too much to say that the defence of the Empire demands that the border tribes inhabiting the country between us and Afghanistan should be entirely under our influence and be subject to our control. In support of what I say as it affects the Waziris, I quote from Government of India, Foreign Department, letter No. 1951 F., dated 29th September, 1887, which runs:—'The

Government of India have not recognized the supremacy of the Amír of Afghanistan over any section of the Wazírís, and there need be no hesitation in dealing with the Zalli Khel direct. The Powindah tribes are also believed to be practically independent of the Amír, and it appears to the Governor-General in Council that any previous communication with His Highness might unnecessarily complicate the question.' It is plain therefore that we have right on our side and that a fear of exciting the susceptibilities of the Amír should not be allowed to trammel us in obtaining what may be under certain circumstances of vital importance to the defence of India. I do not believe that perseverance in a policy which has been observed since the annexation of the Punjab is at all likely to be misunderstood by the Amír and his people. On the contrary, if the Afghán Government can only be persuaded that reliance may be placed on us to maintain their rights, it is extremely improbable that they would regard us in a more friendly light if we neglected our own and their interests. At any rate in the policy which I propose there is no breach of faith with the Amír, and as long as this is the case, we cannot permit his susceptibilities to outweigh the considerations which urge on us steps of paramount importance in the defence of the Empire.

"6. As regards the Amír's own policy towards his people there can be no doubt he maintains his own position greatly by fear. It is a fact that no one can deny that many of the leading and most influential tribes and families—to put it plainly—simply hate him, and would join the faction of either Yakúb or Ayúb at any time, on the occurrence of the first opportunity. Without denying what is constantly asserted that there is much fanaticism in Afghanistan, it should be borne in mind that the whole country is not fanatical. Turkistán, Herát, Kandahár, and in fact the whole of southern Afghanistan is non-fanatical, while Kábul and Kohistán are fanatical, but the fact that a large portion of the country is not so should encourage us to rely in all our dealings with the Afgháns on the fairness and justness of our actions and not on any timid avoidance of what may possibly rouse the fanatical spirit. If we neglect our own just rights and carry too far our respect for the Amír's susceptibilities, we will be pursuing a very dangerous policy, and may lose for ourselves the respect of the majority of the people. In my opinion the Amír and his people both require just but firm treatment in our dealings with them. Anything like submission to unjustifiable demands would injure the position which we occupy in the Amír's estimation, and we should, by our timidity, not only forfeit his respect, but lose that of the whole country, including our own frontier people.

"7. As regards the Gúmal, I am of opinion that the political position

which we have gained in the Pass, should not be allowed to remain in its present state. As things now stand, if not improved, it will probably turn out to be a source of very real danger instead of advantage. We have as yet only established our influence over a small portion of the Waziris, and should now continue to extend it so as to embrace the whole tribe. This is necessary to enable us to secure the Tochi Pass, which is very important, as it is one of the main entrances into the Deraját. I would emphasize the necessity for a definite understanding with the Waziri tribe as a whole, for the reason that most important matters depend on the way in which this question is finally settled. By merely paying a subsidy to the Mahsúd Waziris, we shall never attain to influence over the whole tribe, and if we fail to obtain such influence they will be a great and standing danger to our scheme of frontier defence. At present the subsidy simply enables a few of the Mahsúd Maliks to arm themselves well, and pay a band of followers giving them an invidious and dangerous political status.

"8. I believe that the Amír's present attitude with regard to the Waziris is due, in no small degree, to a sense of injury caused by the advance made in the direction of Chaman—an advance which I at the time deprecated. I say so because I cannot reconcile his present attitude with the attitude which he has all along maintained with respect to the northern Kákar country. In his letters to the British Agent at Kábul and to his Agent in India, dated 8th November and 4th December, 1886, respectively, he stated that the leaders of the Ghilzai revolt had taken refuge at 'Kákar' or 'Murgha in Kákar territory.' He meant no doubt Wali Murgha, the river rising at or near Kákar Tirwa, in Kákar territory, and he called on the British Government to hand them over. On receiving an answer that the refugees were in the country north of Zhob, over which the British had no control, he replied (in a letter to the Foreign Secretary, dated 6th January, 1887), urging that the territory in our possession should be clearly defined, and its limits laid down, so that he might deal freely with the tribes outside our control and prevent his enemies from taking refuge beyond the limits of our influence.\* As a matter of fact, when the Amír asked for them to be given up, these refugees seem to have been at Tirwa, where they again took refuge after their defeat at Shiri Kotal in the autumn of 1887. A glance at our maps will show that

\* "The Amír's treatment of Mushki Álam's son plainly demonstrates how very little consideration he himself gives to religious feelings when it does not suit his purpose to recognize them. He placed this great Mulla and his family under a ban and did all in his power to destroy them.—R. G. SANDEMAN."

Tirwa is rather nearer to Ghazni than Wáno is, and much nearer to the Ghazni-Kandahár Road. Seeing then that His Highness at that time, and indeed consistently ever since, has acknowledged our supremacy in that and all other settlements of the Kákars, it seems inconsistent that his heart should be set on the exclusion of our influence from the Waziri hills. It would seem much more probable that his insistence on this point is intended as a set off to the injury he considers himself to have suffered on the side of Chaman, and that a firm but conciliatory attitude on our part would soon lead to a change in his tone.

"9. In all political matters I am in favour of waiting until a favourable opportunity occurs. I do not however think that any opportunity more favourable than the present is likely to occur. As opinion is almost unanimous that we must hold Kábul, Ghazni and Kandahár in case of necessity, it is clear that times of peace like the present furnish the very opportunity we require for preparing the roads which shall render the occupation of that line easy. We cannot wait until war has broken out or is imminent. What is possible now would be impossible then, and if we recognize the necessity and carry it into effect at the present time, we shall have leisure to consolidate our position before the strain of hostilities arises.

" R. G. SANDEMAN, *Col.*,  
 " *Chief Commr. and Agent to the*  
 " *Gouv.-Genl. in Balúchistán.*

" *Quetta, September 27, 1890.*"

## APPENDIX V.

## NOTE ON THE STATUS AND POSITION OF THE BALÚCHISTÁN AGENCY, AND ITS VALUE FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE (1891).

"IT will generally be admitted by all military and political officers, who are at all conversant with the position of affairs on the Punjab and Balúchistán frontiers, that the present seems a suitable time to consider the status and position of the Balúchistán Agency and its value to the defence of the Empire, as a base of operations for an army in the field in the event of war. I think, too, that in the interests of all concerned the present affords a suitable opportunity for a consideration of the entire military and political situation as it now exists on the Balúchistán, Sind, and Deraját frontiers of the Punjab. I propose to consider the three together :—

"I would here call attention to the map :—

"Within the limits of the Balúchistán Agency will be found the countries of Khárán, Kej-Mekrán, Panjgúr, Lus Beyla, Khelát (including Nushki and Chágeh), Zhob and its dependencies, up to and including the entire country running parallel with Persia and Afghanistán from the sea at Gwádar to the Gúmal Pass.

"We find, then, that Balúchistán has a frontier which commences at the sea about twenty miles inland from Gwádar. It runs along the Perso-Balúch frontier to the villages of Kuhak and Jalak, joins the frontiers of Khárán at the Mashkkel river, and touches some point near to the village of Hassanábád in Persian Seistán, a distance of not more than 300 miles from Herát.

"The frontiers of Khárán at once take us up to the Halmand river and the prolific country of Garneser. We then come to Chágeh and Nushki, where the Niábat of the Khan of Khelát is reached.

"From Nushki the boundary runs along the Afghanistán frontier to new Chaman, thence to the frontier of Zhob at Hindú-bágh, and thence to the Gúmal Pass and some way beyond it. This is the only point

of uncertainty, and is worthy of the notice of the Government of India.

"I can see nothing to be gained by any one concerned by our leaving any part of the Zhob frontier undefined. I can emphatically assert that the A mír does not desire it and never has done so. As it stands it is a weakness to the frontier defence, as it leaves a large tract of country unoccupied that might be usefully obtained for settling the tribes and establishing there a large military post. This, moreover, seems to me a shirking of our responsibilities, always undesirable, but especially in a poor country. Undoubtedly it ought to become a source of livelihood to many a family of the tribe if it were, as it ought to be, within our protection, as it legitimately belongs to us. The Waziris have no claim to it. It belongs to the Mandokhels and is British by inheritance.

"I beg again to take the reader to the port of Gwádar at a point on the sea-coast just below it. The sea-coast boundary of Balúchistán commences there. It runs along to the harbours of Pasni, Kalamat, and Ormara in Lus Beyla, then on to Sunmiáni, also in Lus Beyla, where it ends at the Hab river, sixteen miles from Karáchi.

"The land frontier then again begins and carries us along the whole of Sind (Upper and Lower) to Kasmúr. At Kasmúr the Punjab frontier begins, and it ends in the Déra Ismáel Khan district at the Gúmal Pass.

"All the hill tribes bordering on Sind are within the Balúchistán Agency, and most of those residing along the Punjab frontier. I have contested the wisdom of allowing any of the hill-tribes to remain under the Punjab.

"Most of the principal routes to Afghanistán from the Punjab and Sind either pass through the Balúchistán Agency or are protected by it.

"There is the great Gúmal route from the Deraját to Ghazni in Kandahár. Although the Ghazni route has not been made over to the protection of this Agency authority, still geographically and by the rights of the tribesmen it passes through Zhob and is protected by our occupation.

"The Kandahár and Khelát-i-Ghilzai routes pass through Zhob.

"Then there is the Bolán route *viâ* the Khojak Pass.

"There are also the important routes from the sea *viâ* Lus Beyla and Panjgúr to Seistán and the Halmand.

"We, in fact, dominate the entire route from the sea to within 300 miles of Herát. In short, if we accept our responsibility of guarding Afghanistán, as a portion of British India, and have ever to occupy the Kábul-Kandahár line with this object, all the important routes to



it, by which our armies would have to pass to reach it, must march through Balúchistán to their objective point.

"I believe most military critics consider that Herát is too far off to enable us to succour it. Be that as it may, we hold in our grasp an alternative line through a friendly country, which the line to Panjgúr and the countries of Persian and Afghán Seistán is. Such a line would, I apprehend, be of the greatest value to our armies operating in Afghanistán. It commands most important routes to the Halmund, as also the routes into southern Persia, Bampur, Kirmán, etc.

"In making these remarks my avowed object is to bring to the notice of the Government of India as emphatically as I can the great value the country of Balúchistán under the administration of the Agent to the Governor-General has become to the defence of the British Empire in India.

"R. G. SANDEMAN."

## APPENDIX VI.

NOTE REGARDING RAILWAY EXTENSION IN BALÚCH-  
ISTÁN, MORE ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO LUS  
BEYLA, THE PROVINCE OF KEJ-MAKRÁN AND  
PANJGÚR (1891).

[This Note was written during Sir Robert's last visit to England,—immediately after his eventful march through Panjgúr and Makrán. It was, probably, the last memorandum of importance recorded by him.]

“ DURING my late expeditions to Zhob, the Gúmal Pass, Kej-Mekrán and Panjgúr, the very important question of railway extension in Balúchistán has engaged my anxious attention. Letters received by last mail from Quetta inform me that this matter is again under the consideration of the Government of India. I therefore think it right to record my own views on the subject, in order that any light which I can throw on the matter through my local knowledge of it may not be wanting, before final orders regarding it are issued. After mature consideration, I am earnestly of opinion that the extension of the north-west railway from Karáchi to Lus Beyla and Panjgúr is an urgent Imperial necessity. I am quite aware that, owing to financial pressure, due to the state of exchange and other causes, the question of funds for the purpose is an extremely difficult one to arrange. But there is this to be said regarding the extension of the railway to Panjgúr and Lus Beyla (which does not apply elsewhere in Balúchistán), that the cost, owing to the circumstances of the country being open and easy, would be trifling in comparison with the taking of the railway to Zhob, or the reconstruction of the wrecked Holán line.

“ In considering then the matter of railway extension to Panjgúr and Kej-Mekrán *viz* Lus Beyla, two problems would seem to be before the Government of India : 1st, the extremely difficult one of providing funds.

“ 2nd, the extension of the Sind Railway from Karáchi to Panjgúr and Lus Beyla in such a way as not to have even the appearance of a challenge to Russiá, and not to afford her in any degree cause for increased activity.

“ I trust to be able to demonstrate before closing this paper, that

if the small sum—comparatively speaking—required is provided, the return in results of Imperial consequence will be so great as to justify the expenditure; while the extension of the line to the places named might be set about in the most natural manner possible, without causing the smallest surprise in the mind of the public, or creating anxiety as to our object in the Government of Russia, who has now—taking into consideration her relations with Persia—become our near neighbour in that direction.

“A sketch-map accompanies this note, which if here referred to will show the country in the direction of southern Persia which I desire to open out and develop, by extending the Sind Railway from Karáchi to Lus Beyla, and ultimately to Panjgúr, where we have only recently established our authority. The map shows the strategical value of the move, which is great. Lus Beyla and Kej-Mekrán are very important countries, and have large undeveloped resources. The former has considerable forests, or rather tracts of jungle, which, if carefully looked after, would supply wood in abundance. Were Lus Beyla connected by railway with Karáchi, flank defence would at once be given to Sind and south-western Balúchistán, which are at present entirely without it. Were the line taken to Panjgúr, the whole of that part of Balúchistán would practically be capable of defence, which it is not at present. Moreover, in the event of a war breaking out, it would give our Government enormous defensive advantages. This view of the matter is held by Sir George Chesney and by other eminent military men.

“But it is not merely in our own interests that this railway line is most necessary and desirable. It is required for the proper defence of the country itself, in order to enable our Government to discharge its treaty engagements towards the Khan of Khelát and his sirdars, including the territories of Lus Beyla and Khárán.

“I will here consider what these treaty engagements amount to, as they are very important, and have the confirmation of Her Majesty's Government, who together with the Government of India are directly responsible for them. The Government of Lord Lytton in 1876, acting upon instructions from Her Majesty's Secretary of State, renewed and re-established the treaty with Khelát. The history of this treaty is as follows:—

“For twenty years (previous to 1876) civil war between the Khan of Khelát's Government and the confederacy of Balúch and Brahúi chiefs had caused wide-spread devastation throughout the length and breadth of Balúchistán. So serious had the state of affairs become, that at length, on the 8th July, 1875, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India addressed a despatch to the Right Honourable the Governor-

General of India in Council, pointing out the urgency of settling once for all the distracted state of affairs in Balúchistán. This despatch (No. 198) directed the Government of India to place British relations with the Khan of Khelát on the friendly footing provided for by the treaty of 1854, and—to use the words of the despatch itself—thereby to ‘re-establish a position of affairs desirable in the interests of the British Government, and essential to the continued existence of Khelát as an independent State.’ The despatch further impressed on the Government of India the necessity for ‘unity of policy in the government of this most important frontier.’

“These instructions from Her Majesty’s Secretary of State were carried out, and have had the most important results, the objects aimed at having been achieved. The whole of Balúchistán now enjoys profound peace, from the frontier of Persia to the Gúmal Pass.

“As the officer directly responsible for the continued maintenance of the treaty re-established by order of Her Majesty’s Government in 1876, I feel that the extension of the Karáchi line to Lus Beyla, and ultimately to Panjgúr, is daily becoming a question that, considering the grave issues at stake, ought not to be any longer delayed, in the interests of the Indian Empire and in those of the States of Khelát, Lus Beyla, and Khárán, and of the province of Kej-Mekrán and Panjgúr.

“Feeling this necessity very strongly while in Lus Beyla and Panjgúr, I addressed, in January last, a letter, in which my views were recorded, to the then military member of the Government of India, Sir George Chesney. As already stated, I found that he held the same views as myself on this subject, and he assured me, in a letter now in my possession, that he was ‘entirely in accord’ with me. I am thus enabled to state, that military as well as political interests render this work one of the very first importance, and one demanding the serious consideration of the Government of India and of Her Majesty’s Secretary of State.

“General Chapman, Head of the Military Intelligence Department in England, wrote before leaving India (on the 22nd January, 1889) to the present Indian Foreign Secretary on the subject of the financial position of Balúchistán, and of the railways generally. He said if a change of plan was not adopted, and if the railways in Balúchistán were starved at the outset, that in the event of war this would greatly detract from their usefulness. Are we not then, by not taking the railway line to Lus Beyla and Panjgúr from Karáchi, heedlessly casting away the use that our railways ought to be for the defence of India?

“The countries concerned have been hitherto considered as deserts. My late expeditions have proved to the contrary, and show

that large bodies of soldiers can move easily in them. Last cold weather, when I was encamped with my escort at Panjgúr, accompanied by the Jám of Lus Beyla, the Prince Governor of Kirmán was at no great distance from my camp, escorted by a Persian army. The Persian Government, as recent events prove, are securing their frontiers in this direction. The Russian Government are also establishing their railway communication with energy and vigour. We alone would seem to be neglecting such measures as are essentially needful to the security of our frontier. The carrying of our railway system to the Persian frontiers at Panjgúr is undoubtedly one of these. As things now stand, how are we, in the event of a war, to fulfil our treaty engagements with the Khan of Khelát, the Jám of Lus Beyla, and the Brahúi confederation of chiefs?

"We show, I venture to think, by neglecting our opportunities of establishing our power over Balúchistán on a sure and strong foundation, by the aid of railways, a want of wisdom and a great neglect of the important duties which we have of our own accord undertaken. We have bound ourselves to protect the dominions of the Khan of Khelát and his chiefs from aggression; but I do not think that any military man, acquainted with the situation, would venture to say that at the present moment our precautions are of such a nature as to prevent a sudden onslaught being made upon Mekrán and Panjgúr by a possible enemy. I do not ask for a very large expenditure of the public funds; but I think that the survey of a line of railway from Karáchi along the coast of the Persian Gulf should be undertaken at once. Upon its completion, the line from Karáchi should then, if possible, be taken to Lus Beyla. Its extension to Panjgúr could follow.

"Our treaty engagements, and the opinion of military experts as to the defenceless state of Balúchistán in the direction of south-western Persia, seem to me to render this step an Imperial necessity. Owing to the smallness, comparatively speaking, of the sum required, the financial position of the Government of India could hardly be weakened by it; whilst as we should only be doing what Russia is herself engaged in, it could in no way be considered as a challenge to her. Russia is consolidating her railway system within her re-organized frontier, in Bokhara and elsewhere, she could not therefore reasonably complain of our doing the same by taking the Sind Railway to Panjgúr, Kej-Mekrán, and Lus Beyla, for the peace and prosperity of which countries the Government of Her Majesty the Queen is by treaty responsible.

"R. G.<sup>a</sup> SANDEMAN, Colonel.

"Ardmore, 2nd September, 1891."

## APPENDIX VII.

## A STATEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE IRISH FISHERIES.

[This paper was written by Sir Robert during a short visit home in the summer of 1889. His health had suffered from exposure and a severe accident, and his mind, which was full, as usual, of grand ideas about the frontier, sorely needed rest. But instead of taking rest he took up, with characteristic ardour, the question of the Irish Fisheries, and submitted the following statement to the Irish Government. The recommendations were not adopted, but the warm interest shown by Sir Robert in the subject secured for him the hearty affection of the Irish fishermen.]

"THE recent Report on the Irish Fisheries has shown how enormously they have of late years declined in value. It is stated that thirty years ago or so these Fisheries employed 110,000 hands, men and boys, and something like 30,000 smacks and vessels were engaged in prosecuting the fishing trade. The recent official returns, however, show that those competent to judge estimate the total number of persons now occupied in it at little over 21,007 men and 798 boys, and that the vessels employed have declined in proportion.

"Regarding this, the *Morning Post*, in a recent article, says :—' It is unfortunate that the Celtic residents of the Western and Southern parts of Ireland especially have still so little enterprise in them that they do not even care to take the trouble to cure the herrings they catch for their own use, and thus make the best of the big catches they often make. It is scarcely credible, but is nevertheless a fact, that they prefer to import all the cured herrings they require for their own consumption, though they actually send a large proportion of what they take to the Scotch markets, where the curing is done. It is not at all unlikely, in fact, that they get their own fish back when smoked, after having paid the double carriage on them which the journey backwards and forwards entails. It is strange, too, that Irish fishermen never think of even attempting to net the enormous shoals of

pilchards that visit the Irish coasts year after year. The Cornish men grumble because the pilchards will not come into the bays, within reach of their Seine nets, while the Irish fisher sees them come and go, and never dreams of trying to net the wealth that Nature sends within his reach.'

"These facts are true, but the inference is scarcely just. It is *ignorance* of the proper method of curing, rather than *indolence*, that makes the Irish fisher import his cured herrings from the Scotch markets, to which he has probably sent them as fresh fish. Fish-curing Stations at points along the coast would be of as much benefit as fishing vessels, and keep money in the country that is at present paid to the English and Scotch curers, besides saving the double freight. The reason pilchards are not sought for is that there is no sale for them in any market as fresh fish, and the methods of curing them are not understood. Besides the importation of cured herrings from England and Scotland, there are hundreds, if not thousands, of tons of dried cod and ling imported annually from Newfoundland and the Orkney Isles into Ireland; steamers of 500 or 600 tons trading with them at Cork alone.

"From these remarks may be gathered the importance, if the Irish Fishery System is to be improved, of establishing fish-curing stations at suitable points on the coast, furnished with properly qualified persons to set them going, and to act as instructors to the residents.

"It does not appear from the Inspector's report, that there is anything to complain of as regards the quantity of fish that yearly visit the coast of Ireland, and are available for capture. These are as numerous as ever they were; it is the system, or rather the want of system, that prevents the sea fishing from benefiting even the small number of fishermen employed in it.

"The Irish employed in fishing are not, like the English and Scotch, purely and simply fishermen. Almost universally, they cultivate land as well, and hardly ever give their undivided attention to fishing alone. I believe that it is partly the dual nature of their occupation that has made the Irishmen resident along the coast fail as fishermen, and if inquiry was made of them, they, themselves, would probably admit the fact.

"Moreover, owing to the high rates charged on the carriage of the fish to the best markets the fishers cannot dispose of them, to any great extent, at a reasonable and remunerative profit. In short, it has been found that sea-fishing is not financially a success to those employed in it, and this doubtless accounts for its yearly decline, and for the fishermen adding to it the cultivation of land along the coast.

"With reference to this the Report says:—'The high rates

complained of with regard to the carriage of fish by rail are quite disproportionate to those for other commodities.' One reason for this is, that all, or nearly all, fresh fish goes by mail or special trains, and consequently a higher rate in proportion is charged. Yet surely a reduced rate, even by fast trains, should be effected, seeing the immense importance to the public of an abundant fish supply, and the detriment to the railways themselves should it fail or diminish?

"The Report continues—'There is, however, a still further drawback in the want of railway accommodation, even to some of our most important fishing ports. Kinsale and Bantry have their Termini at such inaccessible places that the inconveniences of transit are very considerable. The Cork, Bandon, and South Coast Railway which brings a large quantity of fish from Kinsale, Bantry, and Skibbereen, has its Cork Terminus so inconveniently situated that the haulage across the city adds considerably to the cost and deterioration of the fish. At Baltimore, one of the most important fishing places on the coast, the railway is over eight miles distant from Skibbereen, to which it might be connected at a moderate cost. and with great advantage.'

"These remarks apply with equal force to railway accommodation in the north-east and west districts, and in addition I would point out that besides the frequent lack of connection here complained of it is the multiplicity of lines which goods have to travel over which make the charges so heavy. Each small line has its own staff to support, who could easily work a railway many times as large. *Amalgamation*, therefore, as well as *connection*, is much to be desired.

"The Inspectors proceed to observe :—'At first extensions of the railway system might not prove remunerative, but it is a question whether it would not be of vast importance to the State to develop, at the public expense, this industry in Ireland. There is little doubt that, should facilities for transit of fish be afforded, a trade would spring up at important centres which would not only benefit the fishermen themselves, but the entire district, and be the means of removing much of the distress prevailing, particularly on the west coast.'

"It is clear, in fact, from what the Inspectors say in regard to the Irish railways, that with the disjointed railway system now existing it is next to impossible to convey the produce of Irish fisheries to the various markets where they may be sold so as to ensure a proper remunerative profit. Until other and better arrangements are made Irish fish cannot, however plentiful the harvest of them may be, compete with other fresh fish in English and Scotch markets.

"Owing to these various depressing causes, and to the emigration



of the best and most experienced of the Irish fishermen, it is hopeless to expect the Irish fishing industry to revive without a helping hand ; in other words, without the direct aid of Government.

"I would recommend that in addition to the extension of railway lines proposed by the Inspectors, the rate of hire of fish from any given part of the coast to the principal markets should be taken up. I would endeavour to come to terms with the Railway Companies, arranging through rates throughout. If reasonable terms could not be arranged, I would inquire if Government could not, of its own action, open up a market for the fish, by means of strongly-built steamers suitable for the purpose of conveying fish to the nearest towns on the English coast. The principal buyers at Kinsale, etc., have such steamers all the season attending the fishing-fleet, and these steamers follow the boats from port to port, and take the fish, usually to Milford Haven.

"Were this system more fully developed, together with reduced rates of railway carriage, improved means of communication, and especially the fish-curing establishments before alluded to, much might be done to restore the declining Irish fisheries, and to alleviate distress in Ireland.

"The question of the development and improvement of the Irish fisheries is one of the deepest interest and importance. Their increase and prosperity would prove not only to Ireland an incalculable benefit, but to the British public generally an immense advantage, by increasing the fish supply, regarded both as an article of trade and of consumption.

"The question is no new one with me. For years I have given it my serious consideration, and two years ago I appeared in person before the Royal Commission, and gave evidence regarding the condition of the fisheries on the south-east coast. What the linen trade is to the north of Ireland, the fishing-trade, properly developed, might become to the southern portion of the island—*i.e.* a source of national wealth and prosperity. But for this Government aid is urgently required. Private enterprise, so conspicuous in the North, is lacking elsewhere in Ireland, and private funds are not, and cannot be, forthcoming. The deep poverty of the country calls for Government assistance ; and in help given to the fishermen in collecting the rich harvest of the deep lies one path to the peace and prosperity of Ireland.

"R. G. SANDEMAN, *Colonel.*

"*Ardmore, 5th September, 1889.*"

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